In recent years, “democratic backsliding” has emerged as something of a defining theme in the politics of Southeast Asia. The most explicit example of this would be the events that transpired in Myanmar in February 2022, when the military seized power by way of a coup and nullified the results of elections held a few months earlier that ushered the National League for Democracy government into another term in power. But that is not the only example. Thailand is still coming to terms with the 2014 coup and its aftermath. Meanwhile, trends in Indonesia and Malaysia have also not been encouraging. Accompanying this is a second theme, namely, the persistence of political violence against the backdrop of evolving political processes as central states attempt to address restless ethnic minority groups.

Democracy and Nationalism in Southeast Asia: From Secessionist Mobilization to Conflict Resolution speaks to these two themes. In it, Jacques Bertrand poses the question whether democracy reduces or exacerbates conflicts. The answer, according to Bertrand, is neither straightforward nor linear. He argues that what democracy does is in fact expand the range of options that nationalist groups—and presumably, regimes that control the state—have at their disposal to pursue their objectives. This, in turn, leads to variation in outcomes. To make his case, Bertrand concentrates his analysis on the levels of violent national conflict involving five groups—the Malay Muslims of southern Thailand, the Moros of the southern Philippines, the Cordillerans of northern Luzon (Philippines), the Papuans of eastern Indonesia, and the Acehnese in the northern tip of Sumatra (Indonesia)—against the backdrop of different phases of democratization. All represent ethnic minorities who have long and complex histories with the central state that Bertrand effectively summarizes and unpacks. Except for the Cordillerans and the Malay Muslims, violence in these conflicts peaked at the start of democratization and tapered when democracy took root and stabilized. To simplify the analysis, the phases of democratization were divided (perhaps too loosely) into Democratic Transition, Democratization, and Democratic Stability, and the level of violence into low, medium, and high. Bertrand suggests that uncertainty surrounding democratic transitions heightens the incentives to mobilize offensively or defensively to secure gains, at a time particularly when the central state is perceived as weak. Once democracy stabilized, violence remained but at low levels with varied outcomes stemming from these conflicts.

Several observations can be made in response to Bertrand’s analysis. First, while it may be true that democratic governments have been more inclined to negotiate with these groups, and many of these groups were indeed founded during the most volatile periods of the histories of the countries being studied, and therefore more active in their early years, the correlation between levels of violence and stages of democratic development may not be as definitive as one might hypothesize. Indeed, there is a growing literature on “illiberal peace” that argues that state-centric, authoritarian responses to internal armed conflict may be just as effective as liberal peacebuilding.

Second, the case can be made that democratic governments have often resorted to repressive means against nationalist and secessionist groups, and whether these levels of repression increased or diminished may have had more to do with external rather than internal factors. In Aceh, when Abdurrahman Wahid took office in 1999 against the backdrop of the progressive liberalization of the Indonesian political climate after the end of the New Order, there was in fact increased violence that ceased only when the devastating 2004 Tsunami brought Aceh to its knees and forced GAM to declare a ceasefire in exchange for government aid. This was arguably a more compelling explanation for the resolution of the Aceh conflict than either the stabilization of the democratic process in Indonesia or satisfaction with the trajectory of negotiations on the part of GAM. In the case of the Philippines, the “global war on terror” cast a long shadow over the repressive approaches that the administrations of Joseph Estrada (1998–2001) and Glorial Macapagal (2001–10) adopted against the Moro Islamists in Mindanao, giving rise to a decided upsurge in violence that in some ways persists today. As Bertrand argues, the Moro rebellion in those years was a result of the erosion of trust in the democratic government because of successive failures in the implementation of peace agreements and promises made mainly by previous administrations. Notably, the level of violence and brutality perpetuated by the Moro Islamist groups over the years ebbed and flowed along with the tactics deployed by successive administrations regardless of the prevailing political system: and in turn, many of these tactics were informed by larger external developments. In Thailand, Bertrand argues that Malay Muslim rebels—the Patani United Liberation Organisation (PULO) and Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN)—fought most vehemently in the 1970s, and this validates his point that almost all the important episodes of violent insurgency occurred when the states were under authoritarian rules. Indeed, PULO and BRN fought hard in the 1970s (soon after the groups were founded) and it was during this period that democracy in the country was also exceedingly unstable, with the government fluctuating between civilian and military rule. Yet most analysts who have looked at the violence in the southernmost provinces would note that the upsurge of militancy through organized and coordinated attacks occurred when democracy had begun to gain traction in Thailand. Democracy took hold in the 1990s, the same time that militant groups were rebuilding their base in preparation for a new stage of their historic armed resistance. During the tenure of Thaksin Shinawatra, Thailand’s first democratically elected prime minister, and in the face of a gradually upsurge in violence, the government responded by launching a widespread crackdown against Muslim insurgents that in turn, triggered a violent backlash. In the aftermath, separatist groups began a series of violent attacks on mostly government targets that transpired at a level of coordination and, in some instances, brutality, that had not been seen in the past. While Bertrand attributes this upsurge in violence since 2001 to the fact that Thailand had never experienced a period of democracy in any authentic way (p. 217), that of course begs the question why there appears to be a relative reduction in violence after the military junta seized power.

Third, a study into the correlation of political process (i.e., democratization), state repression, and nationalist violence in fact uncovers an anomaly if popular opinion is considered. The point is that democracy can also lead to a brand of majoritarianism that could in turn prompt an upsurge in violence. It is striking for instance, how hard-line policies taken by governments in Manila and Bangkok taken by governments toward their respective southern minorities have been very popular nationwide.

Notwithstanding the fact that there are alternative ways of interpreting the empirical evidence that Bertrand musters, this book does advance several important arguments. Bertrand notes that “[w]hile democracy generally makes institutional power and concession more credible, particularly if constitutionally, it does not guarantee that commitments made to nationalists will be implemented or significant accommodation made to meet their demands” (p. 231). Indeed, this is often so. But because it is so, the credibility of any commitments and promises made by a democratic government, at least in the cases considered in the book, are often met with skepticism. Hence, a nationalist insurgency group will not simply lay down their arms after signing an agreement or witnessing a piece of legislation enacted in their favor. In a mature democratic society where there is a clear separation of power and where demands can be channelled through unbiased, robust, and independent institutions, nationalist groups may well have little incentive to resort to militancy. But unfortunately, these conditions have rarely obtained in Southeast Asia where institutions are relatively weak, and minority rights often ignored. Likewise, as Bertrand argues it is true that, generally, nationalist groups possibly have a better chance to negotiate for concessions under democratic rule and that democratic governments can prevent violence if early concessions were made. Unfortunately, in many instances drawn from Southeast Asia, the record shows that these early concessions, if they were ever made, have tended to be predicated on weak guarantees and promises that were broken all too quickly. All said, Bertrand identifies some important correlations between democracy, democratization, and political violence that warrant closer analytical attention, and to that end this volume makes an important contribution to ongoing attempts to understand the sources of internal conflicts in Southeast Asia, and the prospects for their resolution.