Somaliland, a former British protectorate, became an independent state on 26 June 1960 after deliberations at Lancaster House in London. So swift was it that less than a week later – on 1 July 1960 – it joined the ex-Italian Trust Territory of Somalia to form the now defunct Somali Republic. The idea of amalgamation emanated officially from a motion issued in April 1960 by the Legislative Council of British Somaliland, which unanimously called for union with the erstwhile Somalia Italiana. The merger was a sort of an arranged marriage between two borrowed states, as soon demonstrated by the impetuous coup d’état in 1961 when Sandhurst-graduate junior military officers attempted to stage a coup with the intention of seceding from Somalia. The aborted coup was triggered after 54% of the Somaliland population (then northern Somalia) voted against a constitutional referendum. Thirty years later, when the Somali Republic disintegrated in 1991, Somaliland constructed a new state upon a new African concept of a state (an indigenous form of governance), whereas state-building in southern Somalia has had to follow procedures laid down by the international community. Somaliland's case gained acclaim in contrast with other post-conflict successful African states, i.e. Angola, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mozambique and Sierra Leone, for it formed state institutions with its own devices and resources under the aegis of no foreign intervention. Even though it tastes and smells like a Weberian state, Somaliland has remained a de facto state and has not yet attained the much sought-after international recognition.
In this well-researched study, an expansion of a PhD dissertation submitted to the Ghent University in Belgium, Dr Renders unravels how Somaliland's state structures can legitimately be attached to local traditional clan institutions in the form of a hybrid political order. She suggests how hard it is to distinguish the logics of state from clanship in local polity and shows both are ‘part of the same story, part of the same political dynamic’ interplaying in the same polity (p. 57). For a state based on a clan to function – so the theory goes – it is necessary to understand the clanship and clan social structure of stateless societies. Indeed, Somaliland's success of state-building on a traditional basis has been enigmatic to western donors trying to impose their models on Somalia. The apparent irony is that Somaliland has a stronger sense of traditional clan rule than southern Somalia, a consequence of the fact that the clan system rules where there exists a semblance of governance. The traditional customary law, Heer – a contractual law between clans – is still in practice in Somaliland, whereas in southern Somalia it withered and, even where it still exists, there is a minimal respect for it. The composition of grafting Somaliland's traditional elders and their clan institutions onto the state structures dated back to the colonial era, when the British officials utilised them to maintain law and order. Renders makes a somewhat unconvincing argument that the Guurtis (the elders' councils) are a post-colonial phenomenon. In fact, when the French traveller George Revoil surveyed Somaliland in the mid-nineteenth century, he observed the authority of the clan elders; nonetheless, the contemporary concept on which the Guurtis is based today seems distinct.
Renders delimits her discussion to the first Somaliland presidential election in 2003. Missing in her otherwise thorough exploration is the most salient yet turning point election in 2010 that culminated in Ahmed Silanyo's rise to power. She also succinctly reviews the warrior Mohamed Abdulle Hassan, known as the ‘Mad Mullah’; however, any serious work referring to the protracted war against the British would not omit influential works of Drake-Brockmann, Hamilton, Jardine, Martin and McNeill. It left this reviewer wishing that such a scholarly laxity could have been avoided if she had distanced herself from a reductionist approach in Somali Studies, namely the tendency to use selective references. By contrast, Hagmann, in his study published in this journal, noted that the clan elders in the Somali region of Ethiopia, Somaliland's next-door neighbour, are elected for a five-year term of office. Renders does not stick to her initial theoretical framework to critically evaluate the fact that elders act outside state institutions and are easily manipulated by handouts, as seen in their confrontation with the late former Somaliland president Mohamed Haji Ibahim Egal who bought peace by bribing his truculent opponents. Even though Renders squares clan elders with those who run the state, she avoids regarding them as state elders or, simply put, ‘government elders’.
The book unfortunately contains typographical errors with both Anglicised and Americanised word usage, accentuated by numerous missing references in the bibliography. These flaws notwithstanding, this is a timely contribution to the discourse on stateness – the concept of becoming a state – in Somali Studies. Renders has produced an elegantly written book that adds fresh insight into state-building scholarship in fragile and failing states. The study complements preceding volumes on Somaliland by Lewis and Bradbury. Renders provides an up-to-date bibliography, albeit with numerous avoidable errors.
