Joshua Dubler and Isaac Weiner's edited volume Religion, Law, USA aims to “take stock” of scholarship “at the intersection of American religion and American law,” especially by scholars of American religion (2). The impetus is at least threefold. First, the volume responds to scholarship that has emerged in the decades since Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). With Smith's provocative combination of freedom, sovereignty, indigeneity, the public good, and religious motivation, scholars of American religion “have approached [law] with our own theoretical preoccupations and disciplinary vocabularies, and from our own methodological vantage points” (2). The emergence of the subfield leads Dubler and Weiner to ask three questions: “Why . . . has religion and law emerged as a burgeoning area of study now? What has this recent work enabled us to perceive more clearly about religion, about law, and about American society? What, precisely, are we doing and why?” (3).
Second, the volume tracks the influence of Winnifred Fallers Sullivan's work on scholars of American religion who study law. Sullivan, who penned the volume's instructive afterword, has “inspired a younger generation of scholars, including many of the contributors to this volume, to track the consequences of this pivotal disjuncture [between the discourse of constitutional jurisprudence and the phenomenology of American religious life] across a range of ethnographic sites” (14–15).
Third, Dubler and Weiner want readers “in and beyond the classroom” (19) to ask anew the questions: “Where and how should residents of the United States best pursue justice? What can we reasonably expect of courts of law? What role might religion have to play?” (19). With these three motivations, Dubler and Weiner play to those both inside and outside the subfield of American religion and law. With “heat” and “urgency,” as they say in their introduction (19), Religion, Law, USA highlights the importance of each of the title's three categories to each other and to readers.
As a whole, the volume excels in providing crucial context and summarizing current insights on a topic in one compendium while inviting a space to think beyond the status quo understanding of the topic. Dubler and Weiner achieve their goals for Religion, Law, USA through insightful essays and an innovative, self-reflective structure. The essays are wide-ranging and creative. Along with informative rundowns of expected cases, such as Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879), and Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), are discussions of recent and historical cases involving Muslim immigration bans, work by former poet laureate Joy Harjo, the soundscape of Saint John Coltrane African Orthodox Church in San Francisco, and pop singer Oliva Newton John's “injunction” to “get physical” (59). I can say unequivocally that Religion, Law, USA would be useful in upper-level undergraduate or graduate courses on religion and law, American religions, or religion and politics. Individual essays would find welcome homes in courses on too many subjects to enumerate, from race and religion to posthumanism.
Indeed, this book will be important both for students hoping to enter an existing conversation and for scholars to examine assumptions. How does the book successfully reach both audiences?
First, the volume reaches both audiences though an organization tied to its motivating goals. Dubler and Weiner invited authors to “[s]elect a term . . . and show us what it reveals about the mutual entanglement of religion and law in America” (18). They asked for authors “to ground their explorations in a particular case or event” and “spin out from this discrete site and consider how their selected category might open itself up to any number of productive paths of inquiry,” “guided only by their scholarly interests” (18). This organizing prompt—asking scholars to focus on terms, particular cases or events, and their own interests—has yielded both diagnosis of a subfield and an overview for newcomers. In writing studies, “key terms” are important. Gordon Harvey explains in the widely adapted “Elements of the Academic Essay”Footnote 1 that key terms reveal an author's underlying assumptions (“usually imply certain assumptions”) while also setting the stage for readers to understand the argument. Harvey's claim explains precisely why Dubler and Weiner's prompt is so useful. It both gives definitions and histories with which to work, while also outlining the subfield's operating assumptions.
The volume's structure of four sections of essays guided by the terms, definition, contestation, management, and limits, respectively, provides introduction, analysis, and ways forward for the scholarly conversations regarding each term. For example, in the section “Definition,” the term-oriented introduction and prompt allows students to readily grasp the overdetermination of belief in the U.S. courts’ definition of religion through Sarah Imhoff's essay “Belief.” The essays within “Management” frame broadly categories of law that relate to religion. For instance, they include Heather White's essay, “Sexuality,” on the fascinating history and myths surrounding sodomy laws. Also in “Management,” the prompt encourages scholars of religion and law to think with Ashon Crawley's statement that “Noise is an ethics of otherwise possibilities, another modality, otherwise verve and vibration” (169). The reader thinking about what the book is doing, and what that reader will do after the book, cannot but wonder what religion and law would look like if its scholars adopted “an ethics of otherwise possibilities.”
The volume's organization is so effective because it reveals the debates within the subfield and engrains self- and community-reflection in the assumptions each term unravels. Some works in the volume see law and religion as necessarily distinct, others, less so. In contrast to Sullivan's emphasis on theories of law and norms, Dubler and Weiner call norms “law's less discrete cousin;” they refer to law as “firmament,” an element like “water or air,” whereas religion is “force” (5–6). They say, “As an ethnographic matter, law—by which we mean law as such—borders on the untheorizeable” (6). In Jason Bivins's essay, “The Secular,” he distinguishes law from religion, saying “Religion, however, is not a simple or stable category”—here, Bivins implies that law is simpler and more stable—“thus, it is not always conducive to the kind of clarity law seeks” (207). From these essays, readers see the varied assumptions and important histories behind law, religion, and the United States of America.
However, the book also effectively addresses both scholars and students precisely because religion and law cultivate norms, as Sullivan points out in her afterword, citing Robert Cover, Marie Ashe, and others. Not only do both law and religion cultivate norms, but, as the essays in this volume also allude to, religion and law both prioritize goods and seek to organize the disorganized. If law and religion each cultivates norms, it is no surprise that a volume on both can simultaneously educate on existing norms and encourage the reader to think about what those norms inhibit, how the norms may further develop, and where those norms may lead. Sullivan suggests that scholars of American religion should study the law “as a distinct cultural product” (285) specifically by studying law beyond the United States and legal subjectivity. I am eager to assign some of the readings in these areas that Sullivan suggests alongside chapters from Religion, Law, USA and primary source material referenced by the essays.
The line that may become most memorable from this volume opens Sullivan's afterword: “US religious studies has got law!” (283). On the one hand, the statement reveals enthusiasm (the exclamation point), as does the next sentence, which refers to Religion, Law, USA as “this rich and useful volume” (283). However, Sullivan's statement also reveals how potentially idiosyncratic the subfield of American religion and law could be without looking beyond itself, which thankfully, this volume does. The subfield is mostly people with PhDs from religion programs (mostly not in theology) in American religions or adjoining fields, most of whom do not have law degrees and have not practiced law but are nevertheless interested in how the law defines religion. This is a fairly small population (one I, at least partially, consider myself part of), smaller even than the broader audience of this journal. Sullivan thus joins Dubler and Weiner in inviting readers to think about audience and scholarly patterns, to reflect on what the subfield is doing.
Sullivan indirectly encourages US religious studies to ask a most basic question: For whom do we write when scholars of American religion write about law? Other scholars of American religion? Scholars of law? The courts? Scholars of American religion who write about law? Students? This volume engages many of these audiences and at the same time raises concerns about not engaging them. Kathryn Lofton's “Friend” chapter on amicus briefs highlights how useless juries have found amicus briefs by scholars of American religions. Vincent Lloyd's chapter, “Hope,” suggests we will have to find hope outside the courts. Many of the essays in the volume describe or interpret the past rather than telling readers what to do about it. However, because religion and law each cultivate norms, the volume itself also sways toward the creation of norms, the setting of an agenda for the subfield, the possibility to reach beyond it, to think “otherwise,” as Crawley says.
After the Smith case, scholars of American religion have found, according to Sullivan, that “law—understood as the positive law of the state—is seen to mostly get religion wrong—at least religion as we in religious studies understand it” (283). The book is then also an opportunity to think about the interpretive mode of correction. The book's compelling set of essays suggests it is necessary to correct the law's misunderstanding of religion, but perhaps not sufficient, especially if Sullivan is right that a pattern is emerging where issuing the corrective comprises the argument. Sullivan implores scholars of American religion: “But we must also complicate our understanding of law” (283). Like scholars of religion find religion everywhere, Sullivan argues that “the best scholarship on law—by those in the humanities and those in the social sciences—begins with the assumption that law is everywhere” (285).
Religion, Law, USA begins to answer Sullivan's call. I found several essays especially useful in extending beyond the corrective view of religion scholarship on the law. For example, Dubler and Weiner refer to law as an “archive”—“for today's students of American religions” because “Court cases and other legal documents provide extraordinary access to subterranean religious discourses, practices, and histories” (16). In “Sovereignty,” Tisa Wenger helps broaden the understanding of a legal archive by pointing to the Bureau of Indian Affairs, where “BIA agents, not legislators or the US courts, created most of the systems and rules that governed Indians” (117). Wenger explains that “This process illustrates how the law is made, not merely enforced, through the mechanisms of bureaucracy and executive action” (117). Following a review of amicus briefs, Lofton suggests that instead of repeatedly correcting the courts’ understanding of religion as predominantly Christian, an approach that has not historically succeeded in influencing court opinions, scholars of religion might instead explain “how the subjects of the state (parents and children, associations and individuals) have been religiously determined and historically mutable” (244). Fellow contributor Kathleen Holscher begins to do just this: she examines “the relationship between the federal government and the Indigenous people—colonizer and colonized—as that between guardians and wards” by looking at appellee briefs, among other sources (102).
To continue answering Sullivan's call, we might ask: What else makes the legal archive? Dubler and Weiner's phrase “other legal documents” reminds us that legal documents are everywhere, from the Terms and Conditions of your most recent purchase to the waiver you sign at your local yoga studio. Court decisions do not comprise the totality of law. Before decisions are ever made, case files include briefs, evidence, and much more. There are meetings with clients and courtroom procedures.
In my own work on religion and race in twentieth-century public education, I argue that religion forms ideas about race, as well as the purposes of public education. Religion cannot be “removed from” or “inserted into” public education, especially when issues of race have shaped twentieth-century public education, because it is already there. Intersections of religion and law have shaped how we think about racial integration and youth crime and how policy makers, parents, and children alike have tried to enact change. The Supreme Court found devotional Bible-reading and prayer in public schools unconstitutional. That finding does not mean that the courts are necessarily right nor all-powerful in determining public consciousness. I do not need to focus on the courts to prove that they got religion “wrong,” because the cases were about specific scenarios, and there are other places to look for explaining the intersections of religion and law. “The mutual entanglement of religion and law in America” (18) that Dubler and Weiner name is abundant in the archives my research examines: school plays on “brotherhood” and the disciplinary records of acts by students that administrators deemed violated “moral and spiritual values.” These traditionally educational archives are part of the archive of law and religion, I show. Dubler and Weiner's premise of “mutual entanglement” rejects the definition of religion that a famous court case invokes. Dubler and Weiner imply that the prohibition on “excessive government entanglement” articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), is hard to follow because entanglement is hard to avoid. Entanglement of religion and law is their starting point. The essays in the volume reinforce the starting point and begin to take us elsewhere.
At the 2019 American Academy of Religion conference in San Diego, the Law, Religion, and Culture Unit hosted a panel on Religion, Law, USA in which panelists not featured in the volume offered terms that do not appear in the volume, including “justice” and “time.” (Disclosure: I serve on this unit.) The panel was exciting because it made clear that more volumes of Religion, Law, USA could develop the work the book has begun. What other terms might emerge? Perhaps more legal terminology: rights, case, client, lawyer? Or terms that further unpack the intersections of religion and law, such as norms, inquisition, rituals, transformation, and education?
Religion, Law, USA crucially “takes stock” of the field, after the Smith case and Sullivan's Impossibility of Religious Freedom.Footnote 2 The question of “[w]here and how should residents of the United States best pursue justice” (19) is trickier, however. Justice relates to the question of the legal archive—what it is and whose stories appear in it. Perhaps another volume could tell us how, specifically. Telling a full, honest story, asking hard questions, and pursuing understanding: these goals are intrinsically related to the stories absent from traditional archives, legal and otherwise.
From Religion, Law, USA one walks away with interesting reflections, new sources to read, and ideas for where to look for more. Now, I imagine students and scholars will want to take this volume further to discuss yet another set of questions: Does justice look like a larger archive and more scholarly sources? Is the goal of law and religion scholarship to pursue justice, or to find out where and how to pursue it? And, justice for whom?
