When the First World War commenced, both Britain and France were able to meet much of the demand for explosives and warfare gases, but were heavily dependent on German dyes and pharmaceutical products. Even with the revised British patent law of 1908 and its working clause requiring foreign owners of British patents to work their patents in Britain or have the patents revoked, the German companies were reluctant to meet this legal requirement.
When the Allies called on the United States to supplement their own supplies of explosives, warfare gases and smokeless powders to meet the ever-expanding demands of the battlefield as the war escalated, US companies had the knowledge, expertise and production capacity to respond. However, like Britain and France, the US was heavily dependent on German synthetic dyes and pharmaceuticals for its own consumption. The arrival of the German U-boat Deutschland in Baltimore in July 1916 (some nine months before the US entered the war), having survived the Allied blockade of the North Atlantic, was a symbolic act; it brought not confidential documents or a diplomatic envoy but supplies of synthetic dyes. These were the first German supplies of dyes since March 1915, though some pharmaceutical supplies (including Salvarsan 606, the arsenical chemotherapeutic agent development by Paul Ehrlich to fight syphilis, and novocaine) did reach the US during 1916. This event confirmed Germany's desperation to continue trading with the US (after trade with the Allies was suspended), but more importantly showed the weakness of the American synthetic organic chemicals industry, which, with the flourishing German trade, had had little or no reason to develop on a scale to sustain its own internal requirements.
Kathryn Steen's book plots the course of events and actions taken in the United States (by both the government and chemical companies) in response to this threat to its economy and national security whereby synthetic organic chemicals became part of the US political economy in which economic and legal policies towards the sector interacted with political principles. How could wartime restrictions on the supply of these important chemical products be overcome, but also, and more crucially for the future, what actions would enable the extant embryonic industry to reach a more mature state that would allow it to compete with German companies in the post-war period?
In October 1917 Congress approved the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) and this legislation led to the establishment of a number of agencies with which to control German property, both German subsidiary companies operating in the US and German-owned intellectual property (mainly in the form of patents). These agencies included the War Trade Board, with its focus on controlling German imports; the Office of Alien Property, to prevent German property from benefiting Germany financially; and the Federal Trade Commission, with responsibility for licensing German-owned patents to US chemical companies. While each agency had a clear remit, there were the inevitable clashes over responsibility and whether actions taken were effective and in the best interest of the industry and the country. Decisions were frequently challenged by US government departments, including the Department of War, the Department of State and the Department of Justice; accusations were often made about favouring particular US chemical companies and about whether some actions were even legal.
The Armistice in Europe in November 1918 did not end the US government's attempts to secure a viable synthetic organic chemicals sector. Although the US never signed the Versailles Treaty and Congress did not declare the war over until 1921, it had hoped to gain some rewards alongside Britain and France after peace was declared. However, the US did not gain any stocks of German dyes as part of the Brussels Agreement because of the conflicting interests of the federal authorities, and also had to rely on British and French reports about the state of German production plants. Very few German plants were badly damaged during the war and so the US had every reason to be concerned about German competition in the post-war period. There was unease about relying solely on tariffs because of pressure from American textile manufacturers, and the US looked towards Britain for other protectionist strategies until their synthetic organic chemicals industry was able to compete with their German counterparts.
Steen raises the intriguing question of how much the First World War was a catalyst for the growth of the US synthetic organic chemicals industry. While her book provides an in-depth analysis of events between 1910 and 1930 that set the course of the industry's viability, a more nuanced conclusion is only possible by considering how the various strategies played out well into the 1930s and probably up to the beginning of the Second World War. In this period other important political and economic factors have a bearing on the outcome: there is the competition from IG Farben and Imperial Chemical Industries, and the influence of academia as its research function gains added momentum alongside the supply of chemists and chemical engineers. Further studies embracing these factors will help us answer the original question Steen poses.
This book is very well researched; Steen has assembled a considerable body of meticulous research that focuses on the many diverse organizations (both government and private-sector) while unravelling the many complex issues that connected them. This detailed and diverse information has been converted into a very readable narrative. The chapter themes work well and the various subsections help the reader to follow the actions across all those involved in the development of the American synthetic chemicals industry over the period from 1910 to 1930. This is an excellent book and is thoroughly recommended, not just to those with an interest in the history of science, but also to those with an interest in business and economic history and the role of chemical commodities in the US political economy.
