Little more than a half-decade ago, the global economy seemed to be teetering on the edge of a precipice. The bursting of the U.S. housing bubble in 2007 had by late 2008 led to the world’s darkest financial crisis since the 1930s. The threat of another Great Depression loomed. Panic was in the air.
Happily, disaster was avoided. After a relatively brief, albeit deep, decline—what is now conventionally referred to as the Great Recession—output slowly recovered and a modicum of growth resumed. The pain for many was palpable: People lost their homes, their jobs, their savings; entire nations were condemned to years of stagnation. But at least it could be said that economic stability was restored. The global economy did not fall off a cliff.
Looking back, two questions naturally suggest themselves. First, how do we rate the experience we have all lived through? Should we regard it as a success because it could have been worse? Or was it a failure because it could have been better? And second, how do we rate our governing institutions? What role did policymakers play, and was their contribution positive or negative? If there is a conventional wisdom on these two questions, it is that (a) the performance of the world economy has been disappointing, and (b) that policymakers have done little to improve matters.
In the interest of full disclosure, I should confess that I happen to agree with the conventional wisdom. Daniel Drezner, however, does not. A leading scholar of international political economy (IPE), Drezner has established a reputation an iconoclast, prepared—even eager—to challenge popular opinion. In The System Worked, the title tells it all. The conventional wisdom, he contends, is simply wrong. His focus is on global economic governance, which he defines as “the set of formal or informal rules that regulate the global economy and the collection of authority relationships that promulgate, coordinate, monitor, or enforce said rules” (p. 2). In his view, “global economic governance responded in a nimble and robust fashion in 2008 … global governance structures either reinforced or improved upon the pre-crisis status quo. The global economy bounced back … and growth resumed more quickly than was expected… International institutions and frameworks performed better than expected. Simply put, the system worked” (pp. 14–15).
The essentials of Drezner’s argument are laid out in Chapter 1, followed by a review of actual experience since 2008 (Chapter 2) and an analysis of why, in his view, there is so much misperception in the conventional wisdom (Chapter 3). For him, the system’s putative success can be attributed to the influence of three key attributes, each of which receives a chapter of its own—interests (Chapter 4), power (Chapter 5), and ideas (Chapter 6). A final chapter speculates on where we go from here, with a concluding peroration defending “optimistic prognosticators” like himself. “After looking at the evidence,” Drezner insists, “it is clear that the distribution of material interests, state power, and economic ideas combined to make the system work. Going forward, a healthy dollop of optimism is in order” (p. 191).
There is no question that this is an important book by a notable public intellectual. The text is well informed and thoughtful, the style is lucid, and Drezner makes the best possible case for his maverick point of view. The IPE field could use more iconoclasts like him, to keep the rest of us honest; and his forceful argument here compels us to question our own casual assumptions. His is a voice that bears listening to. But is he right? About that we are entitled to more than a small dose of skepticism.
Begin with the first question: the performance of the world economy. Drezner readily admits that on any absolute scale, outcomes have been less than might have been hoped. Economic growth around the world has been mostly dismal, stuck well below pre-crisis highs, and many countries remain mired in the doldrums. The experience has been disappointing. But as Drezner rightly points out, all this requires a counterfactual: compared to what? If we have in mind some ideal of healthy and sustained recovery, disappointment would indeed seem warranted. But that is not Drezner’s standard. “The proper baseline for comparison,” he says, “is the last severe global financial crisis—the Great Depression. By any metric the global economy rebounded much more robustly post-2008 than it did during the Great Depression” (p. 31). Here Drezner sets the bar for success very low. For most people, an outcome only slightly better than the 1930s is not a system that “works.”
Notably, Drezner also works in a second metric: expectations. Repeatedly, as in the quotes above, he uses the locution better than expected. “The liberal economic order proved to be more robust than expected,” he declares at the end of Chapter 2 (p. 56). But that is an awfully subjective kind of reasoning, begging the question: whose expectations? Implicitly, he seems to have in mind only the gloomiest of elite opinion makers—those who really did believe that another Great Depression was nigh. This is a different standard, but it presents the same low bar.
The second question is handled similarly. Drezner acknowledges that the policies hastily enacted to combat the crisis were anything but optimal. By that measure, our governing institutions might be expected to deserve a failing grade. But that, he asserts, is an “absurd standard to apply. ... The question is not whether global governance has been flawless but whether it has been good enough” (p. 15). In effect, therefore, any minimal amount of achievement should be regarded a success. On this view, a grade of D is as good as an A. They all “work.”
In fact, a realistic grade would be closer to D than A. Yes, as Drezner demonstrates, powerful interests went to work to maintain the openness of the trading system. Yes, the United States turned out to have the power to exercise a degree of leadership. And yes, there was no serious challenge to prevailing neoliberal norms. But on balance, protectionist measures did proliferate, mainly in the form of “behind-the-border” nontariff barriers. Many governments, most notably the authorities in Berlin, stubbornly resisted American calls for greater stimulus. And some less market-friendly ideas did begin to gain legitimacy, such as a newfound respect for capital controls. If the system “worked,” it did so barely enough to pass. It seems almost unseemly to boast about what is at best a gentleman’s C.
For students of IPE, the greatest value of this book lies in the practical application of familiar conceptual paradigms relating to the structural domestic, and cognitive levels of analysis. The discussion throughout is theoretically informed and thoroughly up to date. Drezner is a master at bridging the worlds of scholarship and public policy. But that does not mean that he is always right. In this case I think he is not; however, his book offers a provocative take on a topic of great importance, and I recommend that scholars read the book and judge for themselves.
