The social and political history of the Middle East has often been written as though middle social strata did not exist or were unimportant. For the successor states of the Ottoman Empire, the master narrative has been the ascendance of the landed bureaucratic notability during the 19th century, its achievement of hegemony in the interwar period, and its deposition in the 1950s by army officers of peasant extraction. Such narratives often reflect a teleological nationalism, a stereotypical Orientalist vision of essentialized difference, and a simplistic collaboration/resistance dichotomy in treating the colonial experience. Based on wide and deep archival research and critical reading of a range of theoretical and comparative literature, Keith Watenpaugh's Being Modern in the Middle East attempts to correct such analyses through a close examination of the Aleppine middle classes in the first half of the 20th century. This is a rich and provocative work and is especially compelling in its depiction of the contingency of historical experience, but in the end it is only a first essay in the writing of a new social history from the middle. In part this is due to the daunting ambition of the author's project, which interrogates such large concepts as modernity and “middle-classness” itself, a project that cannot be easily contained in one book. Also, the book is limited in its treatment of its own case study, ironically omitting certain segments of the Aleppine middle class and aspects of the middle-class experience from its analysis. It would, however, be churlish to criticize an author for not doing what he does not propose to do, and Watenpaugh's book should be regarded as a call to other scholars to employ his insights and engage with his proposals in their own studies.
As his title implies, Watenpaugh is concerned with how the Aleppine middle class—principally that fraction in the bureaucracy and liberal professions, particularly its Christian and especially Greek Catholic members—engaged with “modernity” during the period between the 1908 “Young Turk” revolution and the achievement of full Syrian independence in 1946. In so doing, he presents an analysis not only of how the putatively universal notions of modernity that arose in Western Europe were received and reshaped in the non-West but also of the idea of modernity itself. For Watenpaugh, modernity and middle-class status were mutually constitutive; his “middle-class modernity” is “a transnational phenomenon whereby being modern and being middle class became intertwined, if not one and the same thing, in the consciousness and praxis of members of emergent middle classes” (p. 10). Modernity itself is taken here as a corpus of ideas and practices that reflect a commitment to Enlightenment notions of reason, progress, and individual subjectivity. The middle class is treated as “more than a neutral economic category, but rather . . . an intellectual, social, and cultural construct linked to a set of historical and material circumstances” (p. 19), and the essential criterion for membership in it is access to formal education. Although both modernity and middle classness are universal phenomena, they are also contingent on historical specificity. Watenpaugh strives to underscore that contingency, an emphasis that is especially important because “modernity presupposes an absolute subject position, one that does not—and cannot—acknowledge its own contingency” (p. 13).
After a pair of introductory chapters that lay out his theoretical problematic and map Aleppo and Aleppine society as they were constituted at the turn of the 20th century, Watenpaugh segments his book into three main sections, each analyzing how the Aleppine middle class practiced being modern during three distinct historical moments: the Second Constitutional Period (1908–18), the moment of “anxiety” that accompanied the destruction of the Ottoman Empire and its ultimate replacement by a set of successor states (1918–24), and the colonial moment of the French Mandate (1925–46). Throughout, the core drama, as it were, is the conflict between the middle class as it sought to assert its right to a prominent place in public life (and to redefine public life itself) because of its commitment to modernity, and the landed notability, which was prepared to use the technologies of modernity and selected middle-class moderns to defend its hegemony while lacking any real commitment to modernity itself. That the leading spokesmen for modernity among the Aleppine middle class were Greek Catholics, and the notability exclusively Sunni Muslims, added an important sectarian dimension to this struggle. But Watenpaugh is at pains to stress that this struggle was ultimately not between sects but between worldviews: one a liberal, progressive, and rational concept of society and citizenship, the other a “reactionary illiberal gerontocratic” vision (p. 276).
With such a wide-ranging book it is difficult to select the most exemplary sections. For this reviewer, Being Modern makes its most significant contributions in the second and third sections, perhaps especially the former. Watenpaugh's discussion of how newspapers such as Halab, historians like Raghib al-Tabbakh and Kamil al-Ghazzi, and such soldier-bureaucrats as Ibrahim Hananu tried to make sense of the chaotic period surrounding the Ottoman collapse in 1918 and its slow supplanting by a putative nation–state system epitomizes his stress on contingency. Watenpaugh reminds us that despite the nation–state being the modal modern political unit, its success was not foreordained. The Faysali administration and its mouthpieces such as Halab faced a tall order in convincing the peoples under its rule that they were “Syrians” or “Arabs,” and meanwhile Ottoman identities and the social order that the empire had endorsed remained powerful attractants until the definitive abolition of the sultanate and caliphate in 1923 and 1924. Watenpaugh reiterates what should be the now-familiar observation that neither Mustafa Kemal nor Ibrahim Hananu was at this moment a nationalist. Yet he goes further by rescuing the authors of the Sivas Declaration from accusations of disguised Turkish racialist nationalism and by taking to task proponents of “popular nationalism” for buying into the teleological and essentialist assumptions of old-fashioned nationalism (pp. 182–83), much as he earlier critiques proponents of “alternative modernity.” Here Watenpaugh shows his acute perception of the drawbacks of both formerly dominant essentialist paradigms and the postcolonial ones proposed to replace them.
In the third section, the problems of colonial modernity and the intrinsic ambivalence of the middle class come to the fore. Watenpaugh's portrait of the fraught relationship between the Christian intellectual Edmond Rabbath and the Sunni notable Saʿdallah al-Jabiri, his nuanced discussion of the “colonial contract” between France and its presumed Uniate clients, which considerably complicates the usual collaboration/resistance paradigm, and his meditations on the attractions of fascism and the mutations in forms of urban violence during the 1936 confrontation that brought to power the notable-led National Bloc all demonstrate an incisive intellect.
The “coda” to the book suggests a theory of the middle class and an agenda for further investigations into the problems that the discussion of Aleppo highlights. As Watenpaugh admits, his is the first monograph to attempt to demonstrate the linkage between modernity and the (Eastern Mediterranean) urban middle class, and it does not aspire to comprehensiveness. But still there seem to be some significant lacunae. At root this is an intellectual and cultural history, and the middle class is largely defined by its cultural praxis. Although Watenpaugh mentions the economic bases of the middle class, merchants and industrialists are almost completely absent from his narrative, and there are very few glimpses (apart from a tantalizing discussion of how the Mandate-period reconstruction of Aleppo's Armenian refugee camps encapsulated middle-class notions of space) of the materiality of middle-class existence. Also largely absent are the Muslim members of the middle class, and on occasion Watenpaugh appears to conflate his Greek-Catholic intelligentsia with the middle class as a whole. A consideration of such Aleppines as Muhammad Saʿid al-Zaʿim, the Sunni merchant-industrialist who acted as the apostle of modernity to the Greek-Catholic Chamber of Commerce president (and arguable notable) Salim Janbart, much as Rabbath served Jabiri, would extend and probably complicate Watenpaugh's argument to other functional and sectarian segments of the middle class. Such criticisms aside, and despite some minor errors (e.g., the Baʿth took power in 1963 through a coup, not elections [p. 300]; Khalid Bakdash was a Damascene, not an Aleppine [p. 245]), this is a remarkable essay in history from the middle that should serve as a challenge to social, cultural, and intellectual historians and not just those concerned with the Middle East.
