Why and how did Thai courts initiate a path of political intervention after 2006? Who were these judges? To what extent were they independent rather than political tools? Fighting for Virtue examines these and other questions. The author, Duncan McCargo, contends that the judiciary, following King Bhumipol's April 2006 call for it to resolve political divisions associated with Premier Thaksin Shinawatra, completely failed, making rulings that were “inept,” “inflammatory,” and “unconscionable” (p. x). McCargo is director of the Nordic Institute of Asian Studies and professor of political science at the University of Copenhagen, and he has been affiliated with Leeds University for several years. He is well known for his publications on Thailand, especially his coined term “network monarchy.” This book especially derives from participatory observation in criminal courts during 2012 as well as interviews conducted over the next three years.
The introduction traces Thai jurisprudence to the 1805 Three Seals Code, which viewed royal preferences as fiat: Thai law originated from monarchical control. Though the 1932 overthrow of monarchical absolutism temporarily enhanced military over monarchical power in politics and courts, the palace regained influence following the 1957 coup. The next thirty-five years saw the rise of “network monarchy,” whereby royal interventions often occurred to reset palace-centered stability. Post-1992 reforms sought to substitute arch-royalist democratic order and civilian control in place of royal interventions. However, when populist premier Thaksin used these reforms to enhance his power while increasing his influence over courts, his opponents—the same democratic reformers—turned toward palace-endorsed intervention to topple him.
Chapter 1 states that most judges (around half of which are women; p. 33) come from well-to-do families and pass rigorous exams, though some royally linked elites are favored. Since 1997, judges have not been subject to state-overseen political monitoring outside of themselves (p. 44). Thus, any corruption among judges is difficult to ascertain. Nevertheless, McCargo asserts that most are “well-intentioned” (p. 53) despite feeling “morally superior to others” (p. 54).
Chapter 2 emphasizes the Crown's influence over courts. King Bhumipol or his son occasionally judged cases despite not having law degrees. The 1970s witnessed a reassertion of monarchical sway over judicial decision-making. King Bhumipol used royal pardons on numerous occasions, demonstrating benevolence. He sometimes supported or suspended death sentences, promoting a tough or merciful image. Ultra-royalist judges were publicly rewarded. Ultimately, the judiciary saw monarchical interest as the public interest.
Chapter 3 argues that judges possess a worldview limited by ultra-royalist groupthink. The April 2006 royal injunction ordered judges to resolve the national political crisis—reinforcing their role as royal agents. Thus, they were increasingly criticized by groups (e.g., Nitirat) for ignoring the public interest and losing public trust.
The next three chapters investigate three post-2006 treason felony cases. Chapter 4 examines charges against Somyot Prueksakasemsuk for violating section 112 (defaming monarchy). McCargo denies Somyot's guilt because he was wrongly accused of writing defamatory articles which did not even mention the king. But the judges were “biased” and the prosecution performed well (p. 116). McCargo also implies that Somyot showed insufficient adoration for royalty (p. 126). Thus, he was convicted. Chapter 5 scrutinizes the case against Katha Pajariyapong for violating the 2007 Computer Crimes Act. Accused of posting social media messages compromising national security, his posts had only joked about royalty. Like Somyot, Katha was convicted. McCargo partly blames Katha's lawyer, Thailand's now-famous pro-democracy activist Anon Nampa, who prioritized a “let's-annoy-the-hell-out-of-the-judges” approach (p. 144). Chapter 6 examines charges against Jon Ungpakorn (and others) for violating section 116 of the Criminal Code (sedition), undermining national security. In 2007, the accused had briefly/peacefully protested inside the assembly, then appointed by the junta. Without evidence, judges conflated Jon with his brother Giles, who was depicted as belonging to an anti-monarchical conspiracy. Ultimately, all defendants were convicted. In the three cases, McCargo blamed the judges as not “neutral” but also the defense as “bait[ing] the bench” (p. 169).
Chapter 7 investigates how judges decided cases against Thaksin and those connected to him. Courts had mostly favored the premier during his 2001–6 administration. Not surprisingly, following the 2006 military coup against him, courts took a decidedly anti-Thaksin turn. But McCargo argues that between 2008 and 2013, there was a dearth of anti-Thaksin rulings, perhaps because his sister Yingluck became premier in 2011. McCargo contends that such inconsistency proves judicial confusion rather than the instrumentalization of judges inside of an arch-royalist, anti-Thaksin “Deep State” (p. 183).
Chapter 8 argues that a 2012 constitutional amendment case brought against the Yingluck government (in which the Constitutional Court ruled in the government's favor) demonstrates that courts are not part of “reductionist,” arch-royalist “Deep State” but instead part of the “inept workings of network monarchy” (p. 187). McCargo contends that court decisions have consistently reflected the preferences of ever-changing powerholders, blaming not judges but the military for removing pro-Thaksin governments. He finds courts guilty of hesitancy.
McCargo concludes that Thailand, especially since 2006, suffers from excessive legalism with judges perceiving justice as obedience to monarchy. Thai courts, he says, have been “ambivalent” toward Thaksin (p. 215) and politically “weaponized” but “inept” (p. 217). Though King Bhumipol delegated authority to the military and judiciary, Bhumipol's successor King Maha Vajiralongkorn has reasserted such power.
Fighting for Virtue is valuable for scholars and laypeople studying Thailand, Asia, and comparative jurisprudence. It is one of the first books focusing on Thailand's contemporary judiciary. A second strength is McCargo's use of ethnographic observation of court proceedings. Third, McCargo offers important statistics on incarcerations, royal pardons, and amnesties while demonstrating the throne's dominance over courts. However, McCargo sometimes presents judges as agents of “network monarchy,” sometimes as principals in decision-making. Which are they? He unconvincingly cherry-picks three minor cases to argue that anti-Thaksin judicial sentiment evaporated during 2008–13 (p. 177). He partially blames defense attorneys for politically biased judgments delivered against their clients by ultra-royalist judges (p. 169). Nevertheless, the book offers crucial details on Thailand's modern judiciary, and therefore it is essential for anyone interested in modern Thai politics.
