
This book is a big ask for both the author and reader – for the author in trying to persuade the reader that coercive measures in psychiatric practice cannot be justified, and for the reader to challenge their own preconceptions of the use of coercion in clinical practice. For most clinicians this will challenge fundamental concepts around diagnosis and treatment. The aim of the book is to explain why coercion can no longer be justified in mental healthcare and to consider what a psychiatry without coercion could look like. The author noted that human rights are currently hardly being promoted, especially in psychiatry, and there is evidence that coercive treatment has increased in many countries.
The book consists of 9 chapters and 140 pages. Some sections of text are verbose. This appeared to be the author’s style, as opposed to the book having been translated from German. The writing is passionate, and in places provocative, which challenges the reader to consider a proposed tsunami of change in practice, e.g. psychiatric coercion is predominantly not carried out for the benefit of the person and is generally not used as a last resort or least restrictive approach; there is considerable doubt about the effectiveness of psychiatric therapies in general; and the biopsychosocial model has been ‘controversial for some time’. The author examines the validity of diagnosing mental disorders/illness which, in his view, remain to be clarified. A philosophical discussion about the psyche and consciousness underpin this, with him preferring an ‘illusionism thesis of consciousness’, i.e. consciousness is an illusion that our brain presents to us (hence if we do not understand the existence of the human psyche and know exactly what a mental disorder is, then an essential argument for justifying the use of coercion no longer applies).
Mental disorders are seen as social constructs, and the author uses the term ‘psychosocial problems’ instead. Symptoms such as auditory hallucinations/delusions can be viewed as neutral phenomena, and may be reconceptualised by ‘demedicalising and de-psychiatrising’ them. He opines that people with psychosocial problems should themselves decide whether they consider themselves ill or not. Consequently, he advocates for human rights-based psychosocial support for people with psychosocial problems. The decisive factor is the person’s preference – preference-oriented support being advocated (which does not preclude conventional treatments and hospital admissions). Chapter 7 – ‘Human rights-based psychosocial support’ – is the best chapter, and crystallises this in more detail by applying these concepts in practice, although this could have been improved had worked case examples been used.
Did the book persuade me that coercive-free clinical practice is achievable? No, but it did provide a fundamentally different view that made me reflect on my own clinical practice. For those who have a more philosophical outlook or approach to clinical practice, this could be a book for you.

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