It is with astonishment that one greets the news that correspondence between Machiavelli, Erasmus, and More has been discovered after being lost for five centuries. These letters, along with other unpublished documents, have been brought to light by Philippe Bénéton and assembled in The Kingdom Suffereth Violence. You may be tempted to wonder why the discovery of these writings was not bigger news. Much of what is contained in this volume is revelatory. Did you know that Machiavelli contacted Erasmus in 1517 and provided him with a copy of The Prince; that Erasmus forwarded a copy of The Prince to More and wrote a critical letter back to Machiavelli; that More wrote a supplement to his Utopia inspired by The Prince and sent this supplement to Machiavelli; that Machiavelli wrote back to More, condemning the unpublished supplement along with the published Utopia; that More responded to Machiavelli, explaining his strategies and intentions with Utopia? Many of these exchanges were extremely nasty: More says that Machiavelli's short-sighted political vision “shrinks the world” (147); Erasmus writes that Machiavelli's “soul is as pure as the public latrines” (63) and that he should be hanged (84); Machiavelli, in turn, says to Erasmus “a blind man knows more about colors than glorious Erasmus about public affairs” (87).
These lost documents are so remarkable that it all seems too good to be true. And indeed it is. As a reviewer it is hard to spoil a joke, but the “correspondence” is fictional, the creation of Bénéton. Originally written in French, the text is wonderfully translated by Paul Archambault, who, it is said, also provides the footnotes (2). The ruse is quite effective. If you read it casually you might miss the joke, until the end of the book which contains letters by Machiavelli and More from “beyond the grave”—Machiavelli writing from “downstairs” and More from “upstairs” (227–31). Hints that this book is not what it appears are provided at the start. On page 1, Bénéton claims the letters were discovered in Florence in the archives of the unlikely named “Palazzo Tuttofare” (Handyman's Palace). The authenticity of these letters, we are told, was firmly established in 2007–8, owing in part to a “day's colloquium” organized by the mysterious “Institute for Utopian Studies” on the nonexistent “Island of Abraxa”—the original name More gives to his imaginary island Utopia. On page 2, and buried in the first footnote, we learn the names of scholars who determined the authenticity of these documents: “R. Hellish,” who published in “Vol. 666” of Utopian Studies, and “A. Sbagliato” (Italian for “mistaken”). You can also contact “Signora T. Stultitia” (Mrs. Folly) at the Palazzo Tuttofare regarding the correspondence. Ultimately this volume is a work of folly, but in the spirit of More and Erasmus it is serious folly. It is also, in the spirit of Machiavelli, a work of deception, which, I suspect, will fool some into purchasing the text thinking it contains authentic correspondence. It may also trick the occasional student writing a term paper or a careless professor looking for a quick reference. Only in Appendix II does Bénéton ask the “shades” of Erasmus, More, and Machiavelli to “forgive us this offhand manner we have of writing apocryphal works” (237). But the comment itself is offhand: you might miss it, just as you might miss the publishing information at the front of the text which declares that the “correspondence” of each man is “fiction” (iv).
Notwithstanding the deceptive front, The Kingdom Suffereth Violence is a serious work of political philosophy. Through these imaginary letters and documents, Bénéton resurrects the spirits of these three men to explore two main issues: the art of governing and the art of writing. In addition, Bénéton raises significant questions about the founding of modernity. He imbeds these forged letters within actual history, taking, as he says, “no liberties with dates, places, facts, works” (237). Bénéton is successful in taking on the voice of each man, revealing extensive knowledge of the authentic primary sources and the secondary literature, all listed in the footnotes and appendices (this time with real scholars and texts). The three primary sources that loom largest are Erasmus's Praise of Folly, Machiavelli's Prince, and More's Utopia. The book is largely an effort to grapple with these texts. As Bénéton's introduction points out, these works have been subjected to wildly different and often contradictory interpretations. This is due to the fact that all three men wrote “indirectly,” not saying exactly what they meant or what their intentions were, and requiring astute readers to attend to their texts more carefully. Bénéton argues they each had various reasons for taking this approach: to avoid persecution by political and religious authorities; to write texts properly suited to particular individuals or small groups; to delight the masses with humor, and thereby distract inattentive readers from the serious, and potentially dangerous, teaching underneath. Bénéton admits that his method of reading classic texts owes much to the work of Leo Strauss, especially Persecution and the Art of Writing (though Bénéton rejects Strauss's political philosophy, which reserves “life in the truth to a few ‘real’ philosophers”) (239). There were good reasons for More, Erasmus, and Machiavelli to be concerned with how their words were perceived. More would eventually be executed because of his refusal to consent to the king's separation from the Catholic Church; Erasmus and Machiavelli would end up (posthumously) on the Church's Index of condemned works.
More and Erasmus try to write prudentially to mock the abuses of power and the corruption of the church, in the hopes of revitalizing Christian civilization; Machiavelli, with his countless equivocations, duplicities, and contradictions, writes as a slippery conspirator in the hopes of founding a radical new order that departs from classical and Christian teachings. Bénéton uses the same techniques as the writers he is depicting: deception, humor, trickery, deliberate contradiction, and the occasional shock. As Bénéton puts it, he takes “a leaf from their book, while attempting to see through their game” (237). One suspects that Bénéton took this approach to combat what he calls the “spirit of seriousness” in contemporary academia, which in his estimation is compromising interpretations of classic texts (238). Notwithstanding Bénéton's reliance on and respect for modern scholarship, he suggests the world has too many peer-reviewed works by earnest researchers trying to establish their reputations; what contemporary scholarship in the humanities lacks is a genuine sense of play. Bénéton endeavors to remedy this by taking a fresh approach—albeit one that a junior scholar would be foolhardy to imitate. The Kingdom Suffereth Violence, as opposed to many scholarly works produced today, is a joy to read; but onus is put on the reader to interpret the text, not simply to receive a lesson. As with the best classic texts, it invites attentive participation, not mere passive reception.
In the debates between More, Erasmus, and Machiavelli, there is no clear victor, but the main division is clear: Bénéton's More and Erasmus are, for the most part, on one side, and Machiavelli on the other. In terms of the art of writing, Erasmus and More use “games of wit,” employ the “art of precautions,” and practice a “pedagogy of truth” when they write, all in the hopes of improving the character of Christian Europe (209). They seek a rejuvenated Christianity, but one in accord with the Renaissance humanism of their day. They denounce the folly of corrupt politicians and church authorities through pleasurable works of folly, but point the way toward what Erasmus calls “the extraordinary folly which is life in Christ” (218). Politically, More and Erasmus want princes whose ambitions are tempered by Christian ethics. As More contends, a prince's power is truly legitimate if he serves the people, not himself (146). On this matter, Erasmus and More denounce Machiavelli as a stereotypical “Machiavellian”—as an evil advisor of evil tyrants and a corrupter of the true art of government. Central to their critique is Machiavelli's account of “necessity”: that a prince, if he hopes to stay in power, must do whatever is “necessary” even if it is held to be evil. Erasmus and More both argue that Machiavelli's prince, in his constant quest for more power, will entangle himself in unnecessary “necessities” rather than necessary evils. As Erasmus puts it, the mad pursuit of unlimited power often assumes the duplicitous mask of “necessity” (78). But, as it turns out, Machiavelli has something even more radical in mind. He is not a mere advisor to “ordinary princes” like the Medici (170–71). Machiavelli is less concerned with geographical principalities or republics than he is with establishing a new (a)moral civilization.
Bénéton's Machiavelli reveals his secrets (or at least appears to) in an undisclosed document not sent to More or Erasmus (149–75). Through this document, Bénéton presents Machiavelli as a king without an actual kingdom (174–75), as the “hidden prince” of modernity—a depiction which Bénéton derives from the work of Harvey Mansfield (especially Machiavelli's Virtue [University of Chicago Press, 1996]). Machiavelli's “kingdom” is not one of necessity; it is, rather, a kingdom of radical freedom. Careless readers of Machiavelli will think he teaches it is permissible to deviate from the “good” as long as it is politically “necessary.” But even this teaching assumes that the “good” and “necessity” are fixed points to guide us. There are no permanent fixed points. Machiavelli's ultimate teaching is meant for what he calls “new men” who are enjoined to live life without a compass, be it one of morality or necessity (173). Though Machiavelli speaks frequently of “necessity” in The Prince, he wants to move beyond any sense of “necessity,” “the good,” “natural law,” or an “order of things,” all of which limit freedom in politics and writing, to say nothing of our private lives. Bénéton's Machiavelli declares: “I undermine necessity and ruin the idea of the good. It follows that I create a new freedom” (172). Exactly what this new freedom means, beyond “having a good time” (174), is not made clear, but it appears that the new men of modernity will have fun using their freedom to conquer fortune.
Bénéton suggests that Machiavelli's vision was historically triumphant: that the modern world, with its quest for boundless freedom, is essentially his baby and nihilistic at its core. But Bénéton gives the last word to More from the afterlife. Writing to the spirit of Machiavelli “downstairs,” More refers to a mysterious passage from the Gospel of Matthew: “The Kingdom suffereth violence, and the violent bear it away” (Matt. 11:12). Machiavelli had first mentioned this passage earlier, interpreting these words in a secular fashion: the “kingdom” is found in this world, and must be seized by the powerful and the “subtle” (130). But More interprets the passage to mean “you must do violence to yourself and divest yourself of the old man” if the heavenly kingdom is to be found. He then says to Machiavelli: “who is your ‘new’ man if not the old man par excellence?” (230). Machiavelli's new man—the modern man—is the very triumph of fallen humanity in its pride. Bénéton's daring book suggests there may be other possibilities. It is left up to us to consider what those possibilities might be.
