Military disengagement from politics that began in the mid-1970s, followed by a wave of democratization and democratic consolidation and anchoring (the third wave), seems to have put a brake on civil/military relations theory regarding the causes and effects of coups and military intervention in politics, a field dominated by the works of Samuel Finer, Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz. Yet as Yaprak Gürsoy correctly points out, the recent and growing breadth of democratic reversals and military coups reminds us “of the pitfalls of the transition paradigm, which assumes a linear path toward democracy once an authoritarian regime collapsed” (p. 183). Furthermore, Gürsoy observes that “the literature on civil military relations has mostly ignored why some militaries establish authoritarian regimes and others stay in power for only a few years” (p. 5). Her timely work seeks to remedy this shortcoming and aims to refresh, refine, update, and expand our theoretical knowledge of civil/military relations and regime change in societies with weak or troubled relationships with liberal democracy.
Using two cases studies, post-World War I Greece and Turkey, Gürsoy attempts to sketch out and substantiate a theoretical framework of military interventions and regime change. Despite historical and other similarities and a myriad of differences, the two often contentious neighbors “are particularly rich in their experience with various regimes and military interventions” (p. 3). She then applies the construct to Egypt and Thailand, two other states that have had their own share of political pathologies. In Gürsoy’s framework three sets of elites—the military, business people, and politicians—are the key actors capable of affecting developments and bringing about regime change and military intervention. Inter- and intra-elite competition and perceptions of each other can affect their actions. Similarly, the behavior of elites can be influenced by the level of threat posed by the actions of non-elite groups (lower and middle classes), often referred to as voters, masses, or the electorate.
The level of cost of toleration and the level of cost of repression are the two determining variables in Gürsoy’s scheme, which she adapts from democratic theory, especially Robert Dahl’s Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (1971) . In situations of conflict between the upper and lower classes, the elites must decide whether the cost of toleration exceeds the cost of repression. If the level of threat to the upper classes by the opposition is high and threatens their security and wellbeing, they will respond with repressive measures. But if the cost of toleration is much lower than the cost of suppression, elites are likely to allow space for the opposition and accept some variant of democracy. In Gürsoy’s words, “political regimes and military interventions are determined by the power of the elites relative to the opposition (levels of cost of suppression) and the elites’ perception of the degree to which their interests are threatened (levels of cost of toleration)” (p. 3).
The same factors and considerations determine the nature and type of regime that emerges and its evolution: low cost of suppression lead to authoritarianism, high levels point toward a democratic alternative. Gürsoy identifies four possible types of regime outcomes. If the majority of the elites perceive that the level of opposition is intense and likely to remain high, they opt for a consolidated authoritarian structure. Such a regime is consolidated “when its institutions are perceived as ‘the only game in town,’ when no one can imagine acting outside of its institutions, and when all politically significant groups regard its key institutions as the only framework for policy making” (p. 10). The survival of consolidated authoritarian regimes presupposes elite consensus and a predisposition to abide by the rules of the game and the virtual absence of significant rebellion against the ruling elites. By contrast, if there are divisions among and within the three key elites, the likely outcome is an unconsolidated authoritarian variant. This usually involves a portion of the military seizing power, usually with the tacit approval or acquiescence from segments of the other two elite groups. Unconsolidated regimes, however, tend to be of short duration as opposition from opposing parts of the leading groups and the masses “engage in contentious action” (p. 11). Interwar intervention in Greece, Turkey in 1960s and 1971, as well as “the Thai coup of 2006, and the Egyptian coup of 2011 fit the short-lived [model]” (p. 185). If the military is badly divided and support from the other elites is scant, the coup attempt can even fail. In Gürsoy’s mind, the July 15, 2016 coup attempt in Turkey did not succeed because “the intervention was carried out outside the military hierarchy [and] the conspirators had no backing from the political elites” (p. 197).
Democratic solutions are preferred when the cost of toleration is low and the cost of suppression is high. In Gürsoy ’s argument, the lower the toleration cost and the higher the suppression the more likely outcome is a consolidated democracy. She points to post-junta (1974) Greece as a case in point, asserting that a consolidated democracy emerged when Greek elites “were not threatened by each other or by the electorate,” and the military felt that “its interests were secure” (p. 19). Conversely, in circumstances where the elites are threatened by each other, the cost of toleration is low and the cost of suppression is moderate to high, the preferred solution is unconsolidated democracy or a short-term intervention. Given that the military possess the means of violence/suppression, “its relations with other elites are crucial,[especially] in the consolidation of various regimes” (p. 27).
But the aftermath of military withdrawal is not necessarily a linear path toward democracy and civilian supremacy over the military. Instead, future politics and the role of the military in societies with weak traditions of democratic governance can be influenced by the economic wellbeing of elites and nonelites alike, the lessons learned that may cause certain social groups across the board to eschew violence and authoritarian choices, and the tantalizing prospect of joining a much-desired international club where democracy is a prerequisite, such as EU membership. Nevertheless, even in situations where democracy is consolidated, a severe and protracted national crisis can lead to deconsolidation. Gürsoy believes Greece is a case in point. The nearly decade-long sovereign debt drama that began in 2009 has significantly damaged the country’s more than 30-year-old well-consolidated democracy, and Greece “might once again experience the adverse effects of an unconsolidated regime” (p. 193). At the same time, Turkey, Egypt, and even Thailand are fast moving toward authoritarian rule.
Gürsoy’s thoroughly researched, well-conceived, and nicely executed book updates, refines, enriches, and advances our understanding of civil/military relations, particularly in post-intervention and post-disengagement periods. Although conscious of the importance of culture, she nevertheless does not pay enough attention to this potentially pivotal variable. Similarly, inclusion of an ethnically diverse country, like Pakistan, would strengthen Gürsoy’s argument and the explanatory utility of her framework. Despite these shortcomings, this is a welcome and much-needed piece of scholarship that should help reignite scholarly interest in the largely dormant field of civil/military relations.
