The Boudican revolt is described as a ‘disaster’ (clades) by Suetonius; as a ‘serious disaster’ (gravis clades) by Tacitus; and as a ‘terrible disaster’ (πάθος δεινὸν) by Dio.Footnote ¹ In agreement with this unanimity of the ancient sources, modern scholars also tend to refer to the revolt as a catastrophe; some go as far as to compare the stakes in the decisive battle to those of the Battle of Hastings.Footnote ² It may be illuminating to employ this revolt as a case-study for the broad problem — one not frequently addressed — of how Rome dealt with unrest in the provinces. Available research on various general aspects of the Roman approach towards war and imperialism may not always apply in the case of internal conflict. The event of a provincial revolt offers an opportunity to examine official Roman action, not just in direct response to open indigenous opposition, but also in anticipation of it, and in commemorating its occurrence. The purpose of this article does not allow for the examination of all these aspects. The intention is to concentrate on the events that followed the subjugation of the Boudican revolt, claiming that at the root of Roman action there stood a strong motivation to relieve local resentment, and to return the province to a routine of governance based on trust in the indigenous population.

The revolt took place in a.d. 60/1.Footnote ³ The narrative of the initial success experienced by the rising opposition movement is brief and violent. Tacitus' account in the Annals narrates the fall of Camulodunum, Londinium and Verulamium, the defeat and annihilation of a division of the Ninth Legion, and the killing all in all of about 70,000 Romans and their allies.Footnote ⁴ The numbers are high, but Suetonius and Dio provide a similar picture, and modern scholars usually quote them without qualifications or caveats.Footnote ⁵ Certainly, the surprise of the attack, as well as the reduced number of troops around the disturbed region, adds credibility to the claims. Boudican archaeological layers from all three sites mentioned by Tacitus have produced enough evidence to corroborate the occurrence of intense destruction by human hands.Footnote ⁶ In at least one other site, Chelmsford, there appears to have been destruction of the same nature, and on a similar scale.Footnote ⁷

When trying to ascertain the possible causes for an eruption of local violence, we must not rush toward anachronistic observations, made on the assumption that foreign rule would have constituted, in and of itself, an incentive strong enough to prompt a local rising against the Roman presence. With regard to the Iceni, Tacitus mentions an earlier clash with the Roman authorities, resulting from an attempt by the governor Scapula to disarm the tribe in a.d. 47, prior to his western campaign; and Dio adds an element of economic pressure, reporting that just before the outbreak of hostilities Seneca had called in a massive loan of 40,000,000 sesterces all at once.Footnote ⁸ Similarly, some of the Trinovantes are said to have been driven out of their houses by new colonists in Camulodunum.Footnote ⁹ However, a close examination of these and other friction points suggests that, from Claudius' invasion up until the Boudican revolt, most of the provocations caused by Roman officials (or groups, such as the colonists at Camulodunum) should be viewed either as unintentional, or as having been performed against the will of the highest authorities.Footnote ¹⁰ Such a background, also consonant with the reality of other local revolts under the Principate, should be kept in mind here, since it relates directly to the Roman authorities' motivation, identified below, to neutralise all causes for local resentment during the period after the Boudican revolt.

To explain the suddenness and intensity of the eruption in a.d. 60/1, we are left, for the most part, with the corrupt conduct of one Roman procurator — Decianus Catus — while annexing the client kingdom of the Iceni. The absence from the scene of the governor, Suetonius Paullinus, who was campaigning in Wales at the time, appears to have allowed the opposition movement to gain momentum, and to be reinforced by various other local groups, including the Trinovantes, whose respective complaints against Roman rule and its various representations had not, up to that point, translated themselves into willingness to rebel.Footnote ¹¹

Perhaps the most crucial factor that facilitated destruction and carnage on a great scale was the surprise and lack of preparedness on the Roman side for the possibility of an indigenous uprising: ‘quasi media pace incauti’ (‘surprised, as it were, in the midst of peace’) as Tacitus represents the residents of the colony at Camulodunum, which was destroyed in the early stages of the rebellion.Footnote ¹² Throughout the process of conquest and expansion in Britain, the Roman administration appears to have pursued further advancement only once pacification and a certain level of trust in the local population had been established in newly occupied territories. Moreover, trust would have been key in a situation whereby the governor was away from the province, campaigning with two legions in Wales, and leaving the eastern part of the province sparsely fortified, with but a few legionary troops stationed close enough to extend practical help. After the initial success of the rebels, a decisive battle took place, apparently somewhere in the Midlands, perhaps around Mancetter.Footnote ¹³ It ended in the defeat and massacre of the indigenous forces. On the Roman side fought some 10,000 men, headed by Suetonius Paullinus; exaggerations regarding the number of Britons reach as high as 230,000.

Hostilities petered out only gradually with the rebel army defeated and its leader dead. Now it was the Roman side that held the initiative. Reprisals and pacification projects did not cease until the imperial court itself interfered in a most direct way in the administration of the province. The following analyses the events in the aftermath of the revolt itself, starting immediately after the decisive battle had taken place and the backbone of the local opposition had been broken. None of these events have escaped the attention of the many modern-day historians who have examined the Boudican episode. However, it is the intention here to lay the entire emphasis on the official Roman action, and to point out aspects of consistency in the response of the imperial administration to the hostile circumstances. The examination of this perspective is essential not only because it has found little representation in modern scholarship, but because the simplistic premise that the ‘Romans were bad’ has come to underlie more than a few aspects of recent research.Footnote ¹⁴

Tacitus' biases regarding the topic of Britain are many and largely obvious. The Roman governors of Britain, from the invasion of the island to the time of Agricola, are divided by him into effective and ineffective, in accordance with the extent of expansion achieved during their time in office. Regardless of the many considerations that could have affected the Roman administration's choices regarding further expansion, Tacitus allows himself to be critical in the most superficial way on this account. His criticism becomes understandable, of course, when recalling that it anticipates the expansion feats that were to be witnessed during the governorship of his father-in-law, Agricola. Suetonius Paullinus' ambition easily won the esteem of the historian, who ascribes to him a motivation to equal Corbulo's success in Armenia.Footnote ¹⁵ Furthermore, in the interval of two years Britain's governor is said to have subdued several tribes, strengthened military posts, and achieved the conquest of the island of Mona (Anglesey), whose inhabitants showed strong resistance.Footnote ¹⁶

The narrative of the Annals moves uninterrupted from the decisive battle between Paullinus' troops and the British rebels to the reprisals that followed. Tacitus' criticism of the governor's acts, when detectable, should be regarded on the whole as instructive, in large part because the historian does not hide his admiration for the governor. When the narrative returns to the description of his actions, Tacitus states that ‘whatever tribes still wavered or were hostile were laid waste with fire and sword’.Footnote ¹⁷ This report, planted within the account of the revolt, should be read, of course, as relating only to those inhabitants of the province or client kingdoms who had taken part in the opposition. The historian's statement regarding ‘fire and sword’, when it is made, appears to formulate Tacitus' approval of the severe response to persisting opposition. Later developments, however, reveal that neither the lower levels in the local administration, nor the central government in Rome, approved of the post-revolt policy of Paullinus. Tacitus himself proves to be judgemental of it in more than one place. ‘Fire and sword’, as it turned out, were not sufficient to achieve pacification, and even an ensuing famine did not break the spirit of resistance. At this point, Tacitus introduces Britain's new procurator:

Tacitus concentrates here on the agency of Julius Classicianus, but it should be noted that his report does not try to contradict or to refute the implied allegations against Paullinus for setting too dear a price for the surrender of previous participants in the revolt. Generally, Tacitus would be the first to admit that ‘little is gained by conquest if followed by unlawful acts’.Footnote ¹⁹ This is in contrast to the actions performed for the benefit of the local population by his father-in-law, Agricola, which are described in a passage we will return to exactly as an attempt to ‘root out the causes of war’.Footnote ²⁰ His general view on the Britons in the Agricola is that they ‘readily accept the conscription, the taxes, and the other duties dictated by the Empire, as long as there is no injustice — of this they are impatient; they are reduced to subjection, not as yet to slavery’.Footnote ²¹ It is also in the Agricola — where he does not yet appear to be bound by his admiration for Paullinus — that he goes so far as to state that after the Boudican revolt many of the rebels clung to their arms out of fear that ‘excellent as [Paullinus] was in other respects, he would act arrogantly towards the conquered, and would treat them more severely, as one who was avenging private wrongs’.Footnote ²²

It may be argued, then, that Tacitus himself believed — even as he was writing the Annals — that resistance in Britain continued after the decisive battle because of Paullinus' oppressive conduct. But still more remarkable is Tacitus' conviction that both the new procurator, Classicianus, and the imperial court considered Paullinus' actions to have been at the root of the problem. He says that Classicianus ‘stated in a dispatch to Rome that no cessation of fighting must be expected unless Suetonius were superseded, attributing that general's calamities to depravity and his successes to good luck’.Footnote ²³ Furthermore, it has been mentioned above how Classicianus may have acted in the interests of the indigenous population when he recommended patience in awaiting Paullinus' replacement and anticipated relief for local suffering at that time.

The motivation behind his apparent support of the local population may be found in Classicianus' ethnic background. The inscription on the two large stones from his tomb in London not only corroborates Tacitus' record of the office held by him, but also supplies interesting information on his family.Footnote ²⁴ It mentions his wife, ‘Iulia Indi filia Pacata’, and it is generally accepted that the Indus referred to here is no other than Julius Indus, chief of the Gallic Treveri, who participated in the subjugation of the rebellion of Florus against Tiberius in a.d. 21.Footnote ²⁵ This does not mean that Classicianus must necessarily have been a Trever himself, although the use of the names Alpinus and Classicus among the Treveri makes the possibility likely.Footnote ²⁶ However, even if he had merely married into Celtic nobility, he might have been regarded as a sympathetic figure by a British population which derived mostly from Celtic origin.

It would perhaps be too hasty to conclude that Nero chose a procurator with a Celtic background specifically in order to compensate for Paullinus' post-revolt ferocity. After all, the previous procurator, Decianus Catus, to whom Tacitus and Dio ascribe most of the responsibility for the outbreak of revolt, is said to have left the island even before Londinium fell to the rebels. Indeed, Classicianus might have been appointed in Rome even before Paullinus' vindictiveness had a chance to express itself. But is it possible that Nero deliberately chose a procurator whom he knew would sympathise with the original grievances of the Britons and work to correct the damage left by his predecessor? The author shall argue later that future (and past) appointments of governors in Britain suggest that such considerations were not necessarily alien to the imperial court in Rome.

For now, based on the report of Classicianus, Nero's decision was to interrupt the governor's provocative activity. Such an intervention on the part of the imperial court is hardly unprecedented in the Principate of the first century. The emperor Gaius is believed to have interrupted unexpectedly the term in office of Egypt's prefect Vitrasius Pollio when the latter failed to preserve the tense status quo in Alexandria, and was blamed by the Jewish party for siding with the city's Greek population in their persecution of Jews.Footnote ²⁷ Also, Claudius is known to have ordered Corbulo back to the left bank of the Rhine when his activity among the Chauci was widely regarded as ‘sowing the seeds of revolt’.Footnote ²⁸

It is also noteworthy that Nero sent to Britain one of his freedmen as his direct representative in order to achieve a similar purpose. In a passage that, once again, diverts attention from the real problem and from the character of Paullinus, Tacitus produces one of his typical mocking accounts of the excessive power of imperial freedmen:

Since it is relevant to the discussion, it ought to be noted that there is a debate over the last part of the quote. ‘Detentusque rebus gerundis Suetonius’ is read by most, after Furneaux, as here, as using the dative to indicate that Paullinus was kept in his post for the conduct of affairs. Madvig and Ramsay, however, translated ‘Suetonius was debarred from active operations’, preferring the other possible meaning of detinere with an ablative, and explaining the absence of a as being typical of Tacitus' loose use of the ablative.Footnote ³⁰ Albeit much harsher on Paullinus, we need not resort to the lectio difficilior in order to deduce from the passage that Britain's governor was given direct orders regarding his current operations, and that the goal of ending the opposition of Rome's former allies was achieved promptly as a consequence.

Paullinus was nevertheless replaced soon thereafter, either because his summons back to Rome was imminent regardless — just requiring some excuse or reason — or because he was perceived to have remained resistant to the imperial dictates delivered by Polyclitus: ‘But as he subsequently lost a few vessels on the shore with the crews, he was ordered, as though the war continued, to hand over his army to Petronius Turpilianus, who had just resigned his consulship.’Footnote ³¹ Ramsay, in line with his translation of the previous passage, translates: ‘… this was held to be an act of war, and he was ordered to hand over his army to Petronius Turpilianus.’

It is evident, then, that the local population's breach of trust prompted no punitive response from the emperor. Furthermore, it appears that Nero himself was determined to end the conflict in Britain. In what follows, it is hoped to demonstrate how the intervention of the imperial court in the affairs of Britain in fact far exceeded the mere removal from the province of all disruptive elements. The issue of official appointments in Britain will be discussed later. First, it may be illuminating to examine briefly the return of Paullinus to Rome, and, more particularly, the celebration and commemoration of his achievements in Britain.

Paullinus' victory over Boudica does not appear to have been commemorated in grand style.Footnote ³² The absence of any relevant sizeable monuments, coin issues, and even personal decoration suggests that Nero's administration chose not to celebrate the event. This apparent choice of the Roman government not to commemorate the subjugation of the Boudican revolt was not in line with the spirit of the time. Neronian Rome was fond of triumphs and triumphal propaganda, despite the fact that its ruler had little taste for military affairs. The prolonged crisis with Parthia over the investiture in Armenia supplied Nero with multiple occasions to celebrate and commemorate victory, as demonstrated by the impressive list of symbolic acts voted in Rome to mark the high points of the negotiations and the fighting in a.d. 54, 58, and, finally, 66.Footnote ³³

The only hypothesis that can be made regarding any acknowledgement of the Roman victory over Boudica is that it was perhaps included in the list of achievements in Britain that won Paullinus a general commendation — remarkably modest in itself — upon his return to Rome. Inscriptions show that between July a.d. 61 and late 62, Nero had held the title of Imperator on a further two occasions (IMP VIII and IX). The eighth occasion is usually related to the victories of Paullinus in Britain, and it may be claimed that Nero took the title after the recall of Paullinus to Rome, thus celebrating, not only the general's foreign victories in the years a.d. 58–60, but also his subjugation of the provincial revolt.Footnote ³⁴ Additionally a lead tessera that has ‘NERO CAESAR’ on the obverse and the name ‘PAULLINI’, along with traditional symbols of victory, on the reverse, has been interpreted as commemorating a congiarium, given to the people by Nero, in honour of the victories of Paullinus in Britain.Footnote ³⁵ Again, if correct, the plausible inference would be that Nero waited for Paullinus' return from Britain before he conferred the donative, and that the subjugation of the Boudican revolt may, therefore, have also been referred to by the symbols of victory on the medal.

It would not be too far-fetched to assume that, had the Iceni not revolted, the earlier achievements of Paullinus in the west of Britain would have won greater renown and, quite likely, further accomplishments would have followed. We are, however, interested less here in the individual himself, and more in the actual nature and significance of the commemoration. Unlike Claudius' conquest of Britain, or the achievements of Corbulo in the East, there would have been very few places across the Empire where it would have been known that a disaster had occurred in Britain. It is perhaps for this reason that such an elaborate provincial celebration of imperial ideology as the Sebasteion in Aphrodisias represents Nero's reign through the emperor's Armenian achievement — obtained diplomatically for the most part — and not through military victories in Britain.Footnote ³⁶ Roman victories over rebelling provincial populations were not normally commemorated on a universal scale in a way that would leave the event everywhere engraved in stone, and, consequently, in the communal memory of the Empire. In limiting to a minimum the publicity given to the Boudican revolt, Nero complied with the prevailing practice. It would, therefore, be wrong to assume a relationship between Suetonius Paullinus' reprisals and a so-called imperial policy of deterrence. Like many other rebelling groups in the history of the Empire, the Britons were not to be made into an example; they were to be reintegrated into provincial routine as purposefully as possible.

Bearing all this in mind, there is a need to return to the consideration of Nero's subsequent appointments in Britain. The topic of the nomination of provincial governors is crucial to this research. It is a well known problem that our sources rarely explain why individuals were chosen for official positions. It is, therefore, difficult for us to understand how appointments were made.Footnote ³⁷ Nepotism and bribery on the one hand, and merit on the other, have been witnessed on occasion as factors that influenced an emperor's choice. Therefore, generally speaking, the statement remains valid that ‘it cannot be supposed that every office was filled, either by a conscientious review of well-qualified candidates, or as the result of backstairs intrigue’.Footnote ³⁸

Nevertheless, the author would argue that, in examining the more specific case of staffing the higher levels of administration in sensitive regions — recently conquered or pacified, for example — greater weight should be given to the former case, that of the conscientious review of well-qualified candidates. In such cases, the reasons for the appointment of certain individuals may be projected from an appointee's known profile and apparent aspirations: the case of a governor as ambitious as Suetonius Paullinus — who apparently openly competed with his contemporary, Corbulo — should be approached differently from that of an older and less ambitious governor, such as Didius Gallus, Britain's governor between a.d. 52 and 57. More importantly, reasons for appointments can also be inferred retrospectively, from the nature of the conduct of officials while in office. Such deductions may gain more validity when they appear to represent consistency in policy: the appointment of one lenient governor — even if leniency indeed appears to have been called for — may have been haphazard; less so the appointment of several such officials in sequence, or in similar circumstances.

Several characteristics of the position of Britain's governor need to be highlighted.Footnote ³⁹ The office was among the most important and prestigious in the imperial administration. Mostly ex-consuls with a military background were appointed to the position, almost invariably after having served as governor in another province first.Footnote ⁴⁰ During the first decades after the conquest, governors had four legions under their command. For the most part, they were in their mid-forties when appointed, and they served on average for three years.

This general profile of Britain's governorship indicates that — at least most of the time — the demand was for men with both military experience and warlike ambition. For this reason, however, it is important to look very closely at those occasions where this practice was not followed. True enough, periods of expansion would have necessitated the presence of people with considerable military experience. But it should also be noted that from an early stage there occurred the occasional need for a period of consolidation. Such times would have called for different, if not additional, qualifications in the governors. In the prosopographical surveys that follow, certain aspects in the profile of appointments, such as the advanced age of governors, the consequent modesty of their military ambition, their generally considerate disposition, and their personal closeness to the emperor, will be emphasised.

An elaborate earlier example, from the time of Claudius, will be considered first, in order to demonstrate later that Nero's actions had parallels even under the reign of Britain's conqueror. Ostorius Scapula, Britain's second governor, died in office ‘taedio curarum fessus’ (‘worn out by the burden of his anxieties’) soon after the capture of Caratacus, the leader of the original opposition movement to the Roman invasion.Footnote ⁴¹ During his term in office, it gradually became clear that both the Silures and the Brigantes (the latter still Rome's allies) would confront the Roman army with a far more demanding challenge than it had had to face so far. In response to this, Didius Gallus was sent to take over the province. He was an experienced senator, and a trusted friend of Claudius, as proven by his decade as curator aquarum at the time of the construction of the Aqua Claudia, and his membership of the XVviri during the Secular Games of a.d. 47.Footnote ⁴² At least sixty years of age, he was significantly older than most other British governors. Had the need for a thorough pacification of Britain been acknowledged by Claudius, who, at least according to Tacitus, had just lost an able governor to the pressure of local instability, his choice of Gallus would have taken into consideration the man's advantages for the task. The requirement was now for an individual who could live at peace with a preservationist policy, and accomplish the organisation and consolidation of parts already under Roman control.

When Gallus arrived in Britain he found that a legion under the command of Manlius Valens had already been defeated by the Silures; and among the Brigantes, factionalism demanded immediate Roman intervention.Footnote ⁴³ In the Annals Tacitus reports: ‘Didius Gallus, heavy with years and with an abundance of honours, thought it sufficient to act through his officers and hold back the enemy.’Footnote ⁴⁴ The historian is only slightly more generous in the Agricola: ‘Didius Gallus preserved the conquests of his predecessors, and, having moved forward only a few forts into more remote places, he sought credit for enlarging his province.’Footnote ⁴⁵ Tacitus is probably loyal to the facts, but his unconcealed criticism may be unjustified. Claudius may have instructed Gallus to pursue such a policy; or he may have chosen him deliberately for qualities that old age and a placid disposition can bring. Additionally, Gallus himself could have recognised upon arrival that a period of peace was desirable, especially if extensive future campaigns to the west and north were to be imagined.

Nero's accession did not bring with it an immediate change in Roman policy in Britain. This fact cannot be interpreted as mere disinterest or carelessness on the part of the new emperor. A survey of Nero's accumulation of imperatorial titles demonstrates that he was keen to acquire them from the very beginning, and hardly missed a chance to add one to his name, even when the ‘victory’ was achieved through diplomacy, as was the case with Parthia in a.d. 55/6.Footnote ⁴⁶ By a.d. 59 he had won seven salutations, mostly from achievements in the East. Undeniably, he would have known that, so long as Gallus remained governor, no conquests or imperatorial titles were to be gained from Britain.Footnote ⁴⁷ The timing of Nero's introduction of a more aggressive British policy must be regarded, therefore, as stemming from a sober evaluation, probably chiefly by Gallus, that the situation was ripe again for further conquests and that the South-East of Britain could be trusted to be left with few or no garrisons to guard it. After five years in office — a period nearly twice as long as the average term — it was time for Gallus to be replaced with an expansionist.Footnote ⁴⁸

Returning to Suetonius Paullinus' replacement, it is very likely that his successor would have been chosen with similar consideration of the special circumstances after the revolt. Petronius Turpilianus was one of only two governors of Britain who are known to have received the office immediately after their consulate.Footnote ⁴⁹ The great majority of Britain's governors whose careers are known to us governed at least one other province prior to their appointment to Britain. Consequently, it may be claimed that such experience would have been valuable both in feats of expansion, and during periods of consolidation. It is, therefore, more than likely that there would have been a practical reason for the choice of Petronius against the prevailing practice. At least, Tacitus seems to know of a direct connection between the circumstances in Britain and the accommodating personality of the man.Footnote ⁵⁰ The little that is known of Petronius matches the profile of the appointment of Didius Gallus, as outlined above.

Petronius Turpilianus' likely father, Publius Petronius, had been proconsul of Asia for six years under Tiberius and governed Syria between a.d. 39 and 42. During that time he quite probably saved the region from revolt with his delicate handling of the crisis between Gaius and the Jews, which centred on the emperor's wish to erect his statue in the Temple at Jerusalem. He was referred to by Seneca as an old friend of Claudius and was married to a Plautia, who was apparently the sister of Britain's first governor, Aulus Plautius.Footnote ⁵¹ This connection may be seen as a possible incentive for the preference of his son for the office in Britain, assuming that Nero's court would have thought that the appointment of a kinsman of Plautius would have had a stabilising effect on the restless indigenous population.Footnote ⁵² When governing Syria, P. Petronius was characterised by Philo as ‘kindly and gentle by nature’.Footnote ⁵³ He was even claimed to have studied Jewish philosophy in preparation for ruling a region containing large Jewish communities.Footnote ⁵⁴ It should be noted that Tacitus' representation of the man's son hints at the possession of similar qualities which, no doubt, would have helped him in pacifying an antagonised indigenous population. Other characteristics of Petronius Turpillianus, less speculative than the example set by his father, indicate that the Neronian court sought to nominate an individual who would succeed in promoting peace in the region. As in the case of Didius Gallus, Turpilianus' age appears to have been significantly higher than that of the average British governor. At the time of his death in a.d. 68 he is described by Plutarch as an old man.Footnote ⁵⁵ It has been argued above that old age could have made a difference, especially with regard to an official's military ambitions and desire for glory. To this must be added the fact that Turpilianus was appointed governor of Britain immediately after his consulate, and that his term in office — roughly two years, from a.d. 61 to 63 — was shorter than the average for Britain. In a.d. 63 we find him curator aquarum in Rome.Footnote ⁵⁶ All in all, the profile of the appointment implies that Turpilianus was indeed sent to Britain for the particular purpose of bringing to an end a crisis that had started with the outbreak of the Boudican revolt. Even if he had a military background, it was probably not military ability and experience that had made him appear the appropriate candidate for the task. Tacitus' observation should hardly surprise: ‘he neither disturbed the enemy nor was himself challenged, and introduced this indolent inaction under the honourable name of peace.’Footnote ⁵⁷ In words other than those of Tacitus, he remained loyal to an appeasing policy that might have been prescribed by Nero himself.

Thus, the very act of appointing a provincial governor could have been in and of itself a tool in the hands of the emperor for the implementation of policy, if a specific line of action were desired by the court. This is especially the case during the first century a.d., when some generals, such as Corbulo and Suetonius Paullinus, could have been recognised and accepted as ambitious and independent in their initiatives. Hence, the nature of the governance of provinces may well have been determined by the character of the appointment itself. In Britain, it would appear that when quarrels between the former rebels and a vengeful governor lingered after Boudica's opposition movement was put down, the central government showed favour to the locals. A sympathetic procurator, Classicianus, was sent to the island; the antagonistic governor was removed; and a new governor was appointed, who was installed to maintain a policy of appeasement, and to consolidate the province and its neighbouring allies. Nero (or his consilium) appears to have identified accurately the causes of the local antagonism, and to have acted above all to avoid the recurrence of grievances instigated by Roman officials.

It is most telling that Petronius Turpilianus left behind him a region sufficiently pacified to allow, two years after the Boudican revolt, the appointment of a governor who had no military experience. Maximus Trebellius kept the province and the region peaceful for six more years, and it is reported that he was kind towards the local population.Footnote ⁵⁸ During his term in office the Fourteenth Legion was removed from Britain by Nero as part of the preparations for an eastern campaign that never came to be launched.Footnote ⁵⁹ Despite multiple troubles on the Roman side, including a quarrel between the governor and one of his legionary commanders, and the mutinous behaviour of the troops, the province enjoyed tranquility.Footnote ⁶⁰ Even the chaos caused by the civil war, and the withdrawal of more troops from the island, did not disturb the general calm.Footnote ⁶¹ It may be telling that Trebellius chose to direct his alleged greed at his own troops, rather than at the more obvious target of the local population.Footnote ⁶²

The success of the conciliatory policy appears to have been complete. For the eight years up to a.d. 69, both Turpilianus and Trebellius seem to have put securing the good will of the province and the client kingdoms at the top of their list of priorities, as they appear to have been expected to do by Nero. Moreover, the locals seem to have repaid this approach by remaining placid, especially when the military resources available to Trebellius dwindled, his status with the troops was shaken, and his peers from other provinces were occupied in fighting each other.

But what did it mean in practical terms to govern with moderation a ‘ferocious’ province such as Britain, or to be popular with the locals in order to appease them and keep them docile?Footnote ⁶³ Agricola appears to have held a clear idea of the local mind and the ways to secure its co-operation:

Tacitus of course makes Agricola the exemplar of this governing philosophy. Just and sensible governance stands out as the single most essential element in such an approach; and the key to achieve this lies in the wise and selective appointment of public officials.Footnote ⁶⁵ It is easy to imagine Suetonius Paullinus — unlucky as he was with his corrupt procurator — as the example set before Agricola's eyes. There is no reason why it should not be assumed that, at least for those predecessors of Agricola who shared his practical approach towards the local population, the experience of Suetonius Paullinus also served as a negative example. While the specific details are not known, it can be assumed that Turpilianus, Trebellius, and probably also Bolanus worked to assure that the locals were not treated unfairly.

Finally, it is necessary to examine the issue of the deployment of forces in the aftermath of hostilities. After a breach of Roman trust of such an order of magnitude as the Boudican revolt, modern scholars frequently appear to expect a tighter military control over the region that rebelled. It ought to be remembered, however, that, as in the case of recent conquests, the re-garrisoning of a formerly trusted territory would be only one way to restore peace. For a Roman rule that still entertained thoughts of expansion, regaining the goodwill of indigenous groups would have been a far more efficient means of making troops available for further campaigns. Arguably, a peaceful routine based on the willing co-operation of the local population would have given the Roman administration a more solid sense of security than a superficial calm enforced by military presence. It is scarcely surprising, therefore, to discover that, once the dust of Paullinus' fury settled, the territories of the former rebels appear to have witnessed little intensification in military presence.

While there seem to be a handful of forts that were newly built or reoccupied in the period around a.d. 60, it is not always easy to find a direct correlation between those forts and the events of the revolt. The main reason for this is the location of the forts, many of which were placed as far to the west as the West Midlands: Mancetter (Warwicks.), the Lunt near Coventry, Wall (Staffs.), and Metchley in Birmingham all seem to have been re-garrisoned. But for what purpose? If their occupation is linked to the Boudican revolt, then the reason must lie in the conjecture that the decisive battle took place near Mancetter. Even if this is accepted as a possibility, such activity can hardly be interpreted as relevant to the enforcement of peace at the focal points of the revolt, much further to the east. On the other hand, if these forts were dated only a year or two earlier, their occupation could be taken as part of Suetonius Paullinus' Welsh campaigns prior to the revolt.Footnote ⁶⁶

Few other sites show renewed military presence in the early 60s that might be the direct result of the Boudican revolt. The Romano-British settlement at Grandford (Cambs.), in the heart of the Fens, was possibly established, like many other similar settlements, on the site of a vacated fort.Footnote ⁶⁷ This assumption has been reinforced by aerial photographs, and it is possible that the fort was built immediately after the Boudican revolt.Footnote ⁶⁸ It appears to have been suitable for a garrison of 500 auxiliary soldiers. Assuming that the date is correct, it could indicate the deployment of troops to a location from where they were immediately available to deal with threats from the Iceni in the years after the revolt.Footnote ⁶⁹ Otherwise, there seems to be relatively little military activity across the Icenian area that can be positively ascribed to this brief period of the 60s, although there is some evidence emerging in Norfolk and Suffolk for possible first-century forts.Footnote ⁷⁰ The argument that may carefully be outlined ex silentio becomes forceful enough once we pay closer attention to those sources that do speak. Forts that had been vacated prior to the revolt, but which must have been still readily available for the stationing of troops following it, nevertheless show no revived activity.Footnote ⁷¹ Military sites that are known to have been occupied during or immediately after the revolt are evacuated shortly thereafter. For example, the fort at Pakenham in Suffolk, which may have been built immediately after the Boudican revolt, appears to have served a military purpose for only a short duration.Footnote ⁷² More significantly, the base at Longthorpe — from which a detachment of the Ninth Legion embarked to aid the colony at Camulodunum during the Boudican revolt — was abandoned soon after peace had returned to the region.Footnote ⁷³

It is significant that troops stationed within operational distance of the Iceni were pulled out soon after a revolt that had found a beginning and a leader in Icenian territory. However, it is perhaps more important for the understanding of Roman policy in post-Boudican Britain to note that a whole legion was withdrawn from the island itself not five years after the end of a war that had nearly led to the loss of the province. Even if the revolt was still a few steps from turning into a clades Variana — as some historians refer to it — Nero's decision in a.d. 66 to withdraw the Fourteenth Legion from the island must serve as an indication of the administration's greater confidence in the stability of the region.Footnote ⁷⁴

The three legions that remained were now based at Lincoln (IX Hispana), Wroxeter (XX Valeria) and Gloucester (II Augusta), significantly with an outward-looking orientation towards the west and north.Footnote ⁷⁵ In the event, Nero's move was not miscalculated, since stability was to be maintained in southern Britain from the subjugation of the Boudican revolt onward. While Nero's eastern campaign never came to fruition, Legion XIV Gemina was detained in Europe in the events that followed the emperor's death, and did not return to Britain until a.d. 69. There is no indication that its absence from Britain during this period encouraged restlessness of any sort in the region, and, while expansionist projects in the following years still made use of the force of four legions, under Domitian the number was finally fixed at three.Footnote ⁷⁶

Bringing the discussion to a conclusion, it is essential to zoom out of the close focus on events that unfolded in a single province in the course of a decade or so, and to ask to what extent the official Roman actions witnessed here may represent more generally the practices of the Roman administration. The answer is a complex one, and must rely on an extensive body of evidence. In addition, for the periods that preceded unrest, a thorough analysis is required of the Roman motivation and ability to obtain and decipher information that would allow consistent action towards the elimination of disruptive elements. The examination both of Britain in other periods and of other provinces — such as Judea before a.d. 66 — suggests that there was a continuing Roman effort to anticipate potential friction points, and to adopt appeasing policies when tension nevertheless emerged. That is not to say, of course, that the shortsightedness of an essentially unsophisticated system, or the unexpected actions of individuals on all levels, could not have resulted in disasters. It is important to acknowledge, however, that that is exactly what they were — unexpected clades, that were to be overcome and then forgotten, so that calm and trust could be restored.

This may be a basic working premise adopted by some — that the Romans generally preferred a peaceful Empire, if only for economic reasons. From this perspective, the uninterrupted flow of tribute to the treasury would have suffered in the event of regional instability, as would the secure traffic of merchandise along trade-routes across the Empire. The disruption of peace would have affected numerous factors in the local routine, that would have complicated further the missions standing before the local government. The sources show a great awareness, for example, of the occurrence of famine as a result of local unrest and the subsequent neglect of agricultural duties. The Boudican revolt, among others, is reported to have led precisely to such a circumstance.Footnote ⁷⁷

Nevertheless, relevant generalisations that are backed by conclusive evidence are hard to come by, and it should be noted that emphasising the benefits of peace runs counter to other prevailing ideas of Roman imperialism. On a universal scale, the widespread opposition to the recent idea of a ‘grand strategy’ for the Roman Empire all too often exceeds its boundaries to deny even the possibility of a degree of consistency in Roman policy. On the local scale, recent post-colonial approaches to individual provincial histories frequently tend to lay sole emphasis on the negative aspects of Roman rule, in a way that may completely overlook Roman aspirations for peace and the consequent action in pursuit of it. In Britain's case, it is perhaps currently more valid than many others: self-confessed post-colonial historiography has had to tackle in a most extreme way the legacy of the British Empire, that persistently made it more natural to identify with Rome, than with Boudica.Footnote ⁷⁸ Finally, there is the issue of the general Roman approach towards war. It is frequently the case that scholarly research on the topic produces sweeping statements that are derived largely from the case of wars conducted against foreign enemies.Footnote ⁷⁹ These generalisations, when tested against the situation of internal, provincial conflicts, may turn out to be less relevant, or even completely inapplicable. The aspect of deterrence through war, examined in recent research, is a case in point.Footnote ⁸⁰ It may be true that Rome sought to produce and maintain through war an image that would be a deterrent to its foreign enemies. No such considerations would have accompanied the subjugation of provincial revolts.