“Egypt's Modern Pharaohs” is a documentary series with a clear thesis. Each episode begins, the mournful traces of Mohamed Mounir's “Baladi ya Arab” in the background, with a declaration – forcefully stated, if somewhat tendentiously – that Egypt's fate has been to suffer the rule of pharaohs, indomitable autocrats who have surrounded themselves with a godlike aura. Upon assuming power, each pharaoh erases remnants of his predecessor and portrays himself as the only legitimate sovereign. It is not quite historical, even for modern times, when lineage remains an important source of legitimacy. It is also an old trope gleaned from colonial texts and early nationalist rhetoric, even if, like many such tropes, it does contain an element of truth.
Is every Egyptian autocrat – king, colonel, or president – doomed to carry this weighty appellation? After all, the ill-starred Farouk, whose demise sets the stage for this series, was at one time viewed popularly, at least from a foreign gaze, as the “last pharaoh.”Footnote 1 The way this series tells it, the 1952 Free Officers Revolution finally restored self-rule, but Egypt's new military pharaohs failed to provide real independence or social justice, let alone bread. Herein lies the series’ primary weakness: the “pharaoh” thesis imagines a static politics in which eruptions of rebelliousness, sometimes revolution, are buried in the face of inert structures invariably linked to a national sense of being. Of course, viewing the series six years after the collapse of Egypt's Arab Spring one can understand Jihan el-Tahri's pessimism and even appreciate her prescience.
The documentary, written, elegantly narrated, directed, and produced by el-Tahri, is divided into three equal parts of roughly sixty minutes, covering the rule of Egypt's three post-monarchical rulers: Gamal Abd al-Nasser (1952–70), Anwar al-Sadat (1970–81), and Hosni Mubarak (1981–2011). Each episode can be viewed independently, although natural time constraints limit the extent to which the regime of each “pharaoh” can be put in the context of his predecessor(s). I will try to treat each in short order, recognizing that gaps or generalizations are inevitable, and focusing in particular on the overall political narrative and themes: the consolidation of and attempt to retain power, the balancing act between competing bastions of support, some of which will drift into opposition, the interplay of global politics (far more important in this telling than Arab politics or the conflict with Israel), and persistent questions about the ability of a rigid political order to incorporate broader, younger, and religiously conservative voices, and, ultimately, to address the needs of a population too many still mired in poverty.
Nasser
Because of ongoing interest in the Suez Crisis and June 1967 “Six Day War” the Nasser era has been more frequently covered by solid, durable documentaries, although less often with such a direct focus on politics.Footnote 2 Michal Goldman's recent “Nasser's Republic,” which views Nasser and his era through wider social and cultural lenses and runs some twenty minutes longer, would be a valuable complement to el-Tahri's treatment.Footnote 3
El-Tahri's opening episode situates the Free Officer's coup within the context of the failings of the old liberal order and follows Nasser's path from leader of the secret organization, then junta, to authoritarian head of state. Given her focus on politics and power, el-Tahri devotes more time than usual to the confrontation between figurehead president Muhammad Nagib and the beleaguered, yet headstrong Nasser. She highlights what she calls the “democracy crisis” of February-March 1954 with remarkable testimony from rebellious artillery officers, but perhaps understates the degree to which Egypt's future hung in the balance, as well as the determination of those who stood with the increasingly authoritarian thrust of the revolution.Footnote 4 She also glosses over Nasser's marginalization of fellow conspirators and his turn to a new core of insiders, many linked to the growing security state, too quickly. I would ask for a bit more on the experiments with one-party rule that produced the behemoth Arab Socialist Union, forerunner of Sadat and Mubarak's National Democratic Party, the origins of a new military class (despite the persistent disasters in combat) and from within that a small ruling clique, the infamous marakiz al-quwwa (centers of power), those who expected to rule in the wake of Nasser's sudden unexpected death in September 1970.
What el-Tahri does do quite well is treat the regime's troubled relationship with the Muslim Brothers, establishing the foundation for an ongoing conflict that will emerge in later episodes. She does not clearly establish the early connections between Nasser and other future Free Officers who joined secret cells that the Brothers established in the army in the early 1940s. But she does cover the growing suspicion between uneasy allies following the July 1952 coup, the attempt by disillusioned members of the Muslim Brothers to assassinate Nasser in October 1954, and the subsequent drive to destroy the Islamist movement. Within this context the emergence of Sayyid Qutb as an ideological threat and guru to an angry new generation of Muslim Brothers, and his martyrdom in 1966, is clearly spelled out. Proponents of both radical and gradualist trends within the Brotherhood – Farid Abd al-Khaliq for the former and Sayyid Nazayli for the Qutubists – speak openly of internal divisions, a sense of impending and, for some, desirable showdown with the state. Representing the state, Muhammad Fayiq reveals how secret armed cells were discovered literally by accident, a wrong turn down an alley that sparked a firefight.
Left to the margins are the Communists, and the secular socialist revolution is never quite given its due. It may not be clear to viewers why Nasser attracted such affection from his people and so many in the colonial world. There is no mention of Bandung, the United Arab Republic or intervention in Yemen. The June 1967 naksa (setback) and its aftermath provide hints at the growing chorus to fix the revolution, especially after the brunt of blame for the Egyptian defeat was placed on a limited number of air force officers. But the epic fallout between Nasser and Abd al-Hakim Amr, his military chief and closest friend, so revealing of cracks in the regime and so tragic on a personal level, is entirely absent.
The film endeavors to explain why millions of mourners followed Nasser's casket, but ultimately fails to convey the depth of a relationship between leader and people founded on pride and optimism as well as trust and dependency. The pharaoh, we are told in conclusion, rode a wave of anti-colonialism, but first and foremost he presided over a police state. Why this was or whether it had to be, remain elusive.
Sadat
If Nasser has been revisited with some regularity, albeit usually in relationship to military conflict, Anwar al-Sadat's turbulent decade of rule is ripe for reconsideration. Here we get a much-warranted focus on internal affairs rather than the October 1973 War and Camp David, events which captured international attention, often at the expense of those developments that more directly impacted Egyptians. The episode begins with Sadat's purge of the Nasserist coterie that presumed he would serve their interests. Taha Zaki, the security officer who secretly taped the plotters, describes approaching Sadat with what el-Tahri calls the “excuse” to clean house. The episode's most compelling sections deal with the rise of the Islamist movements on university campuses. Former student activists from different orientations are interviewed. Islamist student leader Khalid Zafarani describes himself and fellow religious-minded students as less sophisticated than the leftists and frequently the butt of their jokes until, under Sadat's patronage, the tide turned. Zafarani also recollects his mates being armed with batons and transported to campus by state security in order to attack leftist antagonists staging a sit-in at Cairo University.
Fu'ad Allam, deputy director of state security, concurs, asserting that “we” – the government – created the religious current. Kamal Khalil, a leftist student leader, recalls the movie-placard quality of Islamist student banners compared to their own hand-drawn cardboard posters. Hamdin al-Sabahi, later a presidential candidate in 2012, laments that religious organizations mastered fundamentals of classic mobilization that the leftist students could not match.
The October War is treated briefly so more time can be spent on the economic dislocations of Sadat's Infitah (“open door” liberalization), the February 1977 bread riots that sparked his peace initiative, and the rise of Islamist militancy, which Sadat, the self-styled “believer president,” felt he could contain. The filmmaker allows compatriots of Shukri Mustafa, radical proponent of creating a Muslim utopia untouchable by the heretical state, to speak to his charisma. But she neglects to convey the extent to which Sadat's state-sponsored Islamization stoked sectarian tensions, for example the riots that erupted in June 1981 in the poverty-stricken Cairo neighborhood al-Zawiyya al-Hamra, for many, proof of a system run amok and a leader losing control. Sadat's sense of urgency, however he endeavored to soft-peddle it, was underscored by his order in September 1981 to arrest 1,536 intellectuals, a dragnet that included, for the first time, dissenters from all political orientations. Security witnesses claim they were stunned, but Sadat assured them it would only last through the talks between Egypt and Israel to finalize the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. Ex-Nasser insider Muhammad Fayiq quips that had the prisoners been held longer “we might have created a national front.” Instead, jihadist conspirators – here represented by Muntassir al-Zayyat and Nagih Ibrahim, who provide riveting details of the merger of independent radical movements, Jihad and al-Gama`a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group), and training of operatives who plotted Sadat's murder – hoped to spark wider civil unrest that would topple the state.
They succeeded in their minimal aim – “I have killed Pharaoh,” the commando teams’ leader proclaimed – but failed to bring down the system. Ibrahim bemoans the strategic error of promoting armed struggle; al-Zayyat reveals a failed scheme to drug broadcasters at state media so that a revolutionary communiqué could be announced and confesses, “we didn't believe we would succeed.” Security officials implemented “Plan 100,” designed for such a breakdown of order, but still point fingers at those regime insiders they blame for freeing the radical jinn. The missed opportunity to explore Sadat's own megalomania, symbolically represented by his outlandish uniforms, not least his faux-pharaonic scepter, is unfortunate, since he, more than any of his fellow “pharaohs” seemed to relish playing the part, even though it contrasted so dramatically with his other constructed self-image as the pious village elder.
Mubarak
The thirty-year rein of Hosni Mubarak, longest of the three by a full decade, is in some ways the most challenging, given its precipitate end in the wake of the January 2011 “Revolution.” Mubarak, like Sadat, was thrust into power unexpectedly, this time in a hail of bullets on October 6, 1981, the fateful anniversary of the October 1973 war. The event, as Ali al-Din Hillal notes, came to define his presidency. Mubarak sought stability above all, even as early on he toyed with facilitating real democracy and, later, with sidelining the military.
It is worth recalling – and the film only hints at this – how refreshing the dour, monosyllabic ruler appeared to Egyptians caught in the whirlwind of Sadat's mercurial personality (and, one might argue, Nasser's domineering charisma). When Mubarak met Khalid Muhyi al-Din, leader of the leftist opposition and former Free Officer founder, the new president saluted his elder, signaling fraternal respect. Muhyi al-Din (this from his deputy, Rifa`at el-Sa`id) told Mubarak the country was weary of confrontation and asked him to draw his “red line”; Mubarak replied that the army should remain unimpeachable. He freed Sadat's September detainees and oversaw the most open multi-party elections Egypt had seen since 1950. But the wily Fu'ad Sirag al-Din, old regime leader of the Wafd, invited the Muslim Brothers, traditional enemies, to run under a Wafdist banner. He did so, says el-Tahri, in order to test the new president's intent. The opposition secured 14 percent of the seats in the National Assembly; Mubarak loyalists, perhaps not without reason, shuddered at the apparent show of their vulnerability.
Muslim Brothers now sat in parliament, but Mubarak faced more immediate challenges. The Afghani Jihad provided an opportunity to funnel radical Islamists out of the country; we meet some, including Abu Omar, the imam whose secret rendition from Italy later became a cause célèbre.Footnote 5 The Jihad also allowed Egypt to position itself squarely in the American camp as a supplier of arms to anti-Soviet forces. The architect of this strategic partnership, Field Marshal Abd al-Halim Abu Ghazala, flew too close to the sun, threatening to steal the President's limelight – even as he saved the regime from rioting police conscripts attacking five-star hotels in Giza – and fell victim to Mubarak's fragile ego.
The film does not underestimate the extent to which the system ran aground in the 1990s. The army, which profited from Nasser and Sadat, did even better under Mubarak, even if the generals resented Mubarak's civilian business coterie. While civilian and military tycoons got fatter, the state ceded provision of social services to religious elements. Everyone who could went to Islamist clinics. After all, unlike government hospitals – this from Hussam Badrawi, a doctor-turned-politician – they had bandages, syringes, and medicine. When the state failed to respond to the victims of the massive earthquake that struck Egypt in October 1992, Muslim Brothers set up soup kitchens, shelters, and infirmaries. A spike in political violence, the war between state security and radical jihadists, ultimately produced a cease-fire, declared by the opposition. Still, the narration does fault the regime for turning against the more moderate Muslim Brothers, more out of habit than any meaningful policy initiative.
During his final decade, Mubarak found himself at once comfortable in power, vital ally to the United States in its self-declared “war against terror,” and at the same time confronting growing questions about an eventual transferal of power. His son, Gamal, increasingly the heir apparent, remains an ambivalent character, at once a seeming reformer with aspirations to open Egypt more fully to the high-tech, computer-driven world, a serious challenge to the army's stranglehold on the economy, and, concurrently, an unscrupulous prince more interested in personal aggrandizement than national advancement.
In 2004–05, with presidential elections nearing and an anticipated showdown between Gamal's technocrats and the generals brewing, the citizenry erupted in rage at the idea of hereditary succession, taking to the streets under the banner of “Kifaya” (Enough) of Mubarak and his family. In retrospect the broad-based representatives of civil society – secular, religious, Coptic, Muslim – had given the military a pass in the early 2000s, which would come back to haunt them after the Arab Spring. Mubarak allowed the first presidential elections to feature multiple candidates, but he arrested his most serious competitor, Ayman Nour. Nour scored 7 percent of the vote but recalls here how his supporters feared to sit in the front rows at campaign events. A growing sense of chaos – the film omits the cancelled second round of parliamentary elections in 2006 after a strong initial showing by the Muslim Brothers – was encapsulated for many by the sinking of the Salam ferry, a vessel pathetically unfit to carry human travelers, in the Red Sea in 2006. Over 1,000 people perished. Rescue vessels stayed away because no one dared wake up the responsible minister. The owner fled the country in broad daylight and was later exonerated in absentia. The regime appeared to cling tight to power, but the brutal murder of a young blogger, Khalid Sa`id and Mubarak's stated intention to run for a sixth term in 2010 – along with the stunning downfall of Tunisia's dictator in December 2010 – produced a groundswell of popular protest that caused the president's pedestal to crumble.
The story comes to a precipitate ending, even though the production date might have allowed for at least Mubarak's replacement by his generals, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). We are only told that on Police Day, January 25, 2011, throngs of people took to the streets carrying many of the same banners that they did in 1952. The Muslim Brothers and the army joined the protesters but continued what el-Tahri calls their ongoing “dance.”
Overall “Egypt's Modern Pharaohs” tells a gripping, if cautionary tale. I wish some of the fact checking had been tighter (General Exham, not Erskine, led the attack on Egyptian police in Ismailia; Nasser did not die in his sleep; Charlie Wilson was a Texas Congressman; the infamous 1997 Luxor attack did not target a tourist bus) but the general narrative is sound. Inevitably there are a few superfluous moments (Charlie Wilson's belly dancer). But the witnesses, many of them fresh faces, rarely seen on camera, tell a compelling tale.
El-Tahri's narrative of Egypt's political trajectory over the course of the last 60-plus years – my critique of the Pharaoh trope aside – is rooted in a stark vision of what has not gone right since Nasser's Free Officers took their tanks into the streets. Her nuanced treatment of the Muslim Brotherhood and its radical offshoots is particularly welcome in the face of the ever-present “Islamophobia” of many Egyptians who tout themselves as liberals. Without saying anything about the course of events after January 25, 2011, she has provided a base for approaching the eventual shattered alliance and showdown between the erstwhile allies, civil and military, who did succeed in peacefully bringing an end to Mubarak's 30-year grip on power.
Even if this documentary was conceptualized prior to the Arab Spring, the ultimate challenge, once the “revolution” erupted, is where and how to stop. The ending leaves the pharaonic trope dangling. We are left to somehow squeeze future presidents Mohamed Morsi and Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi (one of them elected in the first truly free elections since 1950, the other, put in place by military coup and currently in the process of validating his rule for the next 15 years) into the mold. At the same time, it should be noted that some protesters who hoped to dismantle the system that Nasser and Sadat established (however much Sadat later shifted the orientation economically and culturally), also carried images of Nasser (rarely, if ever, Sadat) as they marched, chanting the “old slogans” for freedom, bread, and social justice. Nasser, after all, was different. Many in the crowd believed, rightly or wrongly, that he, not Pharaoh, but Gamal, Abu Khalid, the Boss, would be on their side, and not stand with those in power.
“Egypt's Modern Pharaohs” is a valuable documentary film series that, walking a straight path between controversial legacies of each of its primary subjects, still takes a clear partisan stand in favor of representative politics, recognizing, even if not stating outright, that Egypt's democratic voices are diverse and that a debate on the role of religion will be part of any serious future reckoning. It can be used in graduate and undergraduate courses on history and government as a springboard for deeper discussion. The documentary footage and stills include images not seen frequently. Many of those interviewed, Egyptian and foreign, are fresh faces and their testimony is woven skillfully into the narrative. Gama`a al-Islamiyya leader Nagih Ibrahim's smiles while recounting the plot against Sadat are worth countless words. I am less convinced by el-Tahri's frequent resort to clips from Egyptian movies, which at times are overly stylized and may actually distort the viewers’ perception of how history unfolded. For me, the episode on Sadat remains the highlight, in large part because his story has too often been told, at least outside Egypt – and as he would like it to be – as one of heroic peacemaker, martyr to religious intolerance.
Ending where she does, on the cusp of what was to be a new Egyptian revolution (indeed an Arab revolution), el-Tahri must have felt incredibly conflicted. Her thesis implies that Egyptians have been bystanders, recipients of an order in which they have no real say, a “dance” between forces that are greater than they are. However, one thing “Modern Pharaohs” underscores is that even if Egyptians have often been willing, or at least acquiescent to trade political freedom and social justice for bread, those in power still at times awake to find they have lost control of the streets and scramble to regain their footing.
