Two major themes have dominated A. John Simmons's philosophical career. He has developed powerful objections to received accounts of political obligation and emphasized the importance of actual consent and other historical considerations in theorizing states’ claims to political legitimacy. Relatedly, he has also argued for a broadly Lockean understanding of political legitimacy and property rights. In Boundaries of Authority, these two themes are skillfully woven together to support and develop a comprehensive moral assessment of states’ claims to rights over territory. The resulting account surely represents the most sophisticated articulation available of an individualist and voluntarist Lockean view of territorial rights.
As its title suggests, this book is not primarily concerned with the legitimacy of political authority or even with the justification of territorial political rule in general. Rather, the chief puzzle that motivates the book is how particular states can come to have rights over particular portions of land, sea, air, and natural resources. This “boundary problem” (59)—the theoretical desideratum of drawing the boundaries of each state's political authority and territorial sovereignty in the right places—arises from the territorial aspect of the “particularity requirement” that Simmons has long emphasized any complete theory of political legitimacy must meet (60–61). A Lockean theory, Simmons urges, is able to solve this boundary problem where “functionalist” and “structuralist” theories cannot (60).
Modern states claim three main kinds of territorial rights: a right to exclusive jurisdiction over a geographical area, a right to exclusively control resources within that area, and a right to exclusively control the movement of persons and materials over the boundaries of that area. Among these, the core right is the right to territorial jurisdiction. On Simmons's Lockean view of legitimate territorial jurisdiction, a state's particular territory properly grows out of the free choices of its individual members. When individuals consent to establish or join a political society, they not only agree to comply with that state's validly enacted law. They also implicitly agree that the land over which they have natural ownership rights will come under the exclusive legal jurisdiction of that state. A further implicit agreement is not to alienate any land thus incorporated into the state's territory, except on the condition that subsequent owners will also be bound to accept the state's jurisdiction over the land.
To put this point another way, individuals who willingly accept subjection to a particular state agree to transfer to the state in question some of the incidents of their natural rights as persons and as landowners. By being the recipient of these rights transfers from particular individuals with holdings in particular areas of land, a state acquires jurisdictional rights over a particular geographical area. On this view, then, a state's legitimate territory is a “patchwork composition” formed by voluntary accretion from “the individual holdings of the state's members,” who have in turn willingly subjected themselves to that state's political authority (117).
It is easy to see how an account of states’ rights to control resources and immigration flows from this basic conception of states’ rights to territorial jurisdiction as derivative from their respective members’ individual and collective natural property rights. A full property owner is entitled to control the uses to which her holdings are put. Since, for Simmons, a state's legitimate territory is constructed from land and resources over which its members once had ownership rights, a state's right to control resources within its territory can be understood simply as deriving from these rights. A state's right to control immigration to its territory is similarly explained by reference to the fact that the territory was constructed from its members’ rightful landholdings. As Simmons puts it, “A state … is entitled to fence, control, and exclude in the same ways that an individual landowner is” (240).
Simmons's theory has radically revisionist implications for the territorial claims of modern states. As he notes, “No modern state governs only consenting members, nor has any modern state's claimed territory been composed solely from the holdings of its consenting members” (121). If we follow Simmons's Lockean theory, we should then conclude that no existing state has legitimate jurisdiction over the whole of its claimed territory, and by extension that no state is fully entitled to control resources within its territory nor to regulate immigration into its territory.
In fact, Simmons's radicalism goes even further: for two reasons, it is difficult to imagine that any state would even approach rightfully having territorial rights in the foreseeable future. First, he holds that states cannot legitimize their jurisdiction over their claimed territories by reforming their institutions, laws, and policies to better discharge morally essential functions, to remove structural injustices, or to improve the well-being of their citizens or of humanity at large. These functional or structural virtues of states are utterly insufficient for legitimate territorial rule if states continue to wrongfully subject unwilling persons and their natural property holdings to their authority.
Second, Simmons rejects the widely held view that rectificatory claims for historical rights violations are normally superseded as circumstances change with the passage of time. For Simmons, when individuals’ property rights are violated by the territorial expansionism of states—even when these violations occurred in the distant past—their claims to rectification persist through time and can be inherited down the generations. In this way, the innumerable wrongs that have marred the long history of state formation have continuing moral effects that massively constrain the kinds of fundamental political arrangements that currently existing individuals and groups can legitimately establish and maintain.
The enormous distance between Simmons's theory of territorial rights—both ideal and nonideal—and not only existing political arrangements but also familiar aspirations for political reform should prompt further scrutiny of the grounds for his radical conclusions. Notably, Simmons's account of territorial rights rests on two groups of claims that are themselves highly controversial. Most obviously, many will disagree that individuals’ actual consent is necessary for their legitimate subjection to political rule. The moral necessity of establishing political institutions that will protect the fundamental interests of each and secure fair terms to regulate the social interactions in which we are inescapably enmeshed casts doubt on political voluntarism.
Equally controversial are Simmons's claims about strong natural rights to full ownership in land. Many will dispute that individuals can acquire (conclusive) property rights in land prior to the establishment of political institutions by mixing their labor with that land, that the (structurally just) regulation of such natural property in land by political authorities absent the owners’ consent is a rights violation, and that such violations generate entitlements to rectification that persist through the ages. If we think that property rights are institutional devices to facilitate a just distribution of the resources that individuals need to pursue their plans and purposes, we may doubt that rights to property in land can play the role that Simmons's theory of territory needs them to.
Even if its foundations are controversial, it might be thought that Simmons's Lockean account of territorial rights is the only one with the theoretical resources to solve the boundary problem. Yet it is unclear that the task of particularizing and individuating territorial jurisdictions presents an intractable problem for so-called Kantian functionalism, which Simmons takes as the main rival to his approach. Of course, purely functionalist or structuralist conditions on legitimate political authority cannot solve this problem, since they are requirements on the substantive ordering of political arrangements over their proper jurisdiction, whatever that might be. But there seems to be no reason why an essentially functionalist or structuralist account of the legitimacy of a territorial state cannot be supplemented by further principles that address the boundary question without fully embracing Simmons's Lockean approach.
