[A]s if words had kept their meaning, desires their direction, ideas their logic; as if this world of things said and desired had not known invasions, struggles, plunder, disguises, ruses . . .. The genealogist needs history . . . with its intensities, its lapses, its secret furors, its great feverish agitations, its swooning fits.
Michel FoucaultFootnote 1It is the wonderful power to grasp two mutually distant realities . . . and to draw a spark from their juxtaposition.
André BretonFootnote 2I thank the Leiden Journal of International Law for this opportunity to address the provocative responses by Jean-Claude Monod and Lorenzo Zucca to ‘The Sacred Conspiracy’. In this short reply, I seek to clarify some misapprehensions, as well as to sharpen the differences between us.
Specifically, I address two concerns that Monod and Zucca share, despite other, radical differences between them. First, they both question the seemingly privileged place I grant to the early twentieth century, particularly the interwar period, in the genealogy of contemporary internationalism. Monod argues that I minimize the differences between that period and our own; Zucca urges me to extend my historical frame, perhaps as far back as Dante. Second, they both conclude with normative advocacy of secular internationalism – which they suggest I do not share. These two concerns may both arise from the paradoxes of my methodology, informed by Foucauldian ‘genealogy’, and the misapprehensions to which it, perhaps necessarily, lends itself.
For Foucault, genealogy sets itself a number of seemingly incompatible tasks. It seeks difference and repetition: the ‘singularity of events’ as well as their ‘recurrence’.Footnote 3 It seeks out the way apparent continuities can mask rupture – as when new holders of power ‘grab hold of laws, . . . use them in an antithetical sense, and turn them against those who had imposed them’,Footnote 4 and, conversely, the way apparent discontinuities may perpetuate power imbalances. When genealogy seeks out ‘recurrences’ of ideas or social phenomena, it does so not ‘in order to trace the gradual curve of their evolution, but to isolate the different scenes where they engaged in different roles’.Footnote 5 It ‘introduces discontinuity into our very being’.Footnote 6
Foucault would thus fiercely reject Zucca's dictum that genealogy means ‘going back to the roots, the origins, of a problem in order to debunk some of the myths that surround [its accurate] understanding’. On the contrary, as Foucault ceaselessly proclaims, genealogy ‘opposes itself to the quest for “origins”’.Footnote 7 The genealogist does not seek to ‘lift masks’ in a search for an original meaning, but rather to show that ideas, institutions, and societies ‘have no essence or that their essence was constructed piecemeal from alien forms’.Footnote 8 For example, when I discuss the ‘cuius regio’ principle, it does not show, as Zucca would have it, that I inconsistently depart from the interwar period to trace longer-range continuities; rather, I seek to show how this principle, or its latter-day avatars, serve very different ends in different configurations of power and knowledge.
In this sense, Monod proceeds genealogically when he compares the differential functioning of the law/religion opposition in the early twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. In the earlier period, he maintains, the avant-garde foregrounding of religion was a ‘provocative, counterintuitive affirmation’, bucking the trend towards secularization; by contrast, the foregrounding of religion in the past decade appears as a ‘fact’, due to the ‘the collapse of the Soviet “secular” system as well as the unexpected power of Islam as a political force’. I do not, however, necessarily agree with his genealogical judgement: the ‘unexpectedness’ of the ‘power of Islam’ is a symptom of a certain cultural situation, in which the ‘expected’ trend remains toward rationalist secularization and ‘Islam’ is framed as a congeries of adverse energies. Islam's ‘power’ appears as ‘unexpected’ only against this background Western ‘expectation’. The source of this ‘unexpectedness’ is thus not very different from that of the ‘provocativeness’ of the deployment of ‘religion’ by the historical avant-garde. Nor is the seeming agency of the earlier ‘provocation’ radically different from the seeming passivity of the later ‘fact’: for the avant-garde, the power of religion and other so-called ‘primitive’ forces was something they experienced as coming from without, beyond the veneer of ‘civilization’; conversely, today's political Islam has both sociologically ‘factual’ and deliberately strategic dimensions.
Questions of difference and repetition, as well as agency and sociological facticity, also surface in Zucca's claim that I do not sufficiently distinguish between ‘secularism’ and ‘secularization’. For a genealogist, the difference between ‘secularism’ as a normative ideological project and ‘secularization’ as a socio-historical process is highly suspect. The genealogist will tend to seek the ways in which socio-historical processes are the surface manifestations of power struggles – specifically, the ways in which the phases of religion's subordination are not mere ‘processes’, but always provisional outcomes of ideological and political battles – whether at the macro level of ‘Church’ versus ‘state’, or at that of their particular avatars in specific locales.
A related, though not identical, issue emerges in Zucca's claim that I overemphasize the distinction between ‘secularization-retreat’ and ‘secularization-transfer’ – a distinction I borrow from Monod. Zucca's critique seems to be partly based on a simple misunderstanding.Footnote 9 More interesting issues, however, arise from the fact that I use this dichotomy in a somewhat different way than Monod, from whom I have learned a great deal. Monod advances it as a conceptual distinction and a description of historical alternatives. By contrast, I show how ‘retreat’ and ‘transfer’ are not only dialectically related – in the classic sense of each giving rise to its opposite – but can also serve as strategies both of which may be actively deployed at different times by each of the rival claimants to social and ideological power.
I now turn to the normative positions advanced in the responses. In light of my genealogy, Monod asks, ‘should we renounce internationalism if we want to be secular, or should we renounce secularism in order to stay internationalist?’ – while seeking to renounce neither. However, precisely in light of my genealogy, I would argue that neither renunciation is necessary nor, indeed, possible. If ‘internationalism’ has always been, in part, shorthand for historically contingent deployments of secularization-retreat and secularization-transfer, then ever-changing, contingent configurations of ‘religion’ and ‘secularity’ lie at its turbulent, divided, provisional core. The question is not whether one should be ‘secular’ or ‘religious’ or ‘internationalist’; rather, it is to attend to the way in which the meaning of each term – and its social power – have been continually expropriated, diverted, and redeployed by rival claimants.
Zucca's normative articulation is rather more symptomatic. He seeks to ‘come to the rescue of secular law’ from my invocation of the Durkheimian ‘contagiousness of the sacred’. Zucca's chivalric plan to save the legal maiden, from the ‘perfidious anti-democrat’ he suspects me of being, propels him into the perennial, yet ever-mutating, battle between ‘religion’ and ‘law’. He first declares that victory has already been won by law, that it is religion that has lost its role as a ‘supreme framework’. Nonetheless, Zucca then points to dark forces loose in the world, for ‘religion – Islam for example – regards the global arena as less well shaped in legal terms’. Of course, Islam is never a mere ‘example’ in Western discourse, but rather always serves as a foil for European exceptionalism – and, sure enough, Zucca strongly implies that Europe remains an exception in its ability to ‘respect’ religion ‘at its right level’. The only solution for Zucca is thus for Western law to actively subordinate religion to a place where it may be ‘tolerated’. Rejecting my irony at the expense of the ECHR, Zucca asks: ‘today's debates about law, religion, and the international order are very much focused on the role of democracy in carving out a place of religion. Yes – why not a respectable place?’ Indeed. When law ‘carves’, it always carves in the name of ‘respectability’ – or, to use the language of Zucca's interwar precursors, it ‘disciplines’ the ‘fanatics’, which Western secular legalism, then as now, often designates with the name of ‘Islam’.
And, here, the normative and historical issues converge: for, when law ‘carves’ out a ‘respectable place’ for religion, the ‘religion’ that is ‘carved’ is no longer the same as the ‘religion’ prior to its disciplining by Western law. Neither ‘religion’ nor ‘law’, any more than ‘democracy’ or ‘Enlightenment’, has an ‘essence’; rather, their meaning and power are always reconfigured through never-ending struggles. In unwittingly repeating the gesture of his interwar precursors, whose tenacious hold he nonetheless denies, Zucca confirms the genealogy of ‘The Sacred Conspiracy’ at both the descriptive and normative levels.
Both to summarize and to conclude, a pithy Foucault dictum on facades of historical recurrence:
The good historian, the genealogist, will know what to think of this masquerade. Not that he rejects it in the spirit of seriousness. On the contrary, he seeks to push it to the limit: he seeks to put into play the great carnival of time, where the masks never cease to reappear.Footnote 10
