Andrew Steadman provides an imaginative and thoroughly researched examination of Neville Chamberlain and appeasement, a subject always of interest to historians and civilians of any ilk. Skating to the edge of “what if” or counterfactual history, he produces a thoughtful and provocative contribution to the discussion of the British policy in the 1930s. The study is methodically structured to identify and analyze the origins and authors of the alternatives to appeasement, why and when the alternatives arose, the nature and viability of the alternatives, and how the alternatives were received by the policy makers and politicians and to assess Chamberlain’s consideration of alternatives and his rejection of them. Through this analytical regime Steadman subjects the alternatives: isolationism and pacifism, advanced economic and colonial appeasement, the League of Nations and collective security, alliances, massive rearmament, the threat of war, and actual war. An application of the orthodox, revisionist, and postrevisionist claims is layered over this. However, as Steadman concedes, his study is fundamentally “whether or not Chamberlain could have done anything else that would have led to a better outcome” (viii).

While enthusiasts in 1938 and 1939 called for British isolationism in the face of the Czech and Prague crises, the British had already followed such a policy throughout the 1930s—with the Manchurian, Abyssinian, Spanish, and the Rhineland emergencies—producing no significant change in German behavior. Taking isolationism, a discredited antique from the pre-1914 era, into the late 1930s, as Steadman suggests, would have emboldened Berlin and forfeited the sympathy of Washington. Perhaps the most compelling segment is Steadman’s examination of economic and colonial appeasement, sentiment for which was found among both prominent Tories and opposition Labour. Rather than pursue a universal or global policy of economic appeasement, Chamberlain actually sought to target and satisfy specific German economic complaints but eventually withdrew even this approach. It is rather doubtful whether the encouragement of closer economic cooperation between London and Berlin would have satisfied Hitler’s military appetite or whether the return of the Cameroons would have extinguished Nazi militarism.

There was a substantial division concerning the League of Nations, which had “already existed as an alternative to appeasement” (83). Although the League’s authority and potential utility had been extinguished with the Abyssinian and Rhineland crises, Churchill and Macmillan remained its great defenders, at least in the abstract. Amery and Duff Cooper dismissed it as a rotting diplomatic corpse. Eden and Attlee, initially pro-League advocates, eventually modified their perspectives with the passage of time. Duff Cooper, Amery, Vansittart, and others argued for alliances, which Churchill also considered a missed opportunity. There has been a long, occasionally acrimonious, debate among orthodox, revisionist, and postrevisionist scholars over the possibility and potentiality of an aggressive alliance policy. Churchill sought a grand alliance, while Macmillan pushed for a London-Paris-Madrid block, and Viscount Wolmer imagined Danubian and Scandinavian possibilities. Perhaps Chamberlain was vulnerable to the missed opportunity charge. He sought Italy when it was too late; he and his party could not overcome twenty years of hostility toward the Bolsheviks; he suffered from an ingrained mistrust of France (which was mutual), and he was convinced the Americans “never can deliver the goods” and thus did not warrant the effort (140). Clearly, his arrogance got the better of him and may have cost his country immeasurably.

Steadman continues the ongoing defense of Chamberlain from the charge that he failed to rearm and left Britain defenseless, a charge begun by Cato’s Guilty Men (1940) and Churchill’s Gathering Storm (1948). He and his fellow travelers argue that even though Chamberlain’s “cautious stewardship of the nation’s finances” gave Britain the financial stability and capacity to withstand a lengthy conflict, the prime minister was actually responsible for a major rearmament program, the most expansive since 1914–18 (165). The orthodox critics, however, refuse to accept that Chamberlain won the Battle of Britain by producing Spitfires and Hurricanes, rather than bombers. The problem is that critics and defenders of Chamberlain’s appeasement shift the goalposts, depending on the alternative under consideration. If the purpose of appeasement was to prevent war, then the rearmament program failed. If it was to survive the war, then yes, but a yes that is wrapped with immense historical complexities. While Eden, Macmillan, Vansittart, Churchill, and others wanted the government to draw a serious line in the sand (as a threat of war), a few others, including Duff Cooper, advocated going to war in order to stop German aggression. Consensus is illusive. Chamberlain’s air minister declared, “thank God for Munich,” since it gave Britain time to prepare, and the postrevisionists denounce Chamberlain for having “lost the war for Europe” at Munich (201). Yet, Chamberlain did not want to take any action that could provoke Hitler and push Europe irretrievably over the edge, and, therefore, he only accepted war as a policy when Berlin forced his hand in September 1939.

It is suggested that Chamberlain subjected the various alternatives to a legitimate assessment and universally found each to be wanting, occasionally under conditions that are not always satisfying. Steadman also reminds us of the complexity of the time, the conditions under which programs were adopted and policies pursued, and the psychology and emotions that churned beneath British opinion. Would Britons really have joined a Churchillian “war for the Sudetenland” (229)? There are the obvious uncertainties that may have resulted had Chamberlain adopted one of the alternatives. Would Hitler have really altered his ambitions? Would France, the Soviet Union, or the Americans have changed their attitudes or policies had Chamberlain embraced one of the alternatives? Steadman’s exploration of the origins, maturation, and advocacy of the various alternatives is worth the price of admission. It is striking how certain antiappeasers are found all over the map and often in inconsistent or contradictory locations. While there are a significant number of issues the revisionists and postrevisionists will treat to considerable argument, Steadman has nevertheless provided an intriguing essay on Chamberlain and appeasement but an even more thoughtful essay on the strengths and weaknesses of the ideas of the antiappeasers.