Scholars of Islamic law have long been concerned with the relationship between legal texts and their application. Max Weber influenced the agenda for the study of Islamic law by identifying one of his ideal types of legal systems as “qadi justice,” which indicates that although the text of the law is sacred and therefore fixed and unchanging, the application of law by a judge is unstable or irrational. Joseph Schacht, one of the fathers of the field of the study of Islamic law in the West, notes that the contrast between theory and practice has been a perpetual problem in Islamic law.
Rudolph Peters's book is a welcome addition to this nascent field of what might be called Islamic “law in action” or “law and its application.” Very few scholars have attempted studies of this kind, mainly because of the methodological challenges and the vast amount of materials—such as doctrinal texts, court records, and historical chronicles—that it involves. Peters states that the book “is not limited to presenting the doctrine but also pays attention to how Islamic criminal law ‘worked on the ground’” (p. 3). He makes the important observation that cannot be overemphasized: attempts to “find ‘the Islamic essence’ in the history of the institutions of the Muslim world” are not possible, and we should instead “confine ourselves to the study of specific regions and periods” (p. 3). It is encouraging to read such an honest description of one of the main problems with Islamic legal studies to date and a direct command for future work.
Peters aims to “show how the actual practice of Islamic criminal law was related to [legal discourse on crime and punishment] and how and to what extent this discourse was applied by the courts” (p. 2). To begin, Chapter 2 outlines the classical doctrine of Islamic criminal law. Due to the vastness of the topic, Peters “refrain[s] from paying attention to the historical development of the doctrine” (p. 6) and instead produces a summary of criminal law, which includes references to Shiʿi law and to the four Sunni schools of law. The reader without a background in Islamic criminal law who wants a general survey will find it in this chapter.
Chapter 3 begins the “law in action” portion of the book. Referring back to the introduction and his directive that scholars should focus on specific regions and periods, Peters explains that his specific region and period is the Ottoman Empire. It is difficult, though, to write a history of the application of criminal law in the Ottoman Empire because we have so few case studies of Ottoman criminal law to build upon. Working with available sources, this chapter is mainly an analysis of the Ottoman Criminal Code, promulgated around 1534 and translated and published by Uriel Heyd in 1973. Peters also frequently cites Boğaç Ergene's Local Court, Provincial Society and Justice in the Ottoman Empire: Legal Practice and Dispute Resolution in Çankırı and Kastamone (1652–1744) (2003) for specific incidents of criminal law in practice. With more work on the level of Ergene's detail, we will eventually be able to piece together a history of the application of criminal law in the Ottoman Empire based on a critical mass of contextualized case studies.
Chapter 4, “The Eclipse of Islamic Criminal Law,” is the most exciting chapter of the book. The eclipse is categorized into three types: “complete abolition of Islamic criminal law; reform of Islamic criminal law; and reform of siyāsa justice” (p. 104). Peters does not discuss the first type and uses India and Nigeria as examples of the second type and the central Ottoman Empire and Egypt as examples of the third. He explains, for example, how the British retained the basic outlines of criminal law as they encountered it in India and Nigeria while achieving important modifications for their own purposes. The section on India covers roughly the period from 1790 to 1860 and focuses specifically on imperial desires regarding local law. The British sought to impose the death penalty in a greater number of criminal trials but were blocked by the high evidentiary requirements of classical Islamic law. The British then turned to local religious leaders and obtained fatwas that permitted a reduction in the evidence needed to convict defendants in capital offenses and to put them to death. Digging beneath doctrine, Peters explains how the outcomes in these cases were not simply a product of legal rules developed in the abstract but that the ruling powers had great influence over the production of Islamic law and its application. Even though British India is still a large territory for purposes of local context, this portion of the book carries out nicely the law in action approach that was presented in the introduction.
Chapter 5, “Islamic Criminal Law Today,” consists of short overviews of contemporary criminal laws in Saudi Arabia, Libya, Pakistan, Iran, Sudan, and northern Nigeria. Peters explains that Saudi Arabia is an example of the uninterrupted application of Islamic criminal law and that the other countries covered involve the reintroduction of Islamic criminal law. These are useful summaries and go into much more detail than what can be found in country reports from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. At the end of Chapter 5, Peters enters into a short discussion of how “the Shariʿa criminal law as applied today is in conflict with human rights standards” (pp. 174–75). The issues of human rights and Islamic law are too complex to be treated thoroughly in the final pages of this work that focuses elsewhere, and as a result this part seems abbreviated and disconnected from the rest of the book.
Scholars interested in Islamic law and its application should definitely read Peters's Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law. We still have much work to do in this field, and this book gives us precious material to think about when formulating methodologies for future law in action studies.
