1. Introduction
John Dalton's chemical atomism has come under recent criticism in several provocative articles by Paul Needham (Reference Needham2004a, Reference Needham2004b, Reference Needham2008). One of Needham's theses is that Dalton's atoms “gave us no explanation at all” (Reference Needham2004a, 1039). He refers to Dalton's theory of atoms as “unilluminating”; he claims that atoms could not explain the difference between compounds and solutions, were unhelpful as an explanation of constant and multiple proportions, and could not explain chemical affinities. Needham's position is an outgrowth of his emphasis on a thermochemical definition of substance and his antimicrostructuralist view (see Needham Reference Needham2000), but his criticisms are also largely inspired by the antiatomistic arguments of Pierre Duhem (see Needham Reference Needham2008). Needham claims that Duhem “clearly thought that Daltonian atomism provided no explanation of the laws that it entailed” (925).
I argue a contrary view in this article, in three parts. First, I argue that explanatoriness is not a binary question, as Needham makes it out to be. Explanations are devices that increase our understanding of a phenomenon, and they can do so to greater or lesser degrees. Second, I aim to show that Dalton's atomism, although by no means perfect or complete, is explanatory of many basic chemical phenomena. Third, and contrary to Needham's subsidiary claim about Duhem, I aim to show that even Duhem admits that Daltonian atomism is explanatory of some very basic and fundamental facts about chemistry. I also discuss his reasons for rejecting atomism despite this admission.
In support of the above points, this article will examine the views of both Dalton and Duhem on explanation and its role in science, as well as their opposing attitudes toward chemical atomism. I argue that Duhem, in particular, appears to take the surprising position that chemical atomism was explanatory of many basic phenomena in chemistry but not explanatory enough. After examining the views of both scientists, I will close with a few tentative conclusions about the relationship between acceptance of a scientific theory and that theory's explanatory value.
2. A Few Remarks on Explanation
For the purposes of this short article, I will attempt to avoid adhering to any particular account of the form that a scientific explanation must take. However, in order to orient my discussion of the explanatory status of Dalton's chemical atomism and the various forms of chemical atomism available in Duhem's time, a few remarks are in order.
First, I assent to the platitude that a scientific explanation is an answer to a “why-question.” A why-question can be about a specific event or a general, repeatable phenomenon. Second, I take a scientific explanation to be a device for increasing our understanding of a phenomenon. The requirement that an explanation increases our understanding demands that a certain amount of intelligibility must be provided by the explanation. The explanans (the device doing the explaining) must itself be intelligible, and the explanandum (the phenomenon being explained) must be rendered more intelligible by the explanans.
The requirement of increased understanding necessarily makes explanation relative to the current state of understanding possessed by the scientific community. It also makes explanation relative to whatever implicit contrasts or assumptions may underlie the why-question. For example, this article will be concerned with a few specific why-questions, one of the most important of which is, “Why do elements in chemical combinations only occur in certain specific weight ratios?” Asked in this way, it might seem that the answer, “because God made it that way,” is as good an answer as any. But this is not a satisfactory answer to the scientific community because it does not reflect the implicit contrast in the background of the question. The question really being asked here is, “Why do elements in chemical combinations only occur in certain specific weight ratios, rather than in a continuum of ratios?” This question begs a much different response, and it will be discussed more in section 3.1.
Because there are degrees of understanding, and since at least part of what it is to be an explanation is to contribute to understanding, there must be degrees of explanatoriness. An explanation that bestows full understanding (to the extent that there is such a thing) is one that would be maximally satisfactory. However, complete understanding is too much to hope for in most real-world cases, and there seem to be good reasons for being skeptical that we will ever reach an end to all why-questions. It is far too high a standard, therefore, to require that all explanations confer this kind of understanding. An explanation that adds only minimally to understanding should also be considered an explanation, even if far less satisfactory. These less satisfactory explanations may be nonideal but are certainly more typical in the real history and practice of science. My view, therefore, will allow for a spectrum of explanatoriness that corresponds to the varying degrees of understanding conferred by explanations.
3. Dalton's Chemical Atoms
For Dalton, the role of chemist and philosopher of chemistry was one and the same. His goal was not only to discover chemical phenomena and chemical laws but, more importantly, to explain them. For example, although we attribute to Dalton the discovery of the law of partial pressures, he saw this discovery as far less significant than his theory about what was going on under the surface to create the effect (see Dalton Reference Dalton1801, Reference Dalton1802). Dalton's manuscripts and his published papers are full of speculative theories and assessments of how well the various possibilities that he had imagined could explain established facts.Footnote 1 In this section, I will attempt to elucidate the chemical why-questions that Dalton took himself to be answering with his chemical atomism and defend his atomism as explanatory of those questions.
3.1. Constant and Multiple Proportions
One of the first and most basic chemical facts that Dalton's atomism was intended to explain was the law of constant proportions—the fact that chemical compounds are made up of constant proportions of elements by weight. Dalton reasoned that there must be ultimate particles of elements whose weights form the basis of these proportions. Needham criticizes this explanation in the following way:
Clearly, the homogeneity of compounds means that smaller quantities contain smaller amounts of the elements, although in the same proportion as the larger quantity. But it is hardly explanatory to say that quantities of hydrogen and oxygen combine in fixed proportions by weight to form water because hydrogen and oxygen comprise smaller chunks which combine in fixed proportions by weight to form water. This merely repeats what has to be explained on a smaller scale. Not only that; it seems that it must be ultimately repeated on an invisible scale, as though taking the ultimate combining units out of sight provides the magic explanatory ingredient. (Reference Needham2004a, 1041)
In my view (and presumably Dalton's), taking the ultimate combining units out of sight is precisely the “magic” explanatory ingredient. Fixed proportions of chemically indivisible particles on the invisible level explain homogeneity on the level of our senses. We have no direct evidence that there is homogeneity “all the way down” because we cannot see “all the way down.” Therefore, Dalton did not need to provide an explanation for anything but homogeneity on the sensible level. On the contrary, after the discovery of constant proportions, anyone who rejected atomism and proposed that it is possible to have homogeneity “all the way down” had to provide a reason for chemical combination only occurring in specific proportions. Dalton's explanation answered the question of why elements in chemical combinations always occur in specific weight ratios and not in a continuum of combinatory ratios.
On the basis of chemical atomism, Dalton saw that there was also a straightforward explanation of the law of multiple proportions. Why should the same set of elements combine in not only one set of ratios but sometimes in multiple sets of ratios? Dalton's response was that elements combine in simple, integer multiples of their characteristic weights because there are integral bits of these same elements that remain undivided in chemical reactions. Configurations that are chemically stable (i.e., chemical compounds) will always manifest integer proportions because of the integral bits that remain intact underneath the chemical change. Dalton's atomism also explained what happens in chemical reactions: there are least parts of chemical elements that remain undivided in such reactions but that separate from each other and recombine in a new arrangement (see Dalton Reference Dalton1808, 212). Dalton's explanation helps us to understand why it should be possible to break down a chemical compound and later build it back up again: there are least parts of each element that remain intact throughout the entire process.Footnote 2
3.2. Chemical Compounds versus Solutions
The background for another of Needham's criticisms of Dalton's atoms comes from Joseph Proust's work in the early nineteenth century, which established a distinction between compounds and solutions. Both compounds and solutions were considered “homogeneous mixtures.” Proust showed that, independent of temperature, pressure, and the process by which they are synthesized, compounds are made up of constant proportions of elements. Solutions, in contrast, contained varying proportions of elements. In light of Proust's result, Needham proposes that any explanation of the law of constant proportions in compounds must also be an explanation of the difference between compounds and solutions. Needham claims that Dalton's atoms did not provide such an explanation (Reference Needham2004a, 1040–41).
However, Dalton did make a distinction that is directly relevant to the difference between compounds and solutions. His distinction was between a pure elastic fluid and a mixed elastic fluid. A pure elastic fluid is “one, the constituent particles of which are all alike, or in no way distinguishable” (Dalton Reference Dalton1808, 145). These identical constituent particles could be either simple atoms or compound atoms (Dalton's term for “molecule”). A mixed elastic fluid, however, is one in which the particles of two or more pure elastic fluids mechanically diffuse through one another in the same space but do not unite chemically (150). If two or more elastic fluids are mixed and the various types of particles are present in certain specific proportions, the different types of particles will unite (i.e., chemically combine) such that they form new compound particles (169). What was originally a mixed elastic fluid will have become a pure elastic fluid because its constituent particles are now all alike.Footnote 3
Using his theory of the constitution of mixed elastic fluids, Dalton also attempted an explanation of the law of partial pressures (i.e., the additivity of the pressure of mixed gases). He proposed a hypothesis in which there is a force of repulsion specific to each distinct type of atom (simple or compound) and where each type of atom was immune to the repulsive forces of other types. Since each distinct fluid pushed against the containing surface with its own force of repulsion, the various forces of repulsion present in any container simply added together to produce a total pressure (Reference Dalton1801, 242–43; Reference Dalton1802, 536). This same hypothesis also explained why gases in mixtures do not separate out according to their specific weights. According to the hypothesis, the particles of each distinct type in a given volume arranged themselves independently of all other types in the same volume, as if the other types were not present at all.Footnote 4
Dalton's distinction between pure and mixed elastic fluids and his hypothesis about selective repulsion give answers to several why-questions: (1) Why are compounds subject to the laws of constant proportions and multiple proportions while solutions are not? It is because of the differing arrangement of atoms in the two cases. (2) Why do the pressures of gases in a mixture simply add to produce the total pressure, and (3) why do the various gases in a mixture not separate out into layers according to density? These last two questions are answered by his theory of the selective repulsion of each distinct type of particle.
Dalton does not, however, give us an answer to a particularly troubling question: What is it that causes two particles to combine? Why should two particles combine, rather than remain separate? Needham objects to the fact that “Dalton offers no account of what draws unlike atoms together in molecules” (Reference Needham2004a, 1046). I agree with Needham that Dalton's explanation of chemical combination is less than satisfying in this sense. Although Dalton distinguished between chemical and mechanical effects, he did not explain the nature of chemical combination or any underlying reason for the tendency of atoms to combine in some cases but not in others. Furthermore, the meager account that Dalton provided for chemical combination gave no ability to predict which kinds of atoms might have the tendency to combine and in what arrangements and proportions they might do so.
Although Dalton gives us very little indication of the nature of chemical combination, he does hint that, if two bodies are to combine, they must be “disposed” to do so (see Dalton Reference Dalton1808, 192, 213). It seems then, if we dare to read between the lines, that the “disposition” of a chemical substance to combine with another is an inherent chemical property of that substance. If so, such a disposition, particular to each type of atom, would be no more (or less) mysterious than Newton's gravitational force.Footnote 5 On my view, the concept of a chemical disposition as something distinct from mechanical interaction constitutes an explanation inasmuch as it is a small step forward in understanding chemical combination. There is, however, an important sense in which the explanation is less than satisfactory because it leaves a why-question unanswered: In what does this chemical disposition or property consist?
4. Duhem's Chemical Equivalents
Duhem (Reference Duhem and Wiener1914/1954) argues that physical theory, if understood as having the goal of explanation, is subordinate to metaphysics and depends on the metaphysical system that one adopts. Due to the sensitivity of explanation on metaphysical and philosophical positions, Duhem holds strongly to the view that explanation should be relegated to the realm of philosophy and metaphysics. According to Duhem, explanation should not be a part of physical science; the true aim of physical theory is not to explain but to give a “system of mathematical propositions, deduced from a small number of principles, which aim to represent as simply, as completely, and as exactly as possible a set of experimental laws” (19).
Duhem claims that there is no way of overcoming the irreconcilable metaphysical differences between atomists and nonatomists and that even among atomists there are deep metaphysical disagreements (see Duhem Reference Duhem1892/2000, 167–68). So for Duhem, a chemist, when acting as a scientist, should not meddle in debates over atomism; philosophy and science are two completely separate enterprises, and science is not in the business of providing explanations. Respecting this distinction, I will first describe Duhem's account of how chemistry can be done without atoms and then discuss his philosophical position on atomism.
4.1. Duhem's Antiatomistic Chemistry
In 1892, Duhem published an essay (Reference Duhem1892/2000) that contains a fascinating account of how chemistry can be done without atoms, and how, furthermore, the entire history of the science can be told without atoms.Footnote 6 In this section, I will explain how this can be done, on Duhem's view.
For Duhem, the science of chemistry is built on the solid foundation of observables—the proportional weights of the various elements in chemical compounds—and “they alone … represent the experimental givens of chemical analysis” (Reference Duhem1892/2000, 130; emphasis mine). Derivative from these proportional weights are the proportional numbers that chemists choose, by convention, to assign to each element. In order to establish these conventions, chemists collate the many instances in which a particular element (e.g., nitrogen) is found in a compound and note that its proportional weight in these compounds is generally very close to a small multiple of a particular whole number (e.g., 14 for nitrogen).Footnote 7 The collection of instances of a given element in compounds, together with a consideration of the analogies between the various compounds to which the element belongs and other compounds to which it does not, helps chemists to collectively fix the most reasonable standard of equivalent weights of various elements. With a system of equivalent weights in place, crude chemical formulas with symbols and superscripts take on a particular meaning; the letter symbol for each element represented the equivalent weight of that element, and the superscript in the formula represents the number of “equivalents” represented. An “equivalent” for Duhem is simply a certain amount, by weight, of an element in proportion to the weight of other elements making up a compound.
Duhem then shows that these crude formulas can be refined by a study of the way in which some elements substitute for others in analogous compounds. Refined formulas not only express the number of equivalents for each element but also group the symbols in such a way as to make apparent the more cohesive (and substitutable) parts of the compound. For example, the crude formula for grain alcohol is C2H6O, but if we wish to regard it as water in which an equivalent of hydrogen is replaced by an ethyl group (C2H5), then we might represent it by the formula (C2H5)HO (Reference Duhem1892/2000, 149).
Even more subtlety in representation can be gained; certain elements or basic subgroups can be swapped not only one for one in analogous compounds but also two for one or three for one. For example, one PO group is substitutable for three equivalents of hydrogen in HCl or H2O (Reference Duhem1892/2000, 156). Duhem explains that the notion of valency is simply a method of accounting for interchangeable groups. Consideration of each element's involvement in various compounds and subgroups allows for a standardization of valencies for each element. Constitutional formulas can be drawn in which connective lines indicate the number of valencies that are “exchanged” among elements. Using this notation, all of the relationships in a compound can be shown at once, making all of the derivative properties of these relationships evident at first glance.
In the entire foregoing account of the science of chemistry, Duhem is very careful and pointed in his use of the word “equivalents” instead of “atoms,” and his use of the word “valency” instead of “atomicity.” According to him, all of chemistry at his time (including classification of chemicals and prediction of their properties) could be done without reference to atoms.
4.2. Duhem's Resistance to the Atomic Interpretation
Although Duhem avoided all mention of atoms when writing as a chemist, he had no qualms about passing a verdict on atomism when writing as a philosopher interpreting chemistry. In fact, Duhem spent a large segment of his 1892 article—a total of 11 pages—discussing how well (or how poorly) atomistic theories explain.Footnote 8 By the time he wrote the article, chemical atomism had expanded to include a great many addenda and modifications to Dalton's original basic postulates. Duhem had several complaints about the inconsistencies and problems with these addenda, but of Dalton's original basic theory, he had only praise for its explanatory power: “The nature and number of atoms juxtaposed to form a molecule are characteristic of the properties of the compound. From that, as Dalton showed, it is easy to deduce the fundamental laws of chemistry” (Reference Duhem1892/2000, 168–69). Duhem's reference to the “fundamental laws of chemistry” here included the law of definite proportions, the law of multiple proportions, and the “law of isomorphism” (i.e., chemical analogy due to similarities in molecular structure; 169). Duhem showed how, when we ask why each of these laws hold, Dalton's atomism can provide a satisfying answer. In his other work on the same topic, Duhem even referred to the atomic theory as a “plausible and appealing interpretation” of the law of multiple proportions (Reference Duhem and Needham1902/2002, 93).
So why did Duhem reject atomism? At the end of the passage in which he discussed the strong points of Dalton's theory, Duhem concluded with the following words: “This is Dalton's atomic hypothesis. It agrees well with the primary laws and the primary notions of chemistry. The concern now is to complete it” (Reference Duhem1892/2000, 170). It is at this point that Duhem began to take issue not with Dalton but with Duhem's own contemporaries who attempted to give atomic explanations of chemical combination and atomicity (i.e., valency). His main objections are as follows:
1. No viable explanation has been given for the atomicity property of atoms, and thus it is difficult to explain chemical combination (i.e., what holds atoms together). Also, atoms of the same element do not always have the same atomicity for all compounds into which they enter (see Duhem Reference Duhem1892/2000, 171–73; Reference Duhem and Needham1902/2002, 88–91).
2. There are compounds with very different formulas that have very similar macroscopic properties such as crystal structure. This is a problem if compositional formulas are taken to represent the arrangement of atoms in a molecule (see Duhem Reference Duhem1892/2000, 175–76).Footnote 9
3. After Dalton, some compounds were found to require large (rather than small) whole-number ratios of masses, which seemed to weaken the significance of the law of multiple proportions. To make matters worse, Duhem showed that the law cannot be empirically verified in principle. No measurement technique can ascertain the exact ratio of the masses of two elements in a compound; it can only say that the ratio lies within certain limits. Because there is an infinity of possible numbers—both commensurable and incommensurable—within these limits, there is a possibility that the true ratio is actually incommensurable (see Duhem Reference Duhem and Needham1902/2002, 92–93).Footnote 10
After discussing the above problems in some depth, Duhem concluded, “It is apparent that the atomic notation as ordinarily explained faces certain difficulties which have their source in experience” (Reference Duhem1892/2000, 176). It appears that Duhem's main reason for his rejection of atomism was not that it did not explain anything but that it did not explain well enough to be accepted as an interpretation of chemistry.
5. Degrees of Explanation
Now, after examining the cases of these two historical chemists who had such opposite views—both on chemical atomism and on explanation in science—can we say anything interesting about the relationship between the explanatory status of a scientific theory and appropriate criteria for acceptance of the theory? First, we see in Duhem's case that it is perfectly possible to admit that a theory is partially explanatory (i.e., explanatory of a particular set of phenomena) but not accept the theory on account of its inability to answer further questions. This is not very surprising. It is easy to admit, for example, that caloric provides a somewhat satisfactory explanation for many phenomena related to heat while not accepting the caloric theory of heat. Our reluctance to accept the caloric theory comes from the fact that there are why-questions about heat that this theory cannot answer. There is some kind of threshold here; for us to accept a theory and to invest time in researching it further, it must be explanatory enough.
There may, perhaps, be something interesting we can say about this threshold. Our standard for how high the bar must be set will be relative to the amount of time and effort that has gone into attempting to fill out the explanation that the theory gives. When a theory is first proposed, we tend to be more forgiving of the things that it cannot yet explain or the aspects of the theory that are less than satisfying in an explanatory sense. Take Berzelius, for example. Even though he was reluctant to accept Dalton's atomism wholeheartedly, he still thought it a worthwhile research project to investigate how chemical combination of atoms might occur (see Rocke Reference Rocke1984, 66–78). In contrast, Duhem, working as a chemist nearly a century after Dalton, found it difficult to forgive chemical atomism for the important phenomena that it had not yet succeeded in explaining. He was frustrated with the pseudoexplanations of chemical combination and the vague concept of atomicity that offered nothing more than the nonatomic concept of valency. He believed that since such explanations had not been advanced since the time of Dalton, there was not much reason to believe that they would be forthcoming in the future.
I have attempted to diagnose and argue against a fundamental problem in Needham's position: Needham requires perfection of an explanation. I have argued that this is too high a standard; explanation should be required to increase understanding, not grant complete understanding or answers to all questions. Once we allow for degrees of explanation, it is possible to see the explanatory worth of Dalton's theory. It is also much easier to understand how Duhem can acknowledge some explanatory worth in atomism while still rejecting it.
In conclusion, my position is that it was Dalton's acceptance of his atomic hypothesis, and not his claim that it is explanatory, that was somewhat naive. Dalton did, in my opinion, have a particularly low threshold for theory acceptance. There were enough problems and unresolved details in his chemical atomism that would have probably given me pause to accept it (at least wholeheartedly) if I were one of his contemporaries. However, I would not have called it nonexplanatory.
