Considering the significant body of literature produced in the last two decades on the European Union (EU), its nature, identity, and destiny, it is probably appropriate to approach new publications addressing these issues by posing a straightforward question: to what extent do they launch innovative visions and stimulate new thinking on the integration process of the old continent? Jan Zielonka passes the test with a challenging, fairly innovative, and well-articulated vision of the EU construction. Contesting perceptions of the EU as a predestined superstate of a Westphalian nature, Zielonka presents the European edifice by evoking the architecture of a medieval empire, erected on the “interpenetration of various types of political units operating in a system without a clear power centre and hierarchy” (1). The argument elaborated through the six chapters of Europe as Empire can be further summarized with another metaphor: rather than slowly moving “toward” or somehow “beyond” Westphalia, Brussels would be stepping “back” from the hierarchical model of public organization that emerged in Europe following the Münster and Osnabrück settlements.
In line with some intuitions elaborated by Hedley Bull thirty years ago, Zielonka's critique of statist approaches is twofold: apart from having constrained explanatory power, Westphalian-type idealizations have a negative impact on both policy-making and bargaining for the EU's delicate institutional building. For example, political initiatives for the constitutional treaty or experiments aiming towards more (re)active foreign policy initiatives would have no chance of success as long as they remain “Westphalian solutions [for] a largely neo-medieval Europe” (19).
Zielonka shows appropriate caution with respect to methodology, and in various parts of the book he tries to immunize his proposals from criticism. He does build a firm opposition against much of the orthodoxy and conventional wisdom currently attached to the EU; still, he cloaks his most challenging normative and theoretical elaborations with a veil of prudence. For instance, Zielonka recognizes the limitations of ideal paradigms; hence, while arguing for a neomedieval conceptualization of the EU, he admits that Brussels still holds in nuce elements of a neo-Westphalian empire. Another appreciable element of circumspection resides in the choice to avoid specific and in-depth parallels between the EU and pre-1648 empires; Zielonka respects the idea that the EU is a quid novi, which reacts to a complex and rapidly-evolving reality.
Linearity is another strength of the book. The first three chapters examine the rationale, modalities, and impact of the 2004 enlargement. This powerful factor of change “creates pressure for introducing far-reaching reforms of the Union's institutional structure [and] determines Europe's position in world affairs” (45). The accession of ten new members (eight of which were re-emerging from four decades of communist domination) is presented as a maneuver conceptualized and implemented in a neomedieval way. Zielonka defines the EU expansion as “a prototype of imperial politics,” a sophisticated and “impressive exercise in empire-building” (13, 44). Moreover, he successfully demonstrates how the enormous diversity brought about by the enlargement has further reinforced EU's neomedieval peculiarities.
In the ideal second part of his book, Zielonka analyzes potentials and challenges of the enlarged Union on three key grounds: economic governance, democratic performance, and external relations. A staunch supporter of decentralization in the economic field, he nonetheless encourages policymakers to strive for an appropriate balance between hierarchy and anarchy: “[F]lexibility, delegation, and decentralization [should] not create ‘authority holes,’ leaving certain firms and stockholders without jurisdiction and protection” (116). An analogous call for equilibrium is attached to democracy-related issues. Zielonka sheds light on the critical exposure of all EU decision-making processes—mostly handled by non-majoritarian fora—to small but effective partisan lobbies. Moreover, adopting a jargon coined by Wallace and Smith, he depicts the current EU-27 configuration as overwhelmed by an inextricable net of unaccountable regulatory agencies, resembling the ideal of “enlightened administration” (129). In spite of this, Zielonka finds ground for optimism: even if tending towards a neomedieval character, the EU seems able to heal internal fracture lines, contain centripetal forces, and overcome anarchy and chaos—peculiarities of the pre-Westphalian era—by successfully bridling its members in an inextricable network of permanent bargaining. But can this still be democratic? The European citizenry is “an ever-growing plurality of demoi with distinct histories, habits, and languages” (133); therefore, a fluid and acceptable democratic arrangement should be conceived through the prism of a neomedieval mindset: contestation is more crucial than parliamentary representation. Let states keep their democratic peculiarities. The EU multilateral bargaining will “benefit” from indirect representation while enhancing the overall democratic quality of the Union through increased participation at local and regional level.
Zielonka persuasively paints a neomedieval EU even when analyzing foreign policy. In his last chapter, he approaches the ways in which Brussels defines external priorities and modi operandi. The Union appears as a benevolent empire exporting rules and procedures in its neighborhood, practicing moves of cautious penetration—in its peripheries and beyond its formal (but fuzzy) borders—and establishing protectorates (e.g. Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo). Zielonka presents the EU as “a civilian power enlarging its territory by consent and diplomatic bargaining” (170); but he warns, “[L]ike all empires the Union is more preoccupied with maintaining its internal cohesion than in solving external problems on the ground” (143). This strong statement finds several empirical confirmations; among others, the genesis of EUFOR/Mission Althea could be considered. The first EU military operation was created while maintaining bargaining costs at the lowest level: Althea practically jumped into NATO's lap, and the operation made use of logistic and human resources from non-EU members as well. This should not surprise, as Zielonka clarifies: while Brussels has “some rudimentary military capabilities its preferred (and most powerful) foreign policy tools are still civilian and range from preferential trade agreements … to EU accession” (149). It is, indeed, the prospect of membership that has successfully worked—and now it is somehow working in the Western Balkans—as an indirect stabilization tool.
Having exhausted his neomedieval argument, Zielonka elaborates policy indications and predictions on future EU strategic moves. Convinced that the Union would be “more likely to benefit from a ‘plurilateral’ than a hierarchical system of governance” (181), Zielonka voices a summarized but clear alert: until the EU is conceived hierarchically, it will be difficult to establish new and more fluid types of governance. If it is difficult to question this remark—more a hope than a clear procedural prescription—something can be said about Zielonka's concluding prediction: the attitude of the EU as a neomedieval power makes it feasible that future enlargements will be based purely on strategic evaluations. This will perhaps depend on whether l'Europe à la carte will be arranged and how; but is this Empire a vessel without pilots, moving by inertia? Zielonka marginalizes “the people factor” somewhat, which in the European project has always been crucial at the level of both elites and citizenry. Brussels may lack some features of a Westphalian capital because in recent times there have been neither leaders ready to strive in that direction nor a bottom-up demand for a superstate. The same applies to future enlargements: elites will go as far as their hearts go and as voters allow them to go. But this bundle of issues probably deserves its own book.
