In the 1960s and 1970s, constitutional crises in Latin America typically involved the participation of the military, whether to replace the democratic regime with a military dictatorship or to suspend the constitution until a new government was elected. Since 1978, there has been a sharp decline of military interventions in politics and most constitutional crises have been resolved within the limits of the established legal order. A different form of political instability has, however, emerged. Although democratic regimes remained stable, several elected presidents ended their terms prematurely. Some of them were impeached; others were forced to resign, most of the time in the midst of corruption scandals and social mobilizations against the government. This new phenomenon is the central topic of Pérez-Liñan's Presidential Impeachment and the New Political Instability in Latin America.
Pérez-Liñan explains the premature termination of presidential terms in the last three decades in the region using the recent wave of presidential impeachments as the main object of analysis. According to the author, in a political environment where the military is not likely to intervene in politics, presidents who face massive popular protests (due to corruption scandals, poor economic performance, or both) are unable to finish their terms. The premature termination occurs by impeachment—or by a declaration of incapacity in Congress, when presidents fail to build a “legislative shield,” either because they lack majority support in Congress or because they do not negotiate with legislators on a regular basis. The early termination occurs by resignation when presidents anticipate an impeachment or when an unexpected popular uprising forces the president to leave office.
In the elaboration of his argument, Pérez-Liñan makes several substantive contributions to the study of Latin American democracies. In the first place, and contrary to most of the literature on political institutions of the last two decades, he shows that presidential leadership, not only institutions, should be treated as an independent variable to explain government instability. The distribution of partisan power in Congress and constitutional voting thresholds required for impeachment obviously matter to determine whether an unpopular president will avoid or survive an impeachment process. According to Pérez-Liñan, however, the style of presidential leadership also shapes the willingness of legislators to shield the executive from impeachment. Other things being equal, a president who established a pattern of negotiation with Congress early in his term is more likely to survive a corruption scandal or a decline in popularity at a later point than another who established a pattern of isolation or confrontation with legislators (167, 175). This is why under similar conditions Paraguay's interim president Gonzalez Macchi survived an impeachment in 2002 and his predecessor, Cubas Grau, did not.
Pérez-Liñan also shows that variables pertaining to the political and social environment are crucial for the occurrence as well as the resolution of a presidential crisis. One of them is the frequency of media scandals involving the president, members of his family, or his cabinet ministers. Media scandals, a phenomenon derived from the recent emergence of a critical form of journalism in Latin America, have eroded the popularity of several presidents and predisposed legislators (not only from opposition parties) to get rid of the president if the situation becomes too critical. Another factor, the most crucial, is the mobilization of a broad multiclass coalition against the president or his policies. A decline in presidential popularity due to media scandals can be damaging for the administration, but a popular uprising against the president is lethal to his survival (123). According to Pérez-Liñan, the extent of the social mobilization against the president explains why Samper survived an impeachment in 1996 and De la Rua was forced to resign in 2001, even before an impeachment process could take place.
Presidential Impeachment invites us to rethink the relation between presidential regimes and political instability. After three decades of debate on the matter, it seems for now a relatively firm conclusion in the literature that presidential regimes are not responsible for the waves of democratic breakdowns that occurred in the region during the 1960s and 1970s. As Pérez-Liñan demonstrates, however, contemporary presidential regimes in Latin America are still prone to extreme forms of executive-legislative conflict and instances of presidential dominance followed by presidential failure. In other words, presidential democracies may be able to survive but their quality and institutional performance is low.
Although Congress has emerged as the dominant institution in most crises, this does not indicate a reinvigorated system of checks and balances. Legislators have used impeachments as a last resort to control presidents who had become too unpopular. But institutional checks were unable to prevent presidential abuses in the first place. Popular uprisings have contributed to limit the power of presidents who transgress the constitution or make arbitrary decisions that affect the economic welfare of the population. But popular uprisings are an imperfect mechanism to create checks that are not provided for in the constitutional system. Popular protest is an intermittent and contingent form of control, insufficient to make representatives accountable on a regular basis. It is also subject to manipulation by political elites.
From a methodological point of view, a strong aspect of this book is the way it transcends the dichotomy between quantitative and qualitative methods of empirical analysis. Although the cases of presidential impeachment are relatively few to support a general comparative argument, Pérez-Liñan tests his arguments using a database that includes instances of early termination of the presidential term without impeachment, as well as instances where presidents survived a presidential crisis. The impact of each of the main explanatory variables is explored in different chapters alternating the use of qualitative case studies with a regression analysis. More than the simple addition of different research methodologies, the book achieves a synthesis in which qualitative and quantitative evidence reinforce each other.
Despite these many strengths, there is one weak point in Pérez-Liñan's account of the new form of political instability in Latin America. The author lists the decline of military interventions, the emergence of new forms of “social accountability,” the appearance of a “watchdog” type of journalism, the partisan support of the president, and his style of leadership, as important variables determining the outcome of a presidential crisis. It is not always clear, however, what the relative weight of these factors is in the causal analysis. Overall, it derives from the case studies and statistical tests that popular uprisings are the most important variable explaining the downfall of presidents, whether they are impeached or not. But if this is the case, the obvious question is why popular uprisings occur in some cases but not in others.
At the end of chapter 5, the book shows that levels of presidential approval are negatively correlated with the frequency of corruption scandals exposed in the media, particularly when the president is directly involved. There is no direct relation, however, between a decline in the popularity of a president and the emergence of mass protests demanding his resignation. Moreover, according to Pérez-Liñan, not every form of social mobilization against the government threatens the survival of presidents. It is only when the middle class converges with popular sectors that an administration is doomed to fall. There is no explanation, however, of what factors contribute to the formation of this multiclass alliance.
This criticism notwithstanding, Pérez-Liñan's Presidential Impeachment is an exceptional piece of political science scholarship. It is very well written, the arguments are persuasive, and the empirical analysis is superb. This book should be used in any upper-level undergraduate course and graduate seminar on Latin American politics and institutions. It is also a very valuable contribution to our understanding of the current performance of democratic regimes in Latin America.
