Although written and published before Egypt's unprecedented 7 September 2005 presidential elections, Egyptian Politics is a vital tool to understanding the background to that contest and why Egyptian elections are not (and have never been) an indicator of democratization. Indeed, for those interested in enhancing their knowledge of what goes on inside the black box of Egyptian domestic politics, Maye Kassem's book will prove an indispensable resource. Thorough enough to teach the seasoned student of the Cairo scene a thing or two, Egyptian Politics, with its concise style and colorful case studies, takes pains to remain accessible to the layperson as well.
An assistant professor of political science at the American University in Cairo, Kassem is also author of In the Guise of Democracy: Governance in Contemporary Egypt (1999). In her more recent volume, Kassem explains the resilience of authoritarian rule in contemporary Egypt. She identifies the following puzzle: whereas the formal political structure in Egypt has changed since the military coup that ended the reign of the Egyptian monarchy in July 1952, the reality of personal authoritarian rule has remained constant. Specifically, across the presidencies of Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat, and Hosni Mubarak—and despite formidable shifts, such as from Nasser's socialist single-party system to Sadat's open-door economic policy and multiparty political system—Egypt's leaders have managed to forestall democratization. How has this occurred? According to Kassem, although the United States has helped to shield Egypt and other Middle Eastern client states from the pressure to democratize, the main factors in sustaining authoritarianism in Egypt are local. She argues that three tactics have been key: the use of patronage and cooptation, the adoption of a legal–constitutional framework that allows the regime to exercise extraordinary powers, and the employment of the state's coercive apparatus.
To reinforce her argument, Kassem examines politics under Egypt's three presidents, with emphasis on the recent period under Mubarak. The book begins with a short introductory chapter in which Kassem identifies the main question of the work and sketches out the three factors (mentioned above) that she believes are most significant in sustaining authoritarian rule in Egypt. In chapter two, she provides brief histories of politics under Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak, showing how Nasser consolidated personal authoritarian rule in the wake of the 1952 Free Officers' coup. Since Nasser's death in 1970, and with it the passing of Pan-Arabism and the socialist–populist ideology he propagated, Kassem claims that Egypt has fallen into the category coined by Juan Linz of a “neosultanistic regime,” held together by patronage and fear. In chapter three, she details the development of political parties and the history of legislative elections, from single-party rule under Nasser to the implementation of a multiparty system under Sadat. Kassem postulates that Sadat's move to liberalize the party system was aimed at securing Western aid while enabling him to marginalize Nasserist and socialist forces. Chapter four provides an analysis of Egypt's weak civil society, illustrating how it has been hindered from development as a consequence of the repressive state's interference. As a stand-in for civil society, she examines the activities of trade unions and professional associations, broadening her analysis to include human-rights groups in the Mubarak era. In chapter five, Kassem turns her attention to Egypt's Islamists, providing readers with provocative arguments. For example, she posits that the state's “rejectionist” approach is largely responsible for the exercise of militant ideology on the part of Islamists, which in turn is responsible for international terrorism by forcing Egyptian Islamists like Ayman al-Zawahiri to circumvent the domestic arena in favor of the international sphere.
In the concluding chapter, Kassem reflects on the broader questions surrounding contemporary Egyptian politics, producing the book's most controversial moments. Although she prognosticates that the Egyptian regime is secure for the “foreseeable future,” she seems to be concerned in the longer term that republican Egypt could go the way of Iran under the Pahlavi monarchy, falling victim to the “unpredictable transformations of dissent” (p. 186). To avoid such an unwelcome outcome (as well as the scourge of future terrorist attacks), she urges the United States to pressure Egypt into genuine political reform. In encouraging the United States to push Egypt to forego repression, however, she does not attempt to reconcile her position with Jason Brownlee's argument, which she cites earlier (p. 7), that authoritarian regimes like the Shah's fall if they are prevented by international actors from using force to quell internal dissent.
In addition, Kassem addresses the important question of why a regime as secure in its power as that of Hosni Mubarak would become ever more repressive. She answers that it is in the nature of authoritarian states that there is never enough security for their leaders, who constantly fear dangers on the horizon that may cost them their rule and even their lives. Surely, however, this answer is incomplete. Were it sufficient, we would expect authoritarian regimes always to be maximally repressive, inhibited only by their capabilities. In practice, however, we have witnessed the liberalization of nondemocratic states, whether it be Egypt under Sadat in the mid-1970s or Jordan under King Hussein in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Why do such leaders sometimes choose repression while at other times aim to secure their rule through popular liberalization measures? Kassem struggles to provide a sufficient answer.
The biggest weakness of Egyptian Politics is its scant engagement with theoretical debates concerning authoritarianism and democratization. Indeed, while she mentions theoreticians such as Adam Przeworski and Juan Linz, Kassem avoids staking a position within the theoretical literature, as well as placing Egypt on the continuum of authoritarian states. This finding is unfortunate due to the disjuncture between Middle Eastern studies and political science that has been noted by area experts. Kassem bypasses an opportunity to compare her arguments about authoritarianism to those advanced by others and to test whether her postulates regarding Egypt can travel to other countries within the region and outside it.
That said, there is much to recommend this book for what it is: an authoritative account of authoritarian politics in modern Egypt. Particularly where Mubarak's regime is concerned, Kassem provides one of the most thorough accounts of how politics works, from how electoral laws have changed over the years to recent legislative elections to government tactics in dealing with Islamists. Moreover, if this encyclopedic account at times risks verging on the prosaic, Kassem makes sure to avert that fate by including illuminating examples, drawn from her own interviews or from Cairo's increasingly lively English-language press. Satisfying though it is, Egyptian Politics does leave a lingering question. How authoritarian can Egypt be if Kassem has the freedom to write such a scathing indictment of her government? In the end, perhaps the most significant challenge to Kassem's no holds barred characterization of Egypt as a maximally repressive, neosultanistic, authoritarian regime lies in her ability to tell the tale.
