Cicero's philosophical works, greatly admired in antiquity and afterwards, suffered a decline in prestige in the nineteenth century which lasted until late in the twentieth. The exaltation of Greece over Rome and a strong emphasis on originality led to their being undervalued. A renewed interest in Hellenistic philosophy, which these works mostly treat, a greater understanding of the link between philosophical thought and literary presentation, and a subtler reading of Rome's adaptations of Greek culture have reversed the trend, but some works have benefited more than others. The Tusculan Disputations, written in 45 b.c. and soon after given star billing by Cicero in the rundown of his works that introduces De Divinatione 2, gave much comfort to Cicero's contemporaries and to later readers, but in recent times the work has continued to seem unappealing in form and content. Missing are the vivid cast of Roman aristocratic characters, the carefully described settings in time and place, the urbane dialogue and clear exposition familiar from his other philosophical works. Instead, the reader faces a colourless interlocutor, a vague setting, and dry teaching from ‘Cicero’, who indulges in lengthy passages of doxography, long translations from Greek tragedy, and often unattractive self-pity.
The author sets out to show that the fault is not in Cicero the author, but in ourselves the readers. We fail to see the ‘profound originality’ (2) that the very anomalies of the work suggest. The barrenness of the characters and setting, the characterization of the work as Greek discourses, and the uninhibited lecturing de haut en bas — practices that Cicero's other works eschew — point to protest and despair. They reflect the bleakness of Cicero's life under Caesar's dictatorship, his enforced retirement from political life besmirched by his teaching of rhetoric to Caesar's younger associates. On the other hand, they also show Cicero's more positive response to the challenge: to forge a system of education that would regenerate the morals of the younger generation of aristocrats and lead them back to the standards of their ancestors and, in doing so, add to Roman conquests the domain of Greek philosophy. Cicero has composed ‘a Roman drama in education with a strong political subtext’ (4).
It is a compelling thesis, brilliantly argued by the author, who manages to combine analytic clarity with passionate conviction. After a brief introduction outlining the main theses of the book, the argument proceeds in three chapters, to which are added two appendices: one on the date of the work (cautiously given as summer or autumn of 45 b.c.) and the other on current ideas about genre analysis. There is a very helpful extended table of contents at the end (307–10). The first chapter (5–88) aims to explain the puzzling features of the work: (1) the title, which differs from Cicero's usual titles in highlighting, not the subject matter or the speakers, but (2) the genre, which is identified as disputatio, a practice which Cicero usually regards as a Greek habit of lecturing unsuitable to Roman aristocrats, and declamatio, a word that also has negative connotations; (3) the cast of characters, which is limited to a nameless stooge and ‘Cicero’, who is presented as a sophist and teacher in the Greek style; (4) the setting, which is merely a named villa, with no further specification of the precise location or of the participants in the morning sessions in rhetoric and the afternoon ones in philosophy; (5) the lengthy translations of Greek tragedy and (6) the apparent endorsement by ‘Cicero’ in 5.105 of Epicurean withdrawal from politics to contemplate nature. The last two features are explained as expressions of bitterness at having too much leisure because of the tyranny of Caesar: as regards the former, Gildenhard might have made more of the way Cicero also takes the opportunity to quote long passages of Latin poetry as part of his assertion of Roman competitiveness with Greece.
The second and longest chapter (89–206) consists of detailed analyses of the vocabulary, syntax, and structure of the prologues to the five books, which, despite Cicero's admission in Att. 16.6.4, G. plausibly insists were purpose built. These analyses constitute a virtuoso performance. For example, the syntax of maxime at 1.1, the proper interpretation of et as ‘even’ in igitur et Epaminondas at 1.4, reveal where Cicero is placing his emphasis and how his argument progresses; proper attention to Cicero's use of sapientia and philosophia illuminates his idea that ancestral wisdom has been lost and can only be recovered through education based on Greek philosophy, which is his own project (97–110). Again, in the treatment of the prologue to Book 4, comparison with De Re Publica and precise attention to verbal usage resolve the contradiction between the apparent backdating of philosophy to the start of the Republic and the locating of its advent in Cicero's own age (188), showing that sapientia and doctrina characterize the earlier stages of Roman native wisdom plus Pythagorean influence, whereas true philosophia, of the sort originated by Socrates, has waited to receive sympathetic coverage until Cicero's day. Comparison with Cicero's earlier philosophical works is also used to highlight the rhetoric of Roman superiority, now that oratory is becoming less useful and Rome is poised to produce better philosophical writing than the Greeks (107–8). Sometimes, however, exaggerated conclusions are drawn from such analysis on the assumption that Cicero only takes one view of an issue at any one time. Thus at Academica 1.10 Cicero does advocate reading Latin works because they bring pleasure, even to readers of Greek philosophy, but at Academica 1.12 he already boasts, as he will in the Tusculans, that we shall not need Greek philosophical writings, given Brutus' and Varro's talents, and of course, Cicero's own (cf. Att. 13.13.1). That only shows that Cicero is capable of saying different things about the same issue even in the same work, being a superb orator and an opportunistic debater.
G. is perhaps over-zealous in his determination to explain everything in political terms. The tension between insisting on service to the community and asserting that the sapiens is self-sufficient and aloof from his surroundings is traced to the need to adjust to dictatorship, while leaving open the possibility of a return of free government (129–30), and yet this is a tension that is found in Stoicism throughout its history. Again, does the mention of the expulsion of Tarquin as a cultural watershed at 4.1 really constitute an ‘encoded call to arms’ (197)? If this is just possible, the reading of such a call to tyrannicide into the prologue to Book 5 is much harder to accept (206–7). As G. notes, Cicero here lifts the discussion to a more abstract plane, celebrating philosophy as a universal product and support of human life. The dedicatee Brutus does indeed come into his own here, but as the author of a De Virtute (5.1; 5.12). Cicero's appeal to philosophy as the guide of life and the antidote to the fear and grief we suffer at the hands of fortune adduces his own misfortunes (5.3), among which his present exclusion from politics must of course be numbered, but we should not forget altogether the death of Tullia earlier in 45 b.c., for which Cicero wrote himself the consolation that he mentions in 1.65, or even his exile, given the discussion of that category of misfortune at 5.106–7. The reference to the virtue of Brutus' uncle Cato in 5.4 doubtless looks forward to the discussion of suicide as the ultimate haven from fortune and explicitly (5.118) brings us back full circle to the discussions of death and pain in Books 1 and 2.
In the final chapter (207–75), G. traces the pedagogic plot of the work, examining the techniques used by the teacher ‘Cicero’ in his ‘enactment’ of what his project of educating the Roman élite would be like. He also points to the signs of progress made by his pupil, who, though anonymous, is actually characterized as a Roman adulescens (2.28) with a good command of Greek (1.15), who has been to Athens (2.26), has been inducted into the Eleusinian mysteries (1.29), and has read Plato (1.24), but who shows Roman common sense (1.10) and a preference for a pragmatic style of argument (1.23). In Book 1 the pupil is brought to admit his mistake about death being an evil for those who are dead, and then becomes open to instruction; indeed he asks for continuous exposition from his teacher (1.16). He is particularly keen to have it proved that death not only does not bring misery but is the gateway to eternal happiness. ‘Cicero’ proves this to his satisfaction, using first arguments from authority and consensus, then from physical science applied to the nature of the soul. By the end of Book 1 the student is beginning to think for himself (1.78), but is also ready to credit ‘Cicero’ with success as a teacher (2.2). In Book 2 ‘Cicero’ responds with praise of his pupil's philosophical potential. After this the pupil's opinion is accorded more weight (3.12), and, by Book 5, the student is standing up to ‘Cicero’, resisting mere arguments from authority (5.12–13) and catching him out in contradictions (5.32).
With this account of the educational drama inherent in the work, G. brings to a convincing conclusion his explanation of the coherence of the dialogue and its significance within Cicero's oeuvre. For those who read G.'s book, the Tusculan Disputations will never be the same again. We all owe him a great debt for showing us why its author was so proud of this work and for demonstrating so fully why that pride was justified.
