Animal welfare

The point of departure that has led to the basic regulation as well as the main incentive for adopting a ban were perceived shortcomings in animal welfare practises in the commercial seal hunts. Ultimately, a major goal, although not present in the regulation itself, was the improvement of animal welfare conditions in the commercial seal hunt. Has the ban contributed to the attainment of this goal? Three aspects must be considered in order to find an answer to this question: firstly, regulatory and managerial aspects must be considered; secondly, enforcement schemes must be evaluated; thirdly, the hunters’ application of possible changes must be evaluated in the field. However, a direct relationship between changes in Canadian seal hunting legislation, enforcement schemes and practices and the European seal products trade regulation cannot be established in a satisfactory manner. In order to do so, a close-up analysis of Canadian policy-making process needs to be undertaken, which would have to reflect the normative change in Canadian sealing discourses based on European actions. Obviously, the same would apply to other areas and countries where seal hunting is conducted. This, however, goes beyond the scope of this article.

Notwithstanding, there are indications that Canadian policy making processes have been influenced by the European initiatives to impose a ban on commercial seal products. In 2009 the Department for Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO) amended the Marine Mammal Regulations (MMR) under which sealing is regulated in order to increase the standards of animal welfare in seal hunting. Based on a report by the International Veterinarians working group (IVWG) and the recommendations it set forth (Smith and others Reference Smith, Caraguel, Crook, Daoust, Dunn, Lair, Longair, Philippa, Routh and Tuttle2005: 21, 22), the three-step-process, stunning, checking, bleeding, was included in the Canadian seal hunting legislation, while at the same time the hakapik, a wooden club with a hammer head and a spike, and a club were both prohibited as initial stunning tools for seals over one year of age. The DFO emphasises that these standards correspond to those standards set out by EFSA in its 2007 report (Canada 2009). While not the cause for the changes in MMR per se, this direct reference indicates the influence European initiatives have had on the policies embraced by Canada regarding seal hunting methods and standards. However, it is not regulation 1007/2009 that caused these changes. Rather, the language of the MMR shows that the discursive and legal environment surrounding seal hunting was influenced by this regulation. This, however, does not mean that animal welfare in practice has actually improved.

In order to determine this, it must be clarified what animal welfare entails. This is problematic as within the discourse of a trade ban and animal welfare improvement no clear-cut definition of ‘animal welfare’ has been enunciated. The concept is ambiguous. Generally, animal welfare is a broad concept, which refers to the ability of an individual animal to cope with its environment, and does not refer directly to the state of the overall species population. ‘Welfare’, however, is not equal to ‘suffering’. The latter implies a state of consciousness and may include pain, fear or distress. Welfare issues for wild animals may arise when the state of an individual animal is negatively affected by threats from its environment, stemming from for example, food scarcity, reproductive difficulties or general environmental conditions that make survival particularly difficult or even unlikely. These may occur without the animal consciously suffering (Broom Reference Broom1991: 4168–4170), however in a state of degrading quality of life. The reduction of suffering in human-animal interaction does not untie the knot of human domination over animals. If the discussion surrounding animal welfare were to consider animals’ right to life, the concept of ‘animal welfare’ would result in an abolishment of cruelty, suffering and ultimately death to animals, and would ensure that all animals can live in their natural environment without being exploited for human purposes. Consequently, a meta-goal of improving animal welfare as such in the commercial seal hunt creates significant conceptual difficulties.

Since the adoption of the EU ban and the coming into force of its implementation regulation, two studies have been carried out evaluating the animal welfare aspects of the Canadian commercial seal hunt (Butterworth and Richardson 2012; Daoust and Caraguel Reference Daoust and Caraguel2012). While seemingly indicating a recent evaluation of the hunt, both studies evaluate different seal hunts prior to 2009, and therefore cannot be taken as indicators of the improvement or degradation of animal welfare conditions in the hunt. Thus, it cannot yet be ascertained whether the EU's seal ban has had a direct impact on the hunting conditions. Interestingly, the two studies contradict each other. While Butterworth and Richardson identify the seal hunt as inherently inhumane, Daoust and Caraguel describe the applied killing methods as meeting high animal welfare standards. Given the absence of scientific proof of a change in the applied methods between the time before and after the EU seal products ban, at the time of writing it cannot be ascertained whether the EU ban has succeeded in improving animal welfare conditions in the seal hunt. Fieldwork on a commercial sealing vessel sailing from northern Newfoundland carried out by the author in April 2013 ascribes to the hunt very high animal welfare standards as instantaneous death or irretrievable unconsciousness of a seal occurred in some 98% of the approximately 2000 shot seals. However, according to non-structured interviews with first and second generation sealers from the area, hunting methods have not changed in spite of regulatory issues undergoing changes. As far as compliance is concerned, the mere potential presence of DFO and Coast Guard vessels in the area (the prevailing narrative of the sealers was ‘We don't see them, but they see us’) led to a continuous and stringent application of the three-step-process, ensuring the quick and painless killing and skinning of seals. It is therefore the Canadian regulations, not the EU regulation, that shape the application of animal welfare criteria, which in turn however have indeed experienced some influence by the policy shaping process of the basic regulation.

The regulation's impact on the overall welfare conditions of seals in their natural environment cannot be quantitatively measured. Although it can be argued that the ban has contributed to a reduction of the number of seals that are killed by creating an unfavourable trade environment for commercially hunted seal products and therefore elevated the hunting standards and regulations, there is no indication that the seal as part of the marine ecosystem has benefited from the ban. In fact, Newfoundland fishing communities are concerned with potential negative influences the ban may have had on the marine ecosystem, as a large-scale sustainable commercial hunt is perceived to contribute to avoiding an overabundance of seals.

Not affecting Inuit or other indigenous communities

The EU seal product trade ban is intended not to affect Inuit or other indigenous communities. But there is no universal definition of the term ‘indigenous’ as the 2007 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) abstains from a definition. Also 1989 ILO Convention 169 concerning tribal and indigenous peoples in independent countries does not define ‘indigenous peoples’. Instead it highlights that the convention applies to disadvantaged culturally distinct peoples having lived in a certain area prior to colonisation (ILO 1989: article 1). In general, national laws define who indigenous peoples are. On a European level there is no definition of an indigenous people, but as protocol 3 to the accession treaty of Finland and Sweden to the EU shows, recognition of special rights to the Sámi people that are considered indigenous under Swedish and Finnish law occurs on a European level (EUPubl 1994).

EU Regulation 1007/2009 inserts a definition of the term ‘Inuit’ in article 2.4 but it does not define who else with regard to their ‘indigenous’ status it applies to. This creates problems in determining who is exempted from the regulation. In the 1983 directive on trade in products derived from harp and hooded seal pups, Inuit were already exempted. Wenzel has argued that the 1983 ban contributed heavily to a drop in seal pelt prices, ultimately adversely affecting the Inuit hunters who were dependent on access to the commercial markets for seal pelts in order to maintain their subsistence harvesting activities. Operational costs to conduct seal hunting for subsistence purposes were too high, ultimately leading to a decrease in subsistence economy in Inuit seal hunting communities, with negative changes for community viability and the ability to utilise resources for livelihood. While inserting the exemption for Inuit into the 1983 ban, Wenzel claims that European policy makers were reluctant to recognise the economic ties and practises that 100 years of contact and colonisation have created (Wenzel Reference Wenzel1991: 128–133). Also, Usher and others highlight the interdependency of subsistence economy and market mechanisms. They refer to subsistence economy as acting as ‘a sponge, absorbing labour when other opportunities decline, and releasing it when they arise.’ They continue noting that ‘[i]n subsistence-based systems, the ends of economic activity tend to be inseparable from the social system, and are more likely to be the maintenance of the system of social relations rather than accumulation at the level of enterprise’ (Usher and others Reference Usher, Duhaime and Searles2003: 178, 179). Disregarding the importance of the role of subsistence economy in Inuit communities, the cultural differences between Europeans and Inuit as well as Newfoundlanders in the underlying human-animal relationship were a main issue in the adoption of the 1983 directive (Lynge Reference Lynge1991: 28–35).

Inuit organisations and individuals claim the Inuit exemption to be ineffective and the ban to have adverse effects on the sustainability of their livelihoods. Therefore, spearheaded by the Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (ITK), the Canadian Inuit representation, Inuit hunters from Canada and Greenland, hunters organisations, fur traders and seal product processors launched several court cases before the EUGC in order to overturn the ban and the implementing regulation. In its most recent judgement in case T-526/10, seeking the annulment of the implementing regulation, the court has underlined that the Inuit plaintiffs had not presented sufficient evidence of the adverse effects of the ban on their communities, but rather presented generalised statements without substantial proof (EUGC 2013: paragraph 97, 98). However, the 2008 COWI study remarked: ‘[P]olicy measures that have adverse impacts on the image of seal skins and other seal products will have a negative impact on the Inuit population anyway’ (COWI 2008: 117). This impact is highlighted in a small report commissioned by the Nunavut Department of Environment, which presents the decline of the prices for seal skins at the fur harvesters auction (FHA), showing that since the start of the legislative process within the EU to impose a seal products trade ban, prices have dropped from more than 70 CAD per seal skin in 2005 to less than 20 CAD in 2011. Also, the similarity between commercially hunted harp seal products and Inuit-hunted ringed seals make it difficult for the purchasing manufacturers to distinguish between the two species and origins. Ultimately, they prefer abstaining from buying any seal products in the first place (Nunavut 2012: 4–10). Hossain notes that the commercial sale of products stemming from subsistence hunts is an important factor in maintaining the subsistence activities, and stresses that the ‘EU regulation clearly failed to understand this complexity. The strict term ‘traditionally conducted’ provided within its regulation, ignores the broader meaning of the right to subsistence’ (Hossain Reference Hossain2012: 10). This is further elaborated upon in COWI 2010, reaffirming that both Inuit and commercial hunters use the same marketing chains, and that substantial financial efforts would be necessary to separate Inuit seal products from others (COWI 2010: 84).

A difficult situation arises when providing evidence that may not be quantifiable and which is cumulative in nature. The reputational loss of seal hunting, which has traditionally been an integral part of the Inuit culture (Boas Reference Boas1888; Wenzel Reference Wenzel1991; Lynge Reference Lynge1991; Dahl Reference Dahl2000; Pelly Reference Pelly2001), may influence ‘broader socio-cultural factors such as poverty, social disorganization, and loss of tradition’ (Nunavut and others Reference Nuttall2010: 7), contributing to an elevated suicide rate in Nunavut compared to the Canadian average. While the social and economic implications seem clear, it may be difficult to provide satisfactory legal evidence that proves that the seal products ban adversely affects Inuit culture.

In absence of legally valid evidence of the adverse impact of the ban on Inuit culture, the press release of the EUGC provides a public appraisal on the seal products ban vis-à-vis Inuit culture and notes that the fundamental economic and social interests of the Inuit are protected under EU law (EUGC 2013b). The ITK president Terry Audla responded to the press release by stating that ‘[t]he EU has no authority to speak on what is best for Inuit. We Inuit have been telling the EU all along that the ban is not good for us’ (ITK 2013). Nunavut's Minister for Environment, James Arreak, according to Nunatsiaq News, denominates the EU's stance in the seal hunting debate as hypocritical and neo-colonialist (Nunatsiaq News (Iqaluit) 11 June 2013).

The applicability of the Inuit and indigenous exemption

Although absent in the basic regulation and its implementation regulation, COWI 2010 frames the term ‘indigenous’ within the context of seal products: ‘distinct identity; historical continuity; basic rights (specifically the right to natural resources); respect for the integrity and non-discrimination; non-dominant part of society’ (COWI 2010: 8). Given this framing, the Kihnu community of Estonia, living on a small island in the Gulf of Riga in the Baltic Sea, is also considered ‘indigenous’ by making reference to its recognition by UNESCO (COWI 2010: 22). The validity of this claim is doubtful. Although the Kihnu enjoy special recognition under UNESCO's ‘Proclamation of masterpieces of the oral and intangible heritage of humanity’ of 18 May 2001 (UNESCO 2001), under which the Kihnu cultural space was added in 2003, this alone does not grant them indigenous status. Hence, although not internationally recognised as ‘indigenous’, in the context of seal hunting COWI would enable trade in seal products stemming from Kihnu hunts.

The exemptions within the basic and implementing regulation do not fully take into consideration and seem to over-simplify the socio-economic realities of indigenous and non-indigenous seal hunting communities. To clarify this let us take a look at the case of the communities of Woodstock and LaScie, Newfoundland, Canada. Newfoundland is the Canadian province with the largest commercial seal hunt. All criteria brought forth by COWI, as well as the banning regulations, apply, although the seal hunters living in these non-indigenous communities are of European origin.

In these Newfoundland outports there is a tradition of seal hunting (distinct identity, historical continuity, basic rights). The sea is omnipresent in these communities, which are built around small coves, with maritime references and activities as the dominant feature when crossing them. In combination with fisheries, of which seals are a part, as the prime employment opportunity, the notion of ‘having the sea in the blood’ (Three fishermen, personal communications, April 2013) emerges. This creates a distinct personal and cultural identity for the fishermen and their families. The seal hunt as such has been continuing for at least 3 generations with the possibility of future continuation if the markets allow. In Newfoundland in general, commercial seal hunting has been conducted since at least 1793 (Ryan Reference Ryan1994: 54) with deep rooted cultural manifestations in songs and poems (Ryan and Small Reference Ryan and Small1978). As outlined in previous research, ‘traditionality’ is not framed by temporal limits and the commercial seal hunt can be located within such historical discourse (Sellheim Reference Sellheim, Alfredsson, Koivurova and Stepien2013a). It can be argued that the ‘basic right’ of Newfoundlanders as Canadians to continue the utilisation of the abundant natural resources is a human right, manifested in common article I.2 of the two 1966 International Covenants which reads:

Products stemming from the hunt are indeed at least partially used according to tradition although both EU seal trade regulations avoid a definition of what ‘accordance to tradition’ entails. Inuit communities have voiced their concerns over the nature of this phrasing, as it may be interpreted as holding a backward, paternalistic worldview on Inuit culture and development. Inuit lawyer Aaju Peter writes that ‘Inuit are not frozen in time, but must pursue economic opportunities just like everyone else in Canada or Europe’ (Peter Reference Peter2010: 7). The harvesting and socially embedded use of marine species in Inuit communities is well documented (see for example Nuttall Reference Nuttall2005: 652). Parallels to this non-commercial meaning of seal products can be found in the outport of Woodstock where seal products are shared with family and friends. Seal flippers, hearts and carcasses are given, not sold, to members of the community for consumption. Upon arrival of the vessel in the local harbour, members of the community greet the arriving sealers and collect the goods that they ordered before the hunt. Thus, although the seal was hunted for commercial purposes, a partial distribution and use of seal products stemming from the commercial hunt within the community can be documented.

The seal hunt contributes to subsistence: subsistence or informal economy plays a vital role for human development and welfare in the Arctic (AHDR 2004: 74) and can be defined as ‘local production for local consumption’ (Nordic Council of Ministers 2010: 51) in which ‘sharing’ is an underlying feature (Glømsrød and Aslaksen Reference Glømsrød, Aaslaksen, Glømsrød and Aaslaksen2008: 9). It must be borne in mind that neither in the banning regulations nor in any of the above definitions of subsistence economy has a quantification of the utilisation of certain animals been undertaken. Therefore, the commercial seal hunt, while aimed to produce goods for commercial purposes, directly contributes to the subsistence of the communities through the sharing of carcasses and flippers as a non-monetary but direct support stemming from the hunt traditionally carried out in the region.

How indigenous peoples other than those represented in the court case before the EUGC, the Inuit, are impacted by the EU seal products trade ban cannot be assessed here. While there is no recent research data available for Alaskan or Russian Inuit, the exemption does not merely include Inuit, but also ‘other’ indigenous communities. Therefore, indigenous communities in Namibia, where a large scale seal hunt takes place, are also to be exempted. However, the lack of a clear definition of the term ‘indigenous’ in the EU regulation leads to a conceptual difficulty: who falls under the indigenous exemption? As shown above, the three criteria that provide the framework for the Inuit or indigenous exemption are also applicable to non-indigenous communities in Canada, whose hunters conduct the hunt that the EU aims to change. Therefore, the applicability of the exemption must be narrowed down to the ‘indigeneity’ of the concerned communities. Since the regulations do not clarify which people or communities are considered indigenous, it remains questionable which legal definition is applied. Two scenarios are possible. Firstly, in case of future court cases that will revolve around the indigenousness of a certain community or people, the court would have to decide on an ad hoc, case-to-case basis. Secondly, as a general rule, national legislation as regards indigenous peoples serves as the hallmark for being eligible to fall under the ban's indigenous exemption.

In the case of Namibia, this would prove to be particularly difficult. The seal hunt focuses on Cape Fur Seals (Arctocephalus pusillus) that live in colonies on land. There is no independent information on the animal welfare aspects of the Namibian seal hunt and the people who conduct it, ultimately making an indigenous exemption difficult to implement. The African Commission on Human and People's Rights (ACHPR) notes that in Africa, all people and peoples of the African continent that derive from colonised populations can be considered indigenous (ACHPR 2005: 88, 89). In the Namibian legislation regulating the seal hunt, no reference is made to the indigeneity of the hunters, but fishing (harvesting) rights are preferably given to Namibian individuals and companies under the principle of ‘Namibianisation’ depending on the percentage of Namibian versus foreign shareholders of the facility or vessel and the number of people employed (Namibia 2004: 13; Namibia 2009: 4–7). Since there is no independent information on how many people are engaged in the seal hunt, what socio-economic significance the hunt and trade has for the communities, and what population groups are engaged in the hunt, no conclusions can be drawn on the effectiveness of the EU regulation's indigenous exemption in a Namibian context unless extensive field studies were to be carried out. Looking at the exports of Namibian seal skins deriving from Cape Fur Seals, between 2006 and 2012 based on the CITES Trade Database, gross exports have varied greatly with no clear signal of a steady decline (CITES nd), indicating that at least up to 2011 the trade in Namibian seal skins has not been impacted by the EU regulation. It cannot be assessed whether the absence of numerical data for the year 2012 indicates an absence of exports or a lack of data.

Internal market harmonisation

As reaffirmed by the EUGC, the primary goal of regulation 1007/2009 is the harmonisation of the EU's internal market with regard to trade in seal products. This harmonisation has been achieved by imposing an EU-wide trade ban in the form of a regulation and not a directive, which would allow for national implementation procedures. The points of departure for the harmonisation clause are the national bans that were imposed by Belgium and the Netherlands in 2007. According to article 95 TEC (now article 114 TFEU) in recourse to article 30 TEC (now article 36 TFEU), national trade bans that fragment the free movement of goods in the internal market of the EU can only be justified on grounds of ‘public morality, public policy or public security; the protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants; [. . .]’ (EU 2001: article 30). This, however, raises several problems, which two EU legal opinions have dealt with extensively (Council of the European Union Legal Council 2009; European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs 2009). It can be argued that the seal products trade ban is indeed a means to harmonise the internal market as it harmonises the member states’ national rules and does not affect the trade in other products whilst obliging public morality. On the other hand, it can be argued that a blanket ban makes the free movement of goods impossible. Arguing on the grounds of animal welfare considerations seems however arbitrary, as the protection of seals on these grounds would call for other animals to also be included, and would ultimately challenge the utilisation of animals for human consumption. At the same time, public morality cannot serve as a point of reference as the public consultation that was carried out, which was used to serve as the indicator for public morality cannot be considered representative (COWI 2008: 125).

The question of whether or not the seal product trade regulation harmonises the internal market focuses on the legality of instituting a ban that prohibits the commercial movement of seal products within the community. Article 3 (c) TEC constitutes the foundation for the smooth functioning of the internal market by making it a prime objective to establish and maintain ‘an internal market characterised by the abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital.’

The judgement of the EUGC of April 2013 picks up two crucial elements in the analysis of the question of the smooth functioning of the internal market with regard to seal products trade. Firstly, as stated in the explanatory memorandum to the commission proposal for a regulation concerning trade in seal products in 2008, several member states had already imposed national legislation shutting down their markets for seal products or were in the process of doing so (EC 2008a: 2). By stressing that these different national bans would create diverging conditions for the trade in seal products, the court concluded that there is a necessity to regulate based on internal market criteria. Consequently, the principle of subsidiarity, action taken on community level where national action proves less successful, allows for legislative steps on a community level. In its judgement the court highlights that internal market harmonisation, not animal welfare, is the primary goal of the regulation, and that both the legal basis and the principle of subsidiarity are justified (EUGC 2013a: paragraphs 26–86).

A second implication arises when looking at the claim that the regulation exceeds the means necessary to fulfil a certain goal, as brought forth by the applicants in case 526/10. The applicants argue that the regulation does not contribute to the improvement of the internal market and that it goes beyond its aspired objective: a breach of the principle of proportionality (EUGC 2013a: paragraphs 91–93). The court's responding argument is twofold. Firstly, it argues that the functioning of the internal market has improved due to harmonised rules that apply to all member states, enabling clear-cut rules for the trade in seal products. Since the regulation does not block the movement, warehousing, processing or manufacturing of seal products within the EU customs union, but merely the placing of these products on the EU market for commercial purposes, trade in seal products that uses the EU as a transit region is not negatively affected (EUGC 2013a: paragraphs 68–71). The second element is the ban's objective. While the plaintiffs refer to the animal welfare objective, the court argues that since the sole objective of the regulation is the harmonisation of the internal market, its objective is reached and it is within the proportionate measures that are to be taken.

However, it remains questionable if animal welfare can be completely taken out of the ban's context. After all, the ban was established because of the animal welfare concerns of European states and this ethical dimension ultimately led to the regulation that harmonised the internal market. The alignment of the rules pertaining to the trade in seal products on a community level can be considered an attempt of the EU to implement ethical concerns over seal hunts, since the community does not possess the legal competence to adopt measures directly linked to ethics. It is nevertheless permissible to use other means available to incorporate ethical considerations in its policies, which in the case of the trade in seal products has been done via internal market harmonisation (EC 2008a: 3).

The attainment of unformulated and secondary goals

As discussed earlier, an unformulated meta-goal of the political process that has led to the conclusion of regulation 1007/2009 was neither the improvement of animal welfare, nor ending the killing of seals as such, but appears to be ending the killing of seals for commercial purposes. Both the dwindling European market and the increasing reputational loss of commercial sealing have devalued seal products and led to a reduced number of seals killed since the launch of the legislative process within the EU. In Newfoundland, both the number of seals and the associated landed value are strongly impacted by the reputational as well as the market loss for seal products. While in 2006 almost 300,000 seals were landed, generating around 30 million Canadian dollars with an average of about 102 dollars per seal, a massive drop occurred in 2007 when the legislative process for a ban was in full progress. The following year around the same number of seals of around 200.000 was caught while the average price dropped to 32 dollars, amounting to a landed value of 6.6 million dollars.

In the adoption year of the ban, 2009, the number of seals dropped to 53,531, generating merely 857,000 dollars with an average of 17 dollars per seal. Since then, the average price has slightly increased and amounted to 19 dollars in 2011, with a number of seals ranging at around 38,000 with a landed value of 735,000 dollars. In 2012, almost 70,000 seals at an average of 24 dollars were landed, producing 1.6 million dollars (Newfoundland and Labrador Department for Fisheries and Aquaculture 2005–2012). For 2013, nearly 90,000 seals were landed, generating around 2.9 million dollars with an average value of ca. 33 dollars (Canada 2013a, 2013b).

As visible in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2, during the crafting process of the EU regulation, the average price for one seal fell drastically, decreasing the landed value by more than 50% within one year in spite of a landing of seals that had decreased by around one third. Yet, although the markets and reputation dwindled and the number of seals that were killed was reduced, the commercial sealing industry did not cease to exist. This may also be due to loans of 3.6 million Canadian dollars from the Newfoundland government to Carino processing Ltd. in 2012 and 2013 to be able to buy and process raw materials from seals (Newfoundland and Labrador Department for Fisheries and Aquaculture 2012; Newfoundland and Labrador Department for Fisheries and Aquaculture 2013). Given the most recent data on the average price and number of seals killed, although not comparable to the conditions before the launch of the legislative process in the EU, since 2009 the average price and the landed value seem to have experienced a recovery. Whether this trend continues remains to be seen. Notwithstanding, it seems that the EU's regulation has weakened the commercial sealing industry, but has not managed to shut it down. In fact, growing demand in Asia, where the largest part of seal skins are sold to via international fur traders, may indicate that the industry as such will continue to exist. Also a growing demand on the Canadian market for seal flippers, seal oil and seal skin products show that the normative change in the perception of seal products has not occurred.

Fig. 1.

The number of seals vis–à–vis the average price for a seal, Newfoundland.

Fig. 2.

The number of seals vis–à–vis the landed value.

As shown earlier an important secondary goal that is reflected in the EU's Arctic documents to at the earliest stage in the 2008 commission communication (EC 2008b), is dialogue with Arctic populations. Indeed, stakeholder consultations were held during the drafting process of the regulations. Nevertheless, in the court cases before the EUGC, the usefulness of these consultative meetings is questioned by the applicants. Yet, the court highlights that it was one of these meetings that introduced the indigenous exemption into the ban in the first place (EUGC 2013a: paragraph 114). An attempt to establish a fruitful dialogue with Arctic indigenous peoples was made with a workshop on 9 March 2010 in which indigenous organisations, the EU Commission, and national foreign ministries were represented. Although no clearly defined platform for future dialogue exists, the workshop yielded several topics for future discussion, amongst others discussions over animal products (EC 2010b). As to how far this was discussed in the second workshop, which was held on 25 January 2011 in Tromsø, Norway, cannot be reproduced here as the information is not publicly available (EC 2011). There is also no information on any follow-up workshops available. Indeed, given the recent deferral of EU observership in the AC and the preceding campaign by Inuit organisations to lobby the Canadian government to deny the EU observer status, a continuous constructive dialogue that will assist in the overcoming of differences is obviously necessary.

It seems fair to say that the seal products trade regime is not a policy that supports indigenous and local populations in the Arctic, safeguards their interests or takes their views adequately into account. It therefore contradicts fundamental elements of the goals as formulated in the EU's Arctic-related documents that make reference to the Arctic's inhabitants. This claim is based on the fact that it remains unclear how a regulation that the Inuit are attempting to annul in court could support them or safeguard their interest. While their needs may seem to have been considered in stakeholder consultations, the Inuit's claim of negative cultural impacts of the regulation as well as the associated reputation loss of the EU in Inuit areas creates an adversarial environment between the EU and the Inuit. Ultimately, this leads to difficulties in accepting the EU in the AC and in considering the EU an Arctic actor.

The EU Arctic documents emphasise the importance of supporting Arctic indigenous peoples, and they also highlight the idea that local people's views are to be supported and taken into consideration. Problematic in the context of commercial sealing is the fact that virtually no knowledge exists within the EU of the commercial sealing industry, the people involved, and the communities impacted by this industry. Instead, in the political discussions, such as the EU Parliamentary discussion prior to the adoption of the basic regulation (EP 2009b), the commercial seal hunt is, in line with anti-sealing lobby groups, commonly portrayed as ‘barbaric’, ‘needless’ and ‘inherently inhumane.’

Therefore, neither the ban itself nor the political will in the EU are flexible enough to consider the commercial seal hunt and the commercial sealing industry as legitimate, and thus ultimately denying the sealer the right to his livelihood. This is a significant difference from the 1983 ‘Seal Pups Directive’. Instead, a labelling of the commercial hunt, the sealers and the industry has occurred which does not allow for a meaningful and sustainable dialogue between the EU and the commercial sealing industry. Moreover, since knowledge on the commercial sealing industry and the people involved is mostly missing, neither the socio-economic impacts nor the long-term discursive impacts of the seal products trade ban on Newfoundland society, especially with regard to the dwindling fishing industry, can be understood.