Beverly Gage's absorbing and colorfully written book restores the centrality of violence, and even terrorism, to American history from the 1880s to the 1920s. She does this by placing the deadly Wall Street bombing of September 1920 in the context of decades of violent class conflict in the United States. She provides a satisfying answer to the question of why a series of terrorist acts occurred in the United States, culminating in history's most lethal single act of anarchist violence, which took place not in Europe, but in New York. Among its many sources, her impressively documented book utilizes unpublished FBI material obtained through the Freedom of Information act.
On September 16, 1920, a man drove a horse-drawn wagon to the corner of Wall and Broad Streets in New York City, across the street from the Morgan Bank and near the Stock Exchange. Inside the wagon were a powerful dynamite bomb and a large quantity of iron slugs, apparently window weights. A few moments after the driver had parked his wagon and departed, an enormous explosion took place that, according to the final tally, killed thirty-eight people and seriously injured 143. This was probably the deadliest single terrorist act in centuries, dwarfing the anarchist bombings of the 1880s and 1890s and the Italian nationalist Felice Orsini's deadly assault on Napoleon III in 1858, which missed the emperor but killed eight and injured 148.
In her compelling introduction, Gage points out, citing Richard Hofstadter, that Americans have had amnesia about the Wall Street bombing and the powerful role of violence in shaping their history. She aims to “rediscover the genuine drama of class conflict in the United States,” with violence coming both from above (public authorities and private employers) and below (anarchists, socialists, and labor organizers) (8). In her recounting, then, the Progressive Era was not just one of “placid reform” but of crisis in which the “entire structure of American institutions, from government to the economy, seemed to be up for grabs” (8). Although scholars have often dismissed terrorism as politically barren, Gage claims: “To the degree that terrorism stoked this sense of disorder, providing a dramatic example of destruction and class vengeance, it was a remarkably effective political tool” (8).
The author dates the era of anarchist bomb throwing and assassination in America to the arrival of German firebrand Johann Most in 1882. Most published a famous manual for preparing dynamite bombs and other nasty surprises for the bourgeoisie. He found an America in which “hundreds, if not thousands, of striking workers died at the hands of policemen and armed guards, and in which almost a hundred were killed each day in industrial accidents” (43). It was also an America in which the top 2 percent owned 60 percent of the wealth and one fourth of poor children died before reaching adulthood (24).
If Most was a foreigner and an anarchist, Big Bill Haywood, who helped found the Industrial Workers of the World in 1905, was neither. Nevertheless, Haywood “came to serve as the symbol of an increasingly radical, growing, and decidedly American labor movement whose fate was tied, more and more, to the national debate over the problem of ‘dynamite’” (70). Other labor leaders also believed that American workers needed to defend themselves by force if necessary against brutal assaults by strike-breaking guards, private detectives, and troops. The most spectacular example of labor-related terrorism was the October 1, 1910, bombing of the Los Angeles Times building, which killed twenty-one men. The bombing was carried out by midlevel union men, the McNamara brothers, from the International Association of Bridge and Structural Iron Workers. “According to one government report, between 1906 and 1911 … [the I.A.B.S.I.W.] carried out no fewer than one hundred dynamite attacks on nonunion work sites: bridges, viaducts, even an opera house and a hotel” (90–91). Gage's conclusion: “The McNamara case did for labor what the McKinley assassination had done for anarchism: confirm, in no uncertain terms, that the rumors of recent years—of bloodshed and murder, of secret plots and elaborate conspiracies—were more or less true” (90). This assertion, however, is open to some amendment. Up to this point, anarchist terrorists in the United States had operated essentially alone. Whereas Alexander Berkman received a little help from Emma Goldman in carrying out his 1892 attack on Carnegie Steel manager Henry Clay Frick, Leon Czolgosz assassinated President McKinley in September 1901 without any kind of assistance or as part of a larger conspiracy.
This more solitary approach changed in 1914 when a group of anarchists inspired by the rhetoric and writings of the charismatic Luigi Galleani began a more or less coordinated campaign of revenge bombings that continued into the 1920s. In 1914–15, presumed anarchists carried out ten attacks in New York City alone. Especially after America's entrance into World War I, such violence provoked an increasingly severe government crackdown, which in turn inspired new anarchist acts of revenge.
In addition to discussing anarchists and violence-prone labor agitators, Gage provides a history of the police and detectives who fought them—and who tried to find out who bombed Wall Street. She provides some fascinating conclusions about the growing fusion between federal and private police. The career of the “Great Detective” William J. Burns, reputedly a genius, was a prime example (137). Burns became head of the Justice Department's Bureau of Investigation in 1921. He had to retire in disgrace, however, after failing to keep his private detection agency completely separate from his public office. Burns was also discredited for publicly expressing the conviction, unsubstantiated by evidence, that the Wall Street bombing was the work of Bolsheviks and the Third International.
Gage also provides insightful conclusions into why, in the 1920s, terrorism as a weapon of class warfare suddenly disappeared from the American scene. In her view, this was due not only to restriction and repression, but also to reform. In the mid-1930s the labor movement finally received the federal protections it had been demanding since the 1870s. Gage's lively and well-argued book will appeal especially to scholars of the development of labor violence and terrorism as a robust strand in the national fiber.
