Bioethics is morally bankrupt. In the name of a Kantian ideal of autonomy, the dominant bioethical theories subordinate patients' real interests to the demands and priorities of neoliberal economics. That, at any rate, is the claim that Tom Koch makes in Thieves of Virtue.
At the heart of Koch's argument is the claim that bioethics has largely been reduced to “lifeboat ethics,” focusing on questions about the allocation of scarce resources, rather than addressing the structural problems underlying the scarcity. “Lifeboat ethics” gets its name from the story of the William Brown, a ship which sank in 1841 after hitting an iceberg during a transatlantic crossing. The ship's sole lifeboat was filled beyond capacity, and sixteen passengers were thrown overboard in order to increase the likelihood of everyone else's survival. Such shipwrecks, and the subsequent loss of life, were routine at the time. Owing to economic incentives, ships rarely carried sufficient lifeboats, and captains frequently sailed at full speed through iceberg-filled waters. More than half a century later these problems were solved—and shipwrecks became rare—once regulations were put in place requiring all commercial ships to carry sufficient lifeboats for all passengers, and also requiring ships to avoid iceberg-filled waters during the dangerous springtime months. Thus the tragic fate of the William Brown and many other ships was the result of social choices prioritizing profit over safety. Likewise, claims Koch, the scarcity that bioethicists presume when considering questions about the allocation of medical resources is not an incontrovertible fact of nature. According to Koch, bioethicists need to stop focusing on ethics in the lifeboat—who gets thrown overboard if there is not enough room for everyone?—and shift instead to an ethics of the lifeboat: why do we allow ships to sail with insufficient lifeboats and create incentives for captains to sail dangerously?
One example that Koch gives of “lifeboat ethics” applied to the allocation of medical resources is the argument of Governor Richard Lamm, elaborated by influential bioethicist Daniel Callahan, that scarce medical resources should not be used on the elderly (or otherwise relatively unproductive) members of society, but should go instead to the young and productive. Koch contrasts this approach—which has had a significant influence on health policies—with the traditional Hippocratic ethic in which patients were attended based on need, regardless of social status or potential “productivity.” The societal response to the polio epidemic in the early 1950s is presented as a paradigm of the Hippocratic ethic at work. Attempting to save those afflicted by the epidemic required costly and labor-intensive interventions, and it was clear that few if any would ever again be healthy and productive, but no one argued that providing the life-sustaining care was a poor use of scarce resources. Unlike the Hippocratic ethic motivating efforts to save polio patients, “the principal allegiance” of the new bioethics “has never been the patient in need of care but the state and its economic future” (22).
A related theme that runs throughout the book is that bioethics devalues the lives of the disabled, elderly, and infirm. Koch traces the historical precursors of this attitude to the eugenics movement as well as the proliferation of unscrupulous medical research practices in the early to mid-twentieth century. While The Belmont Report of 1974, a precursor to Beauchamp and Childress's Principles of Biomedical Ethics, offered guidelines to protect research subjects, Koch argues that Belmont and Principles are woefully inadequate in their approach. The Belmont guidelines require patient consent (though, Koch points out, the value of such consent is questionable when uninsured patients must choose between participation in a research trial and no care at all), but fall short of the Hippocratic ideal that would forbid human experimentation except when there is a “possibility of real benefit for the patient-cum-subject” (131). While the emphasis on consent and autonomy were aimed supposedly at protecting patients from paternalistic doctors, Koch argues that the problem of paternalism is largely a myth, and that “egregious paternalism has occurred only when the needs of the state, or an employer, or a research program, were put before the needs of the patient” (227).
The root of the problem, according to Koch, is that Belmont and Principles reduced respect for persons to respect for autonomy, allowing consent to replace a more substantive requirement to act for the genuine good of the patient, and also leading to a denial of the full personhood of the nonautonomous that justified severely rationing the scarce medical resources they might otherwise have a claim to. This view is epitomized in the utilitarian bioethics of Peter Singer (discussed in chapter 7), according to whom the value of human life depends entirely on its quality—on the ability to exercise certain physical and mental capacities. Koch claims that most bioethicists are “in-the-closet Singerians,” who, while “[paying] lip service to the idea of human worth,” in practice “draw tight a sphere of protected humanness to exclude the ‘pre-person’ (the fetus before birth), the ‘post-person’ (one who while alive is incapacitated and unable to participate socially), the fragile senior, and those others who fail this or that more or less utilitarian performance standard” (170).
Koch's book is thought provoking and raises important issues, but the lines of argument are somewhat scattered, repetitive, and often lacking in nuance. For instance, Koch presents the common practice of withholding or withdrawing life support from ICU patients with little to no chance of recovery as an instance of Peter Singer's utilitarian bioethics at work (194). Yet even the Catholic Church—whose sanctity-of-life ethic is diametrically opposed to the utilitarian quality-of-life ethic defended by Singer—accepts the cessation of burdensome life-sustaining treatments for terminal patients as morally unproblematic. Koch's point about the decline in respect for human life as intrinsically valuable is important, but his failure to make crucial distinctions—distinctions between killing and letting die, between direct and indirect killing, and even between taking a dying patient off life support and removing a feeding tube from a nonterminal but unconscious patient like Terry Schiavo—undermines the potential persuasiveness of his argument.
Koch's discussion in chapter 3 of the Harvard Ad Hoc Committee's 1968 report defining brain death as a valid criterion of death suffers from similar flaws. It is true that the diagnostic criteria the paper proposes for brain death are inadequate, and also that current tests remain unreliable. It is also true that a desire to obtain viable organs for transplantation was among the factors motivating the report's new definition of death. Koch is right, therefore, to question current practices in this regard. Yet he goes too far in assimilating the reasoning of the Harvard report to Nazi physicians' arguments in defense of killing “defective” persons who were considered a drain on societal resources (61). And he conflates the question of whether brain death is in principle a valid criterion of death—a position that can be defended without reducing the value of human life to its supposed quality or potential productivity—with the separate question regarding the accuracy of tests to determine brain death.
Throughout the book Koch disparages “disinterested, dispassionate reason” (117) and “the analytic method learned in philosophy” (164) as inherently inadequate to the task of resolving bioethical dilemmas. Yet a healthy dose of philosophical rigor, nuance, and clarity would have made his otherwise valuable critique of dominant bioethical theories much more compelling.
