Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 March 2005
At its root meaning a “crisis” is a separation. In our everyday lives we use the term crisis to designate a period of decision. A crisis is a moment of separation when one must make a decision about a direction. To make a crisis decision, a person needs some criteria or set of norms to guide the decisions that are made. Sometimes, at a moment of crisis decisionmaking, there is chaos when one does not know which norm to use in making a decision. Without some norm a crisis is a significant loss of direction because there are different criteria for deciding which way to turn or how to decide. It is in this most fundamental sense that one can say that contemporary medicine is in crisis.
At its root meaning a “crisis” is a separation. In our everyday lives we use the term crisis to designate a period of decision. A crisis is a moment of separation when one must make a decision about a direction. To make a crisis decision, a person needs some criteria or set of norms to guide the decisions that are made. Sometimes, at a moment of crisis decisionmaking, there is chaos when one does not know which norm to use in making a decision. Without some norm a crisis is a significant loss of direction because there are different criteria for deciding which way to turn or how to decide. It is in this most fundamental sense that one can say that contemporary medicine is in crisis.
Medicine has been changed dramatically by research in the basic sciences and the development of new technologies. These medical technologies continue to create new opportunities and choices for physicians and patients. But in a limited world one cannot do everything. In a finite world, choices must be made. New medical innovations may save or prolong lives, but we cannot do everything for everyone. In a world of limited resources the allocation of resources and the cost of medical care are important moral questions. Each positive determination is a negation as well. Every decision to use resources in one area is an implicit decision to deny them to other areas. A society needs to decide how many resources will be devoted to medicine and how they will be allocated within healthcare.
Our choices about how to allocate resources reflect logically prior understandings about the purpose of medicine. But we live in a time when there are conflicting expectations and models of medicine. In a world of limited resources we will have to make decisions about what we want medicine to be. In this time of crisis there are different models and directions for the future of medicine. The models do not fit together neatly. They are sometimes at odds with each other. Medicine could become more socially controlled and state run or medicine could make a more profound turn toward the free market.
At this point a reader might well be asking what do the changes and questions about resources and the direction of medicine have to do with the topic of “patients.” Everything. I would argue that each model of medicine has a somewhat different understanding of the patient embedded in the model. There are real, fundamental questions about the purpose of medicine and the object of medicine. Is it about particular patients or is it the health of populations? And if it is about particular patients how do we understand them? Each model of medicine is a somewhat different world view and has a different language. Just as the Rosetta Stone unlocked the language of Egyptian hieroglyphics so, too, the idea of “patient” can unlock a worldview of medicine.
In contemporary discussions about healthcare there are a few key terms that often signal the underlying views that a speaker or author may hold. One of the key terms to attend to is how someone names the object of healthcare: patient, customer, client, or consumer. This list of possible terms is not exhaustive but these terms seem to be the principal choices in our society. The term used for the object of healthcare communicates an underlying view of the nature and purpose of healthcare and medicine. Some people view healthcare as a vocation with a mission of caring for sick patients. Other people see healthcare as a business taking care of clients. For some people it is about the health of populations. Between these positions there are a number of other, mixed interpretations about healthcare and the people who seek it. Furthermore, people are not always disciplined in the use of language. Many people will use the same word (i.e., patient), but mean different things by it in different contexts. Such variations indicate that there is not a consistent or coherent model of healthcare that supports the use of a term or position. The term “patient” then becomes like a Rosetta Stone. If we understand how the term is being used it helps us to understand the view of healthcare that frames its meaning and use.
I will argue, in this essay, that the truth of the matter is more complex than any single perspective can capture. One cannot talk about “patients,” and understand the role they play, without understanding the larger—sometimes conflicting—views of healthcare in which our understanding of patients is embedded. To insist on one interpretation, to the exclusion of others, leads to a distorted and incomplete view of healthcare. Indeed, I will argue for a view that each of these different views of the patient captures different parts of the medical encounter. Each of these views represents some important element about medicine and healthcare that cannot be omitted from an account of patient and medicine. Yet no single view captures the entire reality of the patient. Each reflects different views, not only of the patient, but also of healthcare, medicine, physicians, and society's role.
To understand this complexity it is helpful to understand how and why our model of the patient has changed. This essay will argue that as medicine has become more sophisticated scientifically, creating more and more options for people, so, too, the role of patients has changed. The role of the patient has become more complicated and multifaceted. The concept of patient can no longer be understood only through the “sick role” alone, explored and articulated by Talcott Parsons.1
Parsons T. The Systems of Modern Societies. Engelwood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall; 1971; Parsons T. The sick role and the role of the physician reconsidered. Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly 1975;53:257–78.
This exploration of the geography of patients will begin with the traditional understanding of the patient and the moral obligations attendant to it. Then I will examine how the model breaks down and the implications for these changes in the third section of this essay. Implicit throughout this discussion of the patient is an implicit discussion of physicians, other healthcare professionals, and the medical system. One cannot talk about patients in isolation from the other players in healthcare. One's understanding of the patient will be embedded in one's understanding of the purpose of medicine.
A good place to start this exploration is with what can be called the “traditional” model. The patient in the traditional model is captured if one thinks about the root meaning of the word patient itself. To be a patient is to be overcome by something. In a traditional model of medicine, patients are overcome by sickness. The term patient focuses on the person who is weakened by sickness. The patient is a victim of sickness and disease.
This traditional model of patient has been central to Western medicine. It is the role that Parsons baptized as the “sick role.” In Parson's analysis of the traditional patient model, illness overcomes a patient and he or she assumes the sick role. The traditional model, in its view of illness and the expectations of the patient in the sick role, emphasizes the passivity of the patient. There is no real basis, in this model, to speak of patient responsibilities other than the patient's responsibility to be obedient to the physician in terms of recovery. We do not hold people responsible for getting sick. There is an active element for the patient in Parsons' understanding of the traditional model. The patient is to work toward health by following the orders of the physician.2
See note 1, Parsons 1971:262.
The model of the sick role works well with a paternalistic model of the physician. In focusing on the patient, when sick, the traditional model of patient and medicine has accentuated the fiduciary bond that exists between the patient and the physician. An emphasis on this view of the patient—as sick and in distress—became a cornerstone for understanding a traditional view of physicians. It is this view of the patient that supports a paternalistic view of physicians. Because the patient is weakened and made vulnerable by the illness, the physician has a fiduciary obligation toward the patient. Robert Veatch has argued that the focus of physician ethics on beneficence supports the development of physician paternalism.3
Veatch R. The Patient–Physician Relationship. Bloomington: Indiana University Press; 1991, part II.
There are strengths and weaknesses to the traditional patient model. There is a strength in this view in that it recognizes the immediate existential reality of someone who is sick and suffering with illness. The traditional model calls us to respond to the needs of others. The weaknesses of the model are rooted in its strengths. There is no basis, in this model, to establish a dimension of responsibility on the part of the patient for his or her health. This lack of a basis for responsibility opens the door, understandably, for physician paternalism. There is no clear basis, in the traditional model, for the patient as a responsible agent in relationship to his or her sickness. The lack of a dimension for personal responsibility touches both the development of the illness and decisions during it. Both in how the patient becomes ill, and how the patient is in the sick role, it emphasizes the passivity of the patient and offers no basis for responsibility. Hence, there is emphasis on following the orders of the physician and on the fiduciary role of the physician, grounded in the patient's vulnerability and the physician's expertise.
This traditional model of patient and medicine is crucial for our understanding the contemporary context of patients. It is not the only model of healthcare. But it does identify one of the most crucial elements in the experience of healthcare. People get sick. They get sick. People suffer and endure medical problems. The personal dimension and effects of illness are important dimensions that ought not to be lost in an account of patients. The object of medicine is not something extrinsic to the person but involves the person's very self. But, at the same time, the elements of the traditional model do not exhaust the medical encounter, particularly as medicine has evolved and expanded its possibilities.
One might ask, what is wrong with the traditional Western model? The model certainly captures a very important dimension of the patient's experience: that of being ill and the vulnerability of illness. Indeed, in the wake of managed care many people would like to return to the traditional model. To understand why the model no longer works one must also understand how medicine has changed. There is a transition from this traditional model of the patient to a new model that emphasizes patient autonomy. One could argue that the breakdown started to occur in the middle of the 1960s and there are a number of celebrated cases that are central in this breakdown.4
For example, see Canterbury v. Spence, US Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit; May 19, 1972. 464 Federal Reporter, 2nd Series, 777; Anderson D, Cavalier R, Covery P. A Right to Die: The Dax Cowert Case. London: Routledge; 1996; Kilner J. Who Lives? Who Dies? Ethical Criteria in Patient Selection. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press; 1990.
One reason for the breakdown of the traditional model, which is so obvious but often overlooked, is the development of medical knowledge and technology. In our current contemporary setting of rapid medical advancement one can easily forget that it is only in the recent history of medicine that medicine has had the knowledge and the technological capacities to affect people's sickness and lives. These scientific and technological advances of the past 40 years are crucial to the breakdown of the traditional model of the patient.
To understand the impact of technology on medicine and patients it is helpful to discipline our discussion of technology with some distinctions. One can distinguish “replacement” and “new” technology. Replacement technologies are those innovations that allow us to do, more efficiently and less intrusively, what we can already do for a patient. For example, there are many replacement technologies that have made it easier to read a patient's vital signs. New technology, by contrast, enables us to do what we have not been able to do before. Many of the technologies of reproductive medicine, for example, are new technologies. These technologies are responsible for expanding the boundaries of medicine and its possibilities for patients. They give choice and some degree of control where there had been none before.
The development of new technology, along with its widespread dissemination, has changed the face of medicine and the role of patients. These advances in medical knowledge and development of new technology allow medicine to intervene in the many aspects of the lives of patients and actually change lives. In many circumstances there is something that can be done for a patient. Most often, however, medical interventions come with a cost. The notion of cost is beyond the economic realm alone. It tries to capture the use of time, the risks and burdens of treatments, and the effects of medical decisions on the quality of one's life. Life can be prolonged, but a patient's capacities will often be diminished or restricted. Diseases can be treated but the treatment phase will be a time of diminishment in terms of a patient's quality of life. These choices are never simple. They often involve a mixture of benefits and burdens, create real choices both about life itself and the quality of life. The creation of choices leads to very clear questions about who should make such decisions and how they should be made.
In the traditional model of the patient, in the sick role, the physician was the primary, paternalistic, decisionmaker. However, there were very few decisions that could really be made. There were few, if any alternatives for patients. The scientific and technological developments of the last 40 years have created alternatives and choices. And a key question is choices for whom? The traditional Hippocratic ethic was paternalistic and put decisions in the hands of the physicians. The physician swore to act for the good of the patient according to the physician's judgment. But, in recent years, with the development of real choices for patients we have come to relocate responsibility for decisionmaking into the hands of the patient or the patient's surrogates.
The advances in medical knowledge and technology have been enormous and enable medicine to intervene in people's lives from conception to death. These interventions can greatly affect the quality and quantity of a patient's life. But many of these interventions come at moments in life that are understood by people to have moral significance and meaning. Here we encounter a second major factor in the demise of the traditional model of patient. In facing these different questions and issues it becomes clear that there are differing moral views on these questions. Moral pluralism, so characteristic of contemporary, secular societies, is a defining characteristic for contemporary medicine and an important characteristic for understanding the role of patients.
Many medical decisions are viewed in the context of a person's moral narrative. As moral pluralism becomes more and more pronounced in Western, secular nations it will be crucial for medicine to take such pluralism into account. This pluralism is very evident in medical practice precisely because many medical interventions are not simply “medical.” They often have moral meanings and significance. The best interest of a patient often goes well beyond what is in his or her medical best interest. The development of medical knowledge and technologies is necessary, but not sufficient to explain the transition. One needs to include the moral dimensions of medical choices and the moral pluralism of secular societies to understand why the traditional model of patient and physician is no longer adequate.
The third element undermining the traditional model of the patient has been the strong emphasis that has been placed on patient's rights. The opinion of Judge Spotswood W. Robinson, III in Canterbury v. Spence has set the parameters and direction of patients' rights. He wrote that, “[t]he root premise is the concept, fundamental in American jurisprudence, that every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body.”5
See note 4, Canterbury v. Spence 1972:777.
This emphasis on patients' rights is grounded in the first two trends of expanding possibilities and moral pluralism. This emphasis fits with a growing awareness about individual rights and liberties in general. Medicine's increasing awareness of patients' rights takes place in the era of the civil rights movement and a more widespread awareness of individual rights generally. In medicine, the movement toward patients' rights takes place in the development of practices of informed consent and an active role in patient decisionmaking. Another important element of the changes that come with medical knowledge and technology is that these interventions can be costly. As society struggles with dilemmas of containing costs, the patient finds another role and responsibility: that of a consumer of medical services. If one argues for patient choice and autonomy then one also needs to support the responsibility of patients to think, in advance, about the kinds of choices they do or do not want to make. One can further argue that the patient has a responsibility to think, as a whole, about healthcare and how it is part of his or her lifestyle. Choice brings responsibility.
As our knowledge about diseases has developed there is a new sense that, in many cases, patients are not “overcome” by sickness in the way the traditional model of patient would hold. Rather, in many cases patients contribute to illnesses by lifestyle choices (e.g., diet, lack of exercise, excessive consumption of alcohol, smoking, drug use, or unsafe sex). It is important to recall that the traditional model of the sick role did not address patient responsibility for health or illness. Yet many of the trends that have changed medicine and opened the doors for patient choice have also opened the issue of personal responsibility for one's health.
These three elements have come together to transform the role of the patient. The patient is no longer the passive, obedient object of physician beneficence. Understanding the transformation of medicine and healthcare is important for imagining new ways to capture healthcare and to imagine the role of the patient. Medical and technological advances have created, and continue to create, a myriad of choices for patients.
In examining the sweeping changes that have engulfed medicine there has been, rightfully, a great deal of emphasis placed on patient autonomy. But often these discussions leave the patient as an isolated decisionmaker. Such a model does not often correspond to the realities of illness and medical care. Autonomy is experienced and exercised in complex sets of circumstances and relationships. Although there are a number of important alternatives that need to be explored, I want to argue for a model of patient as partner and the patient as citizen.
In the developments of medicine we have moved away from a paternalistic view of the patient. A natural model for American society, where the free market is essential to the distribution of goods and services, would be to view the patient as a consumer of medical goods. In this model the physicians, and other medical professionals, offer technical assistance and services to patients. What is often lost in this model is the personal nature of healthcare and healthcare decisions; especially when the patient is sick. Related to the consumer model would be a contractual model of the patient and healthcare professional. This model can work and it puts important responsibilities on the patient as a responsible decisionmaker. But, there is a real risk in this model of underestimating the complex nature of the patient–provider relationship. A possible limitation to this model is how to handle important unanticipated healthcare problems.
It is also not uncommon to hear the term client used when speaking about patients. This is probably not an appropriate term. Healthcare seeks to cure, comfort, care, prevent, and diagnose. Patients are in a vulnerable position. A client implies a retainer relationship and fails to capture the fiduciary relationship of patient and physician.6
Engelhardt, HT. The Foundations of Bioethics, 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press; 1996:25, see note 14.
Robert Veatch has examined a number of alternatives for thinking about the relationship of patients and physicians, and he thinks that many fall short of many people's experience. One model is to think of the physician as technician. In this model the physician is the seller of services and the patient is the client. Veatch argues that this model overlooks the special nature of the experience of sickness. The model also overlooks the specialization of medicine and the need to achieve integration of the medical care. One should also be careful about assuming that the physician and patient have the same interests.7
See note 3, Veatch 1991:3–6.
Another very different model that is mentioned is the friendship model. This model appeals to the very personal nature of healthcare. But, many elements that are so central to friendship—time, understanding, common moral values—are missing from the structures of contemporary healthcare. Nor is there the time to cultivate the relationships of friendships. Veatch argues that we should assume that the physician and patient meet as strangers. Engelhardt makes the same argument when he speaks of moral strangers in healthcare. In today's world of managed care these claims seem to be more and more the case.
As one examines the development of medicine, and the changing role of the patient, it becomes clear that new models are needed to understand the complexities of relationships in contemporary medicine. New models are needed not only for patient and physicians, but to understand the relationship of patients to other medical professionals and the infrastructure of healthcare. We have briefly examined some popular alternatives. But now I would like to suggest a model that I think is most comprehensive and adaptable.
One aspect of contemporary medical practice that has received a great deal of attention is patient autonomy and consent. But all too often autonomy is viewed in isolation and one is faced with questions about how to relate autonomy to the realities of medical practice and the autonomy of others. One model, in a morally pluralistic world, is to think of the patient as a partner. In a world where medicine often has a wide array of options for patients and where patients may hold different moral views from the medical team, the patient needs to be viewed as a partner. The patient is more than someone who signs a form to allow a procedure. The partnership model views the patient as coauthoring the goals and decisions in his or her treatment.8
Beauchamp T, Faden R. A History and Theory of Informed Consent. New York: Oxford University Press; 1986.
Partnership is a model that has been carefully, thoroughly developed by thinkers such as Robert Veatch.9
See note 3, Veatch 1991; also see Veatch R. The Patient as Partner: A Theory of Human Experimentation Ethics. Bloomington: Indiana University Press; 1987; American Organization of Nurse Executives. The Patient as Partner: The Cornerstone of Community Health Improvement. Chicago: American Hospital Publishing; 1997.
The partnership model, developed by Veatch and others, very nicely captures the autonomy of the patient as well as the collaborative relationship of patient, physician, and healthcare team. The goal of health can only be achieved if each member of the partnership brings his or her skills to bear. Each partner contributes an important element to the effort of the whole, including the patient. Each partner has voice in the decisionmaking. The partnership model also provides a way to talk about moral responsibility as well.
In terms of partnership, it would seem clear that the project that clinicians and patients join together on is the project of the patient's health. The patient's healthcare is the focus of this relationship. Each person in the partnership brings something different to the project. The clinician brings to the partnership his or her skills, knowledge, and clinical experience. The patient brings him- or herself, and his or her goals, aspirations, and values. This means that a patient needs to be honest. The patient should be attentive and report things to the clinician. Such observation and reporting is not only good medicine, it is good ethics and good partnership. The patient needs to be clear and forthcoming about his or her wishes. The clinician can only create a partnership with a patient if the patient is honest and forthcoming with the physician.
Another moral responsibility of the patient in the partnership model is cooperation. Cooperation ought not be reduced to just following orders as in the traditional model. The key element of cooperation is to listen—to hear. Cooperation arises out of conversation. That is, if the patient is to partner with the physician, the patient needs to follow the agreements they set out and decide upon. Partnerships involve setting boundaries, expectations, and responsibilities for the project. There is coauthorization in this model.
In decisions about treatment a patient is not only a partner of the medical team. The patient is also a partner with others in his or her health insurance pool. The patient is a part of a larger partnership that creates the resources to obtain healthcare. What is also clear, from the development of medical knowledge, is that the patient is part of a group. Our medical knowledge is based on our knowledge of a population. Individual patients can only be understood within the context of a group and as individuals who are members of the group. Furthermore, our ability to treat and care for individual patients is, in part, dependent on our knowledge of the group. In obtaining medical care the vast majority of patients do so through some form of an insurance scheme. That means that the resources the patient uses are not, in most cases, his or her private resources. Rather they are resources that are part of a pool that has been created by joining resources with others. So, it would seem to be a morally incorrect picture if the patient viewed such resources as his or her own. The patient has a moral responsibility, to others in the pool, to steward resources. The partnership model can be developed to include the notion of pooled resources. As a member of a resource partnership a patient has both rights to the resources and responsibilities to others in the partnership. One can imagine that when the resources are public that the patient is part of a public partnership.
To help patients fulfill this responsibility it would be helpful if the pools set out guidelines for how resources will be deployed. Patients can then make more informed judgments about which pool or plan they would like to join. In so doing, they consent to the stewardship guidelines of the plan and they act to fulfill their own obligations of stewardship.
The dimension of pooled resources creates further levels of moral obligations for patients. In virtually every first-world nation there are significant national resources that are used to support the infrastructure of healthcare as well as healthcare delivery. At this level patients must also understand themselves as citizens. They have an obligation, as a good citizen, to participate in deliberations about the creation and distribution of these national resources.
The traditional model of being a patient is no longer an adequate model for healthcare for a number of reasons. First, the development of medical knowledge and technology has given patients and healthcare professionals real choices, which have both medical and moral dimensions. Here the focus is on the patient as a decisionmaker. Second, in secular, morally pluralistic societies, one cannot presume that patients and healthcare professionals will share the same moral views, which inform the medical choices that are being made. Finally, an understanding of the rights of people generally and the rights of patients in particular also undermines the traditional model of the patient.
One can describe the basic direction to thinking about patients as one that has emphasized, heavily, the place of autonomy. All too often, however, the emphasis on patient autonomy has underplayed the autonomy of others. Yet the idea of autonomy can provide a way out of the crisis of medicine. For it must recognize that, in healthcare, autonomy is exercised in conjunction with others. The partnership model nicely captures the autonomy of all the players—individuals, professionals, and institutions—involved in the delivery of healthcare. One can understand that the model of partnership captures the complexity of autonomy and the various arenas in which autonomy is lived out by patients.
The role of the patient is complex. So no one model of being a patient will exhaust the realities of contemporary medicine. The best candidate seems to be the model of patient as partner. Beyond the partner model, which helps explain the clinical experience, is the model of the patient as steward and the patient as citizen. These roles help to explore other important dimensions of the experience of the patient. Partnership can help explore the complex, overlapping relationships in healthcare and the complexities of the different autonomous relationships. It can be a model for us in exploring the many dimensions of what it is to be a patient and can provide a direction in a time of crisis.