Passions and Virtue is a brief volume that represents, in the language of the foreword, “a follow-up to A Plea for Virtue” (vii), one of Pinckaers’ earlier works. The connections are clear from the beginning, as Pinckaers suggests in his introduction that the study of the virtues naturally, and necessarily, leads to an examination of the role of the passions in the moral life. The book as a whole effectively makes this case, reasserting Thomas Aquinas’ vision of virtuous passions as a middle way between the Stoics, who insisted that the virtuous life requires suppression of one's passions, and contemporaries who might suggest that how one feels can never be subject to moral scrutiny.

Throughout the text, Pinckaers is clear and precise, especially in his definitions. The first chapter is no exception, as Pinckaers offers a systematic assessment of passion in relation to more familiar terms like sentiment and emotion in order to arrive at a definition of a passion as “an enduring affective state” (1). The centrality of Aquinas connects this affective state with a kind of movement in the moral life, either away from or toward the good, creating the foundation for Pinckaers’ insistence that virtue ethics envisions the moderation, transformation, and integration of human passions into a life well lived. The notion of movement also undergirds the list of specific passions (chapter 2) examined in the book, for Pinckaers derives his list from Aquinas, adding pity and rearranging the categories slightly so that he can treat certain passions as a subspecies of a particular movement. (For example, Pinckaers links concupiscence and hope in chapter 5 because, he explains, every movement of desire contains within it the hope of achieving that for which it longs.)

In terms of structure, the book effectively has two halves, although there is not an explicit delineation between them. The first consists of the introductory chapters (1–2) plus five chapters (3–7) that explicitly treat the passions identified in Aquinas’ moral system, offering an accessible definition of each and a reasonable defense of the ways they can reinforce virtue. The second involves eight chapters (8–15) examining a variety of quotidian human experiences in relation to virtue. These are humor, silence, anger (admittedly, one of Aquinas’ original passions), piety, work, rest, sport, and psychology. Each represents an underanalyzed topic in moral theology, as Pinckaers points out, and all deserve more scrutiny, but the connections between them are not as direct as they could be, and the links to the passions are a bit unclear—although here Pinckaers seems to appeal to the fact that these are things about which people are often “passionate” in the colloquial sense. The risk of eclecticism is especially noticeable in contrast to the first half, where the Thomistic framework provides a clearly articulated coherence.

In the individual chapters, Pinckaers not only defines his terms but also reviews competing positions on the best way to address the passion or issue in moral terms before adding his own critical reflection and assessment. The chapters are short, and each one reads like a meditation more than a treatise. This will likely disappoint some readers looking for a thorough scholarly analysis of the relationship between passions and virtue, of the sort that a number of contemporary moral theologians are offering on specific passions. One should hardly hold this style against Pinckaers, however, for two reasons. First, even as meditations, the chapters are not without substance. Pinckaers deftly summarizes a number of technical issues in Aquinas, moving beyond the jargon to provide comprehensible explanations. Indeed, his account of delectation in the Summa is such an impressive distillation of a complex question that the book is a justifiable library addition on the basis of those pages (39–42) alone. Second, Pinckaers himself prescinds from comprehensiveness as a goal, hoping instead “to help the reader advance in self-understanding” (ix). Measured against this aim, the text is a success, and would likely benefit even undergraduate students—albeit with a bit of introduction to virtue—for we can all use further encouragement for integration in a culture that tends toward fragmentation.