In this edited volume, contributors aim to answer commonly overlooked questions of how, when, and why organized militaries chose to defect from or defend leaders in the events of regime threatening civil unrest during the “Arab Spring” uprisings beginning in 2011. The book has three sections. First, a section on military priorities within the Middle East and North Africa, and a comparison with civil-military-security force relations of different global regions. Second, the authors propose a theoretical decision model in which to understand the choices made by militaries in states such as Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria. According to this model, a military's decision to support or reject the regime is based on two considerations: 1) if defection is possible, given an evaluation of the military's autonomy, and 2) how the cohesive structure of the military would be affected. The final section outlines the trajectory and nature of the civil-military power balance in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya. In concluding remarks, the authors warn of a rise in military activism in the Arab Gulf states fueled by the foreign-subsidized expansion of domestic defense programs and state reliance on military elites.
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