The late Perez Zagorin's Hobbes and the Law of Nature is an important contribution to Hobbes scholarship, and in particular to the discussion of the role of natural law in Hobbes's theory of sovereignty. The work's main argument is that natural law, the conclusions of right reason, act as a brake on the sovereign's absolutism, and impose on it a moral obligation. The sovereign, he claims, is therefore very moral, and acts in part from a sense of altruism. Zagorin aims both to point out Hobbes's originality “as a humane moral philosopher” and to place Hobbes's theory of natural law in its historical context (x). He is arguing against those scholars who portray Hobbes simply as an “uncompromising proponent of governmental absolutism and centralized power” (1). As with Zagorin's other works, Hobbes and the Law of Nature is historically well grounded, makes good use of most of the relevant scholarship, and makes a good case, though with some important qualifications.
Hobbes broke with the natural law tradition, Zagorin argues, by detaching his theory of natural law from any metaphysical grounding and distinguishing clearly for the first time between natural law and natural right. Natural law, according to Hobbes, is a set of practical conclusions conducive to peace and derived from right reasoning on the basis of empirical observation of human nature, and not, as previous natural law theorists claim, “a metaphysical and teleological doctrine that conceives the basic rules of morality as genuine and universal law whose source is not in any human legislator but in Nature, and ultimately in the reason or will of God the creator” (5). Natural right, by contrast, is a “primordial entitlement” to do whatever is necessary to preserve one's life and has no grounding in the law of nature as it had for Hobbes's predecessors (28). Zagorin carefully distinguishes Hobbes's theory of natural law from that of Grotius and others, and also speculates on which natural law theories Hobbes would have been familiar with based on the Chatsworth library.
Zagorin's most striking claim, and the one he regards as potentially most controversial, is that Hobbes's sovereign is “very moral” and bound by “stringent moral standards and obligations” (84). The claim is based primarily on two connected arguments. In the 26th chapter of Leviathan, Hobbes claims that the natural law becomes civil law with the establishment of the sovereign, and that the civil law and natural law contain each other. Also, Hobbes claims in chapter 30 of Leviathan that the good of the sovereign and the good of the subjects are inseparable. The sovereign, Zagorin argues, is therefore obligated to ensure not only the safety of its subjects, but also that justice and equity are upheld. It is always wrong, for example, for the sovereign to punish an innocent citizen. Natural law also requires the sovereign to treat rich and poor equally with regard to punishments, taxes, and military service (86–88).
The sovereign, in short, is morally obliged and bound by his conscience to make good laws, a good law being, Hobbes says, “that which is needful for the good of the people, and withal perspicuous” (88). “Hobbes's discussion of the sovereign's duties,” therefore, “leaves no doubt that it has genuine obligations that constitute a moral trust, and that in performing its functions it ought to manifest a continuous concern for its subjects' good and happiness, particularly in the making and execution of law” (90). And notwithstanding that Hobbes's sovereign is the sole source of law, and the interpretation of law (just as he is the sole interpreter of scripture), Zagorin does a good job of pointing out that the sovereign should not therefore be entirely arbitrary in his treatment of subjects. This argument should serve, as Zagorin hopes it will, as an antidote to the notion that Hobbes's sovereign can act in any way he pleases regardless of what his subjects think.
As Hobbes frequently points out, however, subjects must endure whatever treatment the sovereign metes out, which seems to suggest that there is no sanction for a breach of natural law on the sovereign's part. Tyranny, after all, is only monarchy disliked, according to Hobbes. Zagorin answers this objection by claiming that “while a statute of the sovereign is always just, it may be guilty of iniquity, and the difference between injustice and iniquity is that the first is a transgression of a statute law, while the second violates the law of reason” (94). He supplements this not entirely satisfying response by pointing out that, for Hobbes, there are always “natural punishments” and the natural punishment of an errant sovereign is rebellion (95). This is indeed Hobbes's position, but Zagorin does not seem to notice that this undermines his central claim; if the sovereign must treat his subjects well because otherwise he will have a rebellion on his hands and may himself be killed, he does not adhere to the law of nature out of a sense of altruism, but from self-interest.
Zagorin's lack of clarity on this point is evident when he states that Hobbes “was not an adherent of psychological egoism who saw personal self-interest as the sole motive of action, and [Hobbes's position] shows pretty clearly that his conception of human nature and human relationships does not in any way exclude the possibility of altruism and human beings seeking the good or happiness of others as part of their own good” (86). He is right to note that the interest of the sovereign and subjects are inseparable in a properly ordered state, but this means precisely that Hobbes is relying entirely on self-interest rather than altruism or conscience to ensure the stability and prosperity of the state. If the good of another is identical to or part of one's own good, acting to further another's good is self-interested, and cannot be entirely disinterested or altruistic. Zagorin, though, claims that individuals should follow the law of nature both because it is in their interest to do so and because “this made for virtuous people and was the right thing to do” (103). This is one example of a general weakness of Zagorin's work. While his argument that the sovereign should act justly and equitably with his subjects is compelling, he hedges on several of the deeper elements of Hobbes's thought.
For example, with respect to Hobbes's stance toward religion, Zagorin claims that “while he might have been in some respects a believing Christian, he was not a man of deep piety or faith” (118). It is hard to know, though, what it could mean for a rigorous systematic philosopher such as Hobbes to be somewhat of a believer. It is also difficult to pin Zagorin down on the source of Hobbes's theory of natural law. He claims that Hobbes saw “moral and political philosophy as sciences,” that “he looked upon geometry as a model by which universal truths could be attained in a process of deductive reasoning from definitions,” but also that the laws of nature are derived from “experience” and that they are “moral truths that emerge in a chain of practical reflection,” and “not a fallacious deduction of values from facts” (32, 4, 116, 117).
Zagorin can be hard to follow on these foundational issues because of his insistence that Hobbes's work is essentially scientific (he dismisses Skinner's claim that Leviathan is highly rhetorical), but at the same time that he derived his laws of nature from long practical experience with human nature. This equivocation allows Zagorin to assert that “it is by converting natural law into a set of purely moral principles that Hobbes … could be at the same time both a legal positivist and a part of the natural law tradition” (54). So, while he succeeds in the limited goal of showing that the sovereign should not be as arbitrary in his treatment of subjects as some claim, Zagorin is not as helpful when it comes to some of the more fundamental aspects of Hobbes's philosophy.
