Constitutional patriotism has in recent years become an influential, though controversial, concept within European Union (EU) studies generally and within EU political and legal theory in particular. The idea is most typically associated with the work of Habermas and is seen by many as a desirable compromise between the dangers of nationalism and the idealism of cosmopolitanism. Müller, at one point in the book, usefully asks, “What is the question, in other words, to which constitutional patriotism is supposed to be the answer?” (46–47). Müller's account of the purpose of constitutional patriotism is an abstract one: its purpose, as a theory, is to provide a foundation for political rule in terms of underlying beliefs and dispositions. Instead of such rule being based on, for example, a blind acceptance of or loyalty towards a rigid, unchanging set of cultural beliefs, Müller prefers an approach which involves a procedural, critical disposition toward a set of essential constitutional beliefs. This is an important point and it is one that will be returned to below.
However, for the moment, it is also possible to provide a much more instrumental answer to Müller's initial question—at least as far as EU studies are concerned. On this account, the problem, for which constitutional patriotism is the answer, lies in the so-called democratic deficit of the European Union, and specifically with the associated no-demos thesis. One of the arguments often made about EU democracy is that it is no use trying to fix the democratic shortcomings of the Union simply by granting more and more power to the European Parliament via, for example, increased use of the legislative co-decision procedure. Such a top-down form of institutional rearrangement may be necessary in democratic terms—the European Parliament being the only directly elected institution at EU level; however, it is not sufficient, because a properly functioning democracy cannot work without an appropriate, bottom-up demos or people. And at EU level, we have multiple demoi or peoples within the various member states, but not a single demos. How then might one create a demos? In the absence of a shared European cultural identity, the answer that constitutional patriotism provides is to look, instead, to a form of postnational civic identity around a set of common European constitutional values. Such an approach is appealing on one level, because it appears to provide a neutral solution which does not involve suspect recourse to an essentialized European ethno-cultural identity, and is thus in tune with the realities of modern, multicultural Europe. However, it has been widely criticized—both by liberal nationalists and republicans, who doubt whether a shared set of values can easily be located at European level among such a diversity of state constitutional traditions, and thus whether a political community can be created at supranational level—and by cosmopolitans, who see no reason why the democratic experiment should stop at the European level.
Müller's book falls into three sections. In the first and most successful section, he locates the origins of constitutional patriotism in post-war Germany and with its associated political theorists such as Sternberger and Habermas. Here, constitutional patriotism can be seen as an obviously safer example of patriotism to the ethno-cultural experience of the Third Reich. However, as Müller argues, rather than being purely a universalist response to a nationalist past, German constitutional patriotism also contained “supplements of particularity” in the form of “memory” and “militancy” (10). In this sense, it is a critical or reflexive and also defensive version of constitutional patriotism: it involves a critical remembering of the horrors of the Holocaust and also a defense of democracy against those (such as the Baader-Meinhof terrorists) who would seek to abuse or undermine it.
In the second section, Müller sets out his normative theory of constitutional patriotism. He sets out reasonably clearly what constitutional patriotism is not (it is not, for example, itself a theory of justice, though it does apparently involve an account of fairness and justice; neither is it necessarily supportive of a solidarity-based welfare state). He then also seeks to distinguish elements of constitutional patriotism from other concepts and theories. Thus, for example, he claims that constitutional patriotism is not the same as civic nationalism—not only because nationalism is typically associated with states in a way which constitutional patriotism need not be, but also because, unlike civic nationalism, constitutional patriotism involves a more transformative, critical moral psychology. However, it is also implicit that his version of constitutional patriotism is not like civic nationalism because it is more than just civic. One of the key criticisms of many theories of constitutional patriotism is that, in their lofty civic-mindedness, they provide rather a thin glue to hold citizens together (“patriotism for professors” in Müller's terms, 44). Müller's theory wants to provide a thicker conception of constitutional patriotism, however, bringing a dose of cultural particularity to be swallowed along with the civic medicine.
This brings a novel element to the debate. In essence, Müller accuses critics of constitutional patriotism of attacking a caricature of the concept. The caricature is that constitutional patriotism involves the reification of a set of civic substantive values in a written constitution protected behind a glass exhibition case. However, Müller's version of constitutional patriotism is, as noted earlier, much more about a critical procedural approach to constitutional essentials, located very much within a particular constitutional culture. His version of constitutional patriotism is thus, as he puts it, “Janus faced” (77): it contains elements of the universal, but is also particular; it is partly civic, but also partly cultural; it idealizes, but is also critical.
While this theory of constitutional patriotism seems to fit well with the situation in post-war Germany, the question is whether it can be universalized. Müller's final chapter attempts to test this by applying the theory to the EU. Unfortunately, it is at this point that things become unstuck. As Müller points out, the Second World War might, at first sight, be thought to form an underlying memory for the EU—it was of course one of the reasons for the creation of the original European Communities. However, Müller rightly rejects this, arguing that European memories of the war are divided and divisive. What then of militancy? Having toyed with the idea of the sanctioning of Austria in connection with Haider's far-right Freedom Party amounting to an example of defensive militancy, Müller also eventually rejects this, inter alia because of the potential, in defending democracy, for the defeat of values of free speech and association held dear by constitutional patriots. Müller is thus forced to abandon the supplements of particularity in relation to the EU, falling back instead on “a constitutional culture centred on universalist liberal-democratic norms and values, refracted and interpreted through particular historical experiences” (136).
So, what is the core constitutional morality specific to the EU identified by Müller? Unfortunately, the answer is somewhat elusive. After a somewhat confusing analysis of the trade-based doctrine of mutual recognition in terms of the politics of recognition, he stresses the need for a readable constitution before identifying the core EU values as “mutual respect and learning, civilized confrontation, and consensus-fashioning” (136), while preserving space for patriotic attachment within member states. Müller wants contestatory constitutionalism, but he does not want a continuous revolution: he argues for a basic level of readability and stability. Apart from this preference for a written constitution, we seem to have ended up in territory that Weiler has explored before in his classic piece on eros and civilization in The Constitution of Europe (Cambridge: CUP, 1999). And while Müller may have started with a thick version of constitutional patriotism, by the end of the book we are left once more with a relatively thin one.
