One of the main themes of Arthur Ripstein's substantial new book on Kant's legal and political philosophy is the question of the relationship between Kant's pure moral philosophy and his “impure,” or applied, legal and political philosophy. A crude way of putting this question is, Does the categorical imperative of the Groundwork determine the recommendations that Kant makes in the doctrine of right? Ripstein, correctly in my view, believes that the doctrine of right lies at the heart of Kant's political thinking. Ripstein addresses this question throughout the book and is strongly of the view that the pure moral philosophy and the applied legal/political philosophy are separate enterprises, although of course related in a way that he intriguingly investigates. Although this relationship between right and morality in Kant is a theme throughout the book, the topic is only investigated in detail in the appendix (“A Postulate Incapable of Proof”). This is a fascinating chapter that contains more than enough to satisfy me that Kant requires the pure theory of morals to be treated in continuity with the doctrine of right, but that I fear will be insufficiently persuasive for the separatist Kant scholars who take the Fichtean line of detecting two distinct fields of philosophical enquiry.
Ripstein's motivation in addressing this question derives in part from the unease that some contemporary American philosophers express about the apparent harshness of some of Kant's political recommendations, as compared with the generosity of the ethical theory that appears to arise from the Groundwork. Ripstein wants to offer a defense of Kant's demanding—often apparently too rigid in its application—political theory that might make it more appealing to contemporary liberal readers. In this he succeeds.
Unlike most other books on Kant's political philosophy, Ripstein's book is devoted almost exclusively to a discussion of the Doctrine of Right, the first part of the Metaphysics of Morals. Generally, scholarly works devoted to Kant's political philosophy have treated Kant's numerous shorter political and historical writings, many of which appeared in the Berlinische Monatsschrift (such as the seminal essay “What Is Enlightenment?”), as of equal, if not greater, significance to the doctrine of right. Ripstein in contrast takes the view that whatever appears in the 1797 Doctrine of Right trumps anything that may be found in the occasional writings (x). Perpetual Peace, which appeared independently as a book in 1795, is similarly treated as a less reliable source. This is not untenable, but it is controversial. Ripstein accordingly follows closely the exposition of Kant's main work on legal philosophy, although this is far from being a detailed commentary. Three chapters are devoted to private right (chaps. 3–5), five to public right (chaps. 7–11). The account of private right is grounded on an explanation of the innate right of humanity (chap. 2), which in turn is preceded by a very useful survey of Kant's views on law and justice in general (chap. 1). The book ends with a technical discussion of the postulate of the universal principle of right.
What is to be warmly welcomed in the book is the confluence of political and legal philosophy that it represents. This is a very fruitful way of tackling Kant's political philosophy, not least because this is how Kant himself deals with the topic. For him the study of political philosophy was intimately bound up with the study of natural law or right. Natural law was the traditional vehicle through which questions of justice were dealt with in German universities. Although Kant transformed this tradition to make political philosophy the study of an a priori metaphysics of right (and its a posteriori implications), he nonetheless took his point of departure from it and his main ideas are best understood as a critique of the natural law tradition. What also is to be warmly welcomed in this book is the conviction with which it is presented. Although Ripstein presents himself as a critic of contemporary (largely Rawlsian) liberalism, it is clear that he wants to present an unequivocal defense of what he regards as a still living Kantian doctrine of politics. With Ripstein, no apologies are made for treating Kant as a major political philosopher; for him Kant's political philosophy is clearly the most viable one on offer today.
Also impressive is Ripstein's very thorough discussion of the problem of welfare provision in Kant's political philosophy. This is an area of considerable debate, with some interpreters of Kant arguing that he is predominantly a libertarian thinker, and others at the opposite end of the spectrum suggesting that Kant provides a very broad scope for public intervention in maintaining standards of life and public provision. Ripstein threads a very neat path between these two extremes. While he starts out from an individualist reading of Kant that emphasizes the need for the state to follow a nonpaternalist approach, Ripstein draws the persuasive conclusion that Kant holds that there are certain forms of public and welfare provision that the state must engage in if it is to function properly as a state. Ripstein's assertion that “the key to Kant's argument for the state focuses on the need for a united legislative will” (272) is sound and brings out how Rousseau's political philosophy provided an inspiration for Kant's work. In a civil society, citizens must regard themselves, through their representatives, as drawing up law for themselves. Thus state regulation appears not as something hostile from without but as a vital support for individual freedom.
Ripstein takes seriously Kant's social contract argument. The hypothetical contract represents a norm for any civil society. Arrangements have to be drawn up in such a way that each individual can see himself as agreeing to them in an original condition where there is as yet no state authority. This is the key to our innate freedom. “Each person is only entitled to use his or her means in ways that are consistent with the entitlement of others to use theirs under universal laws” (42). The state must embody and represent an omnilateral will that acts in such a way as to secure rights and freedoms for individuals that are compatible with the same rights and freedoms for all. Adopting this standpoint, Ripstein engages in a justified polemic against Lockean “unilateral” theories of property ownership.
Where I depart from Ripstein is in his somewhat libertarian understanding of our rights to our own body. As I understand Kant's political philosophy there is no scope for regarding ourselves as the owners of our own bodies, permitted to dispose over them in the way in which we ourselves will. For Kant it is impossible for individuals to get outside of themselves in this way and see their limbs or other parts of their body as instruments to deploy for others or themselves. The individual is his or her limb or body part. It is therefore a mistake to regard yourself as making use of your body (even if Ripstein wants you to do so only in a manner to which you consent). Certainly, others are not entitled to use our bodies for ends we do not affirm, but this is due as much to the fact that we do not relate to our body in such a way that it can be used as to the nature of the use. Using our bodies (making them into instruments for ourselves or others) is wrong in itself and doing so has an unavoidably alienating effect. This, of course, has complex implications for Kant's doctrine of marriage, where, in his view, some use of the other person's body cannot be avoided—there has to be some mutual loss of autonomy to make it work. In this respect Ripstein's discussion of Kant's doctrine of right falls short. One category of ownership that Kant discusses, which grounds “rights to persons akin to rights to things,” is not examined in detail in the book. Thus there is no clarification from Ripstein of what rights parents, spouses, and children can expect from a Kantian perspective.
One other area in which the book treads lightly is that of international law or right. Here one might have expected a more extensive treatment since international and cosmopolitan law loom so large in Kant's overall view of politics and law. Nonetheless, the book will remain a rich source for Kant's legal and political philosophy for years to come. Like all other scholars in the field the author will find that he has not managed to still all contrary voices, and despite all his best efforts, accounts of Kant's political doctrines will still take root which do not seem to be fully substantiated by the texts themselves.
