In the illiberal democracies of Africa, opposition parties face a stern challenge: how can leaders mobilise grassroots support, knit together (ambitious) activists, and apply pressure consistently against an intransigent government? In this book Adrienne LeBas contends that the internal organisation of political parties holds the key to understanding the conditions under which parties succeed or fail. The argument has two components. First, the authoritarian legacy left in the early years of independence ‘determine[s] the resources and organizational networks available to opposition movements' (p. 48), which in turn dictates the extent to which the opposition can mobilise supporters across space. Second, the choice by party leaders to pursue either a strategy of confrontation or moderation influences the degree of discipline among opposition partisans. LeBas develops and tests this two-step theory in a comparative case study of Kenya, Zambia and Zimbabwe in the post-independence period.
Does the argument hold? The section that documents the authoritarian legacy (Chapters 3 and 4) forms the empirical centrepiece of the book; it is clearly argued, painstakingly researched and thoroughly convincing. LeBas tells an arresting story of how governments in the first flush of independence make a crucial decision to either stifle or support trade union movements. The path taken at this critical juncture led to either the construction of a centralised, well-resourced and autonomous trade union movement (Zimbabwe and Zambia), or a quiescent union movement unable to organise protest across social boundaries (Kenya). A strong union movement, however, is not enough to produce mass mobilisation – the transformative role of agency also matters. In Chapters 5 and 6, LeBas neatly links the historical legacy of state-labour relations to the role played by activists in the successful (Zimbabwe) or failed (Zambia) pursuit of cross-constituency protest. LeBas argues unequivocally that ‘long-standing ethnicization of politics and civic life in Kenya made a unified opposition impossible’ (p. 171).
The ‘choice’ argument that follows (Chapters 7 and 8) is ambitious, but a little less convincing. It states boldly and counter-intuitively that ‘the puzzle of party solidarity – for both the ruling party and the opposition – can be explained with reference to a single process: party-based polarization’ (p. 178). The force of the theory rests on a mechanism that emphasises how the use of confrontational tactics – up to, and including, violent resistance – ties candidates' success to ‘membership in one of two parties’ by building solidarity among partisans, prioritising commitment to conflict, and reducing social space across party boundaries (p. 246). I had two qualms, which related to how the theory is specified and tested.
First, it is unclear how party strategy (moderation or militancy) interacts with other important aspects of the party system (e.g. number of parties) and party organisation (e.g. candidate selection mechanisms). The theoretical mechanism that links polarisation to party cohesion seems predicated on the ex ante condition of a two-party system, which is present in Zimbabwe but absent in Kenya, Zambia and the vast majority of other African states. It is not entirely apparent, then, how the deliberate intensification of conflict would influence a multi-party system or, indeed, the fortunes of the opposition in a dominant party system. It is equally unclear how a militant strategy might interact with the locus of decision-making within the party. A decentralized and inclusive candidate selection system might provide disgruntled activists with an important arena to resist the leadership's contentious decision to intensify violence. A centralized and exclusive system, conversely, might reinforce leadership control of the party. In either case, variation in the process candidate selection – a key battleground within political parties – can also influence the cohesion of the party. There is an opportunity for theoretical refinement, which should be seized by researchers who wish to explore party and party system development in other African countries.
Second, LeBas raises some important questions about how we gauge the proximate and distal effects of the leadership's decision to intensify confrontation. In the most engaging chapter in the book (Chapter 7), LeBas concedes that the decision by the leadership of the Movement for Democratic Change to choose popular confrontation led directly to a disastrous split between moderates and militants in the party. The question, then, is whether this split might fragment the party system. LeBas argues her case persuasively, but I think three or four years is too short a time to see how the parties fall into place. I wonder, too, whether LeBas makes too little of the impact of militancy on the internal organisation of the MDC. Does a militant party also choose martial principles: discipline over dissent, secrecy over transparency, and deference over accountability? Have these principles carried over into government? It is of course early days, but the gunman can cast a long shadow over states in transition.
LeBas has written a sophisticated book at the cutting edge of research on African political parties. The early chapters should be required reading for students of political parties, who will appreciate the clarity and force of the legacy argument. From Parties to Protest is an important milestone in the comparative historical analysis of African political parties.
