Despite the broad coverage noted in the subtitle, this book focuses primarily on the emergence of new boundaries during the course of, and immediately following, World War I. Concentrating on a shorter time span than a century is certainly understandable. The allocation and demarcation of political boundaries can be a very complicated matter, and Biger's thorough reading of the archival record during the crucial years between 1916 and 1923 describes in some detail how these processes played out in the making of modern Palestine.
Biger starts with an analysis of the formation of Palestine's southern boundary. The history of its original delimitation is traced to earlier attempts to separate Egypt from Ottoman administration, first by the ambitious Ottoman reformer Muhammad ʿAli and later by British proconsul Lord Cromer. However, practical negotiations over the line's exact location came to the fore during the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, a moment when British officials evidently were caught between the continuing desire to push Egypt's frontiers as far as possible from the strategically important Suez Canal, and the emerging support for the southward expansion of their new administration, based in Jerusalem. Either way, “the British regarded the process of determining the border's location as an internal matter between the Foreign Office and the British Administration in Egypt, which would give them freedom to act as they pleased” (p. 84). Biger describes these negotiations as “exclusively and internally British” (p. 95). Bedouin tribes living in the region were left to adjust their traditional patterns of movement accordingly. Even Zionist leaders, despite their close contacts, were left out in the cold.
The process of determining Palestine's northern boundary was much more complicated. On the one hand, the prior allocation of areas by the Sykes–Picot agreement of 1916 required British officials to undertake bilateral negotiations with the French government. On the other hand, as the line here was destined to pass through more densely settled areas, greater hardship for the boundary's inhabitants was bound to result from discussions that again took place among a small circle of officials who had never visited the area and relied on inaccurate historical atlases. Key roles in determining final alterations from the 1916 agreement were played by biblical–historical notions of a Palestinian entity that stretched “from Dan to Beersheba,” as well as by the more prosaic administrative reality created by the military occupations marked out by General Allenby during the course of the war. According to Biger, Allenby's administrative divisions, although they largely adhered to Ottoman political units, “changed the face of reality in the area” (p. 105). Economic arguments advanced by the Zionist Organization, in favor of Palestine enjoying more expansive northern boundaries—with most of the organization's activity aimed at the Litani River—constituted little more than “a background of demands” that floated about while “the British government formed its own ideas” (p. 113). Metulla, located north of Dan, was the only Jewish settlement that can be said to have contributed in a significant way to defining the boundary's final location. In the end, it and more than a dozen Arab villages were strewn along the superimposed boundary, with those lands divided between the two newly created states of Palestine and Lebanon.
The last of Palestine's boundaries to be defined during this period was the eastern one, along the Jordan River line. As in the south, the key decisions were all made by British politicians and military leaders. In this case, the significance of General Allenby's wartime administrative divisions was not only reinforced locally by prevailing Ottoman practices but also was supported in London by the earlier political decision to establish east of the Jordan River a separate Arab state under British patronage. Although a few Zionist leaders, such as Zeʾev Jabotinsky, viewed as treasonous the failure of the Zionist Organization to expand Palestine's territory to the other bank of the Jordan River, Biger observes that once the British demarcation was made, “no official Zionist demands concerning the location of the eastern borderline were ever raised” (p. 179).
A final chapter highlighting the various partition plans that achieved prominence between 1937 and 1947 reminds the reader that British faith in the boundaries of the territorial unit they had created did not last very long. However, as Biger notes, the eventual location of new boundaries was determined mainly by military positions achieved after 1947. Biger's argument that such a discussion could not be encompassed within this book is well taken, but it raises questions about why a discussion of the partition plans was considered within its scope in the first place.
Other weaknesses range from the sentence to the conceptual level. An annoying number of mistakes are made in the spelling of names (prominent among them being that of Archer Cust, well known for his ideas of cantonization on the Swiss model). The book's illustrations mostly disappoint: the large photographs of political leaders are not especially relevant, and the maps are neither as helpful nor as clear as one might expect for the subject matter. Originally published in Hebrew, the book targets an audience interested mainly in the history of Zionism. The Arabs of Palestine do not register. Biger's explanation for this omission is that Arabs “were not involved with the delimitation process of Palestine” (p. 229), yet the fact that the Zionist Organization's own “real influence was rather minor” (p. 226) does not prevent him from elaborating throughout the book on its positions. It certainly would have been worthwhile for Biger to have elaborated upon his observation of the local inhabitants that “political delimitation with the aid of borderlines was an alien concept to them” (p. 229).
