Introduction
“Dear friend: This is a critical hour in the history of North Dakota,” wrote Don Myrold, senior vice president of the Fargo-Moorhead Chapter of the North Dakota Right to Life Association, in an open letter to Chapter membership.Footnote 1 He implored members to attend the Rally for Life at the Fargo Civic Auditorium on Thursday, November 2, 1972, adding that they “notify the members of your congregation or your friends/staff of it so they may attend and be enabled to make a well-informed decision on this crucial issue.”Footnote 2 Myrold hoped the Rally would serve as the culmination of a statewide effort against a ballot initiative to liberalize abortion laws in North Dakota. With the presidential contest between Richard Nixon and George McGovern at the top of the ballot, voter turnout that next Tuesday would be very high. Myrold and the Right to Life Association wanted this election to deliver a devastating defeat for the very idea of abortion on demand in North Dakota.
“Hundreds of citizens from every walk of life are now moving hand-in-hand in a comprehensive educational campaign in this region,” he intoned.Footnote 3 “These weeks of intense effort by these hundreds of concerned citizens will lead up to participation by over 5,000 persons in the Red River Valley.”
The campaign succeeded beyond all expectations: the initiative was defeated 76.6 percent to 23.4 percent.Footnote 4 The old statutes mandating that abortion was only permissible when done to save the life of the mother remained in force.Footnote 5 North Dakota, with 27.9 percent of its 617,761 citizens identifying as Catholic,Footnote 6 was now an anti-abortion state.
This study examines the events surrounding the 1972 abortion-initiative campaign, with a focus on the North Dakota Right to Life Association (NDRTLA) and its chapter in Fargo. Using archival data and contemporary news reports, the study illustrates how the initiative got on the ballot, as well as the process through which the NDRTLA organized and implemented its strategy to defeat the measure. Many within the anti-abortion movement saw the campaign as an opportunity not only to end the national trend toward more liberal abortion laws but also to demonstrate that opposition in many states was deep-seated and implacable. Finally, the study considers the evolving role of elites in North Dakota politics.
Theoretical Overview
A central finding in public-opinion scholarship is that the public is not very knowledgeable about most policy areas.Footnote 7 People have little understanding of the complexities associated with government policy,Footnote 8 and “lack the motivation or ability to process information systematically.”Footnote 9 Consequently, individuals rely on ‘cues’ from political elites to understand the issues of the day,Footnote 10 accepting prompts from trusted elites and disregarding those by competing elites.Footnote 11 Political elites are “persons who devote themselves full time to some aspect of politics or public affairs.”Footnote 12 This includes “politicians, higher-level government officials, journalists, some activists, and many kinds of policy experts and policy specialists,”Footnote 13 as well as “other entities, such as interest groups or entertainment-industry figures.”Footnote 14 Typically, they hold some power over the policy process, which is enhanced whenever they receive visible support from the public.Footnote 15 Political elites transmit their views through the media, advertisements, campaigns, and other such means, which then serve as “cues” to receptive audiences.Footnote 16 Political parties and interest groupsFootnote 17 play a key role in these efforts at voter mobilization across state and region.Footnote 18 Likewise, nonpolitical social networks, such as civic groups or churches, can quickly mobilize followers in support of certain candidates and issues.Footnote 19
As issues change, so do the prospects of the political elite. Whereas elite actors may be comfortable with providing cues on traditional concerns such as budget or agricultural policy, they shy away from new controversies, such as abortion or desegregation.Footnote 20 The resulting confusion allows fresh sets of elites to step forward.
David Truman argued that the number of groups across society remains static until some disturbance upsets the status quo. Faced by a common threat, people will band together with other likeminded people, thereby creating new groups.Footnote 21 He concluded that political conflict is essentially conflict between the many groups within society. This pluralist argument proved quite influential, but it soon elicited critiques. Schattschneider noted that there are important barriers to participation in this competition between groups, such as uneven distribution of resources across the different levels of society.Footnote 22 Questions also arose over the process of group mobilization, which pluralists assumed would just naturally occur. However, Olson believed most people were unable to devote substantial amounts of time and energy to a particular cause without some reward.Footnote 23 Individuals need selective incentives to make their efforts worthwhile. Without such benefits, they are better off free-riding on the accomplishments of others.
While Olson was largely interested in the role of material benefits in encouraging participation, others noted the importance of expressive benefits. Expressive benefits are those rewards derived by participating in a group that articulates an individual’s values, such as the defense of civil liberties or promotion of religious principles.Footnote 24 “The dynamic surrounding expressive benefits suggest that individuals join groups that express values that they hold dear.”Footnote 25 The resulting sense of civic duty is sufficient to induce active participation in group activities despite the lack of material rewards.Footnote 26
Salisbury emphasized the role played by entrepreneurs in group formation. Entrepreneurs create and expand groups by offering a mix of material and expressive benefits. “The price is group membership, which may cost as little as a supportive signature or as much as the heavy dues attached to some trade association memberships.”Footnote 27 In return for their investments, entrepreneurs maintain control over a group’s resources and agenda. Walker agreed, arguing “that the origins and maintenance of groups depends even more upon the success of group leaders in securing funds from outside their membership which are needed to keep their groups in operation.”Footnote 28 These patrons, which include corporations and nonprofits, then use such groups to shape public policy.
Recent decades have seen a steady increase in interest groups with an explicit religious focus.Footnote 29 Hofrenning noted that, at one time, conservative Christian groups avoided political participation due to fears of its corrupting elements. However, when interviewed, group leaders “pointed to a disturbing law or trend in society” as their reason for getting involved, such as changes to abortion laws, increased availability of pornography, and the rise of the gay rights movement.Footnote 30 These groups did not see themselves as traditional interest groups since they organized to promote moral positions rather than derive material benefits.Footnote 31 Subsequently, religious interest groups have less trouble with “free-rider” issues than other groups.
This study asserts that the refusal by traditional elites to provide clear and consistent cues to voters on a controversial issue such as abortion allows for the rise of alternative elites. The 1972 North Dakota abortion initiative illustrates the process through which these alternatives organized themselves and established relationships with key groups. The study also considers what happens when one set of elites is effective at providing cues on a ballot measure while the opposing elites proves unsuccessful in such efforts.
History of Abortion Law
At the start of the nineteenth century, states had few, if any, statutes overseeing the practice of abortion. Instead, American courts relied on common law doctrine whereby “abortion was a criminal act only after the pregnant woman felt fetal movement (quickening).”Footnote 32 States maintained this doctrine even as they began regulating the procedure itself in the early 1820s. After the Civil War, though, states removed the quickening prerequisite and made abortion illegal throughout pregnancy. Though the particulars varied, state legislatures proscribed criminal sanctions on women seeking abortions as well as anyone providing the procedure.Footnote 33 These changes came at the behalf of the nation’s physicians, particularly those associated with the newly formed American Medical Association, who articulated “a scientific understanding of human development as continuous from the point of conception, a scheme in which “quickening” had no special significance.”Footnote 34 Based on their knowledge of fetal development, physicians asserted that abortion was morally wrong at any point after conception.Footnote 35
Nineteenth-century statutes generally prohibited abortions except when necessary to save the life of the woman.Footnote 36 Since patient health was a medical matter, this exception left legal access to abortion almost completely in the hands of physicians.Footnote 37 It also meant that the practice of the abortion as well the frequency of its occurrence stayed out of the public sphere. Consequently, state legislatures had little reason to reexamine their statutes, which remained largely unchanged well into the twentieth century. While disputes over abortion law occurred in some professional journals as early as the 1920s, public discussion was minimal until the 1950s.Footnote 38
The process of liberalizing abortion laws began in 1962, when the American Law Institute published its Model Penal Code. This template allowed abortions in cases where: continued pregnancy would result in death or the physical or mental impairment of the mother; the fetus would be born with severe physical or mental defects; or pregnancy was due to rape or incest.Footnote 39 In addition, at least two physicians had to attest that circumstances warranted an abortion.Footnote 40 While Catholic lawyers objected, they had little influence over the final draft.Footnote 41 More than a dozen states incorporated the American Law Institute’s recommendations into their statutes by the end of the decade.Footnote 42
In 1970, Hawaii passed legislation that went beyond the Model Penal Code, essentially allowing abortions at the request of the woman so long as they were a state resident.Footnote 43 New York legalized access to abortion that same year, going beyond what Hawaii allowed and without any residency requirement.Footnote 44 Alaska followed suit soon thereafter.Footnote 45
Washington held the first referendum on abortion liberalization in 1970, leading to a bitterly fought campaign between an anti-abortion umbrella organization known as Voice for the Unborn (VFU) and the medical doctor–led Washington Citizens for Abortion Reform (WCAR).Footnote 46 The VFU saturated voters with campaign literature and door-to-door canvassers as well as billboards with pictures of a four-month-old fetus and the message “Kill Referendum 20, Not Me.” The WCAR relied upon a television campaign to get its message across. Due to overwhelming support by voters in the city of Seattle, the statewide referendum passed with 56.5 percent of the total vote.
The trend toward more liberal abortion laws at the state level indicated American attitudes had changed in fundamental ways. Indeed, polls show that popular support for abortion done to preserve the mother’s life or prevent child deformity grew steadily over the 1960s.Footnote 47 This is not surprising since the legal basis behind such abortions already existed in most states. However, support for abortions done for economic reasons or the desire not to have children also grew, though at a slower pace. Most notably, support among Catholics for abortion no matter the circumstances grew at greater rates than the rest of the population.
Arguments over abortion policy had traditionally been couched in medical and moral terms. However, the tone of this debate also changed. “A group of women who valued motherhood, but valued it on their own timetable, began to make a new claim—one that had never surfaced in the abortion debate before this—that abortion was a woman’s right.”Footnote 48 What seemed by many to be a long-settled matter came under renewed scrutiny.
In 1972, supporters of more liberal abortion laws gathered enough signatures to place the issue on the ballot in Michigan and North Dakota. “Pro-abortion forces believe they are on the verge of major victories that will soon make abortion on request available throughout much of the country,” reported the New York Times. Footnote 49 Success in the socially conservative Midwest would bode well for a national movement.
Conversely, the nascent Right-to-Life movement had endured a series of failures at the state level, unable to move beyond its largely Catholic base. It needed a clear political victory to halt momentum toward further liberalization.
The 1972 North Dakota Abortion Initiative
Prelude
For much of the twentieth century, North Dakota abortion law was based on Dakota Territory statutes passed in 1877.Footnote 50 These statutes allowed abortion only in cases where a woman’s life was clearly threatened. Otherwise, actions that brought about the death of an “unborn child” constituted manslaughter in the first degree. In addition, unsuccessful efforts at inducing abortion could result in a sentence of one to three years for practitioners. Finally, a woman could be arrested for just asking about abortions or inquiring about abortifacients.
In January 1969, freshman representative Aloha Eagles (R-Fargo) introduced a bill before the North Dakota General Assembly that expanded the circumstances under which abortions were permissible.Footnote 51 These included instances of rape or incest, when a woman’s life was in danger, or there were “strong indications of possible physical deformity or mental retardation of the unborn child.”Footnote 52 However, abortion would not be allowed after the sixteenth week of pregnancy. Eagle’s bill also called for the creation of hospital panels consisting of at least three physicians who would determine whether a woman’s situation warranted the procedure. Despite support by the state Council of Churches, the House voted 52–42 to kill the bill. Representative Eagles reintroduced the bill during the 1971 session, but it was defeated 85–15.Footnote 53
In December 1971, Wendy Walsh, a research assistant at North Dakota State University (NDSU) in Fargo, helped organize North Dakota Citizens for Legal Termination of Pregnancy (NDCLTP) to place a measure on the ballot that would liberalize the state’s abortion laws.Footnote 54 “I got involved in the petition campaign through Zero Population Growth,” Walsh explained. “I don’t know which came first really. I guess I joined ZPG because of their pro-abortion stand. I believe that a woman should have the right to control over her own body.”Footnote 55 By February, several dozen volunteers were canvassing Fargo for signatures. Some volunteers contacted Walsh after hearing about the petition drive in the news, while others were referred by Aloha Eagles, Zero Population Growth, or a women’s liberation group. Walsh went on to focus her signature-gathering efforts on the NDSU campus, establishing a presence in the student union and dormitories.Footnote 56
The proposed measure would allow a licensed physician to perform an abortion under certain conditions: (1) before the woman entered her twentieth week of pregnancy or was “quick with child”; (2) with the woman’s consent unless she was under eighteen, in which case her husband or guardian would also have to consent; (3) the woman had lived in North Dakota for at least ninety days; and (4) the procedure was done in a facility approved for this purpose by the State Department of Health.Footnote 57 However, hospitals, physicians, and nurses were not obliged to provide abortions if they did not want to.
NDCLTP spokesperson Major Richard Schlorf, a U.S. Air Force otolaryngologist at the Minot Air Force Base in northwest North Dakota, said there was not any specific “type” of person who signed the petitions. “Some young people who dress mod and who you’d think would be progressive won’t sign,” he said in a newspaper interview. “While others, farmers dressed in bib overalls do, so you just can’t tell.”Footnote 58 Schlorf, a Minnesota native who had lived in Minot for nearly two years, emphasized that his work with NDCLTP was done as a private citizen and not an officer in the Air Force. Lieutenant Tom Slover, deputy missile combat crew commander at Minot Air Base, worked as coordinator for the petition drive in Minot. Slover said there were more than eighty volunteers collecting signatures in the state’s largest communities, such as Minot, Bismarck, Fargo, and Grand Forks.Footnote 59 Slover, too, was not a North Dakota native.
Needing 10,000 signatures, the group collected 10,845 by early September, thereby ensuring ballot status in the general election. Organizers claimed the majority came from Fargo residents.Footnote 60
Describing the group’s success, the Fargo Forum noted, “Mrs. Walsh’s efforts have not gone unnoticed by the Right to Life Association.”Footnote 61
North Dakota Right to Life Mobilizes
In April 1967, the National Conference of Catholic Bishops budgeted $50,000 to educate church members about the growing number of proposals aimed at weakening restrictive abortion laws in the states.Footnote 62 This action led to the founding of the National Right to Life Committee (NRLC) a year later. Initially intended to serve as an information clearinghouse, the NRLC began communicating with anti-abortion organizations throughout the nation and encouraging the creation of Right to Life associations at the state-level.Footnote 63 It eventually took on the role of “coordinating entity for state right-to-life organizations.”Footnote 64 The NRLC held its first national conference in July 1970, attracting 140 people from thirty-seven states, the District of Columbia, and Canada.Footnote 65 Attendees used the conference for networking purposes as well as to articulate a national agenda. A second conference in 1971 brought 205 supporters to St. Paul, Minnesota, including fourteen from North Dakota.
North Dakota was one of the first states to have its own Right to Life organization. A prospectus for the creation of the North Dakota Right to Life Association was prepared on November 9, 1970, at the request of Edwin C. Becker, executive director of the North Dakota Catholic Conference.Footnote 66 Becker was a former state senator who had also served as executive secretary of the North Dakota Republican Party in the early 1960s. Thomas E. Cannady, Ted R. Smith, and John C. Warren wrote the document, which asserted that the purpose of the Association was “to inform and thereby bring about in North Dakota a clear understanding and full appreciation of the existence of human life and its dignity at all stages of development, and the right of every human being to the continuation of such life.”Footnote 67
Working with the National Right to Life Committee, the NDRLA pledged to educate the public and lobby the North Dakota Legislature regarding abortion. The prospectus included a four-month budget of $8,000, with $3,200 going toward the executive director’s salary.Footnote 68 In addition, the Ted Smith Advertising and Public Relations Agency in Bismarck pledged to provide office space at no cost for NDRLA headquarters.
Cannady served as administrator for St. Alexius Hospital, a Catholic facility in Bismarck.Footnote 69 Smith’s advertising agency, established in 1968, did survey work for such entities as the North Dakota Bar Association.Footnote 70
The NDRLA incorporated as a nonprofit with the state on November 13.Footnote 71 To cover the initial budget, the North Dakota Catholic Conference provided a $5,000 start-up grant, contingent upon the organization raising an additional $3,800 on its own.Footnote 72
Albert H. Fortman, a Lutheran vascular surgeon from Bismarck, became the NDRLA’s first chairman.Footnote 73 He was joined by Martha J. Lynch as vice-chairman, Karen Larsen as secretary, and Maxine Kadlec as treasurer. While these officers ran the day-to-day operations, they answered to a nine-member board of directors that included Cannady. Montana-born, Fortman received his medical degree from Northwestern Medical School in Illinois, held active staff membership at St. Alexius and other facilities, served for a time as Clinical Professor of Surgery at University of North Dakota Medical School, and had his own private practice.Footnote 74 He soon became the public face of the NDRLA, willing to debate NDCLTP representatives at public forums, give speeches before large and small groups, speak to the media, and recruit new members and allies. He also moderated NDRLA board meetings and events. For his efforts, Fortman became a member of the National Right to Life board in November 1972.Footnote 75
The NDRLA got to work lobbying the state legislature. It took credit for organizing the overwhelming opposition against Representative Eagles’s second attempt to liberalize abortion law in 1971.Footnote 76
Responding to the prospect of an abortion initiative, NDRLA leadership held a planning session on January 28, 1972.Footnote 77 Fifteen attendees, including Bishop Hilary Hacker of Bismarck and Bishop Justin Driscoll of Fargo, considered whether initiative supporters would be able to gather enough signatures and, if so, how the NDRLA should respond. There was some consternation about the role played by Air Force personnel in promoting the measure. Edwin Becker, who chaired the meeting, stated that Dr. Schlorf had already received pressure from the Air Force about his work for the NDCLTP. Becker suggested contacting U.S. Senator Milton Young (R-ND) as to the possibility of removing Schlorf from his position at the Minot Base. However, the group decided against this action, believing it could backfire.
The consensus was that obtaining ten thousand signatures would be easy for the NDCLTP, and the NDRLA and its allies should gear up for a year-long struggle. While members were confident that they would ultimately win this fight, they wanted to avoid overconfidence. Toward that end, the group heard from Ken Van Derhoef, a Seattle lawyer who had headed Voice for the Unborn in its unsuccessful campaign against a similar referendum in Washington.Footnote 78 A meeting summary noted:
In the state of Washington they were caught short on time—they put together a political campaign, organized on a precinct level. They found that the basic element had to be educating the people as to what an abortion is. Some shock material was used but tendered with care. A billboard campaign was used, and a poll was used to get the feel of the people. The medical profession failed to support the antiabortionists and endorsed the abortion bill. The University of Washington was the next strongest element of support for the abortion bill. The billboard approach was criticized by the press, but Mr. Van Derhoef felt that the billboards did a great deal of good.”Footnote 79
Van Derhoef believed the antireferendum forces would have won the Washington contest with one more month of campaigning. He recommended that the NDRLA: raise enough money to wage a professional campaign; seek the support of doctors, nurses, and other healthcare professionals; work with other religious organizations so abortion was not defined as a “Catholic” issue; and ensure women were included as campaign staff.Footnote 80
Soon afterward, the NDLA hired Ted Smith to oversee campaign planning. At the May 31 board meeting, Smith said they would need at least $65,000 for advertising, including billboards, supplements in the state’s eleven largest newspapers, and a plan to saturate the airwaves with ads during the final weeks of the campaign.Footnote 81 They would also need to get out the rural vote, which he felt should be done through direct contact, such as door-to-door canvassing. However, victory in such cities as Fargo and Grand Forks would require a sustained presence.
In July, Smith presented the NDLA with a survey of 722 potential voters done through a mixture of telephone interviews, personal interviews, and mail questionnaires. Smith found that 56 percent of respondents opposed the initiative while 30 percent favored it; a majority of voters in four counties, most notably Cass County, supported the measure; and 58 percent of the state’s Democrats and 52 percent of Republicans opposed abortion on demand.Footnote 82 Smith concluded that “the younger voter, the more educated voter, the more affluent voter are more inclined towards abortion on demand.”Footnote 83 Cass County, which includes Fargo, should be treated as a “trouble spot.” Once again, Smith recommended focusing campaign resources there.
Mobilizing the Catholic vote was the first step toward an overwhelming victory. The individual churches provided a reliable stream of money and volunteers, while church leadership commanded the respect of thousands of voters. The NDRLA called upon priests to speak out so that “every Catholic should know clearly the specific stand of the church and what is at stake here.”Footnote 84 Seeking to integrate the Church’s efforts with its own, the NDRLA organized a ‘churches division’ to oversee this core group of supporters.Footnote 85 The association divided the state into seven districts and appointed a District Chair for each district. Every diocese, province, or Stake within a District named a representative to their District Committee, which met regularly with their District Chair. These committees also worked with representatives from local parishes, congregations, and churches. In addition, the seven District Chairs served as members of a Statewide Management Committee to coordinate campaign strategy among themselves and with the NDRLA.
Catholic dioceses across the state would play a critical role throughout the campaign. A strategy document laid out their activities on a month-to-month basis from April to election day.Footnote 86 The document emphasized that the anti-abortion message should not be delivered in a clean, clinical manner, but, instead, “in the speeches and sermon outlines to be submitted content will create a vivid lasting impression on the listeners. The grotesque, stark, ugly gruesome facts about abortion will be described.” This would produce “a strong, violent opposition to this law,” particularly among women. “We need these morally outraged women to (a) neutralize the pitch of the pro-abortion supporters and, (b) to carry on an overt energetic campaign on an individual, personal over cups-of-coffee campaign.”Footnote 87
The strategy document emphasized raising seed money as soon as possible. “The need for church involvement in fund raising is essential to the success of our campaign.”Footnote 88 The document stated “five dollars ($5.00) per family in each congregation will be the asking figure as a minimum contribution.”
Finally, Dr. Fortman ceaselessly promoted the formation of NDRLA chapters across the state. Twenty-seven chapters were established by November, most notably in Fargo.Footnote 89
Formation of the Fargo Chapter
Fargo was North Dakota’s largest city in 1970 with 53,365 people, or 8.64 percent of the population.Footnote 90 Home to North Dakota State University and just across the Red River from Minnesota, Fargo had a reputation for being a liberal enclave in the conservative rural state.
On October 6, 1971, Assistant Professor Donald Myrold of the Economics Department at NDSU wrote a letter to Fortman expressing his concerns about abortion. “I feel many of us must get off our duffs and actively engage in anti-abortion activities—in every way we can.”Footnote 91 Myrold sent a similar letter to Bishop Kenneth Povish of the Diocese of Crookston, Minnesota: “Although a Protestant, I’m totally opposed to abortion.”Footnote 92 Was there anything he could do in the fight against abortion?
Fortman replied with a letter dated January 4, 1972, stating that he would be visiting Fargo in two weeks to speak before a group regarding the formation of a Right to Life chapter.Footnote 93 Noting the organization was nonsectarian, he invited Myrold to attend. Bishop Driscoll sent a letter to Myrold also suggesting he attend the meeting.Footnote 94
Myrold responded to Bishop Driscoll: “I want to become very active in this group. I feel there is a vital need for it. I will be willing to do whatever I can to make this organization successful. If it is the consensus of the group, I would be willing to serve as an officer or director or committee chairman, member, etc.”Footnote 95
The initial meeting was held January 13, 1972, in Bishop Driscoll’s house.Footnote 96 Eleven people attended, including the Bishop, seven priests, two nuns, and Myrold. They discussed strategy and made plans to meet again on January 19. Fortman attended the second meeting to propose the creation of a Fargo-Moorhead chapter.Footnote 97 The group held additional meetings on January 27, where nominations to the chapter board were made,Footnote 98 and February 7, where a vote on those nominations was held.Footnote 99 Myrold was named senior vice-chairman of the executive board overseeing Fargo Right to Life. Attendants of the February 7 meeting also approved the organization’s charter, which noted that the chapter was a “nonprofit interfaith educational association.”Footnote 100
The formation of the Fargo-Moorhead chapter of Right to Life was announced at a press conference held February 7. The conference was attended by Fortman, who again complained about “various Minot Air Force personnel who are not North Dakota residents and others who are circulating initiative petitions to place the issue of abortion on demand on the ballot at the November 1972 election.”Footnote 101
As part of his new duties, Myrold wrote to President Nixon on March 16, 1972, voicing his opposition to abortion.Footnote 102 Myrold expressed disappointment that the President’s Commission on Population Growth had recommended liberalizing abortion laws in the states. He forwarded copies of this letter to members of Congress from Minnesota and North Dakota.
Myrold received a handful of responses. Representatives Art Link (D-ND)Footnote 103 and Mark Andrews (R-ND),Footnote 104 as well as Senators Quentin Burdick (D-ND)Footnote 105 and Hubert Humphrey (D-MN),Footnote 106 gave perfunctory statements that abortion was a difficult issue best left to the states. Only Representative Bob Bergland (D-MN) struggled with the matter, suggesting he was against liberalizing abortion laws at the federal or state level.Footnote 107 Myrold later wrote that while the other Congressmen were noncommittal and “very mug-wumpish” in their replies, Representative Bergland could perhaps be persuaded into becoming an ally.”Footnote 108
The Fargo chapter placed its first advertisement in the Fargo Forum on March 7. The ad reiterated their anti-abortion agenda and solicited memberships with the top fee for “Patrons” at fifty dollars.Footnote 109
The Abortion Initiative Campaign
As volunteers gathered petition signatures, the issue of abortion came to the forefront of North Dakota politics. Anti-abortion groups from outside of the state got involved, coordinating their efforts with the NDRLA. In April, a chapter of Birthright opened in Fargo to take telephone calls so that “any single girls or married women who is distressed with her pregnancy may talk to a volunteer … who would suggest solutions other than abortion.”Footnote 110 The campus organization Save Our Unwanted Lives (SOUL) opened at NDSU in May.Footnote 111
As part of its effort to reach out to other faiths and denominations, the NDRLA sponsored its first interfaith clergy conference and public meeting on April 17, 1972.Footnote 112 Some one thousand people attended the all-day conference in Bismarck and several hundred participated in a public discussion that evening, which featured Fred and Marjory Mecklenburg of Minnesota Citizens Concerned for Life.Footnote 113 More than four hundred people attended the Fargo Charter Night in Moorhead, Minnesota the next evening, where the Fargo-Moorhead Chapter received its Charter from Dr. Fortman.Footnote 114 The Mecklenburg’s gave the main address and then the officers of the Fargo Chapter were presented to the public. Most notably, Reverend Al Erickson, clergyman in the Eastern North Dakota District of the American Lutheran Church and President of the North Dakota Conference of Churches, was named Secretary.
These outreach efforts bore fruit with the NDRLA receiving support or, at least, neutrality by important religious groups in the state. The Eastern North Dakota District of the American Lutheran Church (ALC) passed a resolution “opposing abortion as a means of population control, birth control or planned parenthood.”Footnote 115 It rejected an alternative resolution more sympathetic to abortion access. The Western North Dakota District of the ALC issued a letter stating that they took no position on the initiative.Footnote 116 The NDRLA also received support from the Luther Church–Missouri Synod as well as the Association of Evangelicals in North DakotaFootnote 117
On September 14, the North Dakota Secretary of State announced that initiative supporters had gathered enough signatures to get on the ballot.Footnote 118 The campaign began in earnest.
North Dakota Right to Life and its chapters proved adept at fundraising. The Association spent more than $100,000 (or $604,727 in 2019 dollars) on their efforts, an unusually large amount for a North Dakota initiative campaign.Footnote 119 According to Fortman, this money was spent on ninety anti-abortion billboards, advertisements in all fifty-two county newspapers, as well as a series of ten and twenty-second spots on radio and television stations across the state. Fargo Right to Life records indicate that $5,000–$10,000 was budgeted on billboards, $20,000 on brochures and voter guides, and $15,000–$20,000 for a two-week blast of radio and television advertisements.Footnote 120 In addition, the NDRLA sponsored hundreds of speeches through its speaker bureau at little cost. By late October, anti-abortion speakers had given sixty-six public talks in the Fargo area alone.Footnote 121
By election day, the NDRLA had spent $18,714 on advertisements in the Bismarck,Footnote 122 Devils Lake, Dickinson, Fargo, Grand Forks, Jamestown, Mandan, Minot, Valley City, Wahpeton, and Williston newspapers.Footnote 123 There were three sets of advertisements. The first was a half-page layout with a “Life or Death” motif and information on how to join the NDRLA or a local chapter.Footnote 124 The second was a full-page ad with the heading “Do you want North Dakota to become an abortion capital?” and an accompanying list of several hundred citizens urging a “no” vote.Footnote 125 The third was a full-page ad reading “North Dakota Doctors and Nurses Speak out Against Abortion” followed by the names of 156 health-care professionals endorsing a “no” vote.Footnote 126
In addition to a series of fifteen- and thirty-second television commercials, the NDRLA sponsored a thirty-minute taped panel discussion to be aired the Saturday before election day across the state.Footnote 127
Annoyed by the initial refusal by politicians to take a stand on the initiative, the NDRLA surveyed candidates for state house and senate on whether they favored retaining the present law or allowing for abortions in situations other than saving the life of the mother.Footnote 128 Some 139 legislative candidates responded with 102, or 73.4 percent, stating they wanted to maintain the status quo and twenty-one, or 15.1 percent, favored a different approach. A further ten respondents did not give a clear answer and five simply stated they opposed abortion on demand.
In October, prominent politicians who had given ambiguous responses came forward to declare their opposition to the initiative. U.S. Representative Art Link, amid what would prove to be a successful campaign for governor, wrote, “It has come to my attention that a misunderstanding has arisen about my position on the issue of abortion. I am opposed to abortion on demand.”Footnote 129 Link emphasized his opposition to the initiative. Allen Olson, a Republican running for Attorney General declared, “I have been asked to clarify my views on “abortion on demand” and the present North Dakota abortion law, which were expressed by me in a recent Right to Life newsletter.”Footnote 130 Olson noted his longtime opposition to abortion and pledged to “vigorously” enforce existing law as Attorney General. Lieutenant Governor Richard Larsen, also running for governor, wrote that he and his running mate, Irv Wilhite, “have not clarified our position on this issue because it has been specific and solid from the beginning. I will not permit legislation to be enacted which would permit liberalization of abortion.”Footnote 131
In contrast to the aggressive campaign waged by the NDRTLA, initiative supporters waited until October to form their own group, called the North Dakota Abortion Initiative Committee. “Actually, we didn’t want a campaign with all the flamboyance of politics,” said Wendy Walsh, who helped organize the committee. “We had enough of politics just getting our initiative petitions signed.”Footnote 132 Dr. Robert Koshnick of Fargo became the committee’s informational director.Footnote 133 The committee operated under severe financial restrictions, gathering some $2,000 in campaign contributions. Koshnick gamely noted that their advertisements had already appeared in several newspapers and a dozen radio spots would soon air in Bismarck, though none were planned for Fargo. The committee hoped to have television advertisements during the final week of the campaign.
“There’s no money right now,” said Koshnick, who had just completed his medical residency in Minneapolis. “We wanted to send out a mailing at least to those people who signed the initiative petition. But we didn’t have the money for it.”Footnote 134
The Fargo Right to Life chapter started planning for a November rally during the summer. By September, the chapter had booked the Fargo Civic Memorial Auditorium, the city’s largest meeting hall.Footnote 135 Originally titled the Fargo Right to Life Rally, the name was changed to the Red River Valley Pro-Life Rally, or the Rally for Life. Dr. Myrold served as co-chair of the event. Ted Smith advised Myrold on event promotion, stating that while newspaper advisements and radio and television spots would be useful, “You are going to have to build most of your crowd using a word of mouth promo and depend upon the priests and ministers to herald it from the pulpit.”Footnote 136
“No less than 5,000 is our Rally attendance goal,” Myrold wrote to Fargo Right to Life board members.Footnote 137 “A total effort and commitment by all of us will guarantee this 5,000 attendance.”
The Fargo chapter also polled local politicians on their sentiments, noting that “some of the legislators of Fargo are pro-abortion.”Footnote 138 The initiative caused some nervousness among Fargo-area Republicans seeking reelection. Indeed, Republicans of the 21st District (Fargo–West Fargo) legislative team, which included Representative Eagles, announced that it would not take an official position on the issue.Footnote 139 The Fargo chapter also prepared a get-out-the-vote effort to ensure that people in need of absentee ballots were properly assisted.Footnote 140 Finally, the chapter asked the Fargo City Commission to declare October 1–7 as Respect for Life Week, but it was initially rebuffed. However, the commission reversed itself a week later, declaring October 8–15 instead.
The Fargo Forum, the largest newspaper in the state, in an editorial on October 22, came out against the initiative, stating “passage of the measure would be a serious infringement of the rights of the unborn, and it would make North Dakota an abortion center serving an area stretching from the Rockies to the Appalachians.”Footnote 141 Despite these strong words, the Forum did not publish any follow-up editorials.
The Rally for Life brought Dr. Hymie Gordon to Fargo, who was marketed as an “internationally-known Geneticist, Chairman, Department of Medical Genetics, Mayo Clinic and prominent Jewish layman,” as well as Cyril Paul, a “nationally known Folk Entertainer.”Footnote 142 The rally was promoted through handbills, advertisements in the Fargo Forum, and from the pulpits of local churches.Footnote 143 However, the rally and its aftermath received little coverage in the local media.
By November, the abortion initiative had become the central topic across North Dakota. “Cutting across party lines, the abortion issue was the most fiery topic of the entire campaign,” read a postelection analysis. “Candidate after candidate rushed to line up against the measure.”Footnote 144
Election Results
The abortion initiative was trounced at the ballot box, getting 62,604 of 267,456 votes statewide, or 23.4 percent.Footnote 145 Support at the county level ranged from 9.9 percent in McIntosh County (out of 3,036 votes) to 35.3 percent in Cass County (out of 20,787 votes). In the major cities, the “yes” vote received 39.0 percent in Fargo (out of 23,318 votes), 38.8 percent in Grand Forks (out of 14,111 votes), 28.8 percent in Bismarck (out of 14,474 votes), and 31.1 percent in Minot (out of 11,887 votes).Footnote 146 Indeed, “yes” prevailed in only nine precincts across the entire state. With the presidential election on the ballot, voter turnout was strong at 71 percent statewide.Footnote 147 President Nixon won, but with “only” 62.1 percent of the vote. North Dakota could now be classified as an anti-abortion state.
Analysis
Elites and Counter-Elites in North Dakota
“The public is not knowledgeable about most policy issues.”Footnote 148 “They have little understanding of the complexities associated with public policy,”Footnote 149 and “lack the motivation or ability to process information systematically.”Footnote 150 Instead, voters rely upon “cues” by political elites to understand the issues of the day.Footnote 151 They accept “cues” from trusted elites and disregard those provided by competitors.Footnote 152 Political elites transmit their views through the media, campaigns, and other such means, which then serve as “cues” to receptive audiences. To be effective, these “cues” should be unambiguous messages in support or opposition to a specific position.Footnote 153 As issues change, so do the prospects of the political elite. Whereas elite actors may be comfortable with providing cues on a traditional set of concerns, they might shy away from a new controversy, such as abortion.Footnote 154 This allows new elites to step forward.
In 1972, the Republican Party held 58 of 98 seats in the North Dakota statehouse and 37 of 49 seats in the senate. Republicans controlled all statewide partisan offices except for governor, who was a Democrat. Thus, the Republican Party played a leading role in North Dakota politics, though Democrats remained competitive. In terms of media, the most powerful voice was the Fargo Forum daily newspaper. The Forum’s parent company owned newspapers throughout North Dakota as well as WDAY-TV and WDAY-AM Radio, which serviced the Fargo–Grand Forks area.Footnote 155 The most important component of the state’s economy was agriculture, which meant farmers, farming cooperatives, and associated groups wielded considerable influence over political leadership. Fargo was the state’s largest municipality, followed by Grand Forks and Bismarck. While state government maintained its traditional rural focus, the elected leaders from these cities had become increasingly important. The congressional delegation had greater sway over federal policy than their small state status would suggest. Finally, some 32.6 percent of the population identified as Lutheran,Footnote 156 giving denominational leadership an ability to shape local culture.
These established elites determined North Dakota’s political and economic policies. Yet, collectively, they initially seemed flummoxed, almost frightened, by the issue of abortion. Consequently, the state’s leadership was slow to respond to the prospect of an abortion initiative on the 1972 ballot.
The congressional delegation reacted to queries about its position on abortion by asserting that this decision was best left to the states.Footnote 157 The Fargo Forum published only a single editorial on abortion,Footnote 158 a stark contrast to other controversies, such as urban renewal, where they produced dozens of editorials considering the issue from multiple angles.Footnote 159 Actors associated with agriculture and resource extraction stayed out altogether, keeping their focus on economic concerns.
Neither political party came out against the abortion initiative, at least initially. Indeed, the parties largely left it to individual candidates and local party organizations to determine their stance on the issue, creating mixed messages. Republicans from the 21st District announced that “the 11 legislative candidates and four incumbent senators have agreed to leave the matter up to the people.”Footnote 160 In response, Sister Elizabeth Regnier of Fargo decided to run as a Democrat in the 21st District with the aim of defeating Representative Eagles, who had promoted a more liberal abortion law.Footnote 161 “Because of this,” said Sister Regnier at a press conference accompanied by a member of NDRLA, “I am gearing my candidacy specifically against her.” This led to complaints by Pam Holland, who was also running as a Democrat in the 21st District. “I am personally acquainted with Mrs. Eagle and know her to be a moral person who has taken much abuse because of her stand on this issue,” said Holland, though she did not endorse Eagle’s stand or the initiative.Footnote 162
The North Dakota Right to Life Association moved into this political vacuum and seized control of the issue. With the initiative poised to make the ballot, the NDRLA brought its resources to bear in preparation for a statewide effort to defeat the measure. The overwhelming rejection left the NDRLA leadership dominant in this policy area.
While the NDRLA dominated the anti-abortion side of the issue, there was room for a pro-abortion counter-elite to arise. However, neither North Dakota Citizens for Legal Termination of Pregnancy nor the Committee for the North Dakota Abortion Initiative was able to fulfill this role. Both groups disappeared after the election.
What Makes for an Effective Counter-Elite?
The NDRLA and its chapters were quite successful in their campaign against the abortion initiative. Not only did the initiative lose by a wide margin, but the NDRLA became part of the state’s political elite, capable of dispensing “cues” on abortion policy. Three factors explain the association’s success. First, the NDRLA was able to set up an effective statewide network to gather resources and distribute its anti-initiative message. The group used its access to Catholic leadership at the diocese and local levels and incorporated new Right to Life chapters across North Dakota.
The NDRLA saw the Catholic Church as critical to success. However, the NDRLA moved beyond this core constituency, seeking to make the abortion initiative not merely a “Catholic issue” but something of relevance to the entire population. The NDRLA repeatedly emphasized that they were a nondenominational organization open to all. They placed non-Catholic people in prominent positions within the campaign as well as the local chapters. The association also featured doctors, nurses, and other medical professionals in their advertisements to convince people that a “right-to-life” perspective was not just a religious sentiment but was founded on science.
Finally, the NDRLA had the resources to campaign effectively across the state. Using its network of supporters, the association raised more than $100,000 over the course of the election.
In contrast, the Committee for the North Dakota Abortion Initiative had trouble getting its message out, mostly due to a lack of resources. Indeed, the committee raised around $2,000 over the campaign and received little, if any, assistance from out-of-state groups. While initiative supporters attempted to establish student organizations at the state’s college campuses, these efforts floundered. The committee tried to recruit medical professionals in support of the initiative, but this, too, had little impact.
The success of the NDLA clearly marked North Dakota as an anti-abortion state. There would be no more attempts to loosen state abortion laws through the initiative process. Liberal politicians now had to downplay their attitudes towards abortion if they hoped to win election to statewide office. Conservative politicians were free to proclaim their anti-abortion credentials. The state’s political culture had changed.
Voter Confusion over the Lack of Counter-Elite Cues
While only 23.4 percent of voters statewide supported the initiative, there was some variability at the county level. Support was lowest in McIntosh County at 9.9 percent (out of 3,036 votes) and highest in Cass County at 35.3 percent (out of 32,153 votes). However, the initiative received less than 20 percent in thirty-three of the state’s fifty-three counties.
To get a sense of the intensity surrounding the abortion initiative, the number of votes cast in the presidential race for each county is compared to the number of votes cast in the initiative. The expectation is that people are generally more interested in casting a vote for president than anything else, leading to some drop-off over the rest of the ballot. However, this did not prove to be the case for most counties. Indeed, in forty-two of fifty-three counties, more people cast a vote on the abortion initiative than for president (one county had an equal number of votes in the presidential and initiative portions of the ballot). The difference ranged from 6.8 percent greater turnout for the abortion initiative in Sioux County (or 78 votes) to 0.1 percent greater turnout in Steele County (or two votes).
Such results are unusual for North Dakota in presidential election years. Indeed, in 1968, three measures were on the general election ballot and in every county the number of people voting for presidential candidates was larger than the number voting on any measure. In 1976, two measures were on the general election ballot. For one measure, there was a single county where the initiative vote was greater than the presidential vote. For the other, there were six counties where the initiative vote was greater than the presidential vote. These counties tended to be rural with a small population.
In 1972, the presidential vote was greater than the initiative vote in only ten counties. The difference between the two was very small in four counties at under 2 percent. However, the drop-off was more sizable in those counties with the largest populations. Table 1 presents the difference between the number of votes in the presidential election and number of votes in the abortion initiative across the counties. As shown, there is a notable drop-off from presidential election to abortion initiative in the state’s six most populous counties. This drop-off ranged from 8.4 percent in Stutsman County to 18.4 percent in Stark County. Statewide, the drop-off was just 4.7 percent.
Presidential Vote and Abortion Initiative Vote by North Dakota County (1972).
Source: North Dakota Secretary of State, 1972.
It is noteworthy that not only did these six counties encompass the largest cities in North Dakota, but they also served as home to at least one state university or college. In addition, Cass and Grand Forks Counties border Minnesota, while Burleigh County contains the state capital. While four of these counties had a lower percentage of Catholics than the state as a whole, the correlation between percent Catholic and support for the initiative as well as percent drop-off in the fifty-three counties is insignificant. However, the correlation between county population and percent drop-off is significant and positive with a coefficient of 0.774.
Judging from county-level results, the anti-abortion forces got their message out to the voters. Their followers knew how to respond when confronted by a measure seeking to liberalize abortion laws. However, groups in support of the abortion initiative proved less capable of providing useful cues. College students, government workers, and city dwellers went to the polls and faced a policy question they could not answer confidently. This confusion may have led large numbers of voters to skip the initiative and focus upon the more easily understood struggle between Nixon and McGovern.
This lack of cues had consequences. The votes represented by the drop-off combined with the votes for the abortion initiative produces a 27.0 percent margin statewide, which is still an overwhelming defeat. However, such a combination changes the narrative within the most populous counties: when combined, support for the initiative is 43.8 percent in Grand Forks County, 42.7 percent in Cass County, 38.4 percent in Burleigh County, 37.3 percent in Ward County, 37.0 percent in Stutsman County, and 31.7 percent in Stark County. Certainly, the initiative still loses in these counties. However, support for the liberalization no longer seems so negligible across all corners of North Dakota.
Conclusion
Lewkowicz asserts that “for voters who have neither the time nor the inclination to be more fully informed on a range of political issues, elite cues can serve as an effective heuristics.”Footnote 163 This role as a trusted source of information gives the political elite considerable power over the policy process. Yet, given the competition between elites and the endless cues surrounding an election, being a trusted source is not enough: an effective member of the elite should also “facilitate participation” by supporters.Footnote 164 This is particularly important in initiative and referendum elections where turnout is low and there is no partisan identification to be found on the ballot. Elite cues in such a situation should be straightforward and galvanizing.
The 1972 abortion initiative campaign provides an example where elites on one side of an issue were able to provide cues and get supporters to participate in the election while the other side was unable to do so. The North Dakota Right to Life Association through the formation of branch chapters and its alliance with the Catholic churches became the singular focus of the anti-initiative campaign. Flush with resources, the NDRLA made sure its supporters turned out to such an extent that initiative voters outnumbered presidential voters in most counties. While the pro-initiative elements did get the question on the ballot, they were unable to transmit their message effectively, let alone galvanize supporters. The result was confusion among potential supports and lower turnout rates in the most populous counties.
This study has three primary findings. First, the North Dakota Right to Life Association campaign was a tremendous success: the group was able to marshal resources and deliver an overwhelming defeat in a campaign that drew national attention. Combined with the rejection of a Michigan measure to liberalize abortion law that same year, the anti-abortion movement became a force to be reckoned with at the state and national levels.
Second, the political disturbance caused by efforts to liberalize abortion led to the creation of new groups. Faced with this disturbance, the established elites refused to act, providing room for counter-elites to arise. The NDRLA’s effectiveness in this campaign allowed it to become a key cue-giver when it came to abortion for decades afterward. The group was able to draw upon its Catholic base and implement a statewide campaign. Put another way, the NDRLA had the support of patrons with considerable resources. Initiative supporters did not.
Finally, the NDRLA offered clear expressive benefits in its campaigns, which led many people to join the group, contribute money, and otherwise offer support. Conversely, the pro-initiative groups were unable to make people aware of the benefits they had to offer, leading to minimal support.
