This book tells two, intertwined stories of Mexican history from 1880 through 1930: the evolution of the Mexican cotton textile industry and the political evolution of Mexico through the Mexican Revolution. By looking at both stories at once, the book paints a rich picture of how firms, unions, political institutions, and social networks interacted, affecting both the communities where the industry was centered and Mexico as a whole. The history is focused on the Orizaba Valley, east of Mexico City, and in detail on one particular textile firm, Compañía Industrial Veracruzana S. A. (CIVSA).
The modern mechanized textile industry was largely created by a network of immigrants from villages in the Ubaye Valley of France. These people were called Barcelonnettes, from the older name for that valley. During the nineteenth century, the Barcelonnettes set up dry goods trading companies, importing goods from Europe. These grew into major department stores. The networks then integrated upstream into textile production, setting up large cotton textile mills during the 1890s, using imported machinery. The network proved not only crucial for trade connections, but also as a source of financing. The period from 1877 through 1910, under the government of Porfirio Díaz, was one of political repression and stability. This stability was conducive to business and, with the assistance of import tariffs, the textile firms earned high profits then.
The nature of the workforce at these mills was distinctive. The workers were almost exclusively male and young, especially during the initial years. About half the workers were literate, a literacy rate that was higher than the population in general. Workers were recruited from across Mexico, a task made easier by the relatively higher wage rates paid in the Orizaba Valley. These workers were relatively productive as well. For example, weavers typically tended two looms, sometimes more. By Gregory Clark's estimates circa 1910 (“Why Isn't the Whole World Developed? Lessons from the Cotton Mills,” The Journal of Economic History 47, no. 1 (1987): 141–73), Mexico's weavers were somewhat more productive than those of France and Spain. But they were distinctively less productive than weavers in the United States or United Kingdom—weavers in the United States typically tended six plain looms or more at this time.
The author provides some tantalizing clues about why there was such a large productivity gap despite the fact that these mills used equipment imported from the United Kingdom. It turns out that some workers were much more productive than others and they were paid much more as well. A considerable number of weavers tended four looms or more, but it appears that they only arrived at such positions after long periods of apprenticeship and promotion. For example, one Gonzalo García Ortiz began as a loom tender, then became a helper, then a first apprentice, then an apprentice helper, until he was given one loom to tend. After more years, he eventually moved up to four looms. This differed from the U.S. model where new hires would often work on four looms after only a month or so on the job. One wishes the book looked into this sort of difference a bit more.
The author notes another important difference in productivity that had long-term consequences: the Mexican mills decided not to install the automatic loom, which had come on the market just before the big new mills were first built and which allowed one weaver to tend eighteen or more looms. The author attributes this decision to the relative lack of skilled mechanics who could maintain these machines. That is surely part of the reason, but one wonders why the mills could not import mechanics as well as they imported business managers. Perhaps difficulty in training the weavers also played a role.
In any case, despite the productivity deficit relative to the United States and United Kingdom, domestic cotton textiles were competitive with imports, thanks to the relatively lower wages paid in Mexico and to tariffs. The mills earned good profits.
Also, for more than a decade, labor peace prevailed. The workers in the Orizaba Valley earned better wages than many other workers in Mexico, but they lived in a company town, shopped at company stores, and had limited opportunities for education. Political activity, notably by people associated with the Partido Liberal Mexicano, led to the creation of a powerful labor organization, Gran Círculo de Obreros Libres, in 1906 and, shortly thereafter to a major strike that was violently repressed. Nevertheless, this activity established labor in the Orizaba Valley as a potent political force.
The author argues that although the textile workers did not play a major direct role in the Mexican Revolution, their political and implied economic power shaped the emerging state. Most of the military activity took place in the north and historians have generally viewed the peasants as the leading force behind the Revolution. But when a stable government finally emerged, labor had an important place at the table. The government mediated a grand bargain between labor and the mills: jobs and wages would be protected with a wage list, the mills would not automate further, and the industry would be protected with high tariffs. This satisfied the existing workers and mill owners, but it meant that the mills did not adopt the automatic loom for many decades, leading to a long period of declining productivity, declining profits, and declining competitiveness. With political power, the workers gained dignity and they established communities that served their interests, for example, providing education for all. Yet the interplay between politics and economics described in this book tells the fascinating tale of what was, in the end, a tragedy.
