Israel in Asia

The late 1980s and early 1990s were marked by important developments for Israel's relations with important Asian countries. The peace process enhanced Israel's international position, and major breakthroughs were achieved in Israel's relations, not only with the countries of the Middle East periphery, but also with the most populous Asian states such as China and India. As part of the transformation of Israel's standing in Asia, one of the important developments was the establishment of diplomatic relations with China in 1992 (Shichor, Reference Shichor1994). Israel has been interested from its inception in good ties with Asian states, and one of the other important Asian country Israel has consolidated its relations has been India. Since the 1990s, Israel and India have strengthened their relations. A military and commercial relationship between India and Israel has developed; both countries have diversified their military–security relations; and India has been one of the important partners of Israel from Asia (Kumaraswamy, Reference Kumaraswamy and Karsh2004: 263–4).

As part of the development in Israel's foreign policy with Asian states, the relations between Israel and India were officially normalized on 29 January 1992 (Kandel, Reference Kandel2009) and full diplomatic ties were established. Israel's relations with India have been indeed a breakthrough for Israel's standing in Asia. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1990s removed India's fears of a hostile reaction on the part of the Arab states. The loss of Moscow's support increased the importance of India's relations with the US as well as with its Jewish community. These developments influenced India's decision to normalize the relations with Israel, and with the establishment of formal relations, comprehensive ties rapidly evolved in the field of security, agriculture, medicine, culture, science, and aviation (Neuberger, Reference Neuberger2009: 23).

The bilateral relationship between India and Israel has steadily increased since its formal establishment, nevertheless it was Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's visit to India in September 2003 that stepped up the relationship. It was the first-ever visit by an Israeli Prime Minister to India. The visit was a significant milestone signaling the change in atmosphere, and an opportunity to enhance each others’ understanding at the highest levels to promote bilateral defense and trade ties. During the visit, Sharon held talks on a wide range of issues with India's Prime Minister and other senior Indian officials. At the same time, six bilateral agreements were signed which included agreements on environment protection, drugs trafficking, visa free travel for diplomats, and cooperation in health, education, and culture (Malhotra, Reference Malhotra2003). The developments on the diplomatic front were paralleled by those on the economic one. A growing interest in economic opportunities in India on the part of the Israeli business sector, and an increasing volume of trade between the two countries were seen. Though it did not initially form the main impetus for improved ties, economic cooperation between the two countries has steadily increased since 1992. Economic ties have greatly expanded in the fields of agriculture, science, and technology. Joint research and development projects in the fields of telecommunications and software have been the main areas of cooperation. Additionally, Indian and Israeli companies and research institutes have formed many joint ventures for cooperation in agriculture, mainly in the areas of irrigation, water management, and crop production (Kandel, Reference Kandel2009).

Moreover, in the years that followed Sharon's visit, Israel and India strengthened their military relations, and Israel became one of India's largest arms providers (Pant, Reference Pant2004). Cooperation in the areas of arms sales and defense have been two core issues which demonstrate the improved relationship between India and Israel. Military ties between both countries have considerably expanded since 1992. India's quest for the latest military technologies have complemented Israel's need to broaden the market for its military products, and today military cooperation continues to form the core of the relations between the two countries. Several strategic interests have accounted for the development of military ties since diplomatic relations were normalized. When the Soviet Union was dissolved, India lost its primary strategic and military partner, and Israel rapidly emerged as an alternative military supplier for India. For Israel's part, the country's limited domestic market and the need to finance the development of new weapons systems required Israeli defense companies to generate revenue through exports (Maoz, Reference Maoz2006: 7). That is why India, with its large domestic market and growing defense budget, has been an attractive partner for Israel. Whereas Israel surpassed Russia as the largest arms supplier to India (World Tribune, 2009), the military relationship between two countries is not confined to Israeli arms sales to India. Both Israel and India share the common goal of seeking technological independence, and India's search for new technologies led to joint projects being realized, which lead to the foundations for a sustained and long-term partnership (Kumaraswamy, Reference Kumaraswamy and Karsh2004: 267–8).

Since the establishment of diplomatic relations, Israel and India have witnessed tremendous growth in their relations and have implemented many measures to promote them. Even though the relations between the two states have been upswing since the 1990s, the recent improvement in relations has much to do with the personality of India's Prime Minister, Narendra Modi. He has been a staunch friend of Israel, and has been credited with promoting Israel–India relations into a strategic partnership (Panda, Reference Panda2015). Israel's relations with India have strengthened significantly in the past decade with both states experiencing a convergence of interests on a range of issues. This relationship is mainly driven by close defense ties. Both Israel and India have much to gain from the developing relationship between the two countries. Cooperation in the economic and military–security arenas has grown, and there are widespread popular exchanges between the people of the two countries. As for Israel, India might become Israel's political friend, given the growing isolation of Israel around the world. Also, there are many potential benefits that both countries will accrue by cementing their friendship.Footnote ¹

Israel and China established full diplomatic relations on 24 January 1992 (Goldstein, Reference Goldstein and Karsh2004: 243). It was an important step in Israel's standing in Asia, as well as China's in the Middle East. In fact, for about a decade before the establishment of formal relations, Israel and China maintained close secret relations in the military field (Goldstein, Reference Goldstein and Karsh2004: 241–3; Shai, Reference Shai2009: 23–4). During this period, there was also growth in unofficial exchanges between Israel and China, especially in trade and technology (Tjong-Alvares, Reference Tjong-Alvares2012: 102–4). Since formal relations have been established, in the context of the balanced policy of China, ties between them have grown, initially moderately and later more rapidly. Politically, high-level visits have helped enhance bilateral relations. Not only has every Israeli President since Chaim Herzog visited China, but Israeli Prime Ministers Yitzhak Rabin and Benjamin Netanyahu also visited Beijing during their terms (Zhu, Reference Zhu2007: 31). In January 2007, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert visited Beijing to commemorate the fifteenth anniversary of diplomatic ties and to seek the China's support on the Iran nuclear issue (Shai, Reference Shai2009: 44).

With the development of political relations came the increase in economic and commercial activities. Technologies in fields such as hi-tech, chemical industries, communications, medical optics, and agriculture were exported from Israel to China. Moreover, Israel became an important investor in the development projects in China and supplier of high technology weapons. Netanyahu once stated that the ‘Israeli know-how is more valuable than the Arab oil’ (Rubin, Reference Rubin1999: 51). Whether or not that is true, Israeli technology does have a high value for China. Until the early years of the 2000s, military technology had been the main Israeli export. Russian arms sales to China during the 1990s topped those of all other countries combined, but Israel was China's second largest source of military technology transfer in the 1990s (Shai, Reference Shai2009: 26). However, both countries were interested in more than just military hardware, and prospects existed for increased civil trade. In this context, the growing political contacts have paid off as they resulted in growing economic relations between the two countries. Economically, the volume of trade between the two countries has increased since the inception of the relations, and China has become Israel's third-largest trading partner globally, and its biggest trading partner in Asia. Trade volume increased from just under $50 million in 1992 to more than $10 billion in 2013 (Yanping, Reference Yanping2014). In Reference Yanping2014, when compared to 2013, China was one of the countries that increased the export of goods to Israel. In 2014 (excluding diamonds), Israel's export of goods to China amounted to $2.36 billion, while the import of goods from China amounted to $5.47 billion (Brusilovsky and Vinokur, Reference Brusilovsky and Vinokur2015). China now stands as Israel's second top export destination after the US and the largest in Asia (Al-Tamimi, Reference Al-Tamimi2014).

Even though there are some important issues, such as Iran, Palestine, and India which have the potential to affect the relations between Israel and China, the deepening diplomatic, military, and economic ties with China constitute a welcome development in Israel. China, who used to shun having relations with Israel in the past, now follows a pragmatic path, and despite the restricting effect of the US, values its ties with Israel. Much of the focus of the relations between Israel and China has been on trade and economic cooperation. In light of the amount of trade, and exchange of high officials, the relations between Israel and China have huge potential for development.Footnote ²

Apart from China and India, Israel has had friendly relations, or has been developing its ties, with other Asian states. After decades of focusing most of its diplomatic and trade efforts on Europe and the United States, Israel is turning to Asia. The shift is not entirely new, but previously low-profile diplomacy is now moving out of the shadows:

Myanmar (Burma) was the first state in Southeast Asia that recognized Israel as an independent state, and was the first Asian country to develop cordial relations with Israel (Embassy of Israel in Yangon, 2012). ‘Mynamar recognized Israel in December 1949 despite its earlier objections to its admission to the United Nations in May 1949’ (Abadi, Reference Abadi2004: 151), and U Nu, Myanmar's Prime Minister, became the first foreign prime minister to visit Israel (Freeman, Reference Freeman2014; Abadi, Reference Abadi2004: xvi). Since the establishment of diplomatic relations, the two states have nurtured a strong bond of friendship, which has included visits of high level officials from both sides. For instance, Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar Armed Forces, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing visited Israel in September 2015. This was the first visit by a military leader from Myanmar to the Jewish state in 55 years (Cohen, Reference Cohen2015b). Despite Western sanctions, this visit was a clear indication of Israel tightening its relations with Myanmar.

Combined with ongoing efforts to cultivate its relations with China and India, Israel has recently developed thriving economic relations with South Korea. Even though Israel's diplomatic relations with South Korea were established in 1962, it was not until the 1990s that the Israel–South Korea relationship began to flourish, and in the last few years the relations have been booming in almost every field (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016). Israel's economic dynamism and cutting-edge technology has attracted South Korea, and trade between the two states has exceeded over $2 billion (Ackerman and Lee, Reference Ackerman and Lee2014). On the other hand, Israel has had covert relations with certain Moslem countries in Asia as well. In this regard, Kumaraswamy (Reference Kumaraswamy2005: 2) has even reported on secret ties between Israel and Pakistan, which is considered a pro-Arab state. Israel developed different models of public and clandestine relations, including official recognition of Iran while concealing the true nature of the relations, and secret ties with Jordan before 1994 without official recognition (Kumaraswamy, Reference Kumaraswamy2005: 10–11).

As Israel has developed its relations with the Asian states, not only changing regional and global realities, and Israel's priorities, but also Israel's image in the world which has been disproportionate to its actual size, strength, and global sway has helped its efforts to diversify its foreign contacts. There has been the naive belief in some circles in the world that Jews control the capitalist world and significantly affect the policies of the United States. For instance, a senior Japanese minister told Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir that ‘you have unlimited access to every place and boundless influence. You have tremendous power. You've got the United States in your pocket’ (Neuberger, Reference Neuberger2009: 28). In this regard, one of the reasons for the Asian states to improve their relations with Israel might be this ‘image of Israel (which was perhaps fueled by latent anti-Semitic notions of the power of ‘international Jewry’) as a country capable of moving mountains in the American Congress and the White House and of securing credit, stipends, and investments to its heart's desire’ (Neuberger, Reference Neuberger2009: 28). It is highly probable that this anti-Semitic notion has helped Israel to establish itself in Africa, Latin America, and the former Soviet Union as well as in Asia.

The year 2012 was called ‘the year of Asia’ in Israel and the Israeli government sponsored an Asian Science Camp attracting Asian students to join Israeli students for a week long program of lectures by world class Israeli researchers (Adelman and Romirowsky, Reference Adelman and Romirowsky2013). The intentions to diversify Israel's foreign relations have helped Israel pursue new friends in Asia. Israel's efforts in Asia reaped tangible results, and it has established meaningful ties with the continent's three most important countries: India, China, and Japan (Neuberger, Reference Neuberger2009: 17). According to Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel's developing relations have been partially affected by Israel's relations with Western countries:

In this context, Japan is no exception. Even though Israel has far more developed relations with India and China, its improving relations with Japan is taking bilateral ties to a new level (Ningthoujam, Reference Ningthoujam2015). Israel's relations with Japan are becoming closer than ever; Japan can be an important partner in Asian trade and diplomacy for Israel as are China and India; and the two countries’ officials share a common desire to improve the relations.

Relations with Japan: historical background

After Israel was born in 1948, it tried to get the recognition of Japan and to establish good relations with it. In January 1952, it proposed mutual recognition and the exchange of diplomatic missions with Japan. These efforts paid off and diplomatic relations between Tokyo and Tel Aviv were established in 1952. An Israeli legation was inaugurated in Tokyo that year, and was upgraded to an embassy in 1963 (Shillony, Reference Shillony and Moorse1986b: 83). ‘Israel was the first Middle Eastern country to open a diplomatic mission in Tokyo’ (Cohen, Reference Cohen2005). Two years later, in 1954, Japan's ambassador to Turkey was posted as a minister to Israel, and this Japanese legation was also upgraded to an embassy in 1963 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2014a). Since the establishment of diplomatic ties, both parties have steadily developed mutual relations.

However, it would not be wrong to express that the state of this relationship was undeveloped until 2000s. During the 1950s and 1960s, because of its increasing dependence on Arab oil, Japan focussed its interests on the Arab world, and relations with Israel did not flourish (Ikeda, Reference Ikeda, Sugihara and Allan1993: 156). Besides, the relations between Israel and Japan faced tension as a result of the attack on Tel Aviv airport by three Japanese terrorists in May 1972. The Japanese government responded by sending an official delegation to Israel to pay its condolences and provided $700,000 as compensation for the victims’ families (Ikeda, Reference Ikeda, Sugihara and Allan1993: 156–9). After the October War of 1973, Japan tried to maintain a low profile in its relations with Israel. Measures taken by the Arab countries, and Japan's need for Middle East oil compelled it to comply with the Arab economic boycott against Israel. From 1973 until Israeli Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir's visit to Japan in 1985, Japan had a pro-Arab position in its foreign relations (Cohen, Reference Cohen2005). During this time, Japan expressed its support for the Arabs and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) (Cohen, Reference Cohen2015a). For instance, Japan abstained from voting in favor of the resolutions about Palestine during General Assembly meetings of the United Nations in 1974, because they did not reaffirm Resolution 242 (Yoshitsu, Reference Yoshitsu1984: 13–14). Moreover, Japan reacted negatively to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 (Carvely, Reference Carvely1985: 164–8), and the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Middle East-Africa Bureau urged Israel to withdraw from the Golan Heights (Kuroda, Reference Kuroda1983: 26–7). Indeed, throughout the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s, Japanese policy towards Israel was dependent on its relations with both the United States and the Arab countries (Ikeda, Reference Ikeda, Sugihara and Allan1993: 158–9). Energy, particularly oil, has been the dominant economic factor in Japan's approach to dealings with Israel and the Arab countries (Shaoul, Reference Shaoul and Karsh2004: 270). In this regard, until the mid-1980s, Japan steered clear of exchanging official ministerial visits with Israel, and the infrequent visits of Israeli officials to Japan during the 1980s were usually described as special visits in order not to upset the Arab countries. Therefore, securing a smooth flow of crude oil from the Middle East has been a priority in Japanese foreign policy and has significantly affected Japan's policy towards Israel (Miyagi, Reference Miyagi2008: 1–2). In this context, relations between Israel and Japan were almost in the same state of affairs until the Gulf War in 1991. Even though there were gradual improvements in relations, it seems that Japan remained committed to the Arab boycott against Israel (Stern, Reference Stern1988: 47).

Despite the Arab boycott, the 1980s bore witness to an improvement in Israel's standing in Asia (Shillony, Reference Shillony1986a: 17–24). During the course of the 1990s, Israel's relations with Japan also began to improve gradually. In the wake of the collapse of the Arab boycott, bilateral trade began to improve and diplomatic ties became increasingly open and cordial (Neuberger, Reference Neuberger2009: 23). After the start of the peace talks in 1991, Japan's endeavours to assume a more active political role in the international arena provided Japan with an opportunity to participate in multilateral efforts in the Middle East. In this context, Japanese officials visited Israel and Middle East in order to monitor the peace process. Besides, mutual visits between Israeli and Japanese officials were conducted, and these visits reflected the progress made between the two countries (Dowty, Reference Dowty2000: 72). Also, economic and commercial ties were formed during the 1990s, and by the end of the decade a scientific cooperation agreement between the two countries had been signed. With the growth in the volume of commercial transactions, many large Japanese companies opened offices in Israel (Ikeda, Reference Ikeda, Sugihara and Allan1993: 153–4). All these developments made it necessary for Japan to lose its traditional image as biased towards the Arabs, and both countries have developed more open bilateral relations.

Relations since 2005

The 2000s saw important developments in the relations. Ties between two countries grew, initially moderately and later more rapidly. Politically, high-level visits helped enhance bilateral relations. As part of these visits, Japan's Foreign Minister, Nobutaka Machimura, visited Israel in January 2005. He held meetings with President Moshe Katsav, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Silvan Shalom. Israeli and Japanese officials discussed a wide range of issues, and both parties agreed to improve bilateral relations. On the diplomatic front, whereas Machimura requested Israel to stop its arms exports to East Asian countries, Israeli officials stated their expectation that Japan would be actively involved in world affairs. Moreover, in the same manner, the Israeli side expressed their view that ‘Japan was qualified to become a permanent member of the Security Council’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2005). On the other hand, after meeting with Machimura, Shalom expressed his feelings about the similarities of both countries:

The following year (2006), the Prime Minister of Japan, Junichiro Koizumi, visited Israel. He was the second Japanese Prime Minister to visit Israel, and it was the first visit by a Japanese Prime Minister to Israel in that decade (The Japan Times, 2006). Koizumi's visit was an opportunity for both countries to strengthen their bilateral ties (Asia News, 2006). Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert stressed the developing relations in the economic field, and pointed to the need to further enhance the relations in different areas:

Olmert made a reciprocal official visit to Japan in February 2008. This visit was very significant, because, despite the deepening of bilateral relations, no Israeli Prime Minister had visited Japan since then Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's visit in 1997. Olmert's visit had two main aspects: diplomatic and economic. Officials from both sides stressed their determination to further strengthen the bilateral relations through cooperation on all levels. The main areas of discussion were political and economic relations, cooperation in science and technology, and cooperation in the Middle East Peace Process and the ‘Corridor for Peace and Prosperity’ initiative (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2008). On the economic front, Olmert's main aim was to increase Israeli exports to Japan, and, for this reason, some of the leading Israeli industrialists and business people joined him during the visit (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008).

Six years after Olmert's visit to Japan in 2008, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made an official visit to Japan in May 2014. His visit was about economic, diplomatic, and security issues. In this regard, several bilateral agreements about high-level visits, security and defense cooperation, economics, agriculture, space, tourism, and culture were signed; and both premiers stated their expectation to cooperate in the field of cyber-security, and affirmed the importance of bilateral defense cooperation (The Times of Israel, 2014). For this reason, Netanyahu and his counterpart, Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, decided to upgrade defence cooperation and bolster economic ties. This visit was a major breakthrough in the relations between Israel and Japan. Because it was announced that an agreement was to be signed to increase defense cooperation, which would include ‘mutual visits by ministers and senior members of Japan's Self-Defense Forces’ (Reynolds, Reference Reynolds2014). In addition, Netanyahu's trip was especially important for hi-tech trade between the two countries. He stated that

In the same year, in July 2014, both countries signed an agreement on industrial research and development (R&D). This agreement was historical, because Israel was the first state to sign such an agreement on cooperation in industrial R&D with Japan (Elis, Reference Elis2014). The breakthrough agreement was signed by Japanese Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, Toshimitsu Motegi, with Israel's Minister of Economy, Naftali Bennett. The agreement was signed during Motegi's visit to Israel in July 2014. It was supposed to support joint industrial R&D projects between Israeli and Japanese companies and organizations. During the visit, Motegi led a delegation of Japanese industrialists, as well senior officials of the Ministry of Economics, Trade and Industry, which is responsible for Japanese industry, industrial R&D, and cyber technology (Yashar, Reference Yashar2014b). On the signing of the agreement, Bennett stated that:

Soon after the R&D agreement, Abe visited Israel in January 2015. This move was significant, as it was the first visit of a Japanese Prime Minister to Israel since Koizumi's visit in the summer of 2006. Abe travelled to Israel with a 100-person delegation of government officials and top business executives (The Times of Israel, 2015). He met with Prime Minister Netanyahu and the main agenda items were ways to improve cooperation and the economic ties between two countries as well as measures to fight cyber terrorism (Yashar, Reference Yashar2015). Netanyahu termed the visit ‘historic’, called for greater economic cooperation between Japan and Israel, and said that Israel ‘must diversify its markets to include Japan and the other great economies of Asia. That's why your visit here . . . is important for both our countries. We all understand that there is great untapped potential in our relations.’ Abe, in turn, said that ‘the economy is the one area which has the greatest potential for advancement of the bilateral relations’ (The Times of Israel, 2015). Both leaders expressed their satisfaction on the exchanges that took place between the national security and defense authorities. They also stated their expectations regarding cooperation on cyber issues, and a bilateral dialogue was held in November 2014 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2015a). During the visit, Abe and Netanyahu also attended the Japan–Israel Business Forum. At the beginning of the meeting, Abe pointed out that

As mentioned before, both Israel and Japan have been especially keen to further develop ties on cyberspace issues. During the Business Forum held in January 2015, as part of Israel's willingness to cooperate on cyber security, Netanyahu emphasized Israel's prominence in this area: ‘Despite the fact that we're only a country of a few million people, we receive almost 10 percent, almost 10 percent of the investment in cyber security start-ups’ (Gady, Reference Gady2015a). In fact, Israel and Japan had held their first dialogue on cyber issues back in November 2014. According to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, both sides emphasized the importance of cyber security, and confirmed their determination to cooperate on issues such as ‘general overview of measures, governmental structure and strategy, as well as economic issues, and norms, rules and principles regarding cyber space’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2014b). The dialogue was part of a plan approved by the Israeli Cabinet in January 2014, which has aimed to bolster Israel's trade ties with Japan (Gady, Reference Gady2015b). The plan has involved the cooperation of different ministries in both countries which would help bolster joint research on space and cyber security.

In practical terms, there have been efforts to improve bilateral relations, and ‘Israel seeks to increase penetration of the Japanese market, while Japan wants Israeli technology and expertise’ (Taylor, Reference Taylor2015). These efforts have involved reciprocal visits to bolster especially cooperation in trade. As the Israeli Minister of Economy, Aryeh Machluf Deri, stated in July 2015, Israel attaches ‘great importance in the Japanese market’, and works to ‘strengthen cooperation with Japan and increase exports to the country’ (Gelber, Reference Gelber2015). Even though both countries have tried to improve their economic ties, mutual trade has remained modest. In 2013, Israeli exports to Japan stood at $0.72 billion, against imports of $1.1 billion (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2014a). Exports from Israel included machinery, electrical equipment, medical equipment, chemical products, and polished diamonds, while imports from Japan mainly included automobiles, machinery, electrical equipment, and chemical products. The figures and cooperation areas suggest scope for expanding the economic aspect of the relationship, something Israel has been doing with China and India (Ningthoujam, Reference Ningthoujam2015). In 2014, total trade between Japan and Israel reached at $2.3 billion, with Israel's exports to Japan reaching $800 million and imports from it $1.5 billion (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015). In this regard, Israel's decision in January 2015 to open a trade office in Osaka in addition to the one in Tokyo has been a good step to strenghten bilateral economic ties (Cohen, Reference Cohen2015a; Embassy of Israel in Japan, 2015). Besides bolstering economic relations, the first Japan–Israel economic dialogue was held in July 2015. Officials from the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry jointly with the officials from Ministry of Economy of the State of Israel exchanged views on various fields, such as ‘measures for the promotion of investment and trade between the two countries, cooperation in R&D, cyber security and venture policies’ (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan, 2015).

One of the most important areas of cooperation between Israel and Japan, which has development potential, seems to be defence. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, there has been significant changes in Japan's foreign and defence policies. Japan is moving away from the pacifist policies that have guided the country's foreign policy since World War II (Yellen, Reference Yellen2014). Abe seems to feel that Japan can no longer ensure its security, within the context of the constantly shifting regional environment, and has taken steps to reform Japan's national security policies with a purely defense-oriented military, a prohibition on protecting allies, and the lack of a national security council. He is trying to move Japan from ‘passive pacifism’ to a ‘proactive pacifism’ in international relations. In this regard, the manner in which Japan has been responding to rising threats to its security and sovereignty would change significantly. As a result, Abe has initiated a series of significant improvements to Japan's already advanced defense forces, ‘established a National Security Council, announced the first National Security Strategy and National Defence Programme Guidelines which introduced the concepth of a Dynamic Joint Defence Force’ (Takahashi, Reference Takahashi2014). Although Japan remains and intends to remain a country that contributes to international security and prosperity, its efforts might involve growing collaboration with Israel on defence issues. In this context, during Netanyahu's visit to Japan in May 2014, both he and his counterpart Abe agreed to ‘bolster bilateral defense cooperation, including in cyberspace’. The two leaders have also agreed ‘to hold talks between their national security organizations, and to increase exchanges of defense authorities’ (Aoki, Reference Aoki2014). And as part of this agreement, senior members of the Japan's defence forces are to visit Israel in the coming years (Kin, Reference Kin2014). Even though it has been stated for Israel that ‘it will take a long time to cultivate anything close to the defense trade ties we enjoy with India, South Korea or other East Asian partners’ (Opall-Rome, Reference Opall-Rome2015), the two countries already seem to be entering a productive future in this area, and thus ongoing changes in Japanese security policy make it very likely that these ties will expand.

On the other hand, two more aspects that need to be mentioned are tourism and culture between Israel and Japan. For instance, Japanese food items, such as sushi, and its popular culture, particularly animation, are widely popular in Israel. Cooperation in these civilian areas is planned to be boosted. There is a significant number of Israeli tourists flocking to Japan as against the modest number of Japanese tourists visiting Israel, and Israel has planned to increase the number of Japanese tourists by 45% in 2017 (Ningthoujam, Reference Ningthoujam2015). As part of this effort, the embassy of Israel in Tokyo launched an animated, online series to attract Japanese tourists (Berger, Reference Berger2014). Moreover, the Jerusalem municipality organized a week-long Japanese culture festival in October 2014. The event was officially called the Japanese Culture Week, which included the celebration of a broad range of Japanese traditions and modern developments, such as ‘culinary fare, artistry, cinema, sports, martial arts, and technology’ (Eisenbund, Reference Eisenbund2014).