Was Machiavelli an earnest rhetorician, a clever ironist, or a flip-flopper? Five hundred years after Machiavelli wrote The Prince, three scholars disagree about what the Florentine intended: Maurizio Viroli claims that Machiavelli sought a virtuous and ambitious new prince who would save Italy; Erica Benner thinks that he was trying to save Italy from its base and ambitious princes; Mark Jurdjevic is of the opinion that Machiavelli changed his thinking to save Florence from wretchedness. In their disparate theses, these three books demonstrate the rich diversity of Machiavelli scholarship, and illuminate important debates about Machiavelli’s rhetoric, republicanism, and hopes for supremely virtuous men.
Machiavelli’s Prince is the first chapter-by-chapter interpretation of The Prince to appear in almost 15 years. A welcome arrival, it is a carefully considered examination that sheds much light on Machiavelli’s text and rhetoric. Benner argues that The Prince is a “masterwork of ironic writing with a moral purpose,” namely, to convey a “biting critique of both ruthless realpolitik and amoral pragmatism” (pp. xxi–xxii) that leads the reader—in a way that is both dialogical and subtle—through myriad poisonous ironies and rhetorical feints to understand the “powerfully reasoned undercurrents” in favor of republics that feature “reciprocal trust between leaders and citizens/subjects, and between states and their external allies” (p. 326). In arguing thus, Benner advances the central claim of her Machiavelli’s Ethics (2009): Machiavelli is a moral thinker, in the tradition of ancient political thought.
Benner’s key analytical innovation is the identification of positive and negative “coded words” in Machiavelli’s work (p. liii). She associates these words with either virtue or fortune: Pairs include “one’s own” and “others;” “citizens” and “subjects;” “acquire” and “seize;” and “stability” and “variation” (p. 1iii). Benner then tracks Machiavelli’s use of these terms in her analysis, using their presence or absence to help penetrate Machiavelli’s ironical presentation. Although scholars will not always agree with Benner’s judgment of Machiavelli’s language, they will profit from her work to assemble this list of terms and track their usage in The Prince. Her portrayal of the “ill-focused hyperactivity” of “fortune-addicted” contemporary princes is penetrating and witty (pp. 106, 227). Her excavation of Machiavelli’s subtle critique of empire (pp. 32–66) and account of Cesare Borgia’s failures (pp. 89–110) are particularly strong. In her discussion of virtue (Chapters 15–18), Benner keenly detects Machiavelli’s consonance with certain ancient teachings—while nonetheless understating his dissonance with Christian virtue and blurring distinctions among Greek and Roman, and private and civic, notions thereof.
In A Great and Wretched City, by contrast, Jurdjevic views Machiavelli’s intellectual career as a movement away from the ancients. He intends to reveal the “Florentine dimensions of Machiavelli’s arguments” by comparing his teachings on the people, the great, and the requirements of republican governance in what Jurdjevic describes as “his earlier Roman and later Florentine republicanisms” (pp. 2, 55). According to the author, The Prince and the Discourses on Livy exhibit the former; the Florentine Histories and the Discourse on Florentine Affairs adumbrate the latter. Readers who seek Machiavelli’s thought in The Prince risk missing the “mature” reflections of the Florentine, which are aimed at leading his native city to greatness (p. 211).
After Jurdjevic offers a capable, yet awkwardly appended, treatment of Savonarola and Machiavelli (Chapter 1), the first part of his main argument (Chapter 2) is that Machiavelli’s praise for Rome in the Discourses betrayed growing doubts about the wisdom and sustainability of Roman republicanism (p. 56) and a wavering belief in the “unbounded potential” of princes (p. 70). The Discourses thus provides no “procedural blueprint” and is merely a waypoint on Machiavelli’s journey to a more complex Florentine understanding of “social groups and structures of power, whether rooted in class, rank, or faction” (p. 79). Having established nuance in Machiavelli’s early republican thought, Jurdjevic largely dismantles that edifice in Chapters 3 and 4. The Prince and the Discourses are now “robustly antielite” (p. 84) books, in which Machiavelli is “uniformly critical” (p. 84) of the elites and ascribes “collective wisdom to the people” (p. 80). Citing instances in the Histories in which Machiavelli criticizes the people for their passion and lack of wisdom (pp. 104–16) and praises the nobles for their martial ferocity and virtue (pp. 92–102, 128), Jurdjevic concludes that Machiavelli’s opinion has changed.
In his claims about Machiavelli’s early writings (supported by scattered decontextualized quotations), Jurdjevic appears to be repeating an un-nuanced version of John McCormick's (Machiavellian Democracy, 2011) thesis: Yet unlike McCormick—or Benner, who devotes 300 pages of careful argumentation to prove what Jurdjevic claims breezily—the latter does not engage Machiavelli’s texts with much rigor, omits lengthy discussion of several passages that pose difficulties for his view of these groups (see especially Discourses I.53, 54, and 57 and The Prince, Chapters 5, 6, 9, and 18), and does not note the existence of dissenting scholarship that has examined this aspect of Machiavelli’s republicanism (Vickie Sullivan’s and Harvey Mansfield’s works on republics are most strikingly absent). His treatment of the commonalities between the Histories and the Discourse (Chapters 5–7) is more thorough and illuminating, but his narrative remains largely descriptive. Jurdjevic concludes that the Histories constitute “a study in applied history” (p. 211) that can enable Florence to become the “great republic with good laws and institutions” that the Discourse sketches (p. 214). Machiavelli thus sheds the awe of Rome that fettered his early works, enabling him to consider the possibilities inherent in practical Florentine politics.
Viroli detects more ambition in Machiavelli. He claims that Machiavelli wrote The Prince “to design and invoke a redeemer of Italy capable of creating, with God’s help, new and good political order, thereby attaining glory” (Redeeming the Prince, 3). This project is closely connected to Viroli’s Machiavelli’s God (2010), where he argued that Machiavelli’s “true hero was Moses” and that “Machiavelli’s God is the God of Florentine Republican Christianity” (p. 61). Here, the author claims that Machiavelli wrote The Prince in order to impel “a new Moses” who might redeem Italy (Redeeming, 53).
Viroli’s central argument (Chapter 1) in his pithy book is that the founders that Machiavelli praises in Chapter 6—Moses, Romulus, Theseus and Cyrus—are imitative models for the Italian redeemer whom Machiavelli encourages in his final chapter. Viroli contributes to a lingering, important debate, and also strengthens his own argument by claiming with the aid of textual analysis (Redeeming, 36–38) and historical evidence (pp. 57–63), that the final chapter was part of Machiavelli’s original text. His other arguments include the less controversial claims that Machiavelli was “a realist with imagination” (Chapter 2, 67) and that he was an avid student and practitioner of rhetoric (Chapter 3). The book closes (Chapter 4) with an account of the literary, philosophical, and political impact of Machiavelli’s “myth of the redeemer,” as various Europeans were attracted and repelled by Machiavelli’s The Prince; some of this material also appeared in Machiavelli’s God.
These three scholars make distinct claims about Machiavelli’s rhetoric. While Jurdjevic ascribes a paradoxical quality to the Discourses (Great and Wretched City, 66–70), since he generally thinks that Machiavelli was earnestly fumbling for clarity, he ruminates extensively on neither Machiavelli’s rhetoric nor his irony. Viroli’s claim regarding Machiavelli’s rhetoric is contentious only because he attributes so much significance to it and views its aims as so transparent (Redeeming, 17, 98–112). Is rhetoric incompatible with carefully concealed subversive argumentation? Those like Benner (Machiavelli's Prince, 325) who identify Machiavelli’s kinship with Xenophon might note that a powerful rhetorical exhortation can be used to mask or even convey profoundly subversive arguments. Yet Viroli strongly believes (Redeeming, 64–65) that Machiavelli is an ardent patriot—and remains skeptical of more skeptical readings of the final chapter of The Prince (p. 5): thus, he rejects more sinister readings of the book.
Although all three identify Machiavelli as a republican, they nonetheless disagree in important ways. Benner’s argument (e.g., Machiavelli’s Prince, 313–14) persuasively contradicts Jurdjevic’s claim (Wretched City, 72) that Machiavelli was generally too smitten with virtue to be attuned to varied forms of social power in his early writings. Leaving aside Machiavelli’s lengthy discussions of the Senate, consuls, tribunes, and the dictatorship in the Discourses, Jurdjevic’s argument shortchanges Machiavelli’s avowed preference for those who create lasting orders rather than showy individual accomplishments—a preference that Benner (Machievelli’s Prince, 313) and Viroli (Redeeming, 92), despite important disagreements, both detect in Machiavelli’s princely book. If Machiavelli emphasizes institutions rather than virtuous individuals in his Florentine writings (Wretched City, 72), perhaps this is due to the decline of virtue in “these corrupt centuries of ours” (Discourses II.19), a development that Jurdjevic himself notes (Wretched City, 98) and Benner’s critique implicitly acknowledges. Viroli—whose hopes for Italy remain lofty—retains more optimism about Italy’s future.
Each scholar addresses the status of the virtuous founder in Machiavelli’s thought. Jurdjevic thinks that Machiavelli eventually sheds his immature attachment to the redeemer-prince (ibid., 10, 211). Benner agrees, but eschews Jurjevic’s historicist framework. Indeed, her controversial claim about the founders leads her to bend the main support of her analytical framework: By claiming that Machiavelli’s praise of their virtue is “suspiciously ironic,” she temporarily abandons the notion that virtue is a positively coded word (Machiavelli’s Prince, 71–72; see also 111–17). Benner adeptly (pp. 77–79) teases out the moral ambiguity of those who put themselves at the head of new orders, but her claim that “their unchecked appetites and spirits will put an unbearable strain on virtuous orders, and make life unnecessarily dangerous for their fatherlands” (p. 79) does not, perhaps, account sufficiently for the commonsense claim that despite their faults, these men were able to establish orders that lasted well beyond their lifetimes. Yet because Benner is convinced that violence cannot reliably engender political faith or good orders (p. 81), and that men cannot virtuously combine badness and goodness in a way that supports stable political orders (pp. 220–24), she judges that Machiavelli polishes these models in order to encourage “more modestly but reliably virtuous ways” (p. 82). For Benner, Hiero—who ruled Syracuse “with transparent, orderly procedures” (p. 103) and exemplifies “the unremarkable-looking qualities that create and maintain good orders” (p. 87)—is Machiavelli’s truest model for princes.
Benner most persistently engages Machiavelli’s sources, which renders her praise of Hiero especially puzzling. Benner acknowledges that he leads his army to slaughter (ibid., 165–66), an act of treacherous violence perhaps excused by their mercenary status, but she does not report Livy’s intimation that he was willing to assassinate his own son (Livy 23.30), and most importantly, dramatically overstates the “lasting security” (p. 99) he gifted to Syracuse. Despite his republican intentions and his stately funeral, Livy reports that Hiero’s legacy was the annihilation of his family, civil discord, and Roman plots (Livy 24.4–34). What people would prefer those orders to those of a founder, however criminal? Indeed, the notion that Machiavelli would recommend a prince who could not produce lasting orders and, moreover, could not escape the orbit of Rome, defies Benner’s own thesis. Romans stalk other examples of ethical behavior cited by Benner. Both the “humane concern” of Dido for Aeneas (compare Machiavelli’s Prince, 206, with Aeneid 1.563–564 and 4.279–665) and Philopoemon’s “firm commitments” to Rome (compare Machiavelli's Prince, 259–60 with Livy 39.35–37 and 39.48) are repaid with faithless ambition that invites disaster upon the ethical. Thus, the historical record to which Machiavelli refers suggests that his ironical presentation may be more complicated—and subversive—than even Benner indicates. Wherever men are bent on greatness, humanity and faith may be more perilous policies than she suggests: To confront human badness, must one exhibit a degree of badness incompatible with Benner’s ethical vision of Machiavelli?
Whereas Benner is critical of the founders, Viroli’s persistent pairing of “founder and redeemer” suggests the opposite view (Redeeming, 66). Pairing these two terms allows Viroli to advance surreptitiously his broad claim that Machiavelli believes in the promise of “Florentine Republican Christianity” (Machiavelli’s God, 61). Machiavelli does not, however, use the words “redeem,” “redemption,” or “redeemer” until Chapter 26. Moreover, they arise in that chapter only in the context of dashed or unrealistic hopes: An unnamed candidate was “ordered by God” to redeem Italy, but failed; Italy “prays to God” for a redeemer, but the best that He can provide is yet another Medici (a family that Viroli [Redeeming, 49, 53], unlike Jurdjevic [Wretched City, 176], identifies as insufficient); the only men who successfully redeemed their provinces are not Italians but two pagans and a Jew. Pagans are long dead, and Jews do not fare well in sixteenth-century Europe. Who could this redeemer be?
“A new Moses,” says Viroli (Redeeming, 53). Does this make Italians akin to the Hebrew slaves? Who is their pharaoh? Can we expect Italy’s redeemer to treat his people as Moses did at Sinai? And even if he is successful, can one really expect a freedom-loving republic to emerge from the corrupt and ill-armed Italians that Benner (Machiavelli’s Prince, Chapters 7–13) describes in such detail? These authors agree that Machiavelli prefers republics, but given the corruption noted by Jurdjevic and the self-destructive behavior of Italian princes noted by Benner, one wonders whether any Italian possesses the virtue required for this enterprise.
By offering different judgments of Machiavelli’s intentions, these books illuminate an important debate about the history of political thought that is especially germane to the study of Machiavelli: To what degree is Machiavelli’s thought constrained by his historical circumstances? That Machiavelli is preoccupied with the events of his time—and especially the state of contemporary Italy—is not controversial. But are his judgments about what ought to be done circumscribed by the horizons of Florentine politics, Italian politics, or Christendom? Or do his ruminations on ancient history and his oblique references to classical philosophy indicate a broader perspective—one that can transcend the corruption, weakness, and futility for which he so frequently castigates his contemporary world?
