INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Constitution establishes a federalist system of government, granting specific, enumerated powers to the federal—that is, national—government, while reserving to the states all powers not so delegated.Footnote 1 One of the many powers reserved to the states is the power to regulate property within their borders. Exercising this authority, the states have established statutes of limitations for lawsuits brought to recover personal property (generally ranging from two to six years) and have adopted various methods for determining when the limitation periods begin to accrue.Footnote 2
These limitation periods—and their methods of accrual—play a central role in lawsuits brought to recover artwork looted by the Nazis.Footnote 3 Indeed, “with claims now coming more than 60 years after the theft,”Footnote 4 these statutes often pose “the greatest barrier” to plaintiffs,Footnote 5 barring recovery if their claim is not brought within the prescribed period of time.
Of course, such a result is not necessarily undesirable, for it is well established that statutes of limitations serve important public policy objectives, including the following:
(1) the prompt filing of suit by a party, on the premise that those with valid claims will not delay in asserting them; (2) the protection of a defendant from having to defend a claim after a substantial period of repose, where evidence may have been lost or destroyed; and (3) the promotion of the free trade of goods, by making sure that those who have dealt with property in good faith can enjoy secure and peaceful possession after a certain, specified time period.Footnote 6
On the other hand, the successful employment of a limitations defense in a Holocaust art caseFootnote 7 is often unsatisfying, because it precludes a merits-based resolution of what is invariably a highly emotional dispute.Footnote 8 Indeed, even the American Association of Museums has “acknowledge[d] that in order to achieve an equitable and appropriate resolution of claims, museums may elect to waive certain available defenses.”Footnote 9 Moreover, at the recent June 2009 Conference in Prague on Holocaust Era Assets, the leader of the U.S. delegation, Stuart Eizenstat, expressed his concern about “the tendency of holders of disputed art to seek refuge in statutes of limitation … defenses in order to block otherwise meritorious claims.”Footnote 10 Some have gone further, supporting the wholesale suspension or elimination of statutes of limitations in Holocaust art cases.Footnote 11
In 2002, the state of California took action. In § 354.3 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, the California state legislature authorized civil lawsuits for the recovery of Holocaust-era artwork against any museum or gallery, and provided that any such action commenced on or before December 31, 2010, would not be dismissed for failure to comply with the applicable statute of limitations.Footnote 12 By enacting this law, the state of California removed a major procedural obstacle facing plaintiffs in Holocaust art cases and effectively revived claims that had once been considered time-barred. Footnote 13
FACTS
More than four years later, Marei von Saher sought to take advantage of the California law. Invoking § 354.3, von Saher filed a lawsuit in federal district court in California against the Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena (“museum”), seeking the return of “Adam and Eve, two sixteenth century oil paintings on wood panels by Lucas Cranach the Elder.”Footnote 14 The basis of federal jurisdiction was diversity of citizenship among the parties;Footnote 15 as a result, the substantive law of California, as opposed to federal law, governed the case.Footnote 16
According to von Saher,Footnote 17 she was the sole surviving heir of Jacques Goudstikker,Footnote 18
the most prominent Jewish art dealer in The Netherlands prior to World War II. He married the beautiful Austrian opera singer, Desi von Halban Kurz. They lived in grand style and were the toast of Amsterdam society; their parties at Jacques' Nijenrode Castle were legendary. There was no equal to Jacques in the art field. He had a great eye and amassed one of the great collections of his time. He was not only a dealer but was generally recognized as a tastemaker and innovator. He was known to put on exhibitions that museums simply were not able to mount.Footnote 19
Being a prominent and well-known Jewish family, the Goudstikkers fled the Netherlands when the Nazis invaded in 1940, leaving behind an art collection of more than 1200 works, including the Cranachs.Footnote 20 The Goudstikkers escaped the country by boat, but Jacques died on board shortly thereafter, breaking his neck in an accidental fall.Footnote 21 “At the time of his death, Jacques had in his possession a black notebook,” which listed the artwork in his collection and indicated that he had purchased the Cranachs at a Berlin auction in 1931.Footnote 22
Shortly after the Nazi invasion, Reischsmarschall Herman Göring seized, via forced sale, approximately 800 of the most valuable works of art in Goudstikker's collection, including the Cranachs.Footnote 23 At the end of the war, the Allied Forces discovered approximately 200 of these works, again including the Cranachs, and, pursuant to its external restitution policy, returned them to the Dutch government so that they could be restituted to their rightful owner.Footnote 24 However, Goudstikker's wife was unsuccessful in her subsequent attempt to recover the art, because the Dutch postwar restitution policy “did everything in its power to prevent Jews from reclaiming their positions and playing a significant role in the new business community.”Footnote 25
More than 15 years later, the Dutch government awarded the Cranachs to George Stroganoff, who claimed that the works had been unlawfully seized from his family by the Soviet government during the Russian Revolution, before they had been sold to Goudstikker in 1931.Footnote 26 Stroganoff subsequently sold the Cranachs to the Norton Simon Museum in the early 1970s, where they remained on display since 1979.Footnote 27
Nearly 20 years later, von Saher learned from a Dutch journalist researching Goudstikker's story that she might have a claim to artwork still in the Dutch government's possession.Footnote 28 She filed a claim in 1998 with the Dutch government, but her claim was denied on the ground that it was filed nearly 50 years after the deadline for submitting postwar restitution claims.Footnote 29 In 2002, however, the Dutch government adopted new restitution guidelines—eschewing a “purely legal approach” in favor of a “more moral approach”—and von Saher filed another claim.Footnote 30 This time she was successful, and in 2006 the Dutch government restituted some 200 works of art that had been looted by Göring.Footnote 31 However, because the Cranachs were no longer in the government's possession, they were not returned to von Saher.Footnote 32
Back in federal court, the museum defended von Saher's lawsuit on the merits, but also moved to dismiss it on the ground that § 354.3 was unconstitutional and that von Saher's claim was untimely under the otherwise applicable three-year statute of limitations.Footnote 33 The museum argued, among other things, that § 354.3 was unconstitutional because it “ha[d] the purpose and effect of inserting California into the business of remedying war injuries, a matter of exclusive federal competence.”Footnote 34
The federal district court accepted the museum's argument,Footnote 35 and in a 2–1 decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitFootnote 36 affirmed, relying on a seldom invoked doctrine of constitutional law known as the foreign affairs doctrine.Footnote 37 In doing so, the Ninth Circuit became the first court to restrict the authority of the states to inject themselves into the realm of Holocaust art litigation.
INTRODUCING THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS DOCTRINE
The foreign affairs doctrine is a complicated and ill-defined doctrine of U.S. constitutional law that cannot be thoroughly examined here. However, at its most basic, the doctrine operates to invalidate state laws that impermissibly intrude on foreign affairs powers granted exclusively to the federal government by the Constitution.Footnote 38 The doctrine is also sometimes referred to as “dormant” foreign affairs preemption, because the state law is preempted—that is, nullified—not by any affirmative federal action such as a statute, treaty, or foreign policy, but rather by the structure of the Constitution itself.Footnote 39
Not much else about the foreign affairs doctrine is clear. The only time that the Supreme Court has ever invalidated a state law using a dormant foreign affairs preemption rationale was in the 1968 case of Zschernig v. Miller.Footnote 40 However, Zschernig is subject to two very different, and equally plausible, interpretations: A broad reading would require the invalidation of any state law that has more than an incidental effect on foreign relations; a narrow reading would require the invalidation only of state laws that display overt hostility toward a foreign government.Footnote 41 Significantly, the Supreme Court has never clarified the reasoning or scope of Zschernig, leaving many “puzzle[d] … over precisely where and how the courts should draw the line between constitutionally permissible and prohibited state and local action.”Footnote 42
Nonetheless, after 35 years of silence, in 2003 the Supreme Court in American Insurance Association v. Garamendi Footnote 43 signaled for the first time that Zschernig remained good law, but it did not clarify the underlying issue in any meaningful way.Footnote 44 Indeed, the Court in that case ultimately invalidated a state law because it conflicted with the President's foreign policy, as embodied in international agreements; the Court did not conclude, as it did in Zschernig, that the state law impermissibly intruded on dormant federal foreign affairs powers.Footnote 45
Despite “avoid[ing] larger questions about Zschernig's dormant foreign affairs power,”Footnote 46 the Garamendi Court, in a footnote, nonetheless suggested—though did not formally adoptFootnote 47—the following new standard for the foreign affairs doctrine: if a state “take[s] a position on a matter of foreign policy with no serious claim to be addressing a traditional state responsibility,” then it impermissibly intrudes on the federal government's foreign affairs powers, regardless of whether there is any conflict with an exercise of federal authority; if, however, a state acts within its “traditional competence, but in a way that affects foreign relations,” then such a conflict is required to invalidate the law, taking into account the strength of the state—and perhaps federal—interests.Footnote 48 The Court did not elaborate further, thus offering little guidance on how this amorphous standard would apply in practice, let alone whether lower courts should begin to apply it. It is against this murky doctrinal backdrop that the Ninth Circuit decided von Saher.
THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION
In addition to challenging the constitutionality of § 354.3 on a dormant foreign affairs preemption theory, the museum also argued that § 354.3 was (affirmatively) preempted by the federal government's postwar restitution policy.Footnote 49 The museum pointed to two sources: (1) the London Declaration of 1943, in which the United States, the Netherlands, and 16 other allied nations reserved the right to invalidate wartime transfers of property and (2) President Truman's policy statement at Potsdam in 1945—entitled “Art Objects in U.S. Zones”—establishing a policy of external restitution, whereby the United States pledged to identify looted artwork and return it to the country of origin, which would then be solely responsible for restituting it to the original owner.Footnote 50
The Ninth Circuit determined that “[h]ad California enacted § 354.3 in 1945, it would have directly conflicted with the federal government's policy of external restitution,” because it established a “competing method of resolving restitution claims” and “would have presented a direct threat to several of the goals underlying the Executive Branch's policy, including the rehabilitation of Germany.”Footnote 51 However, because the United States stopped accepting restitution claims in 1948, the Court held that § 354.3 did not “conflict with any current foreign policy espoused by the Executive Branch.”Footnote 52
The Ninth Circuit then proceeded to address the museum's contention that, even in the absence of a conflict with federal foreign policy, § 354.3 intruded on the federal government's dormant foreign affairs powers. Without discussing the lack of doctrinal clarity in this area, the Court block-quoted part of the standard suggested in Garamendi and purported to apply it by asking two questions: (1) did “§ 354.3 concern a traditional state responsibility?” and (2) did it intrude on a power reserved to the federal government?Footnote 53
With respect to the first question, the Court immediately (and appropriately) acknowledged that property was traditionally regulated by the states; nonetheless, it determined that § 354.3 could “not be fairly categorized as a garden variety property regulation,” because it “addresse[d] only the claims of Holocaust victims and their heirs.”Footnote 54 The Court went further, acknowledging that while California “certainly ha[d] a legitimate interest in regulating the museums and galleries operating within its borders, and preventing them from trading in and displaying Nazi-looted art,” the “real purpose” of the statute was to “create[] a world-wide forum for the resolution of Holocaust restitution claims.”Footnote 55 In doing so, the Court found that “California ha[d] expressed its dissatisfaction with the federal government's resolution (or lack thereof) of restitution claims arising out of Word War II.”Footnote 56
To support its view of § 354.3 as creating a worldwide forum, the Court emphasized that the language of the statute would permit a civil action by “anyone in the world” against any museum, “whether located in the state [of California] or not.”Footnote 57 In this respect, the Court pointed out that, although an earlier version of the statute was limited to California museums, a subsequent amendment removed this geographical limitation.Footnote 58 The Court also seized upon language in a memorandum prepared by the California Governor's Office, boasting that “California ha[d] been a leader in exposing those entities who benefited financially” from the Holocaust.Footnote 59
The Court's worldwide forum argument, however, is subject to doubt. Nowhere did the California legislature express dissatisfaction with the federal government's handling of postwar restitution claims;Footnote 60 instead, the legislature had concluded that, due to the “unique circumstances surrounding the theft of Holocaust-era artwork,” California's three-year statute of limitations period afforded “an insufficient amount of time to finance, investigate, and commence an action.”Footnote 61 Framed in this manner, the statute more closely resembles the traditional state regulation of property.
Moreover, the Court failed to mention that, in its findings accompanying the statute, the legislature declared that thousands of California residents were victims, or heirs of victims, of the Holocaust, and that the state had “a moral and public policy interest in assuring” that these residents were given a reasonable amount of time to bring an action.Footnote 62 In this respect, the Court also failed to mention that a court in California could constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction only over defendants with sufficient “minimum contacts” to the state,Footnote 63 a point voiced by both the dissent and the legislature.Footnote 64 Finally, it is worth noting that § 354.3 was limited to suits brought against museums and galleries; it did not revive claims brought against private individuals.Footnote 65
Despite these limitations, the Ninth Circuit concluded that “the scope of § 354.3 belies any purported state interest in regulating stolen property in museums or galleries within the State. By enacting § 354.3, California has created a world-wide forum for the resolution of Holocaust restitution claims. While this may be a laudable goal, it is not an area of traditional state responsibility[.]”Footnote 66 Under the Garamendi standard, this conclusion was significant because, had the Court come out the other way, the museum would have been required to demonstrate a conflict between § 345.3 and a current federal policy, which the Court had already determined did not exist.
Thus, the Court proceeded to address whether § 354.3 intruded on a power reserved to the federal government. On this point, the Court relied primarily on Deutsch v. Turner Corp.—a precedential Ninth Circuit decision from 2003, though decided without the benefit of Garamendi Footnote 67—to conclude that § 354.3 impermissibly intruded on the federal government's exclusive power to make and resolve war.Footnote 68
In Deutsch, the Ninth Circuit relied on the foreign affairs doctrine to invalidate § 354.6,Footnote 69 a structurally similarly California law authorizing recovery for slave labor performed “between 1929 and 1945, [for] the Nazi regime, its allies and sympathizers, or enterprises transacting business in any of the areas occupied by or under control of the Nazi regime or its allies and sympathizers.”Footnote 70 The Court in Deutsch emphasized that, by targeting those who were, by definition, wartime enemies, California sought “to redress wrongs committed [during] the course of the Second World War,” which also effectively modified the federal government's resolution of such claims in postwar treaties and agreements.Footnote 71 As a result, the Court held that § 354.6 impermissibly “intrude[d] on the federal government's exclusive power to make and resolve war, including the procedure for resolving war claims.”Footnote 72
The Court in von Saher found that § 354.3 suffered from the same fatal flaw as § 354.6, namely the “establish[ment] [of] a remedy for wartime injuries.”Footnote 73 For support, the Court relied on references to Nazi persecution in the legislative history, the structural similarity between § 354.3 and § 354.6, and the fact that § 354.3, like § 354.6, “create[d] a special rule that applies only to a newly defined class of plaintiffs.”Footnote 74 Moreover, it found that actions brought pursuant to § 354.3 could not “be separated from the Nazi transgressions from which they arise,” as evidenced by the fact that, “[i]n order to determine whether the Museum ha[d] good title to the Cranachs, a California court would necessarily have to review the restitution decisions made by the Dutch government and courts.”Footnote 75
The Court's reliance on Deutsch, however, is questionable. In her appellate brief, von Saher sought to distinguish Deutsch on three grounds: First, the statute in Deutsch authorized suits against wartime enemies, while § 354.3 authorized suits only against museums and galleries. Second, the statute in Deutsch concerned only acts that occurred during the lead-up to the war and during the war itself, while § 354.3 applied to acts that occurred well after the war, such as the museum's alleged conversion and retention of the Cranachs. Third, the statute in Deutsch authorized a private cause of action for slave labor that had been omitted from the federal government's postwar agreements on the subject, while the Holocaust art claims authorized by § 354.3 had not been similarly addressed or resolved.Footnote 76 The dissenting judge in von Saher agreed that Deutsch was distinguishable, expressing bewilderment that a statute authorizing the recovery of stolen property located in a California museum could intrude on the federal government's power to make and resolve war.Footnote 77
In spite of all this, the majority responded to just the first of von Saher's three points of distinction, stating only that because “Nazi theft” was the “actionable injury at the heart of the statute … [d]istinctions between the class of eligible defendants [we]re irrelevant.”Footnote 78 The Court's failure to more fully address von Saher's arguments in this regard is surprising given its heavy reliance on Deutsch.
The Court next addressed von Saher's reliance on Alperin v. Vatican Bank, a precedential Ninth Circuit decision from 2005.Footnote 79 In Alperin, the Court drew a sharp distinction between claims alleging slave labor and human rights violations during the war, and property claims seeking to recover assets looted during the war.Footnote 80 The Court held that the former claims presented a “political question” inappropriate for judicial resolution,Footnote 81 because they would require the courts to make a “retroactive political judgment as to the conduct of war”; on the other hand, the latter claims, despite being “politically charged,” presented garden-variety property issues that were frequently decided by the courts and thus not more appropriately left to other political branches of government.Footnote 82
Addressing Alperin, the Court in von Saher stated only that Alperin's “holding that the judiciary has the power to adjudicate Holocaust-era property claims [did] not mean that states have the power to provide legislative remedies for these claims.”Footnote 83 While this point of distinction is technically correct, the Court notably did not address the following counterargument in von Saher's brief:
The political question doctrine prohibits courts from adjudicating cases regarding the conduct of foreign relations because foreign relations are the province of the executive and legislative branches. Likewise, the foreign affairs doctrine prohibits the states from engaging in the conduct of foreign relations, which is vested in the federal government. For either doctrine, the lynchpin [—intrusion into foreign relations—] is the same.Footnote 84
Moreover, it is unfortunate that the Court in von Saher did not more thoroughly address the key distinction drawn in Alperin between property claims and wartime claims, especially considering the majority's reliance on Deutsch, a case involving wartime slave labor claims.
Finally, the Court stated that its conclusion was “buttressed by the documented history of federal action addressing the subject of Nazi-looted art,” referring to the postwar external restitution policy, the congressional establishment of the Presidential Advisory Commission on Holocaust Era Assets in 1998, and the State Department's leadership at the 1998 Washington Conference on Holocaust-Era Assets.Footnote 85 The Court found that “[t]his history of federal action [wa]s so comprehensive and pervasive as to leave no room for state legislation.”Footnote 86 While there may be some force to this point,Footnote 87 it is a bit of a red herring because, as already discussed, the foreign affairs doctrine is predicated on the absence of federal action; if federal regulation truly left no room for state action in this field, the Court should have struck down § 354.3 under a more traditional field preemption theory.Footnote 88
In sum, the Ninth Circuit held that § 354.3 was unconstitutional under the foreign affairs doctrine. Applying the standard suggested (though not adopted) in Garamendi, the Court reached this conclusion after determining that § 354.3 did not concern a traditional state responsibility and that it intruded upon the federal government's exclusive power to make and resolve war. As discussed earlier, both of these determinations, as well as the short shrift given to Zschernig, are questionable. Despite striking down § 354.3, the Court ultimately remanded von Saher's case to give her an opportunity to reallege compliance with the three-year statute of limitations.Footnote 89
CONCLUSION
Beyond the restoration of California's three-year statute of limitations, von Saher has little additional, immediate impact. The reason is that § 354.3 was one of a kind; no other state has enacted a similar law.
Nonetheless, the case raises interesting questions about the Holocaust Claims Processing Office (HCPO). Established in 1997 by then-Governor George Pataki, the HCPO is part of the New York State Banking Department, whose mission is, among other things, to recover lost or looted art.Footnote 90 Without charging a fee, the HCPO processes claims by conducting a comprehensive investigation into the provenance and whereabouts of looted art, submitting claim information to the appropriate entities, and where appropriate, seeking restitution through nonlegal means.Footnote 91 Through 2009, the HCPO has accepted 156 art claims involving approximately 8000 items; 26 of these claims have been resolved, and 42 cultural objects have been restituted to claimants.Footnote 92 Just as § 354.3 was the only statute of its kind, the HCPO is the only entity of its kind in the United States.Footnote 93
The HCPO is implicated by the Ninth Circuit's decision in von Saher because it is a state agency. Moreover, it processes claims submitted by anyone in the world and assists claimants seek restitution from the current possessor, including European museums, collectors, and national governments.Footnote 94 Through the HCPO, New York thus appears to be injecting itself into foreign affairs more directly than California did by enacting § 354.3. Indeed, the practical effect of § 354.3 was only to facilitate a merits-based judicial resolution of certain Holocaust art disputes; the HCPO is arguably going further by taking sides in such disputes, even those involving foreign governments.
Of course, von Saher is not binding in New York, and so the legitimacy of the HCPO remains undisturbed. Nonetheless, the difficulty in reconciling von Saher with the vitality of the HCPO reflects the enduring uncertainty with respect to defining the permissible role of the states in foreign affairs. In the event that states outside of the Ninth Circuit enact their own version of § 354.3, this uncertainty may continue to spill over into the specific realm of Holocaust art litigation.
