Attempting to come to grips with the Knightian corpus can often—as I can readily attest from personal experience—prove rather daunting for the uninitiated. Fortunately, the uninitiated now have Ross Emmett’s splendid volume to help guide them through the thorny Knightian thicket. Emmett has long since firmly cemented his place as the world’s leading Frank Knight scholar, and this excellent volume collects a number of his previously published papers (thirteen chapters), adds some new material (two chapters), and makes Emmett’s first-rate work—all the papers were written between 1987 and 2007—available in one handy place. Accordingly, I expect the volume to make Emmett’s mastery of the Knightian corpus deservedly well-known among a rather wider group of readers than that usually associated with the history of economics community (and various fellow travelers) alone. As the volume contains many previously published papers, there is, unsurprisingly, some near-verbatim reiteration of Knightian points that have been made in earlier chapters. Any such repetition, however, hardly mars the outstanding quality of Emmett’s work and his solid and sympathetic appreciation for the specific historical context within which Knight wrote. Anyhow, Knight himself supposedly liked to frequently invoke Herbert Spencer’s point that “only by varied reiteration can alien conceptions be impressed on reluctant minds” (or words to said effect). Rather than provide a detailed précis of each chapter, I shall here focus on certain key Knightian themes. Indeed, I urge anyone uninitiated in the mysteries of the Knightian corpus to carefully study my two favorite chapters in the volume: Chapter 6 (“‘What is truth’ in capital theory?”) and Chapter 7 (“Maximizers versus good sports: Frank Knight’s curious understanding of exchange behavior”).
In Chapter 3 (“The Therapeutic quality of Frank Knight’s Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit”), Emmett (drawing on Rorty) very aptly views Knight’s work as “therapeutic” (p. 33). As Emmett explains, Knight—much like the “therapeutic philosophers” invoked by Rorty (e.g., Dewey and Wittgenstein)—sought to remind his professional colleagues of the need “for humility in the face of the dynamic complexity and novelty of human experience” (p. 33). Accordingly, Knight attempted to draw professional attention to the inherent limitations of pure economic theory. As Emmett explains, Knight ought to be viewed as a thinker who seeks to “destroy” grand systems of thought because they are viewed as inherently “inimical to the continued health of that great conversation we call society” (p. 103). As Emmett’s book carefully and abundantly makes clear, Knight deemed pure economic theory—understood to denote the pristine logic of choice per se—to be necessarily limited in what it could contribute to our attempt to adequately grapple with various social problems. Indeed, Knight’s favored ‘solution’—discussion among equals—to social problems primarily focuses on the necessity to engage in a genuine discussion about the kind of preferences we think we ought to have (a discussion about the kind of society we think we ought to have and about the kind of people that we think we ought to be). As Emmett explains, in Knight’s view, efficiency simply cannot provide the primary criterion by which “coordination mechanisms” (collectivist or market) can be judged (p. 101): “They should be judged … in terms of the kind of wants and desires they create, and the character of the people they form” (p. 101).
Unsurprisingly, Emmett persuasively argues that Knight would have scant truck with the contemporary Chicago School mantra of de gustibus (chapters 11 and 12). Similarly, Knight views economic theory per se—the analytics (inherent tautologies) of a purely timeless and necessarily static equilibrium—as a rather limited exercise in ‘engineering’: the merely mechanical problem of allocating a set of given means—assuming a given technology and given set of ‘social’ institutions—among a set of given and unchanging competing ends (p. 122).
Accordingly, pure economic theory (a set of tautologies concerning the logic of maximizing behavior) is necessarily limited in what it can contribute to any discussion concerning the potential solution (adequate or otherwise) to social problems. Importantly, in Knight’s view, there is “no real difference between deterministic” and stochastic worlds (p. 56). As Emmett wryly explains (his joke can and ought to be readily and shamelessly ripped off for classroom use), Knight views the economist’s ready and hand-waving invocation of the “comfort of insurance against risk rather than the instability of uncertainty” as the analytical equivalent of offering a cold drink to a “prisoner chained in the sun” (p. 56): There is no analytical escape from genuine uncertainty, and the tautologies of pure theory are simply ill-equipped to adequately grapple with the passage of time, the evolution of socially induced tastes and wants, and the evolution of institutions and technology.
Chapter 5, Frank Knight’s dissent from Progressive social science, is a tour de force and very highly recommended. Importantly, Knight’s disagreements with Hayek over the thorny relationship between the “world of theory” and “reality” come to the fore (p. 67). For Knight, uncertainty—the real thing rather than some merely stochastic doppelganger—provides “powerful reasons” to reject any theoretical claim that we should observe “any necessary movement towards equilibrium in a market or collectivist system” (p. 67). As Emmett explains, the Knight–Hayek debate, usually characterized as an arcane debate over capital theory (p. 67), “involved competing conceptions of the scientific nature and role of equilibrium theory” (p. 67). This issue comes to the fore in Emmett’s brilliant Chapter 6 (one of my personal favorites in the volume and, I think, providing much insight into Knight’s mindset). As Emmett explains, Hayek and Knight—seemingly having markedly similar ’free-market’ sympathies and classical liberal worldview—differ markedly on a variety of important margins. Emmett notes their divergence of views in his brilliant and fascinating essay examining the Hayek–Knight exchange over capital theory. As Emmett persuasively explains, Hayek (Hayek and Knight both posit a sharp dichotomy between “the constructed realm of theory and the contingent world of lived experience” [p. 82]) seeks to analytically collapse the future into the present: modeling the allocative moment as a dynamic “process of dated goods existing through time” (p. 82). For Knight, however, pure theory can never capture more than merely “one element”—the one has much importance—of our momentary “lived experience” and has no relevance beyond the purely “allocative aspect of that moment” (p. 82). Accordingly, Hayek thinks that market dynamics “tend toward equilibrium” (p. 83). Knight, refusing to “model equilibrium over time,” argues that change “in the presence of uncertainty” would necessarily “alter the institutional structure that equilibrium theorizing takes as given” (p. 83).
Emmett could have similarly invoked the seemingly prima-facie equivalent—but still by and large incongruent (their disagreements over capital theory surely coming to the fore yet again)—stances that Knight and Hayek took during the rather heated 1930s and 1940s controversy over the possibility of socialist calculation. Indeed, there is much reason why Knight, with characteristically perceptive keenness (conjunct with vituperative literary bent), deemed the calculation controversy a relatively trivial spat over the economics of “sound and fury” (Knight Reference Knight1938, p. 267). For Hayek, socialist calculation is literally impossible: socialism—I refrain from adequately unpacking what “socialism” (anything akin to full-blown command planning) supposedly connotes—is patently impossible in theory and in the real world of change and uncertainty. For Knight, however, it is unclear why Hayek (Knight clearly thought Hayek was right about the impossibility of adequate socialist calculation in the real-world of pervasive uncertainty) would think socialism is impossible in theory. As Emmett notes, Hayek frequently invokes the supposed tendency with which entrepreneurship adequately coordinates the economy (pp. 67, 83). Knight, however, as Emmett persuasively explains throughout the volume, rather doubts the presence of any such tendency in the real world of change and uncertainty. Accordingly, and much as the auctioneer posited by theory (by Walrasian theory if not by Hayekian theory) adjusts relative prices to attain systemic equilibrium—any false trades and the suchlike are necessarily ruled out of court—the socialist planner-cum-auctioneer can similarly adjust prices by trial and error (thus, in theory, eliminating any hypothetical shortages and surpluses) and supposedly mimic the way in which the Walrasian auctioneer arrives at an overall system-wide equilibrium. The Hayekian might well ask—and with very good reason—how socialist calculation is to adequately grapple with capital investment and the role of expectations in any world where the future is necessarily unknown. How is adequate coordination of production under socialism to occur once we allow those markedly thorny issues into play? Knight would readily nod assent, while simultaneously pointing out that the Hayekian is pretty much giving the ‘calculation game’ away. Similarly, a Hayekian might wonder how long it will take for the supposed planner-cum-auctioneer’s ‘trial and error’ farce to converge on a systemic equilibrium (particularly when we posit changes in the supposedly underlying conditions of tastes, technology, etc). Again, Knight would agree, and then explain why Hayek’s objections cut with equivalent relevance—and irrelevance—against the Walrasian auctioneer posited and beloved by pure theory (or the contemporary Hayekian argument that entrepreneurship coordinates the economy). As Knight would say, the passage of time—introducing time allows genuine choice, indeterminacy, and all manner of historical changes to rear their patently thorny head to the chagrin of pure theory (e.g., Knight’s objections to Hayekian capital theory)—invoked by our imaginary Hayekian cuts both ways. Any tendency to equilibrium is questionable once we introduce uncertainty. Accordingly, ‘socialism’ per se is feasible in theory, feasible within the confines inherent to an economic model, and thus feasible in a markedly irrelevant conception of ‘feasibility.’ As Knight puts it in his review of Lange and Taylor’s ‘market socialism,’ economic “analysis is essential but purely preliminary and negative in significance” (Reference Knight1939, p. 600).
Is it any wonder that Hayek and Knight would take markedly differing stances when it came to evaluating the possibility of socialist calculation in ‘theory’ and yet stand shoulder to shoulder when it came to objecting to any real-world proposals for anything akin to full-blown command planning? All things considered, Emmett’s splendid volume is a must-read for anyone interested in Knight, the development of 1930s and 1940s economics, the Chicago School (vintage and modern), and the history of ideas.
