Taiwan enjoys formal relations with just 11 member states of the United Nations plus the Holy See and is excluded from most major international organizations. Thus, it is a fertile case-study for exploring how being part of an international environment that refuses to recognize one's existence as a sovereign state challenges security, foreign policy and diplomacy. Equally fascinating is how Taiwan competes with the People's Republic of China for diplomatic allies as well as the reasons for, and consequences of, governments across the world deciding to switch their relationship from one to the other.

This new volume of essays, the latest in the Routledge Research on Taiwan Series, is a valuable and welcome analysis of what happens when allies transfer diplomatic recognition primarily from Taiwan to China. (The blurb promises “and vice versa” but the switch of recognition from China to Taiwan is inadequately addressed.) The book also considers the impact on the economies and societies of the target countries and asks whether the promised benefits of changing recognition actually materialize.

In addition to an introduction and conclusion by the editor, Chien-Huei Wu, the book consists of eight chapters. Some of these provide context (“The threat of China's economic coercion”; “The perils of Chinese foreign aid”; “Foreign investment by Taiwan's high-tech sector and its impact”) while others discuss specific geographic areas: Latin America and the Caribbean; Africa; Oceania; and Central and Eastern Europe.

As one might expect from a book focused primarily on economics, each chapter is based on exhaustive empirical research and provides abundant evidence and data to support the arguments put forward. However, statistics-heavy chapters and data-laden appendices may mean the book is more attractive to readers comfortable with economics and the econometric method that informs the analysis and could exclude those less familiar with generating and interpreting quantitative measures of trade, investment and aid. That said, readers outside economics or political economy should be patient, for the excellent analyses and discussions of the evidence are rewarding and provide insights absent from other volumes.

The book's conclusions are compelling: in summary, the chapters find that the economic benefits of switching diplomatic recognition do not materialize on the scale the government in Beijing promises. Rather, the research reveals spiralling debt traps, trade deficits, greater dependence on China, and further economic coercion. Moreover, the absence of accountability in promises of “unconditional” aid can contribute to a deterioration of liberal cultures and democratic backsliding. Chien-Huei Wu notes in his concluding chapter that “Chinese aid results in detrimental political and social consequences in recipient countries” (p. 221). Unconditional aid reinforces China's commitment to “non-interference,” though as we know too well from the rise of “wolf warrior diplomacy” and so-called “sharp power,” this too is mere rhetoric. Moreover, China has not experienced any significant economic benefit, though the satisfaction of prising yet another ally away from Taiwan may be benefit enough (which is why approaching diplomacy via the econometric method progresses our understanding only so far).

The volume's undercurrents are clear: given that it appears in a series on Taiwan studies – a series that has accomplished so much in bringing Taiwan to the attention of the wider academic community – it is not surprising that the contributors adopt a critical position towards China. This is evident in the blurb for the book which declares the volume investigates “how China achieves its foreign policy objective of dissuading Taiwan's diplomatic partners and other third parties from engaging with Taiwan.” Moreover, words such as “threat,” “coercion,” and “perils” in chapter titles (the subtitle of the concluding chapter is “China's promise fails”) are clear indicators that the chapters do not provide a wholly objective analysis. Including more analysis of the process and consequences of switching recognition from China to Taiwan would help balance the argument. For example, perhaps Nauru – which recognized China in 2002, Taiwan in 2005, then China again in 2024 – is worth more than a mere mention on just two pages of the volume. What are the impacts of such repeated switching on the three countries? This may be one of those case studies where dependence on the econometric method is inadequate, for economics is only part of the story.

Despite my reservations, Switching Diplomatic Recognition Between Taiwan and China is a valuable addition to the field. While the data, tables and use of the econometric method may be unnerving for postgraduate students and scholars more used to approaching diplomacy and foreign policy from the perspective of qualitative research, the discussion is nevertheless accessible. The volume is a fascinating read, and while the contributors are predisposed to be more favourable to Taiwan than China, the clarity of the argument and the extent of evidence presented is bound to provoke debate in the classroom.