As the American right wing’s control of national (and local) politics implodes in the United States, there is the inevitable hope wafting in the air as policy specialists and other political activists on the other side of the divide anticipate capturing the US presidency at the end of 2008 to go with the center-left’s majorities won in the US Congress at the end of 2006. And so, health care reform is once again on the march! Alas, if Max Weber was wise to have observed that ideas run upon the tracks of interests, implying clearly that some good ideas die their death because they do not find the right track of interests, while some tracks of interests go nowhere for lack of the right idea, the health policy debate still provides a Technicolor demonstration that the mish and mash of this and that is not yet pointing the country in any particular direction, regardless of election outcomes in 2006 and 2008. Worse yet, in spite of the great sociologist Reinhard Bendix’s demonstration in his masterwork Kings or People (Reference Bendix1978) that non-incremental transformations often occur at critical junctures of a nation’s history due to the diffusion effects of ideas from abroad, there is no evidence in the current (or past) American debate that the country has ever learned anything at all or thinks it has anything at all to learn from the way these problems are grappled with, and more successfully, elsewhere. (Oh, let’s just take Japan, France, Germany, Spain, Canada, the UK, and a handful of other countries as quick examples.)
In his perceptive review of two other volumes – these both explicitly from right-wing thinkers – Tim Jost (Reference Jost2007) showed a tenacious hold – in spite of glaring realities – of the so-called competition dogma on that whole realm of right-wing thinking about the health policy disaster in the United States. Worse, as Jost despairingly demonstrates quite well, these right-wing thinkers almost do not think that much at all is wrong with the American health care system in the first place, and so what tinkering may need to be done around the margins can be confined to perfecting ever-better mechanisms of competition within the current system. Oh my. We are in a mess, as the title of Richmond and Fein’s volume here flatly suggests. But first, more blather and chatter, to add to the two books in Jost’s fine review, can be found in the Porter and Teisberg’s business-school treatise under review here. It’s a thick, heavy tome: 506 pages including notes and index, which virtually guarantees that no business executive in health care, none of them outside health care but concerned by it (all the ones whose businesses face rising premiums, for starters), or any policymaker in or around the health policy debate will ever read it. So, let us jump straight to their conclusions about what ails American health care and how to fix it:
Health care is on a collision course with patient needs and economic reality. Without significant changes, the scale of the problem will only get worse. Rising costs, mounting evidence of quality problems, and increasing numbers of Americans without insurance are unacceptable and unsustainable. (p. 380)
So far, so good. My last flight attendant, my dry cleaners lady, my garage mechanic, my bank branch manager, my Starbucks barrista, the check-out guy at Target, everyone in America knows this already (except, I suppose, those in and around the right-wing think tanks). Not only that, but we have all been saying this at least since the Clinton campaign of 1992 and the his-and-her failed reforms of 1993–94, if not long before that. So what do we do about it? Porter and Teisberg believe that the right kind of competition holds the key, which they refer to as ‘value competition’: ‘Zero-sum competition to shift cost is a road to nowhere’, they say.
Competing on value is a positive-sum competition in which all participants in the system can win. When providers succeed in delivering superb care moreefficiently, patients, health plans, and employers also succeed. When health plans help patients and referring physicians make better informed choices, seek out superior care, and assist in the coordination of care, excellent providers also benefit. Competing on value also goes beyond economic success. When physicians and other health professionals compete to achieve the best medical outcomes for patients, they pursue the aims that led them to the profession in the first place. No longer are economic realities and personal values in conflict. (p. 382)
How wonderful. (Does the adjective ‘utopian’ come to mind?) And like many business school professors before them, they stride forward with the self-evident confidence that, since the theory is so clean, reality cannot be far behind. (However, rather than theory, these claims constitute little more than a series of propositions, not even hypotheses.) Yet for all the good just waiting to be unleashed among all the hosts of diverse actors in the private sector (including the poor patients themselves), something extra will be required to bring all these elements into place, according to Porter and Teisberg: the government!
Government’s fundamental role in this revolution [!] is to put in place the infrastructure and rules that enable value-based competition. Government must ensure that the right kind of competition takes place. This will require overseeing the development of risk-adjusted outcome measures for every medical condition, requiring mandatory reporting of the results, opening up provider and health plan competition, defining new rules for pricing, and speeding the introduction of information technology, among other steps. At the same time, government must ensure that health insurance is available to all citizens, with consistent standards for minimum coverage. With a new kind of competition, universal insurance will become a practical reality [as a by-product?], rather than a hope that the nation cannot afford. (p. 384)
Such a laundry list would be a tall order for a top–down leveraged political system, like that in France or Japan. Imagine such a ‘revolution’ in the flat, diffuse-network system that is America. For this is the key weakness, indeed the fatal flaw of this long treatise. Lots of interconnected nice ideas and many diverse interests in the system never come together because the vested, highly segmented institutions of the system have both a strong interest in keeping it the way it is and the ability to exploit the diffuse veto-vulnerable American political system to keep it that way. It is all quite tautological, this nonsense: to change the behavior of the system, all one has to do is change the system’s incentive structures. But, politically in America, that’s the whole problem! And it is a deep structural problem, not a conjunctural one.
Happily, Richmond and Fein at least show a keen and sustained sensitivity to the reality of institutions and of politics in the American system and its reigning structural suboptimality. In a readable book of 307 pages, including notes and index, they never lose sight of how to strive to construct the possible out of this universe of catastrophic suboptimality. And not least in all this, they clearly recognize that the stickiness of these reigning suboptimal structures and the mess of politics surrounding and imbedded within all that is health care in America today will almost always triumph over any rare conjuncture that might occur to override the structures.
Much of the Richmond and Fein’s book (chapters 1–6) is a clear and plain history of why American health care looks like it looks today. That alone is a pretty nice contribution, although inevitably depressing. But the real value in the book, even for those that may, in the end, disagree, is their finely calibrated analysis of what, now, is possible in this suboptimal universe. These and related arguments by other scholars and actors in the field are particularly salient now, if and when a left-center president is elected in 2008.
While, intellectually, Richmond and Fein would clearly favor a non-incremental overhaul of all the suboptimalities of the American health care system, the rest of their book is, to the contrary, a painstaking argument for incrementalism. This is not the sexy way out of the American health care dilemma, but it is far more realistic and deserves a sustained look by those running for office right now. Hillary? Barack? John? (And the others, of course.) The final pages of the book (pp. 239–263) are the key to understanding their argument for an intelligent incrementalism: while many would-be reformers are rightly enthralled (intellectually) with single-payer systems, with replacing the employer base with the government, and with universally mandated insurance (sort of like that for car owners!), Richmond and Fein argue that, no matter how attractive, these will simply not happen on the reality of the political terrain of the United States.
Their recommended incrementalism, if one accepts their dismissal of more comprehensive approaches, is worth a close look: a ‘road map’ (their label) to an incremental approach to structuring universal insurance. Their map involves three main approaches: phasing, enrollment and financing, program administration and cost containment. First, phasing in universal health insurance should be done by key demographic age groups, ‘starting with the children’ (itself the obvious mobilizing slogan), not by income level or state of residency. There are two keys here in the American context: first, some significant programs covering children (the so-called SCHIP programs) have already been put into place in some American states, including politically right-leaning ones (e.g. Georgia). Second, with the right phasing intervals and sequences, no child once covered, as she or he grew older, would ever leave a state of being covered. Truly universal coverage is not accomplished immediately, but within a generation, it is!
Second, the model for preferred enrollment and financing mechanisms is the Federal Employees Health Benefits (FEHB) program. In it, the federal government already covers 9 million beneficiaries through private fee-for-service insurers and organized delivery systems (e.g., HMOs). The government is the organizer of a competitive market and convenes the participants. This direct model would be generalized to the newly covered populations. Third, the major structural innovation offered by Richmond and Fein is in the area of program administration and cost containment. Here they propose nothing short of a completely new system of regional public boards, autonomous from politics, closely modeled after the network of federal reserve banks that make up America’s central banking system. These regional boards, just as with the federal reserve system, would be charged with overseeing and regulating planning and spending across the whole of the health care system. These regional authorities, reporting through a central national structure (again, just as with the federal reserve system), would be responsible most critically for regional and national health care operating and capital budgets. If it works for interest rates (which can raise highly contentious policy questions, especially if one goes back in history), then perhaps it can work for the macro-elements of the health care system. In a way, it is not hard to imagine that any initial controversies, with the benefits of just five to ten years of operation will have settled down into common routine, just as with monetary policy.
There are many nuances to the incrementalist argument advanced by Richmond and Fein, and they are all clearly laid out. It is particularly attractive that they build upon or adapt directly from currently existing and successful institutions within the American realm. But there is a terribly important caveat to all this: assuming that a center-left majority holds the US Congress after 2008 and a center-left president is elected late that year as well, the heavy catastrophic legacies of the Bush adventures in Iraq may keep any substantial health care reform nonetheless off the national agenda. Any center-left US government after 2008 will have to immediately confront the urgent imperatives of extricating the country from the military disaster in Iraq and the Middle East and extricating it from the disastrous financial consequences that have flowed from that enormous spending along with the Bush tax-cutting. The new president’s agenda will be overwhelmingly consumed by these two imperatives and there is not likely to be any political time or resources left over to do anything else. So, any substantial health policy reform will likely have to await that president’s second term (or a new one’s first term) beginning in January 2013.
Alas, in American health policy, plus ça change, plus c’est la meme chose, et tout cela, c’est pour le pire.
