Efforts to explain the development of welfare states have a long history. Back in the 1960s and 1970s, industrialism highlighted the importance of modernization cum economic growth. Arguments that take politics seriously came to the fore after the 1980s, when political and institutional factors such as power resources, cross-class coalitions, or path dependency were used to explain the divergence between welfare states. These political arguments have focused mainly on developed countries, unlike the industrialism arguments that covered both developing and developed countries. That was one reason why economic development received limited attention in the explanations of the “politics matters” school.
As full-fledged welfare states are costly, it may seem justified to exclude developing countries from their study. However, some middle-income countries such as Mauritius, one of the case studies of this book, have well-developed health policies that are comparable to those of some advanced welfare states. In addition, there are significant differences among the policies of less developed countries. Viewed from this perspective, it may be important to compare these cases, which have been under-studied in the welfare state literature. In Coalitions of the Well-being, Joel Sawat Selway tries to explain differences in the health policies of developing countries.
Selway focuses on the behaviors of politicians who make policy changes that are shaped by two environmental factors: ethnic diversity, and electoral systems. They are both crucial for the creation of broad, cross-cutting party systems that provide high levels of public goods. Cross-cuttingness (or cross-cutting social cleavages) refers to the degree to which different social groups share a common denominator that enables them to cooperate and reduces conflicts between different social groups. Two major patterns of democracies derived from electoral systems – majoritarian and consensus – are familiar to political scientists. Regarding ethnic diversity, Selway distinguishes three types of society: low-ethnic salience societies (low fractionalization and/or high cross-cuttingness); high ethnic-salience societies (high fractionalization and low cross-cuttingness) in which ethnic groups are geographically intermixed; and high ethnic-salience societies in which ethnic groups are geographically isolated.
Generally speaking, sociological arguments which focus on countries’ macro social structures such as ethnic diversity tend to overlook the effect of political institutions, and institutional studies generally ignore ethnic diversity. Combining these two literatures is an important contribution of this book. According to the author, whether ethnic diversity is harmful to the provision of public goods depends on what electoral rules are in place; and electoral rules will affect public goods provision depending upon the types of ethnic diversity that prevail in a given society.
In order to test these theses, this book provides both quantitative and qualitative analysis. The former is based on a data set of 70 developing democracies and 20 advanced democracies. The latter includes case studies based on 14 months of field research in Thailand and Mauritius. Other than his main two case studies, Selway covers some other cases more briefly.
This book's focus on developing democracies offers us a lot more variation in patterns of democracies than previous analyses on the effects of electoral rules. For example, Arend Lijphart's study of 36 democracies covers mainly developed countries with some South American countries and ex-British colonies. To this set of countries, Selway adds to his quantitative analysis a host of countries in Africa, Asia, the former Soviet Bloc countries, and recently democratized Latin American countries.
Thailand and Mauritius were chosen because of their similar electoral systems (before 1997) and different degrees of success in public goods provision. Selway found that the two countries’ wildly different social structures produced different electoral strategies and party systems under their similar electoral systems, which in turn affected policy making. Thailand also provides a natural experiment as it experienced an electoral reform in 1997. Whether different electoral systems bring different health policies under the same patterns of ethnic diversity can be tested by comparing pre/post 1997 Thailand.
Selway tries to revise and expand Lijiphart's patterns of democracy argument that recommends proportional representation (PR), criticizing it as a one-size-fits-all approach. Which of two families of electoral rules – accountability maximizing majoritarian rules or consensus maximizing PR rules – leads to broad, nationally oriented, multiethnic parties and therefore is best for public goods provision? It depends crucially on the types of society in which they operate. Selway points out that PR may not always be the best electoral rule for providing public goods. His typology provides a more sophisticated picture of the complicated patterns of ethnically diverse societies and allows us to identify where and why majoritarian or PR rules would or would not work.
According to his analysis, in low ethnic-salience countries, PR in large districts leads to broad parties; in high ethnic-salience, intermixing countries, majoritarian rules do so; and in high ethnic-salience, isolated countries, neither of the two main families of electoral rules results in broad parties.
Therefore, PR is better for public goods provisions in countries with low ethnic salience, while in high ethnic-salience countries, PR is at best no better than majoritarian rules and at worst leads to poorer provision of public goods. Where ethnic groups are geographically intermixed, majoritarian electoral rules encourage ethnic groups to work together in broad, multiethnic, national parties, thus producing a high level of public goods. The analysis of Mauritius lends support to this hypothesis. The exact same rules that led to under-provision of public goods in pre-1997 Thailand resulted in high public goods provision in the form of universal health care in Mauritius. Last, in high ethnic-salience countries where ethnic groups are geographically isolated, neither PR nor majoritarian rules are able to produce broad, multiethnic national parties.
Alternative theories examined by Selway are financial crisis, bureaucrats’ initiatives, the unique traits of Thaksin Shinawatra in Thailand, additional electoral rules, the size of countries, and the effects of British colonialism. He turns down all of them and sticks to his theoretical core, using electoral systems and ethnic diversity as the key independent variables.
Although Selway's arguments based on case studies seem to be quite compelling, some questions do arise. First of all, though his case studies are very well done, they do cast some doubt upon the generalizability of his arguments. Would alternative cases have fit his arguments as well?
Considering the varieties of meanings that health policies have, actors other than politicians may play an important role in health policy making elsewhere. For example, doctors are often one of the most influential lobbies in some countries, and parties and politicians may be motivated to cater to organized interests rather than individual voters. Considering that health could have strategic importance for national security, it is not just electoral pork for party constituencies. In regard to national strength, bureaucrats may be more important actors than short-sighted politicians who are ‘rationally’ motivated to win elections.
Although Selway did an extensive quantitative analysis in order to bolster the generalizability of his arguments, the outcome of health policies examined in his quantitative analysis was limited to life expectancy, which is also affected by factors other than health policy.
Contrary to the impression readers may receive from the title, this book does not focus on processes of coalition building between ethnic groups. Ethnic groups are treated more as contextual factors than subjective players in building ‘coalitions of the well-being’, and their constituencies are basically passive. The focus of this book is completely party and politician centered. Coalitions seem to be direct reflections of ethnic configurations rather than something attained through laborious negotiation.
The institutions treated in the book are basically electoral rules. Welfare scholars might wonder why there is no reference to welfare regimes or varieties of capitalism (VOC) as well. Are health policies not structured by institutional features of welfare states as a whole?
Despite these lingering questions, this book has considerable value. As the author admits, the focus of this book is mainly health. However, the author's analytical framework, which combines cross-cutting social cleavages and geographical remoteness with ethnic diversity, is innovative and should be useful for the study of other policy fields as well. Carefully selected cases based upon an elaborate research design give strength to his arguments.
The policy implications of the analysis are also valuable. This book represents a significant departure from the one-size-fits-all PR prescription. As PR is sometimes recommended to newly democratized countries, Selway's findings are important warnings against the transplantation of institutions without giving careful consideration to social structures. With its sound methods and skillful analysis, this book is highly recommended for comparativists, especially those who favor the rational choice approach.
