This intellectual history of the English economist George Lennox Sharman Shackle is part of the Great Thinkers in Economics series. Shackle was an important heterodox thinker who was influenced by, and influenced, both Keynesians and Austrians, and gave us an important alternate perspective on choice theory, so this is a welcome addition to the series. And the authors, experts on, and sympathetic but not sycophantic to, Shackle, are well suited to fill this void.
Interestingly, the book begins with Donald Rumsfeld’s famous quote about “unknown unknowns,” and defends it as a Shackle-like point, which I think is correct. Earl and Littleboy argue that, as Shackle contended, “we create the future; it is not sitting there merely beyond our epistemic grasp” (p. 1). This leads to a summary statement of Shackle’s political economy: “A society of Shackle’s design would rely more on the imagination and judgment of decision-makers and less on technical expertise” (p. 2).
They then quote a passage from Shackle on why probability cannot be applied to many real-life situations:
Napoleon could not repeat … Waterloo a hundred times in the hope that, in a certain proportion of cases, the Prussians would arrive too late. His decision to fight … was what I call a crucial experiment.… Had he won, repetition would for a long time have been unnecessary; when he lost, repetition was impossible. (p. 3)
Based upon this understanding of choice, Shackle was very critical of mainstream economics. He wrote: “In sum ... predicted man is less than human, predicting man is more than human,” and, “The standard economic theory of choice does not in fact permit genuine choice” (both quoted on p. 11). The authors quote Kurt Klappholz, who notes that Shackle’s views “have attracted considerable attention from philosophers. Yet I do not think it is unfair to say that Shackle’s impact on economics has been limited ...” (p. 12). They then quote Shackle: “Economics is not pure logic but, quite in contrast with such a character, it is part of the endeavor to describe the integral nature of man” (p. 13). So Shackle’s interests lay in philosophical economics, Footnote 1 which is all well and good. But there is no inherent conflict between scientific economics and philosophical economics: such conflict arises only if one or the other misunderstands its own calling. Footnote 2
Shackle did not believe that advanced, technical economics offered much to the policymaker. What was needed was a person of “conscience” and “a generous mind.” Given that, the economic training needed to make good policy was then “based in economic history, and … only … as much theory as you find up to the second-year textbook” (p. 21).
Shackle attempted to reconcile Friedrich A. Hayek’s business cycle theory with that of John Maynard Keynes. The authors contend that this was futile: “The thought systems of Keynes and Hayek … are irreconcilable” (p. 25). But this claim ignores recent work, such as Tyler Goodspeed (Reference Goodspeed2012), that shows that Keynes and Hayek are, in fact, quite compatible.
The authors go on to discuss Shackle’s relationship with the Austrian school, particularly with Ludwig Lachmann. But their claim that the Austrian school has “an intense methodological preference for equilibrium” (p. 44) seems wrong, since Austrians frequently criticize the mainstream for its focus on … equilibrium!
They then examine Shackle’s rejection of the notion that a singular event can meaningfully be said to have probability x . Shackle puts forward an example in which England and Australia are to have a cricket match. But, instead of the usual coin toss to decide who bats first, England has managed to get the matter decided on the toss of a die, where a 1 will mean Australia bats first, and, with any other number, England will do so. He asks, “Can we now give any meaningful answer whatever to the question ‘Who will bat first?’ except ‘We do not know’?” (p. 63).
The authors reject Shackle’s agnosticism here, claiming: “Of course, the right answer is ‘England will, most probably’” (p. 64). But this simply begs the question that Shackle was raising: In the case of a single event, what exactly do we mean when we assert its probability is x ? Of course, everyone agrees that if a long series of matches takes place with this method of determining who is to bat first, England will do so most often. In defense of their view, the authors note that a bettor will want to place his bet on England. But that appears to rely on the fact that a repeated series of such bets will pay off; i.e., on a frequency-based interpretation of probability, one that Shackle endorses.
When looking at a formal theory of choice under uncertainty, there are (at least) three questions one might ask about it:
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1) Is it mathematically sound?
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2) Should people be applying it in some or all situations, and, if some, which ones?
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3) Do people actually reason that way?
Our authors sometimes seem to be mixing these three questions together, to the detriment of their analysis. For instance, they contend, “Whether probability is relevant [to single cases, rather than to a sequence of repeated trials] is testable even by simple thought experiments” (p. 71). The result they claim will hold—I think, correctly—is that, in the situations they describe, many people would indeed apply probabilistic reasoning. But this hardly addresses Shackle’s point: he was arguing against applying probabilistic reasoning to single cases precisely because he knew people do so. So, showing that people do so merely indicates he was not tilting at windmills.
Earl and Littleboy are rather critical of Shackle’s unwillingness to compromise his ideas so that they could gain more mainstream acceptance. For instance, regarding his complete rejection of case probability, they write: “Shackle rebelled, and he lost. His tactics and timing were not quite right.… The reward even from partial victory could well have been a Noble Prize” (p. 81). They seem to be putting forward a notion that one’s ideas are valid to the extent they gain you accolades and prizes! But, if Shackle was correct in his most radical proposals, wasn’t he right to stick to his guns, even if it cost him recognition? And if those ideas were wrong, isn’t that the reason he should have changed them?
Earl and Littleboy highlight a very interesting aspect of Shackle’s thought that is generally neglected in microeconomic analysis: namely, the utility gained (or lost) while anticipating a very good (or very bad) outcome of some choice, noting that such anticipation may itself be part of the utility function for some choice (p. 104).
Earl and Littleboy then describe what they regard as an empirical test of Shackle’s (non-probabilistic) theory of choice under uncertainty done by John D. Hey in the 1980s. The subjects were presented with three uncertain situations, asked to produce an exhaustive list of what might occur in each case, and then asked to rate each case in terms of possibility, probability, and potential surprise. The authors sum up the result of the experiment as follows: “Though Hey’s findings were problematic for both Shackleian and probabilistic analyses of expectations … they were more damaging to Shackle’s approach” (p. 134).
However, based on the description in the book, this does not seem like a fair test of Shackle’s theory. Shackle says that in typical situations, people do not exhaustively list possible outcomes and then assign a probability weight to each; instead, they consider only certain attention-grabbing possibilities. To test this, Hey apparently told the subjects to make an exhaustive list of possibilities and assign probability weights to them! I suppose the results show that his subjects can follow directions, but they certainly do not refute Shackle.
The authors engage in an interesting comparison between Shackle’s theory of choice and prospect theory, developed chiefly by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (pp. 173–174). They argue that Shackle’s idea of “life-changing events” can explain an S-shaped value function better than prospect theory can.
While this volume offers much illumination about key ideas of Shackle’s, its overall focus is odd for something presented as an intellectual biography: a great deal of space is taken up with the theme of how Shackle could have done better, or how he has been improved upon by those he has influenced (such as Earl, who has sixteen works cited in the bibliography). Meanwhile, large areas of Shackle’s work, such as his macroeconomics and his history of thought, are barely touched upon.
Despite these flaws, this book provides a very good introduction to Shackle’s central concern—his theory of choice under uncertainty—and provides an excellent starting point for anyone wishing to become familiar with this important heterodox thinker.
