Uncovering the Constitution's Moral Design is a work of analytical philosophy addressing the question “Is the Constitution any good?” Paul R. DeHart believes that this question is best answered through the philosophical method of inference to the best explanation. By reasoning closely from the pattern of institutional arrangements created by the Constitution, he argues, we may better understand its moral assumptions.

The book begins with a review of previous attempts to explain the Constitution's normative framework. Although the cover jacket proclaims that DeHart rejects “the standard approach of the intellectual historian,” he spends only a few pages explaining why this approach is problematic (26-31). His brief arguments here will persuade few, but he is on far firmer ground when he proceeds in the second chapter to describe the philosophical method of inference to the best explanation and defend the value of applying it to the Constitution. Taken as an approach that may be used alongside work by intellectual historians, his method has much to offer.

At the book's core are four chapters addressing the Constitution's assumptions about sovereignty, the common good, natural law, and natural rights. In each, DeHart considers possible answers that conform to three general schools of thought: (1) classical constitutionalism, which “acknowledges the supremacy of justice and the invalidity of laws that violate natural justice,” (2) modernist constitutionalism, which focuses on securing “peace in the face of religious and moral disagreement,” and (3) positivist constitutionalism, which contends that law is simply “whatever the sovereign commands” (6). He fleshes out each category and then rigorously considers which one best explains “constitutional facts” such as separation of powers, checks and balances, and limits on power contained in Article I, Sections 8 and 9 (85).

To make a long story short; DeHart concludes that the Constitution is, in fact, good. Specifically, he contends that it “presupposes (1) a constrained popular sovereign; (2) a real, teleological, and thick common good; (3) a natural law that provides a standard to which human laws must conform in order to obligate, which is known through non-instrumental reason and which is known at least to most; and (4) that natural rights are logically dependent on a prior natural law” (242-43). As well, he disposes of bad philosophical arguments that are, nevertheless, repeatedly heard in contemporary political discourse — including discourse by academics who should know better. For instance, he demonstrates that belief in moral realism does not entail a commitment to imposing morality on others (46-67).

As a work of political philosophy, DeHart's book is persuasive. He provides excellent arguments supporting his view that the Constitution presupposes a classical moral framework. One might expect a work on this subject to consider implications for jurists and others who must interpret specific provisions of the Constitution, but DeHart never engages in such analysis. In fact, he offers no substantial discussion of any legal case or contemporary political or jurisprudential issue. This is not necessarily a criticism of a book already 300 pages long, but it is an obligatory warning to readers interested in such issues.

Uncovering the Constitution's Moral Design is an innovative and significant book. It deserves to be widely read by students of the U.S. Constitution, constitutionalism, and political philosophy.