Military history remains, to a considerable extent, a subject dominated by great battles and legendary figures. Joseph Glatthaar has shown the way to go beyond this approach in his treatment of the lives of everyday soldiers in Robert E. Lee's army during the American Civil War. In a similar vein, Thomas Rath has written a useful book that recognises the shortcomings of the traditional approach and conceptually delves into the complicated cultural and political history of the postrevolutionary Mexican army. He dates the beginning of the postrevolutionary era at 1920 because that is the point when highly organised violence ended and government hegemony set in.
The author offers a nineteenth-century context for the postrevolutionary military that includes a debate regarding ‘the circumstances under which the army could coerce the nation's own citizens’ (p. 13). In the ensuing discussion the author asserts that ‘conservative officers were correct’ to be concerned about the effectiveness of militias in the era between the early 1820s and the 1870s. From the perspective of combat, the author does not include the highly successful militia-based 1847–8 guerrilla campaign of Liberal general Santos Degollado against the US supply lines between Veracruz and Mexico City in his assessment, nor the leading role played by the militia at Loreto on 5 May 1862. What is important here, however, is the creation of local strongholds that can lead to an ineffectiveness of government.
Rath skilfully treats the Porfirian era as one of modernisation and the building of capitalism. He also describes the racism of the period and how it affected the army, but the reader would have been well served from the standpoint of historical context if he had mentioned the suppression of organised labour in the late 1870s, the slaughter of villagers in the Huasteca during the counter-insurgency campaign led by Colonel Bernardo Reyes in the early 1880s, and the repression of striking workers at Río Blanco in 1907. That discussion would have deepened the reader's comparative understanding of the excesses of violence that would follow during the revolutionary and postrevolutionary eras.
After noting the build-up in the number of armed fighters during the violent phase of the revolution and the ideological beliefs of the winners and losers, the author goes to the meat of his subject. One explicit goal of the winners was civilian authority over military officers, which was hard to achieve given the Yaqui and Cristero rebellions of the 1920s and the succession of generals who served as presidents from 1920 to 1940. Nevertheless, by 1924, the national leadership had drastically reduced the number of troops and established a network of 38 military districts that roughly corresponded to the states. It also placed two or three cavalry units in each one in order to enhance response times and improve the effectiveness of rule. During the Calles administration, however, corruption and a high degree of military political activism were readily apparent. By the early 1930s there were 7,500 officers, most of whom were veterans of the revolution, out of 52,000 personnel, a ridiculously high ratio of one officer for every six soldiers. The author does a fine job of explaining the 1920s and the Maximato in a survey that is all too brief.
The presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas is given more intense scrutiny than those of his predecessors, some 23 pages versus 18. At one point, in disagreeing with Roderic Ai Camp, the author points out that Cárdenas’ efforts to reduce military political participation were only partially successful, but in a separate passage he reminds the reader that the president wanted an army that was class-conscious and revolutionary. These seemingly contradictory goals underscore the fact that the president wanted a form of military political advocacy that reflected his own objectives. Thirty years later, in 1970–1, I knew several officers, including General de la Brigada Celestino Gasca, and a colonel. They still adamantly held to Cárdenas’ view of the army having an active role in the revolutionary programme.
During the 1940s, the limited military draft became highly controversial. Some of the protestors saw the centralised effort as a violation of local governmental authority. Women staged public demonstrations, and sizeable groups in former Zapatista and Cristero areas, including Morelos and Jalisco, openly defied the government. Economic arguments – the needs of agriculture, industry and public service – were used by the resisting localities to justify non-compliance. Finally, in 1950, a compromise settled the issue. Conscripts would only have to attend periodic training sessions held at nearby military bases. The long-standing tension between the Church and military hierarchies was also eased via negotiations and the mutual recognition of responsibilities.
In the 1940s and 1950s the army's highly visible role in civilian society diminished somewhat as the government defeated major challenges between 1948 and 1952, and then strongly discouraged open political activities on the part of the officers. But the army, as a part of the regime, continued its policing function while radical factions within it continued their advocacies as well. These included agrarismo and ultra-Right agendas, including anti-communism. In 1961 there was one last rebellion, led by Gasca, which enjoyed campesino support, but it lacked sufficient military backing. While independently less powerful than their counterparts in South and Central America, who were overthrowing governments, the Mexican officers were part of the PRI and continued to interface with the civilian elites. Some lobbied, and others participated in fraud and corruption. In the states, some of the local military and civilian power brokers joined forces and openly defied institutionalisation.
In his penultimate chapter, Rath explains how the army helped maintain order in the countryside and at the same time evoked an image of subordination to the ‘revolutionary’ goals of the civilian regime. One of the bases for this programme was that of veterans’ benefits, including pensions and small material amounts, along with medals and ceremonial recognition. These phenomena related to the historical memory of that struggle and brought forth two fundamental perspectives. One, the Cardenista, saw the revolution as a social struggle, ‘often tragic’, and the other, more conservative, stressed individual heroism and virtuous acts. As veterans aged they contributed mightily to the construction of what the author calls the ‘myths of the revolution’.
Rath ends his book by calling upon historians to move away from the ‘praetorian’ perspective or top-down view of army history in order to include not just state planning but also the role of the everyday soldiers and veterans. His own work, however, largely depends on data from those sources, and the difficulties of a bottom-up history are manifest in Mexico. This is a strong contribution to our literature and I recommend it for any Latin Americanist library.
