The editors and contributors to Dismantling Public Policy examine when and why dismantling occurs by drawing on examples of both social and environmental policies. By conceptualising various dismantling strategies, the study addresses the dependent variable problem (Green-Pedersen, Reference Green-Pedersen2004) and contributes to the understanding of how taking away policies differs fundamentally from enacting them.

The term dismantling trumps others by encompassing not only retrenchment but also deregulation. Dismantling also sidesteps claims of agency, allowing for change to occur through reform as well as non-reform. Four ideal types are identified: (1) dismantling by default, (2) dismantling by arena shifting, (3) dismantling by symbolic action and (4) active dismantling. These types are defined by the cross-tabulation of two dimensions including the degree to which there was an active decision to dismantle and the extent to which dismantling activities are visible. Types 1 and 3 result from non-decisions, whereas 2 and 4 result from reform activity; types 1 and 2 are not visible, whereas 3 and 4 are visible.

Besides dismantling strategies, the introductory chapters discuss two additional factors that influence the incidence and nature of dismantling – political preferences and opportunity structures. Two additional concepts are introduced to illuminate the role of opportunity structures. Dismantling varies according to ‘policy density’, the extent to which a certain policy area is addressed by governmental activities, and ‘policy intensity’, the relative strictness and/or generosity of policies. The choice of dismantling strategies also depends on the degree to which costs and benefits are concentrated and diffused. Concentrated costs and diffused benefits thwart dismantling, whereas the opposite situation should be enabling. Both diffused costs and benefits allow politicians room to pursue their preferences, whereas if both are concentrated, interest group politics should prevail.

Six substantive chapters analyse why politicians selected active dismantling, dismantling by default and dismantling by symbolic action (dismantling by arena shifting is touched upon within these various sections though not in its own right). Two chapters on active dismantling examine pension reform in Italy and Switzerland and environmental policy under the Bush administration in the US, respectively. Constant structurally induced demand for pension reform not only motivated actors to discuss and coalesce over reform proposals in an open way but completed reforms also created legacies of reform success that broadened the legitimacy of further active dismantling. Less consistent with the assumptions of rationality underpinning the theoretical framework was the choice of active dismantling with regard to the New Source Review (NSR), regulation to control air pollution from large, fixed sources. Conservative US Republicans clearly preferred dismantling but the high number of institutional constraints thwarts an active strategy, even during the Bush presidency. Arena shifting was partially used as well, though also unsuccessfully.

The rest of the book primarily focusses on dismantling through non-action. Two chapters examine dismantling by default, understood as non-visible, non-action. In Spain, there was a de facto dismantling of child benefits between 1975 and 1990. Divisions within the major political parties and the lack of ‘policy takers’ kept the issue of child benefits off the agenda, leading to a low level of policy feedback between state and non-state actors. At the same time, active dismantling was not seen as a viable option since the government sought to quell internal dissent. Benefit indexation is a clear example of dismantling by default. If benefits are not kept in line with inflation and growth, their value diminishes and failure to index led to significant reductions in benefit levels in Denmark, Germany, Sweden and the UK.

Dismantling by symbolic action differs from dismantling by default because governments take a visible stand in favour of reform even though dismantling as such does not occur. German waste policy is provided as an example of symbolic action whereby the FDP made emphatic declarations of an intent to end the mandate of the inefficient Duales System Deutschland (DSD), a private waste disposal organisation. Despite negative externalities, questionable ecological benefits and performance deficits, the system was not dismantled due to the rising political costs of doing so. Dismantling by default also occurred by non-compliance within various Länder, whereas more active dismantling occurred when the EU was available as a scapegoat. In the end, the concentrated costs of dismantling for the DSD and the diffuse benefits for the rest of the population meant that an inefficient policy was kept in place. A chapter on water policy in the UK illustrates the role of dismantling by default and arena shifting in the case of the Control of Pollution Act whereby the government impeded its full implementation as well as the dismantling by symbolic action of EU environmental policy by the Commission getting rid of dead-end proposals.

The contribution of this volume is substantial. Studies, particularly in welfare state research, tend to focus almost exclusively on policy change resulting from clear-cut decisions made by identifiable political actors. Yet, as shown here, the effects of policies may change due to inaction or by shifting the administration of a given policy area to another level or perhaps an agency. These hidden types of dismantling are often less contested than other forms and illustrate that an expansion–retrenchment dichotomy is not always useful in explaining the nature of policy change. The main contribution of this volume is therefore in providing a more valid conceptualisation of policy change that can undoubtedly be of use to diverse scholars of public policy.