CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND

A chain of events began in the early 1990s with the trial of a priest who was found guilty of conduct unbecoming of a clerk in holy orders.Footnote ³ As a result, a Legal Aid Commission report was commissioned and recommended that the 1963 Measure and other legislation on clergy discipline should be reviewed by an appropriate body.Footnote ⁴ A General Synod working party was then set up, the scope of which included reviewing clergy discipline. Its recommendations, along with the general trend at the time for professions to examine how they regulate themselves, strongly influenced the 2003 Measure's regime.Footnote ⁵

In the House of Lords, the Bishop of Winchester described the 1963 Measure's regime as ‘inflexible, expensive and slow’ and that, while in force, its procedures were rarely used, with a ‘significant number’ of complaints left unresolved or disposed of on an informal and voluntary basis.Footnote ⁶ Adrian Iles notes that some defendants would resign and thereby fall outside the 1963 Measure's jurisdiction rather than be subject to proceedings under it. In minor cases this would be a disproportionately severe outcome; in serious cases it would be disproportionately lenient.Footnote ⁷

Only three trials were ever heard under Part IV of the 1963 Measure.Footnote ⁸ By sharp contrast, under section 22 of the 2003 Measure, in the period 2006–2020 there were 33 tribunals.Footnote ⁹ In addition, in 2018, 90 complaints against 75 respondents were made and disposed of without going to a tribunal hearing.Footnote ¹⁰ Of cases dealt with in 2018, 45 per cent of complaints were of no substantive merit: that is, they were disposed of at the earliest stages in terms of sections 11(3), 12(1)(a) and 13.Footnote ¹¹ The 2016 and 2017 figures are broadly similar.Footnote ¹² In the period 2006–2012, the number of complaints averaged only 66 per year but with a similar average of 42 per cent dismissed at the earliest stages.Footnote ¹³ It is suggested that the significantly higher number of complaints made in the years 2016–2018 versus the average number in the years 2006–2012 may be explained by the amendments to the 2003 Measure facilitating complaints in respect of historic sexual abuse.

As a significant number of cases were dealt with on an informal basis, it is not clear how many complaints were received annually under the 1963 Measure and consequently what proportion of cases were sifted out at the earliest stages or disposed of under section 31.Footnote ¹⁴ However, comparing the figures for trials/tribunals under the 2003 and 1963 Measures, it is assumed here that, as there was a practice of dealing with complaints informally, the number of formal complaints made and the number of sentences pronounced by consent were similarly low.Footnote ¹⁵

Therefore, there are roughly the same number of 2003 Measure tribunal hearings each year as there were trials during the lifetime of the 1963 Measure, with a large number of complaints made annually versus the smaller number assumed to have been made under the 1963 Measure. One analysis of this step change between the 1963 regime and the 2003 regime is that the 2003 Measure provided greater access to justice owing to the wider range of people who may institute complaints contrasted with the chilling effect of the 1963 regime being regarded variously as complex, elaborate, expensive, slow and inflexible.Footnote ¹⁶ While it is suggested that this analysis holds significant weight, developing a more granular analysis would begin with the working hypothesis that there was a prevailing culture of deference during the lifetime of the 1963 Measure (at least in its early days) and a culture of dealing with matters behind closed doors; and that it was a less litigious time. Nonetheless, it is suggested that the 2003 Measure created a more accessible route for a wider range of people to institute complaints against clergy and with a degree of well-founded hope that they would receive a fair hearing.

From the above analysis and because a significant minority of complaints are disposed of at the earliest stages, it can be seen that there is some merit to the fears that the 2003 Measure would be a ‘complainant's charter’.Footnote ¹⁷ However, from the complainants’ perspective, the 2003 Measure could be seen to have achieved its aims, which the Bishop of Winchester described as being to balance complainants’ and respondents’ rights.Footnote ¹⁸ The Second Church Estates Commissioner, Stuart Bell MP, described its aims in similar terms and added that a trusted and a manifestly credible, fair and transparent system was necessary.Footnote ¹⁹ In addition, the overriding objective of the 2005 Rules is that proceedings will be dealt with justly, fairly and proportionately.Footnote ²⁰ This shows not only a step change in the rights of complainants but also a change in the prevailing culture, with complainants feeling able to institute complaints.

Criticism of the 2003 Measure by complainants has, in general, been about specific issues, in particular regarding clergy involved in extremist politics and regarding safeguarding concerns.Footnote ²¹ From the claimants’ perspective, however, it seems that the 2003 Measure has indeed redressed the balance between complainants and respondents. Nonetheless, the question arises as to whether the 2003 regime is truly fair from the perspective of respondents.

While the amendments in 2013 and 2016 finessed the 2003 regime, the criticisms from the respondents’ perspective address the substance of the regime and have been widespread from the outset.Footnote ²² In a 2007 article, Rupert Bursell QC raised a number of questions as to how the 2003 Measure would operate in practice, including where the line would be drawn with regard to jurisdiction and the 1963 Measure.Footnote ²³ However, more significant concerns were noted in an article in the Church Times from 2009 reporting on a debate regarding the 2003 Measure in the July session of the General Synod of that year.Footnote ²⁴ By 2009, the main concerns being reported were from the respondents’ perspective. The two key concerns were the psychological toll that the process took on respondents, and a legal concern questioning the role of diocesan bishops, whether they were conflicted and, in effect, wearing both a mitre and a judge's wig. An attempt to address the latter concern resulted in an amendment to the 2006 Code in 2011. The Clergy Discipline Commission noted that, although the principle that the relevant bishop must be independent and impartial ultimately derives from Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’) (and not the 2006 Measure), in practice this principle has been applied by the 2006 Measure's regime in ways that were not intended. Steps could have been taken to ensure Convention compliance but, in order to crystallise these steps, the 2006 Code was amended to include practical ways in which the relevant bishop's disciplinary and pastoral functions could be kept apart.Footnote ²⁵ Whether these amendments were sufficient to ensure fairness is considered below.

From the General Synod reports available online (that is, from November 2012), we can see the concerns raised in that forum from the respondent's perspective. These included:

1. i. Financial and ‘unsustainable’ emotional costs in terms of legal fees, time taken in sick leave and stress experienced by respondents;Footnote ²⁶

2. ii. An apparent ‘presumption of guilt’ arising from respondents stepping back from ministry during proceedings.Footnote ²⁷ Although the bishops were at pains to point out that this is not the case legally, in practice, it is suggested that there is a tendency to see no smoke without fire;Footnote ²⁸

3. iii. The appearance of a conflict of interest in the bishops’ roles as ‘pastors and prosecutors’;Footnote ²⁹

4. iv. Protecting respondents from vexatious complaints. In his response to this concern in 2016 the Bishop of Lincoln spoke about balancing the rights of respondents with those of complainants.Footnote ³⁰

Sitting alongside these public criticisms is the Community of Mary and Martha at Sheldon (‘Sheldon’), a retreat centre for those in ministry. From their experience of ministering to respondents in private, Sheldon began ‘Project CDM’ in 2017, including commissioning independent academic research into the effects of the 2003 Measure. Among the aims of Project CDM is to improve the pastoral support available to respondents and to make recommendations for the repair or replacement of the 2003 Measure, based on sound evidence of current practice.Footnote ³¹ In May 2019 the Warden of Sheldon, Dr Sarah Horsman, outlined tentative suggestions for proposals of what a new regime should look like.Footnote ³² Then in January 2020 Sheldon published a briefing paper reiterating the significant personal cost to respondents of being subject to a 2003 Measure procedure and proposing a new legal framework, following one of two tracks, A and B:

• Track A. Gross Misconduct. To handle allegations which, if proved, would warrant loss of home/livelihood. This would have a clear gateway process before being actioned, and would be professional, national, transparent, properly funded, evidence based and not episcopally led.

• Track B. Grievances. To handle all the other complaints. This would be episcopally led, local, focused on restoration of relationship and community, using resources such as mediation and training. Bishops would be able to sanction both clergy and laity.

• It would not be possible to escalate a Type B into a Type A just because the grievant was dissatisfied with the outcome. If additional concerns or evidence emerged during the course of a Type B process then the formal gateway into Type A would have to be actioned.

• Track A would have an Ombudsman to oversee the process, as well as a suitable appeals process against the judgement.Footnote ³³

Parallel to Sheldon's Project CDM is a review of the 2003 Measure by the Clergy Discipline Measure Working Group chaired by Tim Thornton, Bishop at Lambeth.Footnote ³⁴ Briefing notes and summary minutes of meetings have been regularly posted on one of the Sheldon forums.Footnote ³⁵ The Ecclesiastical Law Society is also convening a working party on the 2003 Measure.Footnote ³⁶

All in all, therefore, there is a great deal of interest in reforming the 2003 Measure, with most criticism coming from the respondents’ perspective. It is widely acknowledged that there is significant concern around the pastoral care of respondents and, while that is outside the scope of this article, what follows is an analysis of the current regime through the lens of common law rights and the ECHR Article 6 right to a fair hearing.

DOES THE 2003 MEASURE ENGAGE ARTICLE 6?

Article 6(1) of the ECHR guarantees the right to a fair trial by an ‘independent and impartial tribunal’. This relates to the determination of civil rights and obligations (as well as criminal charges). What we can see from the history of the 2003 Measure's drafting is that ECHR compliance was understood to be necessary. For example, a draft was scrutinised by leading counsel who found that the preliminary stages of the disciplinary process as contemplated under that draft were not fully compliant with Article 6, but this was cured by there being the right of appeal to the provincial appeal courts. While it was not strictly necessary to do so, the non-compliant aspects of the draft measure were amended in an attempt to be compliant at all stages.Footnote ³⁷ This allowed the Second Church Estates Commissioner to inform Parliament that the Church of England was satisfied that the draft 2003 Measure was ‘fully consistent’ with the Human Rights Act 1998 (‘1998 Act’).Footnote ³⁸ As primary legislation in terms of section 21 of the 1998 Act, there was an obligation under that Act to ensure that the draft 2003 Measure was ECHR-compliant.Footnote ³⁹ However, it seems that the Church of England was particularly keen to ensure that the 2003 Measure was fully ECHR compliant and not just meeting a minimum threshold for compliance.

Article 6 of the ECHR also applies in the determination of civil rights and obligations and is it therefore engaged by proceedings under the 2003 Measure? Since 2008, there have been a series of cases in domestic courts dealing with the question of whether the Article is engaged in professional disciplinary proceedings,Footnote ⁴⁰ with R (on the application of G) v X School Governors (‘R(G)’) being the most authoritative. However, these cases have generally followed a similar rationale and have certain factors in common: they were brought by employees who can be described as ‘professionals’; and it was argued that the disciplinary proceedings in question had implications for them exercising their profession generally and not just in relation to the particular employer in question. The same factors are evident in clergy discipline proceedings.

In Kulkarni v Milton Keynes NHS Foundation Trust, the right in question was the right to legal representation and it was found that Dr Kulkarni was contractually entitled to this. However, Smith LJ stated obiter that, had a decision in respect of this Article 6(3)(c) right been necessary, she would have found in Dr Kulkarni's favour as the charges he was facing would, if proved, effectively bar him from his profession. This not only contemplates Article 6 ‘civil limb’ rights being applicable to professional disciplinary proceedings but that the ‘criminal limb’ rights contained in Article 6(3) would also apply. Smith LJ's rationale is that the charges were so serious as to be quasi-criminal.Footnote ⁴¹ It seems that this would have been a significant extension of Article 6 rights in UK domestic law.

In R(G), which dealt with a teaching assistant, the workplace disciplinary proceedings would be followed by proceedings of the Independent Safeguarding Authority (the ‘ISA’) which would have the authority to effectively bar G from the profession. It was argued that a decision of the ISA would be so serious as to engage Article 6 rights and that, as the workplace disciplinary proceedings (‘proceedings A’) would significantly influence the ISA's decision (‘proceedings B’) to effectively bar him from the profession, then Article 6 protections should be extended to the workplace proceedings. In the Court of Appeal Laws LJ (with whom Wilson and Goldring LJJ agreed) adopted a test that proceedings A would be required to have ‘substantial influence or effect’ on proceedings B before Article 6 would be engaged in proceedings A.Footnote ⁴² This test was affirmed by the Supreme Court but, on the facts and after considering the Strasbourg jurisprudence, it was held (with Lord Kerr SCJ dissenting) that there was not sufficient influence or effect in this case to warrant the engagement of Article 6 rights in the workplace disciplinary proceedings.Footnote ⁴³

What is noteworthy here is that Lord Dyson SCJ, referring to Strasbourg and domestic jurisprudence, accepted obiter that not only are Article 6 ‘civil limb’ rights engaged but that ‘criminal limb’ rights in Art 6(3) are engaged in non-criminal proceedings that would have grave consequences (such as being barred from a profession).Footnote ⁴⁴ Nonetheless, as a matter of principle the court was not willing to extend Article 6 rights to ordinary workplace disciplinary proceedings that do not have grave consequences.

What, then, is the relationship between Article 6 rights and proceedings under the 2003 Measure? As defined by the 1998 Act, the 2003 Measure is primary legislation and so there is no doubt that in principle it must be ECHR-compliant. However, does the ECHR guarantee fair trial protection in 2003 Measure proceedings? On one hand, these procedures are framed as being within the category of workplace disciplinary proceedings and as such outside the scope of Article 6 protection. For example, in the House of Lords, Baroness Wilcox, a member of the Ecclesiastical Committee, commended the draft Measure by stating that it offers a ‘scheme for professional discipline’ and that it is a ‘scheme for the regulation of professional conduct’;Footnote ⁴⁵ as part of the new regime ushered in by the 2003 Measure, guidelines for the professional conduct of the clergy were published; and Adrian Iles described it as being ‘more in line with the disciplinary procedures of other professions’.Footnote ⁴⁶ On the other hand, Lord Dyson SCJ stated obiter that if enhanced protection (as afforded by not only the civil but also the criminal limb of Article 6) is engaged, the more serious the allegation and the graver the consequences if the allegation is proved.Footnote ⁴⁷ The standard of proof required under the 2003 Measure being the same as in the High Court exercising civil jurisdiction,Footnote ⁴⁸ the ability for the decision-makers under the 2003 Measure to impose life-changing decisions on a respondent on the lower civil standard of proof would, it is suggested, satisfy Lord Dyson SCJ's obiter test.Footnote ⁴⁹

Therefore, if we characterise 2003 Measure proceedings as simply workplace disciplinary proceedings it would be difficult to argue that Article 6 is engaged. However, given the severity of the penalties open to decision-makers (including being ‘barred from the profession’ – that is prohibited for life under section 24(1)(a) of the 2003 Measure), there is a strong argument that respondents enjoy Article 6 civil and criminal limb protections. Even if that argument failed in law, the desire for the Church of England to hold itself to a high standard is evident and would suggest that the civil and criminal limb rights protected by Article 6 would be voluntarily adopted.Footnote ⁵⁰ Therefore, the question arises as to what these rights are and whether the 2003 Measure complies with them.

IS THE 2003 MEASURE COMPLIANT WITH ARTICLE 6?

The foundational common-law principle when determining whether a tribunal is fair is that ‘justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done’.Footnote ⁵¹ This created a test with two aspects: the degree of bias deemed to be unjust; and the perspective from which the apparent bias should be viewed.Footnote ⁵² Lord Goff of Chieveley in R v Gough reconciled the various strands of jurisprudence flowing from this test when he held that ‘the court should ask itself whether, having regard to those circumstances, there was a real danger of bias on the part of the relevant member of the tribunal in question’.Footnote ⁵³ In other words, the perspective from which the apparent bias should be viewed is the court's. Sir Thomas Bingham MR suggested that the Gough test undermined the principle that justice should not only be done but also be seen to be done.Footnote ⁵⁴ Meanwhile, a different line of jurisprudence from Scotland applied ‘the reasonable apprehension of bias’ test: that is, a test from the perspective of a reasonable person who is aware of the circumstances.Footnote ⁵⁵ This is the test adopted in most common-law jurisdictions and is consistent with Strasbourg jurisprudence.Footnote ⁵⁶ In R v Webb, an Australian case, the court firmly rejected the Gough test and reiterated the Australian test of bias from the perspective of a ‘fair-minded and informed observer’.Footnote ⁵⁷

We can, perhaps, see a degree of English exceptionalism in the reluctance of the English courts to revisit the Gough test on the basis that, in spite of its different formulation, applying that test would, it was believed, result in the same outcome as the reasonable apprehension of bias test in the overwhelming majority of cases.Footnote ⁵⁸ Nonetheless, following the commencement of the 1998 Act, Lord Phillips MR in In re Medicaments and Related Classes of Goods (No 2) proposed that a ‘modest adjustment’ to the Gough test should be adopted to bring England in line with Strasbourg, Scottish and Commonwealth jurisprudence.Footnote ⁵⁹ This adjustment to the Gough test was broadly approved by the Supreme Court with a further adjustment so that the following test (the ‘Magill test’) was proposed by Lord Hope SCJ and adopted: ‘The question is whether the fair-minded and informed observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility that the tribunal was biased.’Footnote ⁶⁰ While this remains the relevant test, it has not been without its critics. For example, there is a question as to what it means to be ‘informed’. If it means being as well informed as the court then it would effectively mean reintroducing the Gough test by the back door. This would be particularly true where, for example, legal, professional conduct or procedural issues were engaged.Footnote ⁶¹ Another critique is that a culturally homogenous judiciary would not be able to formulate an accurate hypothetical fair-minded and informed observer.Footnote ⁶² This is, perhaps, a more compelling critique and one which will be revisited when discussing bias in the Church of England and in the bishops’ role as quasi-judicial decision-makers.

It is, of course, the case that the jurisprudence around bias is applied on a case-by-case basis and it is not within the scope of this article to re-litigate individual 2003 Measure cases. However, it is the regime under the 2003 Measure that will be examined here. While the 1963 Measure and the 2003 Measure regulate their respective regimes, diocesan bishops derive their authority in law to ‘correct and punish’ from the Canons, specifically Canon C 18(7). Sheldon critiques the bishops’ role in 2003 Measure proceedings as being ‘investigator, prosecutor, judge and pastor’.Footnote ⁶³ Meanwhile, Prebendary David Houlding encouraged bishops to decide whether they were wearing ‘the mitre or the wig’.Footnote ⁶⁴ However, when examining the terms of the 2003 Measure, can it be said that the bishop's role is so conflicted that a fair-minded and informed observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility that the 2003 Measure's regime was biased?

It is uncontroversial that diocesan bishops are the chief pastor in their dioceses. They are also, in some traditions in the Church of England, referred as a priest's ‘father or mother in God’. What, therefore, are the roles ascribed to bishops under the 2003 Measure that would conflict with that? We can see that, at the preliminary stage, on receipt of the registrar's report, the bishop has a wide discretion to dismiss the complaint.Footnote ⁶⁵ There is no explicit obligation on the bishop to take into account the registrar's views, as set out in the report under section 11(2). Nonetheless, the complainant is able to appeal the bishop's decision to dismiss the complaint to the president of tribunals, thereby providing a safeguard against an irrational decision to dismiss.Footnote ⁶⁶ At this stage, the bishop is acting as a judge of both fact and law since he or she is determining whether the complainant's version of events is both credible and worthy of punishment. A similar analysis applies to a bishop's decision to take no further action in terms of section 12(1)(a), except that in this case the bishop accepts the complainant's version of events.

At the next stage, apart from taking no further action in terms of section 12(1)(a), the bishop has two broad options: imposing punishment or conciliation but only with the respondent's consent;Footnote ⁶⁷ or directing that the complaint be formally investigated in terms of section 17.Footnote ⁶⁸ The first option involves the bishop acting as both a judge of fact in determining which version of events to prefer and a judge of law in determining the course of action to impose with the respondent's consent. The second option involves the bishop only making a preliminary determination, as the matter then falls to the president of the tribunals to make a determination, including dismissing the matter with no case to answer or referring the matter to be heard in a disciplinary tribunal or the vicar-general's court.Footnote ⁶⁹ Rule 37 of the 2005 Rules protects the disciplinary tribunal and the vicar-general's court from accusations of partiality.Footnote ⁷⁰ Therefore, what we can see is that diocesan bishops have both a quasi-judicial role in terms of section 11 and 12 of the 2003 Measure and the role of chief pastor in their dioceses. These are two distinct and potentially conflicting roles that require bishops to tread the line between justice and mercy. It would not be inconceivable for bishops to find themselves in the invidious position where a merciful pastoral response would appear unjust and vice versa. This means that they do, indeed, wear two hats.

The 2006 Code seeks to address this conflict. Paragraph 91 recognises the fundamental principle that it is important for justice to be seen to be done, as well as actually being done, and provides for bishops to delegate to a suffragan where there is a conflict of interest. However, this is narrowly defined and paragraph 90 states that at all times the diocesan bishop is responsible for administering discipline over clergy, even when they have delegated their function. While it may be arguable that the 2006 Code allows for there to be no actual bias, it is suggested here that these provisions in the 2006 Code fail the appearance of bias test. Therefore, as primary legislation in terms of the 1998 Act, it is suggested that there is at least an arguable case for a court to make a declaration of incompatibility under section 4 of the 1998 Act.

APPLYING THE MAGILL TEST

Previously it was necessary to show that bias was probable but the Magill test means that it is sufficient to show that it is a ‘real possibility’. The bishop's two roles (pastoral and quasi-judicial) mean that bias is, indeed, a real possibility in the following ways: apparent bias, the bishop's personal views, separation of powers, and investigations.

It is almost inevitable that there is a personal relationship between the diocesan bishop and a respondent, owing to bishops having a pastoral care role in respect of their clergy as well as a role in clergy appointments, whether as patron in some instances or otherwise and even as the ultimate gatekeeper when it comes to deciding who will be ordained. In some cases, the personal relationship will be so personal as to be on the spiritual level and lead to there being a real danger of bias either in the complainant's favour if there were animosity or tension between the bishop and the respondent, or in the respondent's favour if they had a sympathetic relationship.Footnote ⁷¹

The Locabail case carves out a judge's general personal views from considering their partiality and so, where a respondent and bishop are at odds over a particularly contentious matter and the bishop is then called upon to act in unrelated 2003 Measure proceedings, this would not in itself show bias.Footnote ⁷² However, that is assuming that a bishop can act with the same degree of judicial professionalism as a trained judge.Footnote ⁷³ On the other hand, a clear statement by a bishop on a matter directly relevant to the 2003 Measure proceedings in hand could, indeed, show bias.Footnote ⁷⁴

As members of General Synod, diocesan bishops are members of the Church of England's legislature. There is therefore an argument that, whether or not they personally were involved in the 2003 Measure's passage through Synod, their role places them in the position of both legislator and judge, necessarily lacking apparent independence.Footnote ⁷⁵

Finally, the registrar and designated officer's roles suggest that bishops are not expected to make their own investigations but this is not explicitly prohibited. If bishops were to investigate, this would undermine their impartiality.Footnote ⁷⁶

The second and third aspects of the Magill test question who the archetypal fair-minded and informed observer is and what it means to be informed. There is no evidence that bishops have been asked to consider their own bias but if they were to do so it is suggested that they would not be in a position to formulate such an archetypal observer. The House of Bishops is notoriously lacking in diversity; while this is also true in the judiciary, bishops are not professional judges and therefore not accustomed to assessing what it would mean to be the objective ‘fair-minded’ person.Footnote ⁷⁷ Similarly, for someone steeped in the workings of the Church of England, it is argued that they would not be in a position to assess what it would mean for the objective observer to ‘informed’.

By analysing the 2003 Measure's regime through the lens of the Magill test in this way, whether or not there is actual bias, from a fair-minded and informed observer's perspective there is a strong argument that there is an appearance of bias. Therefore, it would be open to parties on a case-by-case basis to waive any objection on the ground of bias.Footnote ⁷⁸ By engaging with the penalty by consent process, respondents could be seen to be impliedly waiving their right to object on this ground. However, in the face of a decision-maker who wields a great deal of spiritual and temporal power directly over a respondent, it is suggested that relying on respondents to waive any objections in this way is in itself unfair.

It has been argued that the preliminary stage of the 2003 Measure's regime, where bishops are the decision-makers, is potentially actually biased and certainly has the appearance of bias. There is, perhaps, one redeeming feature, however. In a case where the respondent does not engage with the penalty by consent process, the decision-maker will be the disciplinary tribunal and it is not argued here that the disciplinary tribunal is subject to the same charge of bias as bishops.Footnote ⁷⁹ In general terms the disciplinary tribunal procedures conform to the requirements of a fair trial as protected by Article 6, such as a presumption of innocence, fair notice of what is being alleged and time to prepare a defence, the right to cross-examine, access to legal aid, the right to attend the hearing and put a defence, and the right to receive a public decision. There is a principle that where a decision by an otherwise biased tribunal is reviewable by another unbiased body this may ‘cure’ the bias in the first-instance decision-maker, either through appealing the decision or through the decision-maker being indirectly influenced.Footnote ⁸⁰ Therefore, while it may be argued that 2003 Measure proceedings at the stages where bishops are involved are biased, by operation of this principle it may also be argued that the lack of bias in the tribunals renders the overall regime compliant with Article 6.