Penny Weiss's new book is an untimely work of feminist political theory. Weiss criticizes those who keep women out of the canon and feminists whose canonical reinterpretations shore up these exclusions. No more rereadings of Aristotle, Hobbes, and Rousseau, Weiss pleads. Looking for a feminist research agenda? Mine the work of your “foremothers,” largely forgotten women whose political wisdom “could help us out of [the] patriarchal jungles” of today (32). To drive home her point, Weiss calls for a five-year moratorium on references to male thinkers (53). Canon Fodder is, therefore, an ambitious book with (as I see it) four primary goals: 1) to expose the justifications for excluding women from the canon of political theory; 2) introduce readers to historical women political thinkers whose knowledge has contemporary relevance; 3) provide historical evidence that supports “feminist standpoint” theory; and 4) make the case for reading political theory as a theoretical guide for political practice.
Some will dismiss this book because of the last two priorities, which indicate Weiss's second-wave framework. “Women,” as a coherent category of people, is largely unquestioned. Drawing upon Nancy Hartsock and Patricia Hill Collins's standpoint theories, Weiss identifies a common story of equality in a cross-cultural and cross-generational sampling of political women, which would be of political use in the context of contemporary inequality. Yet Weiss does not take up the widespread criticisms of Hartsock and Collins and the category of “women” as a site of knowledge more broadly. Her failure to do so gives the book a dated feel, which is further corroborated by other parts of the book, most specifically in the chapter on “community” that is introduced with reference to a “recent resurgence” of interest in communitarianism (i.e., MacIntyre, Sandel) and the “enticing possibility of a distinctly feminist communitarianism” (i.e., Phelan, Weiss, and Freidman) (81).
But it would be a mistake to ignore Canon Fodder on these grounds. The body of the book includes close readings of works by Mary Wollstonecraft, Anna Julia Cooper, Christine de Pizan, Sei Shōnagon, Emma Goldman, Mary Astell, and the Declaration of Sentiments at Seneca Falls. Weiss shows how these authors and texts do more than participate in the traditional conversation of political theory. She argues that their works are superior to the work privileged by the canon. For example, taking Wollstonecraft to be the preeminent theorist of liberty and liberalism (rather than Locke or Mill) offers an account of individuality that is embedded in friendship and equality. Liberty is then not antagonistic to equality as is so often presumed, but impossible without it (84–85). Similarly, Weiss reads the Declaration of Sentiments as a radical statement about equality in its own right, and not a “minor corrective to the brilliant but modestly flawed” Declaration of Independence. The Declaration of Sentiments, in this revised interpretation, conceptualizes male domination as a problem of illegitimate government and “establishes new standards of what it means to have a free and equal citizenship” (102). Weiss concludes the exegetical chapters with Mary Astell, whose writings on security are compared to Thomas Hobbes's. Astell includes the “domestic” violence women suffer in the private sphere in her account of national security. This chapter—and more importantly, Astell's work—should be required reading for scholars of feminist security and security studies generally.
Why don't we know more about Mary Astell? Why isn't there a book on the political thought of Virginia Woolf? Why are feminists (and antifeminists) quick to describe Mary Wollstonecraft's work as “badly organized” (45) and yet eager to “maximize the coherence” of writing by men like Hans-Georg Gadamer (45, 47)? Why do genre boundaries contract when confronted with women's writings and expand when confronted with men's? In the first chapter, “The Politics of the Canon: Gatekeepers and Gate-Crashers,” Weiss recounts how and why women are excluded in traditional and feminist political theory, specifically secondary collections that promise overviews on “Western Political Theory” or “Women and/or Gender in Political Theory.” The former tend to ignore women thinkers on the grounds that they are not that influential, that the author knows little about them, or—stranger still—that there have been so many women thinking and writing that it would be difficult to choose whom to represent! More prominent women, like Wollstonecraft, are often excluded on the grounds that someone has already written an exhaustive treatment of her work—a criterion that would never be applied to Hobbes or Rousseau. Feminists have not done much better, in Weiss's estimation, and she counts her own work on Rousseau as evidence of this problem. We have gone to great lengths to uncover the gender politics of male thinkers, but ignored the political insights of our foremothers. Even Arendt, who garners little attention from Weiss and complicates her argument about the exclusion of women, is still considered dispensable by many political theorists, reduced to sound bites or seen as someone about whom “everything has been said.”
While at times Weiss's book feels stuck in the canon wars and second-wave debates of the 1980s and 1990s, there is something quite effective about raising these questions anew in the “postfeminist” or “third-wave” era. We have not escaped the problems animating second-wave feminism even if we better understand its limitations. The canon has loosened its grip on political theory and begun to welcome studies of “minor” figures whose works may not be expressly “political” in spirit, but we have not seen a proliferation of work on women. This is likely because women are not the minor figures comprising the “new canon” and their writings are quickly dismissed as too personal, domestic, or narrow. Pessimistically, just as earlier generations of feminist scholars mastered the traditional canon to legitimate their feminist work, younger feminist theorists must do that while also staying current in the (largely male-authored) contemporary literature. This leaves little time or incentive to excavate and analyze the works of unknown women. And so the cycle continues.
Two exceptions to Weiss's indictment of contemporary feminist theory stand out. Linda Zerilli's and Lori Marso's recent books draw their political and intellectual inspiration from political women and women intellectuals—standing on their own or commingled, in Zerilli's case, with the insights of Ludwig Wittgenstein (see Zerilli, Feminism and the Abyss of Freedom [University of Chicago Press, 2005]; Marso, Feminist Thinkers and the Demands of Femininity [Routledge, 2006]). Zerilli and Marso see something politically useful, broadly understood, in looking to historical women's writings, yet reject the epistemological frame as well as the presumption that “theory” can be deployed to “solve” social and political inequality. Publishing timelines likely prevented Weiss from engaging these books in detail, which is unfortunate.
While I find Weiss's epistemological framework unconvincing, her exegetical work and attention to the subtle (and the not so subtle) chauvinisms at work in the academic enterprise are timely. In calling for a new generation of feminist political theory, she suggests ways in which feminists—no longer “revisers” or critics of already-existing theory—are those who examine and defend the criteria of the political and the genres and disciplines that best elucidate it. Taking Weiss's cue, we can also then ask hard questions about the bias at work in our own representations of an intellectual and political field, rather than simply counting who's in and who's out.
