This book outlines how in the 1980s human rights were reimagined by US policymakers, intellectuals, and private citizens as Ronald Reagan's White House made democracy promotion a cornerstone of US foreign policy. Schmidli presents readers with a solid US diplomatic history that traces the development of Reagan's foreign policy ideals over his administration's eight years in power.
This extensively researched book makes good use of political speeches, declassified government documents, periodicals, NGO publications, newspaper ads, memoirs, and oral histories to convincingly explain the complicated history behind how and why Reagan went from rejecting President Jimmy Carter's commitment to a foreign policy focused on human rights to codifying human rights as a central US foreign policy concern by the end of his administration.
To explain this ostensibly radical policy transformation, Schmidli first examines how in the 1970s the Democratic Party splintered into two camps, following the failures of the Vietnam War. Within this context, Schmidli illustrates how New Politics Liberals advocated for a foreign policy that underscored human rights and rejected interventionism. Jimmy Carter made meaningful strides in that direction; however, Carter's approach alienated Republicans and hawkish Democrats, paving the way for Reagan's election. Schmidli highlights Reagan's stark reversal of Carter's human rights foreign policy approach, apparent in his friendly dealings with South America's anticommunist dictators, like Chile's Augusto Pinochet. Even though this turnaround garnered favor among Southern Cone military leaders and hawks at home, it provoked pushback from human rights organizations, activists, and bipartisan politicians domestically.
Schmidli shows how in the second half of 1981, in response to domestic political pressure, Reagan officials began to speak critically about human rights in communist countries. Importantly, these officials took a narrow approach to human rights that emphasized civil and political liberties. The administration's limited definition of human rights meant its officials saw little value in the Sandinista government's human rights agenda. Indeed, the Sandinistas initial successes in improving the social and economic outlooks of most Nicaraguans, their abolition of capital punishment, and even their holding of elections in 1984 failed to meet Reagan officials’ criteria.
Reagan's seemingly newfound concern for human rights produced immediate political fruit at home. By the close of Reagan's first term, he would be championing a policy of democracy promotion and free market development, touting them as the cornerstones of his foreign policy. This approach would ultimately provide the administration with bipartisan support for many of Reagan's foreign policy goals, including funding for US allies in Central America's civil wars.
Schmidli persuasively argues that this bipartisan consensus was a pivotal development in late–Cold War US foreign relations. Indeed, it allowed the Reagan White House to pursue an aggressive policy against Nicaragua's democratically elected government, whilst, ironically, proclaiming they were promoting democracy. Moreover, as Schmidli details, even after the Iran-Contra affair, both the Reagan and Bush administrations were able to funnel millions of dollars to the Contras, under the claim that the Contras would somehow ensure the Sandinistas held free elections in 1990. Additionally, in the name of democratic promotion, the United States poured millions of dollars into supporting the creation of a unified political opposition party, which also benefitted from US funds for its political campaign. Lastly, these efforts which helped ensure the Sandinista's electoral defeat in 1990, proved democracy promotion's merits to Washington policymakers.
The book's conclusion extends Schmidli's analysis beyond Reagan's administration noting how the recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq highlight the enduring connection between democracy promotion and interventionism in US foreign policy.
Schmidli has written a solidly researched argument-based monograph, which covers a lot of ground, and at times this reader struggled to see the forest for the trees. Some sign posting, namely section breaks with subheadings, might have helped this reader better see how the pieces of this complex puzzle were fitting together. Notwithstanding this critique, this well-researched book will no doubt be of interest to US and Latin American scholars.
