Excerpts of Remarks by Secretary of State Clinton and Secretary of Defense Gates, October 5, 2009Footnote 1
Secretary Hillary Clinton and Secretary Robert Gates delivered these remarks at George Washington University in Washington, DC
Ms. Amanpour. So given that you're involved in a very difficult situation right now—the war in Afghanistan, a place where I've spent a long time—I want to start by asking you: Do you think you can win there? Both of you, I'd like to know whether you think you can win.
Secretary Clinton. Well, I think, Christiane, what we're looking at as we meet to advise the President is what do we need to do in Afghanistan and Pakistan, because we see the region as the area of concern that will promote American interests and values, protect our country, as well as the allies and other interests that we have around the world. So I think it's a very thoughtful analysis about what is it we need to do. And we're trying to look at it from the ground up and make sure that we're examining every assumption, because what's important is that at the end of the day, the President makes a decision that he believes in, that he thinks is going to further our core objectives of protecting our country, preventing attacks on us, trying to protect our interests and our allies. And that's what we're attempting to do.
Ms. Amanpour. Secretary Gates, the majority of the American people believe that America can win in Afghanistan. Do you think America can win in Afghanistan?
Secretary Gates. From the time I took this job, I have tried both in Iraq and Afghanistan to avoid terms like “winning” and “losing” because they become very loaded in our domestic debate, but they also become loaded around the world. I think the key thing is to establish what our objectives are, and can we achieve our objectives. And the answer to that question is absolutely.
Mr. Sesno. Well, let me ask you about our objectives, because back in March, President Obama said several things. He said our clear and focused goal— that was his term—was to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaida. He said for the American people, the Afghanistan-Pakistan border was the most dangerous place in the world, that Afghanistan was an international security issue of the highest order, and that if the Afghan Government were to fall to the Taliban, the country will, and I'm quoting him here, “be again a base for terrorists who want to kill as many of our people as they possibly can.”
Has any of that changed from then till now in this review?
Secretary Clinton. No.
Secretary Gates. I don't think so.
Secretary Clinton. No.
Mr. Sesno. So staying the course and having this government survive and not fall to the Taliban, and disrupting and dismantling al-Qaida is the objective, is the goal of this review that you're going through?
Secretary Clinton. Well, Frank, the goal remains as the President said last spring. What we are, I think rightfully, doing is examining the strategies and tactics to achieve our goal. And I happen to think that's a good thing. It is difficult enough to deal with the challenges emanating from Afghanistan and Pakistan and the continuing threat from al-Qaida, but to do it when there is so much pressure to make a snap decision, never to ask the hard questions, is really counterproductive. And I admire the President for saying, as he did last spring, we're going to reassess this. He appointed a new commander. That new commander was asked to assess it. He has a special representative based in the State Department with a whole-of-government team, constantly being asked, “Are we making progress?”
So I think what we're going through in asking ourselves—okay, we know what the goal is, is what we're doing most likely to achieve that goal?—is what a very decisive and intelligent commander-in-chief would do. So we're going to come up with what we think is the best approach, but the goal remains the same.
Secretary Gates. I think it's important to remember that as Secretary Clinton said, that the President indicated very explicitly at the end of March that we would revisit the strategy after the election in Afghanistan. Now, at least a couple of things have happened. One is the new commander has done an assessment and found the situation that—in Afghanistan that is more serious than we anticipated when the decisions were made in March. So that's one thing to take into account.
The other is, clearly, a flawed election in Afghanistan that has complicated the picture for us. And so it seems to me under these circumstances, and particularly—I mean, let's be honest, the President is being asked to make a very significant decision—and the notion of being willing to pause, reassess basic assumptions, reassess the analysis, and then make those decisions, seems to me, given the importance of these decisions, which I've said are probably among the most important he will make in his entire presidency, seems entirely appropriate.
President Obama. To advance security, opportunity, and justice, not just in Kabul, but from the bottom up, in the provinces, we need agricultural specialists and educators, engineers and lawyers. That's how we can help the Afghan Government serve its people and develop an economy that isn't dominated by illicit drugs. And that's why I'm ordering a substantial increase in our civilians on the ground. That's also why we must seek civilian support from our partners and allies.
Mr. Sesno. Secretary Clinton, you heard there President Obama speaking in March about the need to increase the number of civilians. The civilian surge, it's called. But the civilian task has been—or civilian personnel has been way under-tasked: when you came into office, 300-some-odd civilians. You're trying to move to a thousand by the end of the year, or just under it.
Secretary Clinton. Right.
Mr. Sesno. That's a big increase.
Secretary Clinton. Right.
Mr. Sesno. But compared to the tens of thousands of the military, it's just a drop in the bucket. Is that really going to change the dynamic? What should the balance be in a conflict zone like Afghanistan if you're going to accomplish the goals that you're out to accomplish?
Secretary Clinton. Well, Frank, I think what we are attempting to achieve is remarkable in a short period of time. As you say, back when the President made those remarks in March, we had about 300 civilians—Americans—in Afghanistan. We will have close to a thousand in—by the end of this year. But it is a kind of chicken-and-egg issue. We want to focus on development, particularly agriculture, rule of law, good governance, economic development, women's empowerment— those kinds of issues. But in order to operate in many of the places in Afghanistan, you have to have a level of security. So there has to be a commitment to make an area as secure as possible, because, remember, when an American goes in, that person will always be accompanied by NGOs, Afghans, so the numbers are much bigger than just the direct American hires because there are a lot of Americans working in Afghanistan who work for charities or nongovernmental organizations.
But our assessment was that we needed to focus on how to help the people of Afghanistan lift themselves up, have their own opportunities. And it goes hand-inhand with our military effort.
Mr. Sesno. Secretary Gates, you in many ways launched this conversation a couple of years ago with a speech where you talked—and you said that we will not kill or capture our way to victory in these places. What should our civilian diplomats be doing that the military is now doing?
Secretary Gates. Well, they are a lot of civilians out there and doing things that—
Mr. Sesno. But not enough, right?
Secretary Gates. Well, let's step back, first of all, to that point two years ago when I said—when I sort of gave my man-bites-dog speech of the Secretary of Defense saying there wasn't enough money going to the Department of State. The reality is the Department of State and the Agency for International Development were starved for resources for decades. Now, just let me give you an example. Working for me are 2 million men and women in uniform. Secretary Clinton has, I think, somewhere south of 7,000 Foreign Service officers. If you took all the Foreign Service officers in the world, they would barely crew one aircraft carrier. So just to keep things in perspective.
Mr. Sesno. You can trade a few people here, perhaps.
Secretary Gates. Well, and we have partnered. And the reality is that the civilians who do end up in Iraq and Afghanistan in the Provincial Reconstruction Teams and in the other activities, rule of law, agriculture and so on, have a disproportionate impact to their numbers. And I talk to brigade commanders, and one or two civilians working with them have an enormous impact. And these are the colonels who are the brigade commanders who talk about this. So do we want more civilians? Absolutely. We will take all the civilians that we can get out there.
Mr. Sesno. But my question was: What are the things that the military is now doing that should be handled and are better handled by our diplomats?
Secretary Clinton. Well, Frank, let me just answer that because a lot of what happens when our military—and they've been doing an incredible job against a really ferocious enemy in Afghanistan, particularly along the south and along the border. Without civilians, it's very hard to make the transition from the soldier or the Marine holding the automatic weapon who has been trying to rout out the Taliban, to going and trying to help a farmer get enough yield out of his wheat crop so that he doesn't want to grow poppies. I mean, that's an issue that is very difficult for the military to take on a sustained basis.
But in the last several years, in both Iraq and Afghanistan, it was young lieutenants, captains, majors—they were doing that. They were trying to do both jobs. And at a certain point, we need to support them, and I appreciate what Bob said about how, in effect, trained civilians are force multipliers; they can begin to do the civilian interaction with tribal elders and others that will help to make the environment more secure that our Marines and soldiers have helped to create.
Ms. Amanpour. And part of what's happening is that the Afghan people are not getting as much economic development, therefore not as much help and hope, as one might have thought when this started. So the question I have for you, sir—both of you, actually—is that there's been some talk over the weekend about how the United States believes that perhaps al-Qaida has been diminished, the threat from the Taliban is not as great as one might have thought. So I want to know what you think about the momentum of the Taliban, their long-term prospects, given the fact that today 80 percent of Afghanistan has a permanent Taliban presence, compared to 72 percent a year ago, and 54 percent the year before that. They seem to be winning territory rather than losing.
Secretary Gates. I can't improve on General McChrystal's assessment that the situation in Afghanistan is serious and deteriorating, and there are a lot of reasons for it. You have to go back to 2003, 2004, in terms of the Taliban beginning to reconstitute themselves in Pakistan and so on. I mean, that's a historian's debate. We are where we are. And this—that kind of goes back to General McChrystal's quote that you aired—you have to start where you are, not where you wish you were. And the reality is that because of our inability and the inability, frankly, of our allies to put enough troops into Afghanistan, the Taliban do have the momentum right now, it seems.
Ms. Amanpour. And do you believe that should—not next week or next month, but should Afghanistan fall to the Taliban again, that it would again become a base for al-Qaida to have its operations there?
Secretary Gates. I think the thing to remember about Afghanistan is that that country, and particularly the Afghan-Pakistan border, is the modern epicenter of jihad. It is where the Mujaheddin defeated the other superpower. And their view is, in my opinion, that they now have the opportunity to defeat a second superpower, which, more than anything, would empower their message and the opportunity to recruit, to fundraise, and to plan operations.
So I think you have to see this area in a historical context in terms of what happened in the 1980s and the meaning of the victory over the Soviet Union in order to understand the importance of this symbiotic relationship between al-Qaida and the Taliban and the other extremists, frankly.
Ms. Amanpour. So you think they would come back if Afghanistan fell?
Secretary Gates. I don't know whether al-Qaida would sort of move their headquarters from the FATA to—back into Afghanistan. But there's no question in my mind that if the Taliban took large— took control of significant portions of Afghanistan, that that would be added space for al-Qaida to strengthen itself and more recruitment, more fundraising.
But what's more important than that, in my view, is the message that it sends that empowers al-Qaida. Al-Qaida, in many respects, is an ideology. And the notion that they have come back from this defeat, come back from 2002 to challenge not only the United States, but NATO, 42 nations, and so on, is a hugely empowering message should they be successful.
Mr. Sesno. In Afghanistan, the notion of bombing from the air and going after militants from the air has caused a lot of civilian casualties and a huge dropoff for American public support amongst the people there. Do you think that it's possible to continue using that as a primary weapon against militants just in terms of its effectiveness? And do you think that it's moral to use that as a primary attack against the militants?
Secretary Gates. Well, I think one of the principal changes that General McChrystal has brought—and I will give General McKiernan credit, his predecessor, for beginning to move away from the use of air power, and particularly in offensive operations. And I think General McChrystal has underscored this, and a central element of his strategy in Afghanistan is to get away from the use of air power and the potential for mistakes that create the civilian casualties, and that every civilian casualty is a strategic defeat for the countries trying to help the Afghan Government and people.
And I would just say this: We will continue to use air power to defend our own troops. If they are in trouble, we will use air power to defend them. Where I think General McChrystal has drawn a line is in using air power in offensive operations.
Q. Good evening. My name is Seth Hyman. I am a junior in the Elliott School of International Affairs. I'm from Bay Ridge, Brooklyn. My question tonight is to you, Secretary Gates.
You both mentioned how you were pleased with the Pakistani Government in how they were combating the Taliban in Afghanistan. That being said, it is a known fact that the Pakistanis are always worried about the Indians and their—and their presence, especially being a nuclear power. I was wondering if you could talk about if you believe that the ISI and other members of the Pakistani military apparatus—if they are still supporting the Taliban as a counterweight to India?
Secretary Gates. Well, you know, I first started dealing with the ISI when we were partnered working against the Soviets and supporting the Mujaheddin in the early 1980s. And Pakistanis obviously established very close relationships with a variety of the Mujaheddin groups—Gilbuddin Hekmatyar and a number of others.
There obviously is the question of whether they have sustained those relationships and what the nature of those relationships might be. We talked to them about this. And I think that the clear path forward is for us to underscore to the Pakistanis that we are not going to turn our backs on them as we did in 1989 and 1990. We turned our backs on Afghanistan, we turned our backs on Pakistan. They were left to deal with the situation in Afghanistan on their own. Their worry is what happens in the future—will we be there, will we be a constant presence, will we be supportive of them over the long term?
I think in terms of the way they look at Afghanistan, the way they look at the region, depends on the degree of confidence that they have in us, that we will be a reliable partner of theirs going forward. I think that shapes the view of the Pakistani Government, and that includes the ISI.
Ms. Amanpour. There is so much more to talk about. But thank you both very, very much for joining us. Thank you, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Thank you, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. Thank you to Frank Sesno and to all of George Washington University. Good night.
Excerpts of Remarks by Secretary of State Clinton, October 11, 2009Footnote 2
Secretary Hillary Clinton was interviewed by John Humphrys of BBC Radio while en route from Carlton Gardens to Chequers, London, United Kingdom
Mr. Humphrys. Secretary of State, President Obama assured Senator McCain that what is happening in Afghanistan cannot be a leisurely process. Is that what it's become, in truth?
Secretary Clinton. Well, I think the President has made it clear that he is committed to pursuing our goals in Afghanistan, goals which we share, not only with your government and people, but with many across the world who understand the ongoing threat from extremism and Jihadi violence emanating from that region.
And what the President is engaged in now is a very thorough scrubbing of the implementation plans for achieving our goals. I actually believe that the in-depth discussions we're having, where we are testing our assumptions, where we are looking at how better to integrate our civilian and military components, and our very clear understanding that Pakistan and the larger region must be addressed as well, is leading to some welcome clarity and the kind of commitment that is needed.
Now, I know that sometimes when people in leadership positions, as the President is, you know, ask questions, ask questions of our military, of our allies, of ourselves, people wonder, “Well, what does that mean?” I think what it means is that, you know, we are going to have a very clear, unambiguous commitment to achieving our goals, and for the United States to demonstrate leadership, along with our friends and allies, because we hold to the conviction that this is in our national interest.
Mr. Humphrys. But you seem now to be testing your assumptions to the extent that you are changing the strategy. You are now emphasizing the campaign against al-Qaeda in Pakistan, and arguing that the Taliban in Afghanistan don't actually pose a direct threat to the United States. Is that the case?
Secretary Clinton. No, Mr. Humphrys, it isn't. I know that's been some of the press coverage, and I appreciate this opportunity to clarify.
We are not changing our strategy. Our strategy remains to achieve the goal of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al-Qaeda and its extremist allies, and denying them safe haven, and the capacity to strike us here in London, or New York, or anywhere else.
It is fair to say that we are doing a much more careful analysis of who actually is allied with al-Qaeda. Not everyone who calls himself a Taliban is necessarily a threat to the UK or to the United States. And I think there has been, to some extent, inherited from our prior involvement in Afghanistan, a lack of clarity. Because there well may be a number of people who currently are considered Taliban who are there because, frankly, they get paid to fight, or because they see no alternative.
Similarly, in Iraq, when we began to more carefully parse out who was really with al-Qaeda in Iraq, and who had been coerced or intimidated, we began to make real progress on the ground in developing partnerships that led to a decrease in the violence, and a glide path that we are all on to turning over the security to the people of Iraq.
So, I think that it is important to note that what we are doing is bringing to bear information and evidence that needs to be part of our thinking, as we implement in the most effective manner.
Mr. Humphrys. Does this explain why you seem reluctant to give General McChrystal the extra 30,000 or 40,000 troops that he wants in Afghanistan?
Secretary Clinton. Well, I don't think we can characterize the President's approach to that request, because it is one of several factors that he is taking into account: the current political situation, the election outcome, the role civilians must play, and so much else.
But General McChrystal is present through video conference at his command center, and the chairman of the (inaudible), General Petraeus and Admiral Mullen are at the table with us in the situation room, along with, of course, Secretary of Defense Gates.
So, we are putting into context the request for troops, the request for additional civilian assets, the request that we both expect more and see more coming out of all levels of the government of Afghanistan, that we do more to train up and deploy an operational force of Afghans themselves. So these are all the factors that have to go into the analysis that will lead to the President making his decision.
Mr. Humphrys. But the longer you leave this decision, the more it looks like a leisurely process, doesn't it?
Secretary Clinton. Well, but we also don't want to continue doing what we inherited.
At the time of the President's remarks in March, announcing that he would send more troops—which was a request of the prior commander—that we would try to better integrate our civilian and our military efforts, and that we would see Afghanistan and Pakistan—and particularly their border area—as the real theater that we are focused on here, I think he made clear that we would reassess after the Afghan elections.
Well, the elections have come and gone, but the results are not yet known. So the President has proceeded to do what I think is responsible. When the commanders were changed—a quite unusual action, as I am sure you are aware—the President asked General McChrystal to give him his best estimate as part of the review that was going to take place.
So, this is all in the course of what we think is a responsible approach. You know, one should never doubt our commitment of our leadership. We intend to pursue the goal. We will not rest until we do defeat al-Qaeda. But we want to be smart about how we are proceeding. Now, the lives that our young men and women, both American and British, have put at risk and lost, are very much on our minds. And, you know, we intend to get this as right as it's humanly possible.
Excerpts of Remarks by Secretary of State Clinton, October 16, 2009Footnote 3
Secretary Hillary Clinton was interviewed by Jill Dougherty of CNN in Washington, DC
Q. Secretary Clinton, thanks very much for taking out the time to talk with us. Afghanistan, let's talk about that. Afghanistan's Electoral Commission is coming out with its report. The Afghan ambassador says that that commission is likely to order a runoff election. Should President Obama wait for the results of that runoff election before he makes his decision on troops for Afghanistan?
Secretary Clinton. Well, Jill, first let me say we're not positive what the election commission will recommend. But clearly, whatever their recommendation is, I believe should be followed. And if that requires a second round, that is what should happen. I think that the President is well aware of all the permutations of what can happen in the election. It is likely that they will find that President Karzai got very close to the 50+1 percent. So I think one can conclude that the likelihood of him winning a second round is probably pretty high. But I think the ballots have been printed, and certainly the military, through NATO and through our own troops, is looking at how you would secure such a second round.
But I think that we have taken into account every possible outcome as we have engaged in our strategic analysis. And I think the President is expecting to make a decision on his own timetable when he is absolutely comfortable with what he believes is in the best interest of the United States.
Q. Could that runoff election be carried out, do you think, if it happens within a month? And what if it stretched on into the spring? Could Afghanistan survive without a legitimate government until then?
Secretary Clinton. Oh, absolutely. First of all, I think it could be carried out, since, as I said, the ballots are printed and certainly some planning has been done. It could absolutely be carried out within the next few weeks before the snows come. We have problems in the south, as you know, because of the intimidation from the Taliban and al-Qaida at every turn, trying to prevent people from participating. But I think it could be, but we won't know. We have to wait until the decision is made, because certainly I don't want to prejudge or preempt whatever the election commission itself is going to determine. But I also think that the decision that the President has to make is looking at how we can have a different and more effective relationship with the Afghan Government, whoever is the final victor, but not only with the government in Kabul, but with governors throughout the country with what they call sub-national, regional, local leaders. And there has been a lot of thought given as to how we would do that.
Q. But the decisions in the Administration right now, looking at President Karzai, there are numerous allegations of corruption, fraud, et cetera. Is he really damaged goods? Because, after all, the Administration says they need a reliable partner, that the whole strategy is pinned on having a reliable partner. Is he a reliable partner?
Secretary Clinton. Well, I think that— let's wait and see how this election turns out. Let's determine what the winner— assuming it is President Karzai—commits to do, and the measures of accountability that can be put into place to more effectively guarantee the outcomes that we're seeking. I think, unfortunately, over the last eight years, there wasn't the kind of expectation that should have been set for what the United States and the international community expected to be delivered, but we're going to change that. And we are in the process of working through the best ways to do that.
But let me just put this into a context, because I certainly am concerned about fraud and irregularities anytime they occur, in any election, anywhere. But this is one of the most carefully vetted elections, the fact that there is this check and balance through the election commission process is unlike what we see in most countries where elections are held, results are announced, we all roll our eyes, the ruling party gets 98 percent. And everybody knows that that's either because they have effectively limited or eliminated their opposition or because they have committed fraud.
We had a real election. Now, were there irregularities? Yes. And has there been an accounting of those irregularities? Yes. But the fact that an election was held in a conflict as terrible as this one is in many parts of the country, that it was a real election with rallies and platforms. And a number of people did quite well. The two predominant winners—we know, President Karzai, Abdullah Abdullah—I think should be also recognized. So we're trying to be realistic here and not blow too hot or too cold. In fact, I think that the prior administration was too unrealistic in the way that they treated both our involvement and the number of troops that we put in to achieve our goals and the relationship they built with certain leaders in Afghanistan. So we're trying to recalibrate this, and I think we're well on the way to do that.
Statement by President Obama, October 20, 2009Footnote 4
President Barack Obama delivered this statement in Washington, DC
President Obama. I welcome President Karzai's statement today accepting the Independent Electoral Commission's certification of the August 20 election results, and agreeing to participate in a second round of the election. This is an important step forward in ensuring a credible process for the Afghan people which results in a government that reflects their will.
While this election could have remained unresolved to the detriment of the country, President Karzai's constructive actions established an important precedent for Afghanistan's new democracy. The Afghan Constitution and laws are strengthened by President Karzai's decision, which is in the best interests of the Afghan people.
I congratulate the Afghan people on the patience and resilience they have shown throughout this long election process. Given Afghanistan's recent history, it is extraordinary that they were able to overcome threats and violence to express their democratic right to choose their leader. Insecurity in the country prevented some Afghans from voting, but it is a testimony to the bravery of the Afghan people that so many of them did come out to vote in the first round under tremendously difficult circumstances.
I commend both the Independent Electoral Commission and the Electoral Complaints Commission for carrying out their mandates. Throughout this process, the United States has been interested above all in the strength and independence of those institutions, and the need for them to fulfill their mandate on behalf of all Afghans.
I congratulate President Karzai and Dr. Abdullah, who both earned the support of voters from across the country. I also commend all of the other Presidential candidates who made this such a vibrant campaign.
It is now vital that all elements of Afghan society continue to come together to advance democracy, peace and justice. We look forward to a second round of voting, and the completion of the process to choose the President of Afghanistan. In that effort, the United States and the international community are committed to partnering with the Afghan people.
Excerpts of Remarks by President Obama, October 20, 2009Footnote 5
President Barack Obama delivered these remarks in Washington, DC
President Obama. Hello, everybody. Before I discuss the meeting that I've just had with Prime Minister Maliki I just want to make a brief statement about Afghanistan.
I had the opportunity to speak with President Karzai this morning and I wanted to congratulate him on accepting the certification of the recent election. As we all know, this has been a very difficult time in Afghanistan to not only carry out a election under difficult circumstances, where there were a whole host of security issues that had to be resolved, but also post-election a lot of uncertainty.
President Karzai, as well as the other candidates, I think have shown that they have the interest of the Afghan people at heart, that this is a reflection of a commitment to rule of law, and an insistence that the Afghan people's will should be done. And so I expressed the American people's appreciation for this step.
As I mentioned before, this has been a difficult election. You have violent forces opposed to democracy in Afghanistan. And yet despite these very difficult conditions what we've seen is elections take place; we have now seen the IEC and the ECC in Afghanistan complete their work; we have seen the candidates expressing a willingness to abide by constitutional law, and there is a path forward in order to complete this election process.
I want to give particular thanks to Ambassador Karl Eikenberry and his team, who have been working tirelessly throughout this process. I also want to commend Senator John Kerry, who was in the region traveling and ended up working extensively with Ambassador Eikenberry and was extraordinarily constructive and very helpful. So I think he deserves great congratulations.
Moving forward, we will continue to work with our ISAF partners as well as the Afghan government, however this election turns out, to ensure that we can move the Afghan—that we can move Afghanistan towards peace and security and prosperity and that the will of the Afghan people is ultimately done. So we are pleased with the steps that have been taken today and we hope that we can build on this progress.
I finally want to thank the incredible work of our U.S. military and the young men and women who are stationed in Afghanistan who are doing so much to help bring about a more secure and prosperous and democratic Afghanistan.
Excerpts of Remarks by Secretary of Defense Gates, October 23, 2009Footnote 6
Secretary Robert Gates delivered these remarks at a press conference during the NATO Defense Ministers Meeting
Secretary Gates. We also discussed NATO's role in Afghanistan; in particular, reforming ISAF's operational culture, supporting the training mission and improving the ability of ISAF to counter improvised explosive devices. There'll be a more in-depth discussion of Afghanistan this afternoon, with troop-contributing nations' working lunch, and then again the RC South meeting.
But I will say that many allies spoke positively about General McChrystal's assessment.
As you know, the United States government is currently reviewing our strategy and posture for Afghanistan and central Asia. This NATO ministerial presents an opportunity to consult with allies as part of our review of General McChrystal's assessment and forces request. Other nations have put more than 35,000 troops on the ground in Afghanistan, and their views are important to us as we consider the way ahead. I assured the allies this morning and will state again this afternoon that the United States has no intention of pulling out of Afghanistan or abandoning our core mission there, a mission we deem critical to our national security and vital national interests.
The United States continues to appreciate the military and nonmilitary contributions of the international coalition in Afghanistan. We are especially mindful of and grateful for sacrifices of allied troops who are in the fight and taking casualties in this dangerous and complex effort. And we pay tribute to all they have achieved and all they have sacrificed.
With that, I'll take a couple of questions.
Q. (Inaudible)—from German television. Mr. Gates, there were reports in the American press that the U.S. thinks about sending another 13,000 troops to Afghanistan. You have already sent, I think, 21,000 troops this year. And can you give us an idea whether this figure is correct and whether you think about sending them when you know that— who is president in Afghanistan? Is there any connection?
Is there any connection?
Secretary Gates. That was an inaccurate story in the American press. The number of 13,000 in addition to the 21,000 was fundamentally a mistake in math and also a failure to recognize that there were a number of troops, something on the order of 7,000 troops, that had been approved to go to Afghanistan by President Bush and that were—but actually did not arrive in Afghanistan until President Obama was in office.
President Obama knew that when he made his decision. The total number of additional forces that we've added under President Obama, trainers, combat forces and enablers altogether is the 21,000.
Q. Mr. Secretary, Viola Gienger from Bloomberg News. Did you get a sense of what—how deep and how strong the support would be from the NATO allies in the event that a decision is made that more troops would be needed for Afghanistan? What is your sense of how much support you might expect, compared to how much you're getting now?
Secretary Gates. Well, I'd—again, this was not the forum for anyone to express a view of any commitment or anything like that. As some of you have heard me say, I think that since I've been at this now almost three years and after the NATO summit this last spring, I detected a commitment and an energy on the part of our allies, both in uniform and civilians, in terms of their determination to participate with us in Afghanistan and see this through to a successful conclusion.
Although this was not the—although the troop generation conference won't be until next month, there were a number of allies who indicated they were thinking about or were moving toward increasing either their military or their civilian contributions or both. And I found that very heartening.
I think we lose sight of the fact that, just as we have doubled the number of Americans in Afghanistan over the last 15 months or so, the reality is, the number of our partner nations, the number of their troops has doubled as well, to almost 38,000 at this point. So people really have been stepping up to this. And I think it remains to be seen the—as the secretary-general made clear, the troop-request part of General McChrystal's overall assessment and resource request is working its way through the NATO chain of command. It really wasn't discussed today. It'll be there for a—at an appropriate time.
But I just—I would say—again, I have felt both over the last number of months but even after this morning's session there seemed to be a renewed determination to see this through.
Statement by Secretary of State Clinton, October 28, 2009Footnote 7
Secretary Hillary Clinton delivered this statement in Islamabad, Pakistan
Secretary Clinton. I strongly condemn the cowardly attack today in Afghanistan. My thoughts and prayers are with all those who were injured and the families who lost loved ones. One American citizen working for the United Nations was among those who lost their lives, along with other UN international employees and members of the Afghan National Security Forces who bravely fought to protect them.
More than twenty Americans have died in recent days and we honor their service and sacrifice, and our hearts go out to their families.
The United States remains steadfast in its support for the United Nations and its vital work to help the Afghan people build a better future. We remain firm in our commitment to Afghanistan and the Afghan people and to working with the Afghans to conclude their Presidential election process.
White House Statement, October 30, 2009Footnote 8
We welcome the announcement by the government of the Republic of Korea to expand its assistance to the Government of Afghanistan and its people by establishing a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), in addition to the Medical and Vocational Training Team that South Korea is already operating. This is an important contribution to the international effort in Afghanistan and to fostering reconstruction and stability in the region. The U.S. will continue to work closely in partnership with Korea as we support the people and government of Afghanistan.
Statement by Secretary of State Clinton, November 1, 2009Footnote 9
Secretary Hillary Clinton delivered this statement in Washington, DC
Secretary Clinton. I recognize the decision by Dr. Abdullah Abdullah not to participate in the second round of balloting in the Afghan presidential elections.
He ran a dignified and constructive campaign that drew the support of Afghan people across the nation. We hope that he will continue to stay engaged in the national dialogue, and work on behalf of the security and prosperity of the people of Afghanistan.
It is now a matter for the Afghan authorities to decide on a way ahead that brings this electoral process to a conclusion in line with the Afghan constitution. We will support the next President and the people of Afghanistan, who seek and deserve a better future.
Excerpts of Remarks by Secretary of State Clinton, November 9, 2009Footnote 10
Secretary Hillary Clinton was interviewed in Berlin, Germany on the Charlie Rose Show
Q. Is Germany on board with respect to Afghanistan?
Secretary Clinton. I think Germany is committed to the effort in Afghanistan. They're waiting, like the rest of the world is, the United States, and through President Obama, to announce our intentions and our way forward. But they have a deep understanding of why this is important for NATO, why this is important for the larger international community. And I think that given the right measures of accountability that we need to be seeking from President Karzai and his government, we're going to see a commitment not just from Germany, but from many of our NATO allies.
Q. Might they make up whatever the gap is between what General McChrystal is seeking and what the United States is prepared to provide in terms of troops?
Secretary Clinton. Well, I think we have to wait for the President's announcement, but we will be, as we have been, consulting very deeply with our allies and talking about what we want to see from them in order to have this integrated military and civilian strategy. Because remember, it's not just about troops on the ground; it's about making sure that the people in Afghanistan see the results of this effort, that they have more faith in their own government as an entity that can deliver for them. And so there needs to be a lot more civilian and financial support as well as military and troop support. But in my conversations with a lot of our allies, not only in NATO, but beyond, there is an openness and a readiness to participate.
Q. To look at it in a new direction?
Secretary Clinton. Absolutely.
Q. When you look at that question of Afghanistan, and those who say, can we win, can we stop the Taliban, is your answer yes?
Secretary Clinton. My answer is yes. But right now, we've been somewhat in a holding pattern because of the Afghan elections. It's hard to make a new policy until we know who is in the new government and until we have some very clear discussions about what is expected from them. This is not just a one-sided contract here.
But I also think that the momentum as described by General McChrystal and others that the Taliban seems to have acquired can definitely be broken. There is no evidence whatsoever that the vast majority of the people of Afghanistan want to see a return to the Taliban. In poll after poll, in anecdotal evidence as well, they remember of the brutality and oppressiveness, the perversion of religion that was used as a basis for the grabbing and holding of power that they experienced under the Taliban.
Q. Beyond that, is a Taliban in control in Afghanistan a threat to the United States?
Secretary Clinton. I believe it is. I believe it is a threat, because I believe that it once again provides a safe haven. Because what we have seen is that al-Qaida is now part of a syndicate of terror. It inspires, it directs, it trains, equips, funds other groups within this syndicate.
Q. From Asia to Africa?
Secretary Clinton. Yes. And to many of us, the principal objective is still to defeat, capture, kill the al-Qaida leadership. We do think that is important. It's not a marginal issue; it's a core issue for us. But we also realize that there are many aspects to this threat from extremism that have to be addressed. It is imperative that there not be safe haven for al-Qaida and its syndicate, its allies in Afghan—
Q. And that's what the Taliban would deliver, if they were in control?
Secretary Clinton. They would. In parts of Afghanistan, it's not—if they couldn't take over the entire country because of resistance from the Afghans themselves and allies like us, they would certainly establish a beachhead and would have a broader area of operation.
Q. So what do you say to mothers and fathers—as you know, the question— who are saying, are you asking me to send my son or my daughter to Afghanistan where I am essentially fighting for a corrupt or a fraudulent government?
Secretary Clinton. No, but you're not. You're fighting for the United States. You are fighting to protect our homeland and our people. We often don't get to choose the battlefield that we're on. We have to adjust to whatever the circumstances are that we find. And much of what President Obama and the rest of us in this Administration have been working on for the last eight months is that given the failures of the last eight years to capture and kill the al-Qaida leadership, to try to stabilize Afghanistan, we have to recommit ourselves, because we do think it's in our interest, we do think it's in our security interest. And I feel very strongly that the young men and women who are stationed in Afghanistan are really doing what has to be done on the front lines of the war against terrorism.
Q. And they understand and believe in the mission?
Secretary Clinton. Yes. And—well, and it's important that the entire American public understand and believe in the mission, because in a democracy we have to support those that we send to the battlefield.
Q. Do you believe at this point that the American public understands the mission, or are they waiting for the President now to redefine the mission—
Secretary Clinton. Well, I think that—
Q.—and the strategy?
Secretary Clinton. Yes, and I think that they are waiting for the results of this review. Back in March when the President made his speech about what we were going to do going forward, he ordered new troops into Afghanistan, he saw a change of commander, which is unusual, in order to better fulfill our mission. And he said we will be revisiting this after the Afghan elections. It's just taken longer to get the elections over than we had thought. So he will be clearly defining the purpose of our mission, how it's going to be reconstituted.
Q. What's taking so long, and what's the debate inside?
Secretary Clinton. Well, I have to say that I think we went through eight years where, at least it appeared on the outside, that there wasn't enough time taken, there wasn't enough thought given as to what we were trying to achieve and how we would achieve it. There were a lot of mid-course corrections. Witness the surge in Iraq. And part of what the President is trying to do with his national security team is to go and seek out information that is of direct relevance, evaluate that information, make sure that we are putting forth the best thought in order to fulfill the mission that he's going to set.
I think it's unfortunate, Charlie, that we live in a time when people expect instantaneous reaction: Oh, huge crisis, get out in front of the cameras and talk about it even when you don't have all the facts because the facts are hard to gather. And I think that what the President is determined to do is to feel as positively focused and comfortable as possible.
Q. Fair enough. But is he—are you looking for the answer to some question? And if so, what is that question and what is the debate about that question?
Secretary Clinton. Well, I think that the question really is how best to define the mission so that we and our allies, our publics, and the world understand what we're trying to achieve. The mission was, frankly, confused. There was a lot of talk during the prior administration that came pretty close to nation building, transforming Afghanistan. There was a lot of confusion about what that meant and how to do it.
We wanted to be sure that we strip down and focus on what is most important. I mean, we fight wars to protect America, our values, our interests, our allies. We fight wars so that we can achieve an endpoint that we think is in furtherance of that. So if we're going to fight this war, then everybody better be very clear what it is that we're trying to do. Would we like to see education levels in Afghanistan improve? Absolutely. Is that directly in our national security interest? Probably not.
So we want to help, but we want to keep focused on what is clearly in our national security interest—to dismantle, disrupt, and defeat al-Qaida and its extremist allies. Well, then let's define those extremist allies more carefully. Let's not just paint with a broad brush. Is some poor young man who has no economic prospects who is basically volunteered to the Taliban by his village so that the village is not attacked by the Taliban, is he our extremist foe, or is he someone who can be persuaded to leave the Taliban and once again reenter society?
These are questions that go to the operational aspects. I mean, it's easy to paint the big picture—we're there and good for us. How does that translate into what we do on the ground? How does that actually affect troop decisions and deployment decisions and expenditures of civilian dollars? So I think that this review, which has been more thorough and more debated than what we're told ever happened previously, gives us a platform on which the President can stand.
Q. But it has to be a certain element of government, because if the strategy is within 10 areas, say, to take and hold and build, which is the operative idea, is it not? So to give protection to the civilians, that's the only way you'll have an effective counterinsurgency strategy.
Secretary Clinton. Right, but let's think about counterinsurgency. Counterinsurgency is protecting population centers.
Q. Right.
Secretary Clinton. So—
Q. And they have to be a part of that themselves.
Secretary Clinton. They have to be a part of that themselves, but it may mean that you don't deploy in some areas where there is not very much in population to speak of, but instead you only do counterterrorism in those areas. So you try to concentrate your troops where we can give the maximum stability.
And when we talk about governing, it's not just what happens in Kabul. It's what happens on the ground in local districts. If you look at a map of Afghanistan and you really evaluate, well, which districts are under government control, meaning the central government in Kabul, what are under local government control, what are contested, what are under Taliban control—I mean, there is a varied picture here. And part of what we want to do is to convince the people of Afghanistan that it's not just clear, hold, and build; it's also transition. We don't want to stay a day longer than we must in order to transition over to forces and security that is in the hands of the Afghans themselves.
Q. More and more of the evidence you see indicates that that is possible, because you're sitting in these national security meetings—there have been some 20 of them with national security leaders—that it's possible to achieve these objectives, that the Afghans themselves have the capacity to do that.
Secretary Clinton. Well, they have some of the capacity. And part of our challenge will be to provide as much of the rest of capacity. We know they are fiercely loyal to their family, village, area. We know that they are not afraid to fight. We know that there is a great appetite for better governance and for some services that can improve their living standards. So we know that the people of Afghanistan are seeking something more, but what they seek may not be what we would ideally want.
And part of our discussion has been to really sort this out. What is it we can do in a period of time that is reasonable that will give the people of Afghanistan the capacity to defend themselves? I mean, the most common refrain we hear as people go around and visit in various parts of Afghanistan, particularly in the south where the Pashtun population is, is we want your help, we want you to protect us and give us the security we need until we can do it ourselves, as soon as possible, and then we want you to leave. That's a pretty good summary of what we want too.
Q. Yeah, and you have to convince them this is not an occupation.
Secretary Clinton. Of course not. I mean, we have no interest in their territory, we have no interest in staying there. But we do have an interest in making sure that it doesn't become a breeding ground or a staging ground for terrorism.
White House Press Release, November 11, 2009Footnote 11
Statement by the Press Secretary on the contributions by the Government of Japan to Afghanistan and Pakistan
We welcome the announcement by the Government of Japan to provide approximately $5 billion over the next five years to Afghanistan and to implement swiftly its April 2009 pledge of $1 billion for economic assistance to Pakistan. The U.S. appreciates all that Japan has done to assist in the stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan and welcomes Japan's renewed commitment to development assistance for this international effort. Japan is among the largest bilateral donors in foreign assistance to Pakistan and Afghanistan, reflecting Japan's crucial leadership in the region and around the globe. As President Obama prepares to travel to Japan this week, he looks forward to renewing our strong alliance with Japan, and discussing our continued partnership on Afghanistan, Pakistan, and critical bilateral issues.
Excerpts of Remarks by Secretary of Defense Gates, November 12, 2009Footnote 12
Secretary Robert Gates delivered these remarks while en route to Oshkosh, Wisconsin
Secretary Gates. The purpose of this trip is really a focus on the counter IED fight. This has become a serious problem for us in Afghanistan. More than 80 percent of our casualties are coming from IEDs. It's a very different kind of challenge than in Iraq. The terrain is different, the road system is different—both paved and unpaved and nonexistent.
The composition of the IEDs is different to a considerable extent. In Iraq they were mostly—they've mostly based on artillery shells and so on. And in Afghanistan, we find that a lot of them—especially the bigger ones—are made from fertilizer, like ammonium nitrate, with mines as detonators.
The networks are different—structured differently in Afghanistan than in Iraq. So it's a different kind of fight that we face here. We need both an offensive and a defense capability. The offensive capability is being able to take down the networks. And just the big find of ammonium nitrate a few days ago, that's the kind of thing we're looking for—and at the same time defense in terms of protecting our troops.
We have a lot of different elements at the Pentagon working on this issue—obviously, the Joint IED Defense Organization. We have a lot of different elements working on intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. We're obviously producing these MRAP all-terrain vehicles that we'll see today. We're upgrading some earlier Cougar MRAPs with a new kind of suspension so that they can go off-road. And the command is changing its own tactics, techniques and procedures.
And one of the things that I've asked for, for example, is the mujahadeen used these same kinds of IEDs in a different way—in a different form against the Soviets. So let's go back and look at the playbook that they used against the Soviets to see if there's something that we could learn in terms of adapting our tactics, techniques and procedures.
My concern—principal concern over the last few weeks has been whether all of this is being properly integrated and prioritized and aligned and whether we're adaptable and agile enough. And so I've decided that I need to focus my attention on this problem as one of my top priorities for say the next six months. I'm creating a department-wide task force on the counter-IED threat in Afghanistan. It'll be co-chaired by Dr. Carter, the undersecretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; and Lieutenant General Jay Paxton, the J-3 of the Joint Staff.
And the whole purpose of this, really, is to make sure that we get the troops what they need to protect themselves, and also the tools to be more effective at taking down these networks.
Now, this MRAP-ATV is really another great example of partnership with industry. This company in July produced 46 MRAP-ATVs. They will produce about 660 this month and they will go to 1,000 next month. And as I mentioned, we're also upgrading probably somewhere on the order of 600 or 700 Cougars that are used principally by the Marines.
Obviously, if the president makes a decision to increase the number of troops in Afghanistan, we would look at this in terms of whether we needed to buy more.
I will meet with the task force and expect a report from them monthly—as I say, probably for about six months. I just want to make sure that all of these different organizations in the department are moving together and cooperating—breaking down the stovepipes so that we've got the maximum possible effort working with the command. And I want the command—General McChrystal and company—to have a lot of say in this in terms of how we do this. So that's one of the reasons for the co-chairs of the task force to link it to the field.
So the main purpose for this trip is simply to come up and thank these folks for what they've done. It's been an extraordinary effort on their part. We're flying most of these in right now and the effort is to get them to the troops as quickly as possible.
Q. Can I ask you to follow up on that just a bit? What role did the IED situation in Afghanistan play in your deliberations in figuring out whether or not there should be an expansion of U.S. force? Are you at all concerned that you, essentially, may be sending tens of thousands more into—
Secretary Gates. It was not a significant factor.
Q. You said you might look at buying more of these particular vehicles if that—
Secretary Gates. If the president decides to send more troops, we would probably look at buying more than the 6,600.
Q. How many more?
Secretary Gates. That would depend on how many—nice try! That would depend on how many—how many troops the president decides to send.
Q. Mr. Secretary, there were reports yesterday that the president rejected all of these four options you talked about yesterday at the White House. Is that how you understand it—you were there—or is it more that he was asking for revisions or asking questions about more options?
Secretary Gates. I did not—I'm not going to get into the details, but I would say that it was more: How can we combine some of the best features of several of the options to maximum good effect? So there is a little more work to do, but I think that we're getting toward the end of the process, as Robert Gibbs said the other day.
I would say one more thing, though: I've been at this business a long time. And I have been appalled—I realize this is not your self-interest to write—I have been appalled by the amount of leaking that has been going on in this process. And I think a lot of different places are leaking. I'm confident that the Department of Defense is one of them.
To have details of options that are being considered out there in the middle of the president's deliberative process I think does not serve the country and does not serve our military. And frankly, if I found out with high confidence anybody was leaking in the Department of Defense— who that was—that would probably be a career-ender, because it is contrary to every kind of discipline there ought to be in a decision-making process involving the president.
Q. Did you have any reaction to General Eikenberry's cables?
Secretary Gates. No. I'm not going to—just as I'm not going to talk about my recommendations and the views that I've expressed, I'm not going to talk about anybody else's—apropos see the last answer. I don't want to fire myself by the end of the day. Although it's a thought!
Q. It's not leaking—I mean, just, I mean, kind of, reaction to this cable saying—
Secretary Gates. I'm not going to give you a reaction.
Q. Just about a more general point: What about the debate about whether putting more troops in Afghanistan makes it easier—(inaudible)—easier to bring the U.S. troops out? Or does this allow the Kabul government to hang back and not step up? (Inaudible.)
Secretary Gates. Well, I think that's one of the issues. How do we signal resolve, and at the same time signal to the Afghans—as well as to the American people—that this isn't an open-ended commitment.
Q. In RC south, the effort to buy ammonium nitrate fertilizer has only been allocated $50,000. Do you feel that's enough?
Secretary Gates. Well, I'm open to anything that will take that stuff off the market. It's illegal in Afghanistan, as I understand it, but it hasn't been enforced. So my attitude would be to try and treat it like we do narcotics. To the degree we could get it off the market, get it under control and capture as much of it—and if we have to pay for some of it, I'm open to that.
You know, when one of these 1,500 pound IEDs goes under—goes off under an MRAP and tears it in half, it tells you what these things can do. So I'm open to anything that will help save the lives of our troops.
Excerpts of Remarks by Secretary of State Clinton, November 15, 2009Footnote 13
Secretary Hillary Clinton was interviewed in Singapore by George Stephanopoulos of ABC's This Week
Q. But President Karzai does seem to be ignoring some of our concerns. He is surrounded by a Vice President Marshal Fahim, who's been accused of corruption. He is allied with General Dostum, a warlord, who has been accused of massacres in the past.
What kind of concrete steps must President Karzai take to prove that sending more troops is not a waste of American lives and American money?
Secretary Clinton. I have made it clear that we are not going to be providing any civilian aid to Afghanistan unless we have a certification that, if it goes into the Afghan Government in any form, that we are going to have ministries that we can hold accountable.
We are expecting there to be a major crimes tribunal, an anti-corruption commission established and functioning, because there does have to be action by the Government of Afghanistan against those who have taken advantage of the money that has poured into Afghanistan in the last eight years, so that we can better track it, and we can have actions taken that demonstrate there is no impunity for those who are corrupt.
So, we are going to be doing what we can to create an atmosphere in which the blood and treasure that the United States has committed to Afghanistan can be justified and can produce the kind of results that we're looking for.
But we have no illusions. This is not the prior days when people would come on your show and talk about how we were going to help the Afghans build a modern democracy and build a more functioning state, and do all these wonderful things. That could happen. But our primary focus is on the security of the United States of America. How do we protect and defend against future attacks? We do not want to see Afghanistan return to being a safe haven and a staging platform for terrorism, as it was before. That is what is driving the President to make the best decision he can make.
Remarks by Secretary of State Clinton and Ambassador to Afghanistan Eikenberry, November 18, 2009Footnote 14
Secretary Hillary Clinton and Ambassador Karl Eikenberry delivered these remarks in Kabul, Afghanistan
Introductory Remarks Omitted
Secretary Clinton. We stand at a critical moment on the eve of the inauguration of President Karzai's second term. There is now a clear window of opportunity for President Karzai and his government to make a new compact with the people of Afghanistan to demonstrate clearly that we're going to have accountability and tangible results that will improve the lives of the people who live throughout this magnificent country.
We want to be a strong partner with the government and the people of Afghanistan. And I always say both because it's not either/or. It has to be both. And I will look forward to the conversations that I will be having with the president and others. We have engaged in a very careful and thoughtful review. When the President asked us to make this review, we wanted to question every assumption, we wanted to look at every possible decision. Because we know that this is a turning point that we all face together.
And I'm very impressed that we've had so much assistance from so many of you in providing ideas about the best way forward. Many of you were, as you know, chosen to come here. You were chosen not only by State and USAID, of course, but by Defense, by Justice, Treasury, Agriculture, FBI, DEA, or some other alphabet agency of our government. Because you were thought to have particular skills and savvy to be able to deliver what we need to do together with the government and people of Afghanistan. And we need your help. We need your help to guide our thinking and strategy in Washington. We need your feedback about what works and what doesn't work. We need your honest assessment.
When I became Secretary of State, I said that I wanted us to be using smart power. And that was a combination of what too often has been divided between our incredible military assets, so-called hard power, and our diplomacy and our development, so-called soft power. But in effect, we have done a disservice to both by separating them out and labeling them, instead of looking at what they could represent in the furtherance of our values and our interests around the world.
So smart power requires smart people, and that's what each and every one of you represent. I think it's fair to say that nobody knows better than our military commanders that troops alone cannot meet our goals of defeating al-Qaida, of helping the Afghans to get the capacity to defend themselves and provide governance that will result in positive changes for the people of this country.
The military has performed brilliantly time and time again in confronting terrorists and protecting civilians and training security forces and defending borders. But this has got to be a common joint strategy that we have to look at in that way from the beginning, not as an afterthought. And that's what we are trying to demonstrate, and you are on the front lines of doing that.
We are on track to having close to a thousand American civilians here by the end of the year, tripling the number that we inherited back on January 20th. Whether you are a civil service officer or a foreign service officer, or a locally engaged staff, or an eligible family member, you are all integral to our strategic efforts here in Afghanistan.
And a lot of the work that we're asking you to do is work that we think has long-term payoff. It may not be immediately apparent, like those of you working in agriculture to support food security and agribusiness, or those of you who are partnering with local governors to expand opportunities for modern banking and private enterprise, launching a “cash-for-work project” to clean water from the Kabul River, or supporting the first Afghan-led elections after 30 years of war, you are helping to create the conditions that will, we believe, assist in achieving the core objectives, not just by the international community or the Americans, but by the people and Government of Afghanistan.
And I want to note the excellent work of our Provincial Reconstruction Teams, all the PRTs who lead our development efforts in some of the most difficult and dangerous regions of the country.
There is one Embassy staff member in particular, a foreign service officer who has gone above and beyond the call of duty that I just wanted to mention, because to a great extent, he represents all of you. Last May, Matt Sherman was on a mission with military colleagues when the lead convoy vehicle struck an IED and flipped. Matt raced from the safety of his vehicle to assist the wounded soldiers. And in recognition of his courageous and selfless actions, the troops of Task Force Spartan, Third Brigade Command Team, 10th Mountain Division, from upstate New York, nominated him—let's give a round of applause for Fort Drum, okay? The 10th Mountain Division were the first American soldiers to come to Afghanistan after 9/11. I had the honor, when I was a senator from New York, escorting President Karzai to Fort Drum to thank the 10th Mountain Division and to recognize their sacrifice.
Well, the Task Force and the Brigade Command Team and the 10th Mountain Division have nominated Matt Sherman for the Department of State Award for Heroism. And Matt—where's Matt? Matt, come up here. Matt, please.
Well, Matt, we have approved—big surprise—we have approved—this award in appreciation for your outstanding service. As I said, there are a lot of people who have performed just extraordinary and admirable service on behalf of the United States.
The President and I know this is hard work in a hard place. I'm not coming here to give you happy talk and just say onward and upward. I'm coming to tell you how important what you do is, how absolutely essential your service and commitment has to be to whatever can be achieved here.
We know that the security and logistical challenges you face are considerable. I'm working with Ambassador Eikenberry to improve the quality of life here at post— although I have to tell you, it looks a lot better than it did when I was here in '03— to address some of the overcrowding. We are moving forward with efforts to demine the multi-acre lot nearby and expand the Embassy compound to provide a more comfortable and safe work environment.
We ask a lot of you, but we do it because we really believe in you, and you believe in our mission. So I want to thank each and every one of you. I'm so grateful for the opportunity to be here with you.
I want to take a few minutes to say hello to you. I know some of the locally engaged staff want to get home, and I appreciate that. So I'll try to see as many of you, and then please leave so you can get home to your families. But I'm very, very grateful. God bless you, and God bless America.
Excerpts of Remarks by Secretary of State Clinton, November 19, 2009Footnote 15
Secretary Hillary Clinton delivered these remarks in Kabul, Afghanistan
Secretary Clinton. Thank you all very much for being here. I want to start by thanking Ambassador Eikenberry and General McChrystal and all of the dedicated men and women of the U.S. and NATO ISAF missions here in Afghanistan. The work that Ambassador Eikenberry and General McChrystal are doing together, both their personal collaboration and the joint efforts of their teams, is a model for civilian-military cooperation and a source of confidence that we will make progress toward our objectives.
I also want to thank Ambassador Holbrooke and his team in Washington, who have provided vision and leadership to our efforts in this region.
This is an important moment. Today's inauguration opens a real window of opportunity for a new compact between the Afghan Government and its people, and for a new chapter in the partnership between Afghanistan and the international community. And we must seize this moment. For the United States and Afghanistan, this means a renewed partnership based on mutual responsibility, where we each do our part to deliver for the Afghan people and to advance our common fight against our common enemy.
President Karzai's inaugural address provides an important new starting point, and we intend to build on it. The speech laid out Afghanistan's commitment to take responsibility for the security of its own country by speeding efforts to stand up a capable and effective Afghan national security force that can replace international forces over time. The United States shares this same objective, and we welcome this strong commitment.
Of course, our civilian effort will remain long after our security effort has concluded, and it will be just as decisive to Afghanistan's future and our interests. So I was pleased that the inaugural speech also outlined the steps the Afghan Government will take to improve its efforts to deliver for its citizens, to bring them basic services, access to justice, and the educational and economic opportunities they deserve.
It's an effort that will require steady progress on government capacity, transparency, and accountability. It will also require us to pursue a broader and deeper partnership with capable Afghan ministries responsible for carrying out their own programs. Last night, I met with the education and agriculture and finance ministers, and received detailed briefings on past progress and future plans.
Through their work and our support, we are starting to see results. Farmers are beginning to switch from poppies to pomegranates, girls are attending schools—many taught by newly trained teachers, families are visiting new health clinics and driving on freshly paved roads. Thousands of new civil servants, trained through a partnership with USAID, are helping build democratic institutions from the ground up.
Moving forward as we work with President Karzai and his government in Kabul and leaders at the local, district, and provincial levels, we will keep in mind that our most critical partnership is with the people of Afghanistan. We will use clear benchmarks and measures to ensure that our efforts are delivering results for them. We will also coordinate with our international partners to ensure we are engaged in a common and effective effort in service of their needs as well as our common interests. I had a series of extremely productive discussions with my counterparts here, with the foreign ministers from troop-contributing countries, donor countries, and those who have a stake in the future of Afghanistan.
Now, as we call for accountability from others, we will hold ourselves accountable as well. That's why we are working to ensure that development funds are tracked, accounted for, and used as intended; that our detention facilities and procedures are consistent with our security and our values; that we do everything we can to minimize civilian casualties.
I am here in Afghanistan and so many brave Americans are serving here because we believe that we can make progress. Now, we are under no illusions about the difficulty of this mission. The road ahead is fraught with challenges and imperfect choices. Setbacks are inevitable, and we have to be realistic about what we can accomplish. But we are also clear-eyed about the stakes. For the Afghan people, it is about a better future. For the United States, it is about protecting our people, our allies, and our interests. That is why we are working so hard to renew this partnership and why it is so vital that we seize this moment, this crucial window of opportunity.
Again, I want to thank everyone serving here and really express, on behalf of not only President Obama and the Obama Administration but our country as well, our gratitude for the service of the men and women who serve the United States of America. Thank you all very much.
Moderator. The first question is going to be (inaudible) TV.
Q. First of all, let me thank you and—for coming here to Afghanistan and the inauguration ceremony. My first question is that whether President Karzai has not bring any reforms in his new cabinet, and the second is that if there is a six-month deadline as you've given to President Karzai to bring reforms? And the third is that—the question of whether the U.S.—Mr. Ambassador Eikenberry has said that more forces should not be sent to Afghanistan, in contrast to the request that was made by General McChrystal.
So in those cases, the first few cases, whether the United States will leave Afghanistan or will work with the new government if President Karzai does not make any changes or if that deadline is not achieved in six months time?
Secretary Clinton. Well, first, I thought that the inaugural speech that President Karzai gave today set forth an agenda for change and reform. He was particularly strong on the steps that he intends to take regarding corruption, the idea that government officials will have to register their assets so that any money or other influence can be more easily tracked is a very bold proposal.
So we are heartened by what we see as the agenda for change and reform that was outlined by President Karzai. We think that the issue now is to ensure that it is implemented, that we see results. I had a number of conversations with President Karzai, and I know that he has every intention of moving on these reform measures to stand against corruption and to make the Government of Afghanistan even more effective.
Also, I think what you have seen in the debate in the United States is a very serious effort to try to analyze all the different aspects of the decision that has to be made. And I'm very proud that we have a country and we have a President who really encourages people to express themselves, so that we don't leave any questions. We try to answer all the questions. And I think when President Obama makes his announcement, he will be very well prepared to express the significance of his decision because he will have asked, and asked many others to contribute to the debate.
I want to make something very clear: Our relationship with Afghanistan is not exclusively military. Obviously, we have troops here along with our allies to try to assist the people of Afghanistan in defeating the terrorist threat. But we also are committed to a long-term relationship with Afghanistan to assist the people of this country in having a better future, having the education and healthcare opportunities, ensuring that the farmers can be productive and have a good income going forward, helping with infrastructure that will enhance the economy of Afghanistan.
So we see our relationship as very broad and deep, and our approach now is to focus on security so that the people of Afghanistan can feel that they are free from intimidation and threats from our common enemy, but it is much more than that as well.
Q. My question, please, Secretary Clinton, is that today in the inauguration ceremony, we saw the two warlords standing on each side of President Karzai. So if people like this remain in the future government, what will be the reaction of the United States Government in the future?
Secretary Clinton. Well, we understand the concerns that have been expressed about this. We have certainly conveyed those concerns ourselves. What we are looking for in the second term of President Karzai is an effective government that respects the rights of the people of Afghanistan, delivers services to them, responds in a transparent and accountable way to the concerns of the people. Anyone who's in the government should agree with that kind approach that President Karzai outlined today.
And we expect that the government he is putting together will abide by the directions that his inaugural speech set. And we want to work with a government that is ready to meet the needs of the people of this country, and that is our priority and that's what we're going to expect from the government.
Moderator. Final question is to Nick Kralev of Washington Times.
Q. Madame Secretary, I wanted to ask you about two issues that the president mentioned in his speech. And the first was his goal that in five years Afghan troops will take responsibility for the security of the entire country and the foreign troops out. Is that goal too ambitious? Do you think it's doable? And what's the link between that goal and to what might happen to the American troops?
And the second question on corruption. He wasn't very specific in what he said. He was very general and vague. In your private meetings with him and his ministers, were they any more specific about the measures they have in mind to prove to you that they have really resolved to fight corruption?
Secretary Clinton. Well, as to the first question, I was personally pleased to see the president set an ambitious goal for the training of the Afghan national security forces. It is a goal that he believes can be met. We want to assist him and the military and police leadership in Afghanistan to move as quickly as they can to stand up and deploy a professional, motivated, effective force on behalf of the people of this country.
And I think that both the analysis that General McChrystal has made and the analysis that's been made within the Afghan Government is that we can do more, we can provide greater support to assist them in doing that. And we intend to follow through. It is clearly one of the highest priorities, both for the government and people of Afghanistan, as well, as for our NATO ISAF leadership here, because the goal is to create conditions of security that will be able to be transferred and maintained by the Afghan security forces. And we are—we're going to work with the president to try to move toward the goal that he set.
Secondly, I had a somewhat different reaction. I've sat through a lot of inaugural speeches, and they often don't get down to specifics at all. As I recall, the president talked about the registration of assets, which is a very tangible demand that will be placed on government officials, the major crimes tribunal, the end of a culture of impunity. I thought that the commitment that we heard today from President Karzai gives us all a very strong base on which to measure the actions taken by his government. He could have been very vague and talked about how we're all against it and we all want to end it, but he got much more specific. And we're going to—along with the people of Afghanistan—watch very carefully as to how that's implemented.
So thank you all very much. It's been wonderful being back here, and I really appreciate the chance to participate in this historic day here in Afghanistan. Thank you.
Excerpts of Remarks by Secretary of State Clinton, November 19, 2009Footnote 16
Secretary Hillary Clinton was interviewed in Kabul, Afghanistan by Indira Lakshmanan of Bloomberg Radio
Q. You've said that U.S. civilian aid coming to Afghanistan is going to depend on anticorruption measures. Now, President Karzai said he wants half of all foreign aid within two years to go directly to his government. So what specifics has he given you about his anti-graft plan, and what benchmarks have you given him to say this is what we need from you specifically?
Secretary Clinton. Well, we actually started this earlier in the year. Our Special Representative Ambassador Holbrooke and I decided that we wanted to do two things. We wanted to create a certification process where we would evaluate ministries, determine their capacity, their honesty, the results that they're able to achieve, and begin to increase the aid that we give to the Afghan Government following that certification. So that we wouldn't be doing this for the entire government; we would be doing it for those ministries that we think, number one, are most critical, but, number two, really meet our standards. And we've been pleased by the results so far. And when we look at the positive actions that have been taken in education, in finance, in agriculture, there is a lot that demonstrates the capacity in those ministries that needs to be further developed.
So today, I spoke with my international colleagues about how we're going to better coordinate our aid programs, because everybody has a bilateral program, we go through multilateral programs. But at some point, we need to be coordinated so we're not replicating. We use similar standards so that we don't have some countries refusing to aid certain programs or ministries and other countries coming in and doing it, when that would undercut our message. So we have to do more on our side to be better prepared to support the capacity of this government.
White House Press Release, December 1, 2009Footnote 17
Readout of President Obama's video teleconference with President Karzai
President Obama spoke with President Karzai on the evening of November 30 via video teleconference for one hour about the way ahead in Afghanistan. The two leaders reaffirmed their commitment to work closely together to ensure stability in Afghanistan and to prevent the country from becoming a safe haven for terrorists. They also discussed a range of related issues, including security, governance, corruption, economic development, and regional relations.
President Obama underscored the need for more rapid development of the Afghan National Security Forces so that Afghans themselves can assume greater responsibility over the security of their country. The President also emphasized that U.S. and international efforts in Afghanistan are not open ended and must be evaluated toward measurable and achievable goals within the next 18 to 24 months. Both Presidents agreed to redouble their efforts to improve the delivery of services to the Afghan people, particularly at the local level, and to reinvigorate economic development and investment, especially in the areas of agriculture, mining, water management, and energy.
Remarks by President Obama, December 1, 2009Footnote 18
President Barack Obama delivered these remarks in West Point, New York
President Obama. Good evening. To the United States Corps of Cadets, to the men and women of our Armed Services, and to my fellow Americans: I want to speak to you tonight about our effort in Afghanistan—the nature of our commitment there, the scope of our interests, and the strategy that my administration will pursue to bring this war to a successful conclusion. It's an extraordinary honor for me to do so here at West Point—where so many men and women have prepared to stand up for our security, and to represent what is finest about our country.
To address these important issues, it's important to recall why America and our allies were compelled to fight a war in Afghanistan in the first place. We did not ask for this fight. On September 11, 2001, 19 men hijacked four airplanes and used them to murder nearly 3,000 people. They struck at our military and economic nerve centers. They took the lives of innocent men, women, and children without regard to their faith or race or station. Were it not for the heroic actions of passengers onboard one of those flights, they could have also struck at one of the great symbols of our democracy in Washington, and killed many more.
As we know, these men belonged to al Qaeda—a group of extremists who have distorted and defiled Islam, one of the world's great religions, to justify the slaughter of innocents. Al Qaeda's base of operations was in Afghanistan, where they were harbored by the Taliban—a ruthless, repressive and radical movement that seized control of that country after it was ravaged by years of Soviet occupation and civil war, and after the attention of America and our friends had turned elsewhere.
Just days after 9/11, Congress authorized the use of force against al Qaeda and those who harbored them—an authorization that continues to this day. The vote in the Senate was 98 to nothing. The vote in the House was 420 to 1. For the first time in its history, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization invoked Article 5—the commitment that says an attack on one member nation is an attack on all. And the United Nations Security Council endorsed the use of all necessary steps to respond to the 9/11 attacks. America, our allies and the world were acting as one to destroy al Qaeda's terrorist network and to protect our common security.
Under the banner of this domestic unity and international legitimacy—and only after the Taliban refused to turn over Osama bin Laden—we sent our troops into Afghanistan. Within a matter of months, al Qaeda was scattered and many of its operatives were killed. The Taliban was driven from power and pushed back on its heels. A place that had known decades of fear now had reason to hope. At a conference convened by the U.N., a provisional government was established under President Hamid Karzai. And an International Security Assistance Force was established to help bring a lasting peace to a war-torn country.
Then, in early 2003, the decision was made to wage a second war, in Iraq. The wrenching debate over the Iraq war is well-known and need not be repeated here. It's enough to say that for the next six years, the Iraq war drew the dominant share of our troops, our resources, our diplomacy, and our national attention— and that the decision to go into Iraq caused substantial rifts between America and much of the world.
Today, after extraordinary costs, we are bringing the Iraq war to a responsible end. We will remove our combat brigades from Iraq by the end of next summer, and all of our troops by the end of 2011. That we are doing so is a testament to the character of the men and women in uniform. Thanks to their courage, grit and perseverance, we have given Iraqis a chance to shape their future, and we are successfully leaving Iraq to its people.
But while we've achieved hard-earned milestones in Iraq, the situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated. After escaping across the border into Pakistan in 2001 and 2002, al Qaeda's leadership established a safe haven there. Although a legitimate government was elected by the Afghan people, it's been hampered by corruption, the drug trade, an under-developed economy, and insufficient security forces.
Over the last several years, the Taliban has maintained common cause with al Qaeda, as they both seek an overthrow of the Afghan government. Gradually, the Taliban has begun to control additional swaths of territory in Afghanistan, while engaging in increasingly brazen and devastating attacks of terrorism against the Pakistani people.
Now, throughout this period, our troop levels in Afghanistan remained a fraction of what they were in Iraq. When I took office, we had just over 32,000 Americans serving in Afghanistan, compared to 160,000 in Iraq at the peak of the war. Commanders in Afghanistan repeatedly asked for support to deal with the reemergence of the Taliban, but these reinforcements did not arrive. And that's why, shortly after taking office, I approved a longstanding request for more troops. After consultations with our allies, I then announced a strategy recognizing the fundamental connection between our war effort in Afghanistan and the extremist safe havens in Pakistan. I set a goal that was narrowly defined as disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al Qaeda and its extremist allies, and pledged to better coordinate our military and civilian efforts.
Since then, we've made progress on some important objectives. High-ranking al Qaeda and Taliban leaders have been killed, and we've stepped up the pressure on al Qaeda worldwide. In Pakistan, that nation's army has gone on its largest offensive in years. In Afghanistan, we and our allies prevented the Taliban from stopping a presidential election, and— although it was marred by fraud—that election produced a government that is consistent with Afghanistan's laws and constitution.
Yet huge challenges remain. Afghanistan is not lost, but for several years it has moved backwards. There's no imminent threat of the government being overthrown, but the Taliban has gained momentum. Al Qaeda has not reemerged in Afghanistan in the same numbers as before 9/11, but they retain their safe havens along the border. And our forces lack the full support they need to effectively train and partner with Afghan security forces and better secure the population. Our new commander in Afghanistan—General McChrystal—has reported that the security situation is more serious than he anticipated. In short: The status quo is not sustainable.
As cadets, you volunteered for service during this time of danger. Some of you fought in Afghanistan. Some of you will deploy there. As your Commander-in-Chief, I owe you a mission that is clearly defined, and worthy of your service. And that's why, after the Afghan voting was completed, I insisted on a thorough review of our strategy. Now, let me be clear: There has never been an option before me that called for troop deployments before 2010, so there has been no delay or denial of resources necessary for the conduct of the war during this review period. Instead, the review has allowed me to ask the hard questions, and to explore all the different options, along with my national security team, our military and civilian leadership in Afghanistan, and our key partners. And given the stakes involved, I owed the American people—and our troops—no less.
This review is now complete. And as Commander-in-Chief, I have determined that it is in our vital national interest to send an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan. After 18 months, our troops will begin to come home. These are the resources that we need to seize the initiative, while building the Afghan capacity that can allow for a responsible transition of our forces out of Afghanistan.
I do not make this decision lightly. I opposed the war in Iraq precisely because I believe that we must exercise restraint in the use of military force, and always consider the long-term consequences of our actions. We have been at war now for eight years, at enormous cost in lives and resources. Years of debate over Iraq and terrorism have left our unity on national security issues in tatters, and created a highly polarized and partisan backdrop for this effort. And having just experienced the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression, the American people are understandably focused on rebuilding our economy and putting people to work here at home.
Most of all, I know that this decision asks even more of you—a military that, along with your families, has already borne the heaviest of all burdens. As President, I have signed a letter of condolence to the family of each American who gives their life in these wars. I have read the letters from the parents and spouses of those who deployed. I visited our courageous wounded warriors at Walter Reed. I've traveled to Dover to meet the flag-draped caskets of 18 Americans returning home to their final resting place. I see firsthand the terrible wages of war. If I did not think that the security of the United States and the safety of the American people were at stake in Afghanistan, I would gladly order every single one of our troops home tomorrow.
So, no, I do not make this decision lightly. I make this decision because I am convinced that our security is at stake in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This is the epicenter of violent extremism practiced by al Qaeda. It is from here that we were attacked on 9/11, and it is from here that new attacks are being plotted as I speak. This is no idle danger; no hypothetical threat. In the last few months alone, we have apprehended extremists within our borders who were sent here from the border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan to commit new acts of terror. And this danger will only grow if the region slides backwards, and al Qaeda can operate with impunity. We must keep the pressure on al Qaeda, and to do that, we must increase the stability and capacity of our partners in the region.
Of course, this burden is not ours alone to bear. This is not just America's war. Since 9/11, al Qaeda's safe havens have been the source of attacks against London and Amman and Bali. The people and governments of both Afghanistan and Pakistan are endangered. And the stakes are even higher within a nuclear-armed Pakistan, because we know that al Qaeda and other extremists seek nuclear weapons, and we have every reason to believe that they would use them.
These facts compel us to act along with our friends and allies. Our overarching goal remains the same: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten America and our allies in the future.
To meet that goal, we will pursue the following objectives within Afghanistan. We must deny al Qaeda a safe haven. We must reverse the Taliban's momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow the government. And we must strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan's security forces and government so that they can take lead responsibility for Afghanistan's future.
We will meet these objectives in three ways. First, we will pursue a military strategy that will break the Taliban's momentum and increase Afghanistan's capacity over the next 18 months.
The 30,000 additional troops that I'm announcing tonight will deploy in the first part of 2010—the fastest possible pace— so that they can target the insurgency and secure key population centers. They'll increase our ability to train competent Afghan security forces, and to partner with them so that more Afghans can get into the fight. And they will help create the conditions for the United States to transfer responsibility to the Afghans.
Because this is an international effort, I've asked that our commitment be joined by contributions from our allies. Some have already provided additional troops, and we're confident that there will be further contributions in the days and weeks ahead. Our friends have fought and bled and died alongside us in Afghanistan. And now, we must come together to end this war successfully. For what's at stake is not simply a test of NATO's credibility— what's at stake is the security of our allies, and the common security of the world.
I want the Afghan people to understand—America seeks an end to this era of war and suffering. We have no interest in occupying your country.
But taken together, these additional American and international troops will allow us to accelerate handing over responsibility to Afghan forces, and allow us to begin the transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan in July of 2011. Just as we have done in Iraq, we will execute this transition responsibly, taking into account conditions on the ground. We'll continue to advise and assist Afghanistan's security forces to ensure that they can succeed over the long haul. But it will be clear to the Afghan government—and, more importantly, to the Afghan people—that they will ultimately be responsible for their own country.
Second, we will work with our partners, the United Nations, and the Afghan people to pursue a more effective civilian strategy, so that the government can take advantage of improved security.
This effort must be based on performance. The days of providing a blank check are over. President Karzai's inauguration speech sent the right message about moving in a new direction. And going forward, we will be clear about what we expect from those who receive our assistance. We'll support Afghan ministries, governors, and local leaders that combat corruption and deliver for the people. We expect those who are ineffective or corrupt to be held accountable. And we will also focus our assistance in areas—such as agriculture—that can make an immediate impact in the lives of the Afghan people.
The people of Afghanistan have endured violence for decades. They've been confronted with occupation—by the Soviet Union, and then by foreign al Qaeda fighters who used Afghan land for their own purposes. So tonight, I want the Afghan people to understand—America seeks an end to this era of war and suffering. We have no interest in occupying your country. We will support efforts by the Afghan government to open the door to those Taliban who abandon violence and respect the human rights of their fellow citizens. And we will seek a partnership with Afghanistan grounded in mutual respect— to isolate those who destroy; to strengthen those who build; to hasten the day when our troops will leave; and to forge a lasting friendship in which America is your partner, and never your patron.
Third, we will act with the full recognition that our success in Afghanistan is inextricably linked to our partnership with Pakistan.
We're in Afghanistan to prevent a cancer from once again spreading through that country. But this same cancer has also taken root in the border region of Pakistan. That's why we need a strategy that works on both sides of the border.
In the past, there have been those in Pakistan who've argued that the struggle against extremism is not their fight, and that Pakistan is better off doing little or seeking accommodation with those who use violence. But in recent years, as innocents have been killed from Karachi to Islamabad, it has become clear that it is the Pakistani people who are the most endangered by extremism. Public opinion has turned. The Pakistani army has waged an offensive in Swat and South Waziristan. And there is no doubt that the United States and Pakistan share a common enemy.
In the past, we too often defined our relationship with Pakistan narrowly. Those days are over. Moving forward, we are committed to a partnership with Pakistan that is built on a foundation of mutual interest, mutual respect, and mutual trust. We will strengthen Pakistan's capacity to target those groups that threaten our countries, and have made it clear that we cannot tolerate a safe haven for terrorists whose location is known and whose intentions are clear. America is also providing substantial resources to support Pakistan's democracy and development. We are the largest international supporter for those Pakistanis displaced by the fighting. And going forward, the Pakistan people must know America will remain a strong supporter of Pakistan's security and prosperity long after the guns have fallen silent, so that the great potential of its people can be unleashed.
These are the three core elements of our strategy: a military effort to create the conditions for a transition; a civilian surge that reinforces positive action; and an effective partnership with Pakistan.
I recognize there are a range of concerns about our approach. So let me briefly address a few of the more prominent arguments that I've heard, and which I take very seriously.
First, there are those who suggest that Afghanistan is another Vietnam. They argue that it cannot be stabilized, and we're better off cutting our losses and rapidly withdrawing. I believe this argument depends on a false reading of history. Unlike Vietnam, we are joined by a broad coalition of 43 nations that recognizes the legitimacy of our action. Unlike Vietnam, we are not facing a broad-based popular insurgency. And most importantly, unlike Vietnam, the American people were viciously attacked from Afghanistan, and remain a target for those same extremists who are plotting along its border. To abandon this area now—and to rely only on efforts against al Qaeda from a distance— would significantly hamper our ability to keep the pressure on al Qaeda, and create an unacceptable risk of additional attacks on our homeland and our allies.
Second, there are those who acknowledge that we can't leave Afghanistan in its current state, but suggest that we go forward with the troops that we already have. But this would simply maintain a status quo in which we muddle through, and permit a slow deterioration of conditions there. It would ultimately prove more costly and prolong our stay in Afghanistan, because we would never be able to generate the conditions needed to train Afghan security forces and give them the space to take over.
Finally, there are those who oppose identifying a time frame for our transition to Afghan responsibility. Indeed, some call for a more dramatic and open-ended escalation of our war effort—one that would commit us to a nation-building project of up to a decade. I reject this course because it sets goals that are beyond what can be achieved at a reasonable cost, and what we need to achieve to secure our interests. Furthermore, the absence of a time frame for transition would deny us any sense of urgency in working with the Afghan government. It must be clear that Afghans will have to take responsibility for their security, and that America has no interest in fighting an endless war in Afghanistan.
As President, I refuse to set goals that go beyond our responsibility, our means, or our interests. And I must weigh all of the challenges that our nation faces. I don't have the luxury of committing to just one. Indeed, I'm mindful of the words of President Eisenhower, who—in discussing our national security—said, “Each proposal must be weighed in the light of a broader consideration: the need to maintain balance in and among national programs.”
Over the past several years, we have lost that balance. We've failed to appreciate the connection between our national security and our economy. In the wake of an economic crisis, too many of our neighbors and friends are out of work and struggle to pay the bills. Too many Americans are worried about the future facing our children. Meanwhile, competition within the global economy has grown more fierce. So we can't simply afford to ignore the price of these wars.
All told, by the time I took office the cost of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan approached a trillion dollars. Going forward, I am committed to addressing these costs openly and honestly. Our new approach in Afghanistan is likely to cost us roughly $30 billion for the military this year, and I'll work closely with Congress to address these costs as we work to bring down our deficit.
But as we end the war in Iraq and transition to Afghan responsibility, we must rebuild our strength here at home. Our prosperity provides a foundation for our power. It pays for our military. It underwrites our diplomacy. It taps the potential of our people, and allows investment in new industry. And it will allow us to compete in this century as successfully as we did in the last. That's why our troop commitment in Afghanistan cannot be open-ended—because the nation that I'm most interested in building is our own.
Now, let me be clear: None of this will be easy. The struggle against violent extremism will not be finished quickly, and it extends well beyond Afghanistan and Pakistan. It will be an enduring test of our free society, and our leadership in the world. And unlike the great power conflicts and clear lines of division that defined the 20th century, our effort will involve disorderly regions, failed states, diffuse enemies.
So as a result, America will have to show our strength in the way that we end wars and prevent conflict—not just how we wage wars. We'll have to be nimble and precise in our use of military power. Where al Qaeda and its allies attempt to establish a foothold—whether in Somalia or Yemen or elsewhere—they must be confronted by growing pressure and strong partnerships.
And we can't count on military might alone. We have to invest in our homeland security, because we can't capture or kill every violent extremist abroad. We have to improve and better coordinate our intelligence, so that we stay one step ahead of shadowy networks.
We will have to take away the tools of mass destruction. And that's why I've made it a central pillar of my foreign policy to secure loose nuclear materials from terrorists, to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, and to pursue the goal of a world without them—because every nation must understand that true security will never come from an endless race for ever more destructive weapons; true security will come for those who reject them.
We'll have to use diplomacy, because no one nation can meet the challenges of an interconnected world acting alone. I've spent this year renewing our alliances and forging new partnerships. And we have forged a new beginning between America and the Muslim world—one that recognizes our mutual interest in breaking a cycle of conflict, and that promises a future in which those who kill innocents are isolated by those who stand up for peace and prosperity and human dignity.
And finally, we must draw on the strength of our values—for the challenges that we face may have changed, but the things that we believe in must not. That's why we must promote our values by living them at home—which is why I have prohibited torture and will close the prison at Guantanamo Bay. And we must make it clear to every man, woman and child around the world who lives under the dark cloud of tyranny that America will speak out on behalf of their human rights, and tend to the light of freedom and justice and opportunity and respect for the dignity of all peoples. That is who we are. That is the source, the moral source, of America's authority.
Since the days of Franklin Roosevelt, and the service and sacrifice of our grandparents and great-grandparents, our country has borne a special burden in global affairs. We have spilled American blood in many countries on multiple continents. We have spent our revenue to help others rebuild from rubble and develop their own economies. We have joined with others to develop an architecture of institutions— from the United Nations to NATO to the World Bank—that provide for the common security and prosperity of human beings.
We have not always been thanked for these efforts, and we have at times made mistakes. But more than any other nation, the United States of America has underwritten global security for over six decades—a time that, for all its problems, has seen walls come down, and markets open, and billions lifted from poverty, unparalleled scientific progress and advancing frontiers of human liberty.
For unlike the great powers of old, we have not sought world domination. Our union was founded in resistance to oppression. We do not seek to occupy other nations. We will not claim another nation's resources or target other peoples because their faith or ethnicity is different from ours. What we have fought for— what we continue to fight for—is a better future for our children and grandchildren. And we believe that their lives will be better if other peoples' children and grandchildren can live in freedom and access opportunity.
As a country, we're not as young—and perhaps not as innocent—as we were when Roosevelt was President. Yet we are still heirs to a noble struggle for freedom. And now we must summon all of our might and moral suasion to meet the challenges of a new age.
In the end, our security and leadership does not come solely from the strength of our arms. It derives from our people— from the workers and businesses who will rebuild our economy; from the entrepreneurs and researchers who will pioneer new industries; from the teachers that will educate our children, and the service of those who work in our communities at home; from the diplomats and Peace Corps volunteers who spread hope abroad; and from the men and women in uniform who are part of an unbroken line of sacrifice that has made government of the people, by the people, and for the people a reality on this Earth.
This vast and diverse citizenry will not always agree on every issue—nor should we. But I also know that we, as a country, cannot sustain our leadership, nor navigate the momentous challenges of our time, if we allow ourselves to be split asunder by the same rancor and cynicism and partisanship that has in recent times poisoned our national discourse.
It's easy to forget that when this war began, we were united—bound together by the fresh memory of a horrific attack, and by the determination to defend our homeland and the values we hold dear. I refuse to accept the notion that we cannot summon that unity again. I believe with every fiber of my being that we—as Americans—can still come together behind a common purpose. For our values are not simply words written into parchment—they are a creed that calls us together, and that has carried us through the darkest of storms as one nation, as one people.
America—we are passing through a time of great trial. And the message that we send in the midst of these storms must be clear: that our cause is just, our resolve unwavering. We will go forward with the confidence that right makes might, and with the commitment to forge an America that is safer, a world that is more secure, and a future that represents not the deepest of fears but the highest of hopes.
Thank you. God bless you. May God bless the United States of America. Thank you very much. Thank you.
Statement by Secretary of Defense Gates, December 2, 2009Footnote 19
Secretary Robert Gates delivered this statement in Washington, DC to the Senate Armed Services Committee
Secretary Gates. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee:
Thank you for inviting us to testify today. Last night, President Obama announced a renewed commitment and more focused strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. I would like to provide an overview of the strategic thinking and context behind his decisions, in particular:
*The nexus among Al Qaeda, the Taliban, Pakistan, and Afghanistan;
*Our objectives and how the President's strategy aims to accomplish them; and
*The military forces required.
As the president first stated in March, and re-emphasized last night, the goal of the United States in Afghanistan and Pakistan is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al Qaeda and to prevent its return to both countries. The international military effort to stabilize Afghanistan is necessary to achieve this overarching goal. Defeating Al Qaeda and enhancing Afghan security are mutually reinforcing missions. They cannot be un-tethered from one another, as much as we might wish that to be the case.
While Al Qaeda is under great pressure now and dependent on the Taliban and other extremist groups for sustainment, the success of the Taliban would vastly strengthen Al Qaeda's message to the Muslim world: that violent extremists are on the winning side of history. Put simply, the Taliban and Al Qaeda have become symbiotic, each benefiting from the success and mythology of the other. Al Qaeda leaders have stated this explicitly and repeatedly.
Taliban success in re-taking and holding parts of Afghanistan against the combined forces of multiple, modern armies—the current direction of events—has dramatically strengthened the extremist mythology and popular perceptions of who is winning and who is losing. The lesson of the Taliban's revival for Al Qaeda is that time and will are on their side. That, with a Western defeat, they could regain their strength and achieve a major strategic victory—as long as their senior leadership lives and can continue to inspire and attract followers and funding. Rolling back the Taliban is now necessary, even if not sufficient, to the ultimate defeat of Al Qaeda.
At the same time, one cannot separate the security situation in Afghanistan from the stability of Pakistan—a nuclear-armed nation of 175 million people now also explicitly targeted by Islamic extremists. The two countries, bound by ties of tribe and faith, share a porous border of more than 1,500 miles. Giving extremists breathing room in Pakistan led to the resurgence of the Taliban and more coordinated, sophisticated attacks in Afghanistan. Providing a sanctuary for extremists in southern and eastern Afghanistan would put yet more pressure on a Pakistani government already under attack from groups operating in the border region. Indeed, the Pakistan Taliban, just in the last year or so, has become a real threat to Pakistan's own domestic peace and stability, carrying out—with Al Qaeda's help—escalating bombing attacks throughout the country. It is these attacks, and the Taliban's movement toward Islamabad seven months ago, that largely motivated the current operations by the Pakistani army. And we know the Pakistan Taliban operate in collusion with both the Taliban in Afghanistan and Al Qaeda.
A related point with respect to Pakistan: Because of American withdrawal from the region in the early 1990s, followed by a severing of military-to-military relations, many Pakistanis are skeptical that the United States is a reliable, long-term strategic partner. We must change that perception.
Failure in Afghanistan would mean a Taliban takeover of much, if not most, of the country and likely a renewed civil war. Taliban-ruled areas could in short order become, once again, a sanctuary for Al Qaeda as well as a staging area for resurgent militant groups on the offensive in Pakistan.
Success in South and Central Asia by Islamic extremists—as was the case 20 years ago—would beget success on other fronts. It would strengthen the Al Qaeda narrative, providing renewed opportunities for recruitment, fund-raising, and more sophisticated operations. Aided by the Internet, many more followers could join their ranks, both in the region and in susceptible populations across the globe.
It is true that Al Qaeda and its followers can plot and execute attacks from a variety of locations—from Munich to London to Denver. But what makes the border area between Afghanistan and Pakistan uniquely different from any other location—including Somalia, Yemen, and other possible redoubts—is that this part of the world represents the epicenter of extremist jihadism: the historic place where native and foreign Muslims defeated one superpower and, in their view, caused its collapse at home. For them to be seen to defeat the sole remaining superpower in the same place would have severe consequences for the United States and the world.
Some say this is similar to the “domino theory” that underpinned and ultimately muddied the thinking behind the U.S. military escalation in Vietnam. The difference, however, is that we have very real— and very recent—history that shows just what can happen in this part of the world when extremists have breathing space, safe havens, and governments complicit with and supportive of their mission. Less than five years after the last Soviet tank crossed the Termez Bridge out of Afghanistan, in 1993 Islamic militants launched their first attack on the World Trade Center in New York. We cannot afford to make a similar mistake again.
A stable security situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan—one that is sustainable over the long term by their governments—is vital to our national security. By the same token, the current status quo in Afghanistan—the slow but steady deterioration of the security situation and growing influence of the Taliban—is unacceptable. So too is the status quo ante—a largely ungoverned region controlled by extremists in which the United States had little influence or ability to gain actionable intelligence on the ground.
The president's new strategic concept aims to reverse the Taliban's momentum and reduce its strength while providing the time and space necessary for the Afghans to develop enough security and governance capacity to stabilize their own country.
We will focus our resources where the population is most threatened, and align military and civilian efforts accordingly— with six primary objectives:
*Reversing Taliban momentum through sustained military action by the U.S., our allies, and the Afghans;
*Denying the Taliban access to and control of key population and production centers and lines of communications;
*Disrupting the Taliban outside secured areas and preventing Al Qaeda from regaining sanctuary in Afghanistan;
*Degrading the Taliban to levels manageable by Afghan National Security Forces;
*Increasing the size and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces and employing other local forces selectively to begin transitioning security responsibility to the Afghan government within 18 months; and
*Finally, selectively building the capacity of Afghan government, particularly in key ministries.
This approach is not open-ended “nation building.” It is neither necessary nor feasible to create a modern, centralized, Western-style Afghan nation-state—the likes of which has never been seen in that country. Nor does it entail pacifying every village and conducting textbook counterinsurgency from one end of Afghanistan to the other.
It is, instead, a narrower focus tied more tightly to our core goal of disrupting, dismantling and eventually defeating Al Qaeda by building the capacity of the Afghans—capacity that will be measured by observable progress on clear objectives, and not simply by the passage of time.
The essence of our civil-military plan is to clear, hold, build, and transfer. Beginning to transfer security responsibility to the Afghans in summer 2011 is critical— and, in my view, achievable. This transfer will occur district by district, province by province, depending on conditions on the ground. The process will be similar to what we did in Iraq, where international security forces provided “overwatch”— first at the tactical level, and then at the strategic level. Even after we transfer security responsibility to the Afghans and draw down our combat forces, the United States will continue to support their development as an important partner for the long haul. We will not repeat the mistakes of 1989, when we abandoned the country only to see it descend into chaos, and into Taliban hands.
Making this transition possible requires accelerating the development of a significantly larger and more capable Afghan army and police through intensive partnering with ISAF forces, especially in combat. It also means achieving a better balance between national and local forces; increasing Afghan unconventional warfare capabilities; engaging communities to enlist more local security forces to protect their own territory; and bolstering Afghan-led reintegration and reconciliation efforts.
At the strategic level, the president's plan will achieve a better balance between investments in the central government and sub-national entities. At the national level, the focus will be primarily on reforming essential ministries and pressing for the appointment of competent and honest ministers and governors. At the local and regional level, there will be a shift to work through existing, traditional structures rather than building new ones. In all of these efforts, we must have a committed partner in the Afghan people and government. That is one reason why there will be very clear and definitive timeframes for reviewing our—and their—progress. As the president announced, the United States will commit an additional 30,000 troops to Afghanistan for an extended surge of 18 to 24 months. These forces—the U.S. contribution to the fight—will be deployed and concentrated in the southern and eastern parts of the country. The first of these forces will begin to arrive in Afghanistan within two to three weeks.
In all, since taking office President Obama has committed nearly 52,000 additional troops to Afghanistan for a total U.S. force of approximately 100,000. We are looking to NATO and our other partners to send a parallel international message of strong resolve. Our Allies must take the lead and focus their resources in the north and west to prevent the insurgency from establishing new footholds. We will seek some five to 7,000 troops from NATO and expect the Allies to share more of the burden in training, equipping, and funding the Afghan National Army and police.
Let me offer a few closing thoughts.
It is worth remembering that the security situation in Afghanistan—though serious—does not begin to approach the scale of violence that consumed Iraq and confronted our forces there when I was confirmed as secretary of defense three years ago this week. With all the resources already committed to this campaign—plus those the president has just announced—I believe the pieces are being put in place to make real and measurable progress in Afghanistan over the next 18 to 24 months.
The president believes, as do I, that, in the end, we cannot defeat Al Qaeda and its toxic ideology without improving and stabilizing the security situation in Afghanistan. The president's decision offers the best possibility to decisively change the momentum in Afghanistan, and fundamentally alter the strategic equation in Pakistan and Central Asia—all necessary to protect the United States, our allies, and our vital interests. So, I ask for your full support of this decision to provide both Ambassador Eikenberry and General McChrystal the resources they need to be successful.
This is will take more patience, perseverance, and sacrifice by the United States and by our allies. And, as always, the heaviest burden will fall on the men and women who have volunteered—and in many cases re-volunteered—to serve their country in uniform. I know they will be uppermost in our minds and prayers as we take on this arduous but vitally necessary mission.
Excerpts of Remarks by Secretary of State Clinton, December 2, 2009Footnote 20
Secretary Hillary Clinton was interviewed in Washington, DC by Katie Couric of CBS Evening News
Q. After spending much of this day on Capitol Hill answering questions about the new strategy, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton answered some questions for us. We began with an issue that, as you've just heard, is troubling to some Afghans and members of Congress: Why start withdrawing U.S. troops just 18 months after the surge begins?
Secretary Clinton. Well, I think there's been considerable misunderstanding about what the President said and what he meant. He said last night that our goal is to begin transferring responsibility for security and hopefully being able to bring some of our troops home starting in July 2011. But this is going to be done in a responsible way and based on the conditions as they are assessed. And we want to send a message of urgency to the people and Government of Afghanistan and others that they have to be part of making sure that we go after al-Qaida and their allies, which include a lot of the Afghanistan Taliban.
Q. So is this a not-so-subtle message to Hamid Karzai that he better step up to the plate because the U.S. will not be there forever?
Secretary Clinton. Well, I think that this is a very clear message to President Karzai and to the rest of the Afghan leadership what has gone before hasn't been as effective as it needed to be, and we want to have the Afghan attention focused in a way that will produce results.
Q. Senator McCain told me last night that if U.S. troops leave Afghanistan, President Karzai will be leaving shortly thereafter or find himself probably assassinated. What's your reaction to that?
Secretary Clinton. Well, it's a tough neighborhood they live in. President Karzai, who was one of the real stalwart heroes of the struggle against the Soviet Union and against the Taliban, and I think this is a new window of opportunity that he is ready to open in order to demonstrate leadership.
Remarks by Secretary of State Clinton, December 2, 2009Footnote 21
Secretary Hillary Clinton delivered these remarks in Washington, DC before the United States Senate Armed Services Committee
Secretary Clinton. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, members of the Committee, I am grateful for this opportunity to testify before so many former colleagues and friends. My experience on this Committee helped form my views on many of the issues facing our nation. And it's a privilege to be here before you now in this different role.
Yesterday, President Obama presented the Administration's strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Today, Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, and I will all be providing you with additional details. But let me speak briefly at a more personal level about why we are making this commitment. Simply put, among a range of difficult choices, this is the best way to protect our nation now and in the future.
The extremists we are fighting in Afghanistan and Pakistan have attacked us and our allies before. If we allow them access to the very same safe havens they used before 2001, they will have a greater capacity to regroup and attack again. They could drag an entire region into chaos. Our civilian and military leaders in Afghanistan have reported that the situation is serious and worsening, and we agree.
In the aftermath of September 11th, I grieved with sons, daughters, husbands, wives whose loved ones were murdered. It was an attack on our country and an attack on the constituents I then represented. I witnessed the tragic consequences in the lives of thousands of innocent families and the damage done to our economy and our sense of security. So I feel a personal responsibility to help protect our nation from such violence.
The case for action against al-Qaida and its allies has always been clear, but the United States course of action over the last eight years has not. The fog of another war obscured our focus. And while our attention was focused elsewhere, the Taliban gained momentum in Afghanistan. And the extremist threat grew in Pakistan—a country with 175 million people, a nuclear arsenal, and more than its share of challenges.
It was against this backdrop that President Obama called for a careful, thorough review of the strategy. I was proud to be a part of that process, which questioned every assumption and took nothing for granted. And our objectives are clear: We will work with the Afghan and Pakistani governments to eliminate safe havens for those plotting to attack against us, our allies, and our interests; we will help to stabilize a region that we believe is fundamental to our national security; and we will develop a long-term, sustainable relationship with both Afghanistan and Pakistan so that we do not repeat the mistakes of the past. The duration of our military presence is not open-ended, but our civilian commitment must continue even as our troops begin eventually to come home.
Accomplishing this mission and ensuring the safety of the American people will not be easy. It will mean sending not only more troops, but more civilians and more assistance to Afghanistan, and significantly expanding our civilian efforts in Pakistan.
The men and women carrying out this military-civilian mission are not members of a list or items on a PowerPoint slide. They are our friends and neighbors, our sons and daughters, our brothers and sisters. And we will be asking them and the American people to make extraordinary sacrifices on behalf of our security. I want to assure this Committee that I know takes its oversight responsibility so seriously that we will do everything we can to make sure their sacrifices are honored and make our nation safer.
The situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan is serious, but it is not, in my view, as negative as frequently portrayed in public. And the beginning of President Karzai's second term has opened a new window of opportunity. We have real concerns about the influence of corrupt officials in the Afghan Government, and we will continue to pursue them. But in his inauguration speech last week that I was privileged to attend, I witnessed President Karzai's call for a new compact with his country. He pledged to combat corruption, improve governance, and deliver for the people of his country. His words were long in coming, but they were welcome. They must now be matched with action. The Afghan people, the United States, and the international community must hold the Afghan Government accountable for making good on these commitments. We will help by working to strengthen institutions at every level of Afghan society so we don't leave chaos behind when our combat troops begin to depart.
The President has outlined a timeframe for transition to Afghan responsibility, something that President Karzai assumed would happen, and which we took as a very good sign of a renewed understanding of the necessity of Afghanization. That transition will begin in the summer of 2011, when we expect Afghan security forces and the Afghan Government will have the capacity to start assuming ownership for defending their own country. As the President has said, we will execute the transition responsibly, taking into account conditions on the ground. But we think a timeframe for such a transition will provide a sense of urgency in working with the Afghan Government.
It should be clear to everyone that unlike the past, the United States, our allies and partners have an enduring commitment to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the region. So our resolve in this fight is reflected in the substantial commitment of troops and in the significant civilian commitment that will continue long after combat forces leave. That civilian effort is already bearing fruit. Civilian experts and advisors are helping to craft policy inside government ministries, providing development assistance in the field, and working in scores of other roles. When our Marines went into Nawa this July, we had civilians on the ground with them to coordinate assistance the next day. And as operations progress, our civil—our civ-mil coordination is growing even stronger.
We are on track to triple the number of civilian positions in Afghanistan to 974 by early next year. On average, each of these civilians leverages 10 partners, ranging from locally employed staff to experts with U.S.-funded NGOs. It's a cliché to say we have our best people in this job— in these jobs, but it happens to be true. When I was in Kabul a few weeks ago, I met with an American colonel who told me that while he had thousands of outstanding soldiers under his command, none of them had the 40 years of agricultural experience of the USDA civilian serving alongside his battalion, or the rule of law and governance expertise of their civilian experts from the State Department. He told me: “I'm happy to supply whatever support these valuable civilians need. And we need more of them.” The President's strategy will make that possible.
Not only do we have the right people to achieve our objectives; we also have a sound strategy. We will be delivering high-impact assistance and bolstering Afghanistan's agricultural sector, the traditional core of the Afghan economy. This will create jobs, reduce the funding that the Taliban receives from poppy cultivation, and draw insurgents off of the battlefield. We will also support an Afghan-led effort to open the door to those Taliban who renounce al-Qaida, abandon violence, and want to reintegrate into Afghan society. We understand some of those who fight with the insurgency do not do so out of conviction, but due to coercion or money.
So, all Afghans should have the choice to pursue a better future if they do so peacefully, respect the basic human rights of their fellow citizens, and reintegrate into their society. Our regional diplomacy complements this approach by seeking to mitigate external interference in Afghanistan, and working to shift the calculus of neighboring countries from competition for influence to cooperation and economic integration.
We also believe a strong, stable, democratic Pakistan must be a key partner in the fight against violent extremism, and people in Pakistan are increasingly coming to view that we do share a common enemy. I heard this repeatedly during my recent visit. So our relationship needs to anchored in common goals of civilian rule, robust economic development, and the defeat of those who threaten Pakistan, Afghanistan, the United States, and the rest of the world.
We'll significantly expand support intended for Pakistan to develop the potential of their people. We will do so by demonstrating a commitment to Pakistan that has been questioned by the Pakistanis in the past. And we will make sure that the people of Pakistan know that we wish to be their partner for the long term, and that we intend to do all that we can to bolster their futures. Now, we're not going to be facing these challenges alone. We share this responsibility with governments around the world.
I will go to Brussels tomorrow to begin the process of securing additional alliance commitments of troops, trainers and resources. We expect Secretary General Rasmussen to have an announcement today about the progress we're making in that effort. Ambassador Holbrooke, our Special Representative, is already there consulting with our allies. And we're also asking the international community to expand its support to Pakistan. Our objectives are shared by people and governments across the world, and we are particularly reaching out to Muslims everywhere.
Let me conclude where I began. We face a range of difficult choices in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but the President's plan represents the best way we know to protect our nation today and in the future. The task we face is as complex as any national security challenge in our lifetimes. We will not succeed if people view this effort as the responsibility of a single party, a single agency within our government, or a single country. We owe it to the troops and civilians who will face these dangers to come together as Americans, and come together with allies and international partners who are ready to step up and do more.
We have to accomplish this mission, and I look forward to working with you to help meet this challenge. Thank you all very much.
Excerpts of Remarks by Secretary of State Clinton, December 3, 2009Footnote 22
Secretary Hillary Clinton delivered these remarks while en route to Brussels, Belgium
Q. Well, maybe we could just ask you to preview for us what you hope to get out of tomorrow—
Secretary Clinton. Okay.
Q.—and specifically (inaudible).
Secretary Clinton. Well, we have a lot of people on the ground already who are working and talking with our NATO allies. Ambassador Holbrooke is there, Deputy Jim Steinberg is there, Assistant Secretary Phil Gordon is there, obviously our Ambassador Ivo Daalder is there. And we've been doing intensive outreach to all of our NATO ISAF partners.
I spoke with Secretary General Ras-mussen yesterday. He has been also traveling to capitals, meeting with heads of state. And we are encouraged that we're going to, beginning tomorrow but not ending tomorrow, have a number of public announcements about additional troop commitments, additional civilian assistance, and development aid as well.
The response has been positive. I've spoken to probably 20, 25 of my counterparts over the last week. And there is an understanding about the importance of the mission that the President has described. There is a desire to be able to explain it to the publics of various countries, and to make sure that in coalition governments the political stars are in alignment to be able to announce additional commitments. But we feel good about it.
Q. What are you looking for from NATO?
Q. Is it mainly trainers? Is it mainly—
Secretary Clinton. It's everything. It's the whole range of more combat forces and more trainers, but there is not as big a distinction between those two as some have, I think, unrealistically posited, because the best way to actually create a fighting unit is through partnering in combat. So yes, there are people who will do what we think of as training—here's how you load your weapons, here's what—the kind of logistical experiences you need. But we've got to bring the Afghan security forces into the fight.
And it is a fact that General McChrystal has made a number of significant changes that one would ask, why weren't they made before, but the fact is they weren't. And so we are implementing a new training approach. We are implementing a different form of partnering between NATO ISAF and the Afghans. When I was there, Minister Wardak, the defense minister who has been there from the very begin-ning—and he has really labored hard, everybody who knows him who has worked with him has a high opinion of him—he was just with this big smile on his face telling me that it's the first time he has felt fully integrated into the NATO ISAF structure.
I mean, that's a little bit discouraging when one looks back, but he said we're in it now, we're getting the intelligence now. McChrystal has changed some of the rules of engagement on air support for combat, on nighttime raids using dogs. There has been so much change, and we've seen improvements in Helmand Province since the Marines arrived in July.
So this is putting all the pieces together, and I think that when you say, well, what will be doing—combat, training, logistical support, intelligence, all of that is part of the kind of partnership we're now trying to provide to the Afghans.
Op-ed by Secretary of State Clinton, December 4, 2009Footnote 23
Secretary Hillary Clinton published this op-ed, titled “All Nations Must Play a Part in Afghanistan Mission,” in The Daily Telegraph
The violent extremism that threatens the people and governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan also undermines the stability of the wider region and threatens the security of our friends, allies and interests around the world. All of us whose shared future is at stake must take responsibility for securing it.
This week, President Barack Obama reaffirmed the commitment of the United States to our core goal: to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and prevent their return to either country. The US is sending an additional 30,000 personnel to Afghanistan, significantly increasing our civilian aid to the Afghan people, and broadening our partnership with Pakistan.
Today in Brussels, I will discuss the way forward with our allies. And I will thank those nations that have pledged additional troops. This is a crucial test for Nato. After September 11, the alliance invoked Article 5 of its charter for the first time, affirming that the terrorist attacks planned in Afghanistan and perpetrated in the US were attacks on every Nato member. The members of the alliance have paid a steep price in lives, but we must remain firm in our resolve.
For countries in the region, the stakes are particularly high. Civilians of every faith have been murdered, but Muslims have paid the highest toll. Troops from Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and other Muslim-majority nations are fighting extremism in Afghanistan and their participation is vital to our mission.
Along with the extra American troops, more international forces will help to deny al-Qaeda a safe haven; reverse the Taliban's momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow the government; and strengthen the capacity of the Afghans to take responsibility for their own security.
President Obama has outlined a time frame for transition to Afghan responsibility, with the additional troops allowing us to accelerate handing over security to Afghan forces, beginning in July 2011. Just as we have done in Iraq, we will execute this transition responsibly, taking into account conditions on the ground.
Our approach signals both the urgency and resolve that this mission requires. Our urgency is reflected in the time frame for transition that asks the Afghan government to start taking full ownership of security. Our resolve is reflected in the substantial deployment of troops since the President took office; in our commitment to assist Afghan forces for the long haul; and in the significant civilian commitment that will continue long after our forces leave.
It should be clear to everyone that we will not repeat the mistakes of the past. The US and our partners will have an enduring commitment to the region. Ultimately, we recognise that only the Afghan people can decide what kind of nation they want to build for themselves. And only the Pakistani people can ensure their country's democratic future. That is why we are working as partners in both countries. The United States has no interest in occupation—we seek partnerships based on mutual respect, mutual interest and mutual trust.
As the President said, our goal is to isolate those who destroy, to strengthen those who build, to hasten the day when our troops will leave, and to forge lasting friendships in which America is a partner, and never a patron.
Excerpts of Remarks by Secretary of State Clinton and Secretary of Defense Gates, December 5, 2009Footnote 24
Secretary Hillary Clinton and Secretary Robert Gates were interviewed in Washington, DC by Bob Schieffer of CBS's Face the Nation
Q. Let me ask you this: Former Vice President Cheney says anytime you start talking about leaving, that just emboldens the enemy; it causes the Afghans to begin to accommodate the enemy, because they get the idea that the bad guys are still going to be there, but we're going to leave.
Secretary Gates. No. The reality is the Taliban read the newspapers, okay? They know what popular opinion is in Europe. They know what popular opinion is in the United States—you announce a date or not. They can tell as easily from reading the news media about political support for these kinds of undertakings themselves, and they always believe that they can outlast us.
The reality is, though, what are they going to do? Are they going to get more aggressive than they already are? We don't think they can. If they lie low, that's great news to us because it gives us some huge opportunities in Afghanistan. We think that we have the opportunity to engage these guys with the additional force we're sending in, make a significant difference in 18 months, get enough additional Afghan troops and police trained that we can begin this gradual process of transitioning security.
Q. Madame Secretary, let me ask you about one thing the President said. In his entire speech, he talked about handing over authority to the Afghans, but he never included the words “win” or “victory,” as far as I know in that speech. He just talked about avoiding an open-ended commitment. Have we given up trying to win? Do we think that's no longer possible? Is victory no longer possible?
Secretary Clinton. Well, Bob, I think he talked about success, and that's what—
Q. Yes.
Secretary Clinton.—we're looking toward. We do believe we can be successful.
Q. Well, what is success?
Secretary Clinton. Well, success is doing what we have set forth as our primary goal, which is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaida. It is also being able to stand up an Afghan security force so that they can defend themselves, and partnering with the Afghan Government and people so that they will not once again become a safe haven for terrorists.
And I think part of our very careful deliberation over the last months was to ask ourselves really hard questions like, okay, who is the enemy? Is it every young boy who is coerced into joining the Taliban or who decides he can make more money being a fighting member of the Taliban than he can being a member of the Afghan security army? We thought hard about that, and no, we don't think so. We think those are people that actually, if we reverse and break the momentum of the Taliban, which we think can very well happen with the strategy that we're pursuing, that a lot of these people are going to come back over. They don't want to see the return of the Taliban. There is absolutely no evidence that Afghans are in any way supportive of that.
Q. Will there be a civilian surge as well as a military surge?
Secretary Clinton. Yes, there will be. In fact, there has been. We've tripled the number of civilians in Afghanistan. When this Administration came into office, there were about 320 civilians. They were on, most of them, six-month rotations. There was, in my view, not the kind of serious effort that needs to be demonstrated to the civilian aspect of our strategy. And we've changed that and we're going to keep building it.
Secretary Gates. And the fact is with this pledge of 7,000, that will be 50,000 non-U.S. troops in Afghanistan. That is not a trivial matter.
Q. Let me just ask you this. I want to go on to talk about Pakistan. But it's my understanding now that we have a ratio of one combat troop in Afghanistan to one civilian contractor. Is that ratio going to continue?
Secretary Gates. That's not quite right. But there are a lot of contractors.
Q. It's pretty close to that?
Secretary Gates. But most of the contractors are, in fact, Afghans.
Secretary Clinton. Yeah, that's a very important point.
Secretary Gates. And so these are people that we are paying who have a real job that, frankly, become our allies rather than potential recruits for the bad guys.
Remarks by Secretary of Defense Gates, December 8, 2009Footnote 25
Secretary Robert Gates delivered these remarks while en route to Afghanistan
Secretary Gates. So let me just talk a little bit about the trip to Afghanistan and what my agenda is.
First of all, with the Afghans, clearly we'll want to talk with President Karzai and Minister Wardak about the president's decision and the implementation of that decision, how we hope to use our troops and the additional troops from our allies in partnering with the Afghan national security forces.
Another major message will be the importance of a long-term relationship between the United States, ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] and Afghanistan, that we are not going to repeat the experience of 1989, and that obviously, as the security situation improves and we're able, over time, to reduce our forces, that the civilian developmental, economic, other kinds of relations between us and developing countries that are normal will become the predominant part of the relationship. But we intend to be their partner for a long time to come.
I will ask them about the prospects for increasing the retention and recruitment of the Afghan security forces and the training of those forces and the speed with which we can get them into embedded and partnering relationships with our forces and those of the other ISAF countries.
I'll talk to them about the importance for us of capable, honest ministers in areas that are critical for our success, such as defense and interior and others, as well as in key provinces.
With respect to the meetings with the U.S. commanders and our troops, clearly, again, I'll be asking them about their view of the way forward, now that we have the president's decisions, how they are viewing the Afghan capabilities and potential for accelerated growth and partnering.
I'll probably focus a lot on their perception of logistics and the ability to receive the inflow of U.S. forces and equipment in the time frame that we're talking about. And then I have a lot of concerns that are sort of traditional for me that I'll be talking to them about in terms of taking care of the troops.
I want to talk quite a bit about the counter-IED effort, especially in light of this task force I've just formed. I want to make sure that we can preserve the golden hour in terms of medevac with the influx of additional, significant additional U.S. and ISAF forces.
I'll be asking them if they have much experience at this point with the MRAP all-terrain vehicles. There are only a few hundred in Afghanistan at this point. But we'll see if we have any reaction to that; obviously concern about the adequacy of intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance efforts for them.
And I'll be asking about equipment in general. For example, one of the members of Congress told me offline at the hearings the other day that he heard some complaints from some of the soldiers about the straps on their backpacks being too thin and putting too much pressure on their shoulders in ways that leave their hands numb; so just little stuff like that. I'll be asking the soldiers what kind of equipment issues they have that we can do something about back in Washington; obviously talk about civil-military cooperation.
And then a big piece of my conversation, especially with the soldiers, will just be to thank them for their service and for their sacrifice and tell them we're in this thing to win. Some of these units, particularly the Stryker unit, have taken a lot of casualties, so I want to talk to them about that, express sympathy.
Q. Secretary, can you describe the discussions that you've had?
Staff. This is Anne Flaherty—the new AP reporter.
Q. Hi. The discussions that the administration has had with Afghanistan since the announcement or before the announcement. I believe Obama called him Sunday night, Karzai Sunday night, before the big announcement. But you have not spoken to Karzai, or—
Secretary Gates. I spoke—I have not spoken to President Karzai. I did talk to Minister Wardak about the decision and where we were headed. I think it was— Monday? I think it was on Monday.
Q. What was that conversation like?
Secretary Gates. Basically foreshadowing the president's decisions of the speech and the agenda that we have in front of us, and particularly the importance of recruitment for the ANSF [Afghan National Security Forces].
I would say his main concern is the flow of equipment, particularly the Afghan National Army. And so I'm sure that'll be a subject that comes up in my conversations with him.
Q. (Inaudible)—which units?
Secretary Gates. You probably know that better than I do at this point. (Laughs.) I signed the first deployment orders on Friday for roughly the first 17,000 troops that will flow through March and April.
Q. (Inaudible)—when March and April will arrive?
Secretary Gates. Yeah, they'll begin arriving February, March, April. As I mentioned, the first Marines actually will start arriving next week, and the Marines will flow in probably at a fairly steady pace over the next few weeks. They may not all be in until February or thereabouts, but the first units are coming in pretty quick.
Q. Mr. Secretary, the effort to build the Afghan security force has been going on for many years. What can be done to speed it up and to raise the level of their confidence?
Secretary Gates. Well, a couple of things. First of all, as was mentioned in the hearings last week, I mean, one of the eye openers for us was learning that the Taliban, for the most part, are better paid than the ANSF. So that's something that we and the Afghans have already taken steps to correct. The police are particularly poorly paid. But even the army is less well paid.
And so the army is putting—they're raising the pay of the police and they're putting in place a number of additional incentives and bonuses and so on for the army in terms of combat pay and various things like that. So that clearly will help. And I think, frankly, that's the biggest obstacle.
And one of the problems—I mean, it sounds silly on its face, but attrition is higher in the areas on the Afghan National Army—attrition is higher in the areas where the combat is heavier than it is in places, say, in the west and in the north. And the reason is that there aren't enough of them, and they basically fight until they die or they go AWOL, because there's nobody to rotate in behind them so that they can get a break. So the numbers and beginning to be in a position where you can rotate some of these Afghan soldiers, I think, will be an important part of the retention piece of it as well.
Q. (Inaudible.)
Secretary Gates. Well, there's a lot of this. It's late in the game, frankly.
Q. Sir, Adam Entous from Reuters. Can you give us a breakdown of the 17,000? What exactly are that 17,000?
Staff. We can get you a breakdown.
Q. (Inaudible)—where they're going, what they're going to be doing?
Secretary Gates. Well, most of the first troops going in will be going into the south. And I think the bulk of those 17,000 are Marines. But we can get the specifics for you.
Q. (Inaudible.)
Secretary Gates. I don't think so. I think some number will also go to Kandahar Province.
Q. How surprised were you by— (inaudible)?
Secretary Gates. Well, you know, I think I've mentioned to you all before, since spring I have been surprised by the change of tone on the part of our allies. There's been—and Admiral Mullen has seen it on the uniformed side as well— there's been a sort of a sense of commitment, a sense of the realization of the importance of being successful in Afghanistan, of the consequences for the alliance of not being successful, and just a greater sense of commitment to this thing.
And the uniformed military in many of these countries has been much more ready to provide additional forces than some of their civilian leaders. But what has been impressive has been the change in tone on the part of the civilian leaders as well.
Q. (Inaudible)—the conversations that you have with them as far as strategy?
Secretary Gates. There was a lot of interaction with the allies. We spent—a good part of the discussions in Bratislava were about this. And then there have just been a lot of telephone calls and a lot of visits. I mean, I've had the Australian defense minister and the German defense minister both here in the last couple of weeks, several other countries as well.
Q. On the NATO issue, when you take into account that the Canadians and the Dutch are going to be reducing their numbers, and when you look at how many of the 7,000 are actually already in the country and just getting extended, is it really that substantial of an increase that you got from NATO?
Secretary Gates. Yeah, I think it's— frankly, my hope was more—I mean, my hope was that we could get 5,000. So a commitment for 7,000 is better than I expected. And what I'm hearing coming out of the NATO meeting is that it may go—that the commitments may go higher than that.
There are several governments that are unwilling to make a commitment prior to the January conference that Chancellor Merkel and Prime Minister Brown are organizing in London. And then some others have elections early in the year, provincial and other kinds of elections, and would rather not make any new commitments or make a decision before that time.
Q. And is it really seven [thousand] when you consider that many of them are already positioned in the country now, because they were sent here for the election and are just being extended out? Is it really—
Secretary Gates. Well, some of that is true. But I think—my understanding, at least—I mean, I haven't seen the specific commitments of specific countries, but my impression, at least from the couple of defense ministers that I talked to, was that these are new and additional forces.
Q. (Inaudible.)
Secretary Gates. To a certain extent it is. And I think one of the benefits of the change in the command-and-control structure and creating the intermediate joint headquarters puts us in a position to try and establish greater consistency in the training programs and so on, so that people who are being trained by the Czechs or by the French or by the Germans or someone, and those being trained by the U.K. and the U.S., all are essentially getting the same level of training, whether it's—I think that the differentiation is probably greater on the police side than it is on the army side, but for both.
Q. Mr. Secretary, there is an article in the Post this morning about a concern that millions of dollars of equipment is being left behind in Iraq and that some of it should be moved into Afghanistan. Can you talk a little bit about that? Is there a concern or—
Secretary Gates. The Army has been deeply engaged for months in terms of what to do about the equipment left in— the equipment that we have in Iraq. What of it should be turned over to the Iraqis? What of it should be sent on to Afghanistan? What of it should be brought back to the United States?
We have about a little over three million pieces of equipment in Iraq. I'm told that by September of ‘10, more than two million pieces of that three million will have been disposed of one way or the other. We have gotten some extra flexibility from the Congress in terms of turning equipment over to the Iraqi army, and we are trying to decide.
Frankly, we just have to figure out, in terms of cost and in terms of logistics, what makes sense in terms of moving it from Iraq to Afghanistan. In some cases, it's just easier and cheaper to buy it new than to take used equipment, pack it up and ship it from Iraq to Afghanistan. But I will tell you, the Army has been working on this in great detail for months now, and I think they have a pretty good plan.
Q. Do you have any sense of how that'll break down, that 2 million by next year? How much will be left behind? How much will go to Afghanistan?
Secretary Gates. No.
Excerpts of Remarks by Secretary of Defense Gates and Afghanistan President Karzai, December 8, 2009Footnote 26
Secretary Robert Gates and President Hamid Karzai delivered these remarks in Kabul, Afghanistan
President Karzai. Media members, ladies and gentlemen—(inaudible)—I'm pleased that we have a very—(inaudible)—American—(inaudible)—Secretary Gates— (inaudible)—Afghanistan—(inaudible)— Afghan National Army—(inaudible)— Afghanistan—(inaudible). We had a detailed discussion of all the issues. I'm so happy to see our discussions could help us prolong the relationships and enhance the existing relationships for a better fight against terrorism. (Inaudible)—thanking the secretary.
Secretary Gates. Thank you, Mr. President. And first let me thank President Karzai. As always, he has been a gracious host and I look forward to continuing our discussion over lunch.
The United States and indeed the entire international community shares President Karzai's vision, as articulated in his inaugural address last month, of an Afghanistan that is capable of defending itself and where peace reigns across the whole nation. That goal underpinned President Obama's announcement last week of our enduring commitment to this country, its people and the region, a commitment highlighted by a major increase in our support here.
To reverse the negative security trends in many parts of this country, to seize the initiative, President Obama is sending 30,000 more U.S. troops to southern and eastern Afghanistan, the first of which are scheduled to arrive within days and most of the remainder by mid-summer.
Afghanistan's international partners have also demonstrated their strong commitment by pledging at least 7,000 additional troops. When all is said and done, some 43 nations will have a force that is nearly 150,000 strong, a clear demonstration of the world's unwavering resolve to help the Afghan people, and all here at the invitation of the Afghans and with the sanction of the United Nations.
The primary objective of this troop increase is to reduce the Taliban's ability to threaten your communities and terrorize your families. Of course, even as we add more troops, we know that you prefer to have Afghans protecting Afghans. That is our desire as well.
Our troops are here only as long as it takes to defeat your enemies. We will fight by your side until Afghan forces are large enough and strong enough to secure the nation on their own, as they have already done in Kabul. Indeed, wherever Afghan soldiers and police are in the fight, they have shown great courage and made great sacrifices.
Often, however, there have not been enough of them, and our meeting focused principally on this challenge, on how best to recruit and retain more Afghan troops. And I reiterated my commitment to do whatever it takes, with training, funding and partnering, to help build Afghan security forces at all levels capable of securing and protecting all Afghans.
I know there is concern that more international troops will lead to more civilian injuries and deaths. Unlike the enemies of Afghanistan, who deliberately target innocent Afghans and lie about it, our top priority remains the safety of civilians. We will continue to do everything in our power to protect casualties. To this end, our commanders, especially General McChrystal, have already changed operational guidelines, and as a result, civilian casualties have declined dramatically.
The transition of security responsibility that begins in July 2011 will be gradual and based on conditions on the ground. It will proceed district by district, province by province, as conditions permit.
Our relationship with Afghanistan is a long-term commitment. As security improves and we begin turning over responsibility to Afghans, our relationship in other areas will only grow, especially with economic and political development.
As President Obama and I have said repeatedly, our government will not again turn our back on this country or the region. The United States and our many friends and allies around the globe are determined to defeat those who stand between you and a peaceful and a prosperous future. Together we will succeed and our partnership will flourish for decades to come.