John Walker's 2012 book is a timely reminder of the difficulties engendered in agreeing arms control prohibitions for the triptych of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons (NBC). These are often unhelpfully labelled under the universal banner of ‘weapons of mass destruction’, and have been in the headlines as recently as August 2013 with the use of the chemical nerve agent sarin in Syria. Walker, who works in the Arms Control and Disarmament Research Unit in the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, is in an ideal position to analyse the relevance of past policy to current and future challenges in these fields. He is also able to traverse the academic and policy worlds and, having worked with him first-hand on the AHRC-funded project at Southampton University on which this book draws, I can testify he does so with honesty and integrity of the highest order.
His book has benefited from extensive and thorough research in the National Archives at Kew and from key interviews with senior civil servants who were at the centre of the British nuclear, chemical and biological programmes and arms control negotiations. It adds considerably to the literature on these major issues and the question of how to control them after decades of work internationally to locate areas for norms and prohibitions to take root. Until the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), states were still drawing on the 1925 Protocol to the Geneva Convention designed to inhibit the proliferation of the use of chemical and biological weapons. For nuclear weapons, the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty was the only tangible international treaty until the pivotal Non-proliferation Treaty was negotiated in 1968.
Walker shows Britain was a key player in negotiating both these treaties as one of the established nuclear-weapons states and a permanent member of the UN Security Council (the P5). As a member of the P5, it acted as a depository state for the NPT as well as the BTWC. Within the bipolar international system, dominated by the two superpowers, Britain clearly had a distinctive voice and one that was listened to. This was despite the fact that Britain's international position was in systemic decline, its economy frequently in peril, and its military commitments and capabilities diminishing. Although there is relatively little on the important role Britain helped play in establishing the NPT, this is covered in detail in Walker's British Nuclear Weapons and the Test Ban 1954–1973 (2010). The present book does provide a full appreciation of the British position regarding the superpower Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) first begun in 1969. Walker shows how Britain's national need to maintain nuclear cooperation with the Americans through the 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement and 1963 Polaris Sales Agreement meant they resisted Soviet proposals for a ‘no-transfer’ agreement of nuclear materials and know-how to the UK from the US. This was based on UK strategic calculations related to the viability of their Polaris strategic deterrent balanced with the considerable need to limit the arms race, particularly in anti-ballistic-missile limitations.
Although there is much to praise in Walker's book the prose is laden with acronyms such as CCD (Conference of the Committee on Disarmament), DRC (Defence Research Committee) and ENDC (Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee) and would have benefited from a list of these at the beginning of the book to help guide the reader. Without it, the book often becomes an alphabet soup of acronyms. In addition, the people at the centre of these stories (many of whom remain largely unknown) have a strong tendency to appear as a footnote within the bureaucratic structures they inhabited. Although some of these key human agents are highlighted in his acknowledgements, they are not fleshed out in any way and the resultant narrative feels devoid of personalities. Instead, Walker's analysis is centred on the complex process of locating international norms on NBC activities between the representatives of national governments, which then required treaties drafted in exacting legal formulae and language. Indeed, so complex was that process (still very much in evidence in the twenty-first century, as Walker himself points out frequently) that the micro-level detail he provides obscures the human agency needed to generate the social and political will to enable enforceable and verifiable international legal treaties in these vital areas.
Walker also points out that NBC programmes had domestic applications as well as implications for national and international security. For example, serious consideration was given to the use of chemical weapons for riot control, or in Northern Ireland during the ‘Troubles’, whilst the NPT had to account for legitimate civil energy needs. The international dimension helps provide the context for British chemical and biological weapons activities at Porton Down and why, with the Warsaw Pact operating their own CW and BW programmes, understanding the effects and producing remedies guided UK thinking. As Walker accurately concludes,
for both political reasons – domestic and international – and because of an intrinsic sense of the value of arms control and disarmament in its foreign and defence policy, the UK has been a strong supporter of arms control, but it has also sought to moderate its impact where its provisions could damage its own programmes … [it] was about hard-headed calculations of national security rather than grand moral gestures (p. 257).
